Intelligence and national security policymaking on Iraq

List of tables and figures Acknowledgements Contributors 1. Introduction: policy-making and intelligence on Iraq – James P. Pfiffner and Mark Phythian Part I: Intellectual antecedents of the Iraq War 2. The neoconservative roots of the war in Iraq – John Dumbrell 3. The origins of the British decision to go to war: Tony Blair, humanitarian intervention and the ‘New Doctrine of the International Community’ – Jim Whitman Part II: The public case for war 4. Did President Bush mislead the country in his arguments for war with Iraq? – James P. Pfiffner 5. The British road to war: decision-making, intelligence and the case for war in Iraq – Mark Phythian 6. Australian use of intelligence and the case for war in Iraq – Rodney Tiffen 7. The Iraq War and the management of American public opinion – John Mueller Part III: Intelligence failure 8. Intelligence collection and analysis on Iraq: issues for the intelligence community – Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donegan, and Aris Pappas 9. The politics and psychology of intelligence and intelligence reform – Robert Jervis 10. Congress, the Iraq War, and the failures of intelligence oversight – Loch K. Johnson 11. Flawed intelligence, limited oversight: official inquiries into pre-war UK intelligence on Iraq – Mark Phythian Part IV: Policy failure 12. Decision-making, intelligence, and the Iraq War – James P. Pfiffner 13. Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq – Paul R. Pillar Part V: Excerpts from key speeches and documents concerning the war Appendix A: Excerpts from key U.S. speeches before the war in Iraq Appendix B: Excerpts from key UK speeches and documents before the war in Iraq Appendix C: October 2002 National Intelligence estimate: key judgments (excerpts) Appendix D: Excerpts from post-war U.S. investigations Appendix E: Letter to George Tenet from U.S. intelligence professionals, 28 April 2007