Frontiers of Globalization Research

Ino Rossi

Editor

Frontiers of Globalization Research:

Theoretical and Methodological Approaches

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Preface

Every generation has its own social, economic, or political challenges, and globalization is a powerful combination of all three. This is one topic that inevitably pops up in public media as well as in daily conversations, and one that we find difficult to discuss with clarity and equanimity. This volume amply demonstrates that even academic discourse is far from having reached a consensual understanding on foundational issues regarding the study of globalization. This is to be expected given the complexity of the issues in question and the richness of our disciplinary traditions. The hope is that the diversity of perspectives discussed here will enable the reader to appreciate the strength and complementarity of alternative points of view and research strategies.

We must be grateful to the contributors to this volume for having found time in the midst of their "globalizing" schedules to offer us a primer of first-hand research and/or a re-examination of the theoretical and methodological principles that have guided their globalization journey. The list of contributors has been augmented by leaps and bounds, as a result of consultations and debates. Repeated exchanges and revisions have produced a set of papers that are purposefully focused on theoretical and methodological issues that scholars face in globalization research. My gratitude goes to the "early" contributors for having patiently waited for the "late" deliverers and newcomers: I have continued to seek insightful and provocative contributors until the very end as the unfolding of the process has generated new theoretical and methodological issues.

There are many other people whom I must thank. I was unsuccessful in my repeated attempts to obtain an essay or a commentary from a representative of the World Polity perspective. However, John Boli has been helpful with comments, especially in the early stages of this project. Unfortunately, his administrative and publishing commitments have prevented him from writing a full-fledged essay. The patient and supporting series editor, Teresa Krauss, of Springer, and her competent editorial staff have provided competent support for the completion of this project. My "enduring" graduate assistants, Veronica Ticas and Christian Francis Tran, have helped me greatly in editorial matters, and some of my colleagues have occasionally "volunteered" to listen to my probing on globalization matters. Neither they nor my son, Paul, who kept wondering whether this book would ever make it to the press, have been told about my numerous hours spent in front of the PC to think through a lot of difficult issues. My wife Irene has assisted me over the years through my bouts with French structuralism, dialectic sociology, and disaster studies, and currently, globalization. Not only my perseverance, but also my style and

editorial chores have benefited a great deal from her supportive understanding and skills.

With the realization that the globalization debate is still in its early stage, I hope that this contributed volume will facilitate a multiperspective and a cross-disciplinary discourse on a complex process with all its ramifications and potential trajectories. One hopes also that the imbalances and tensions of the globalization process that have been documented in this volume will foster a genuine dialogue among all its protagonists, winners and losers alike.

Saint John's University Ino Rossi
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Introduction
Rationale of the Volume and Thematics of the Contributions

Ino Rossi

Genesis and Rationale of This Volume

Globalization has attracted the attention of the social sciences since the early 1980s. Given the recency of the topic, it is no wonder that there are plenty of controversies on what "globalization" means, on the theoretical and methodological approaches for studying it, and on the diagnoses and solutions of problems attributed to globalization. This book focuses on the formulation and discussion of alternative definitions, modes of theorizing, and research methodologies in the field of globalization.

The intellectual itinerary that led to this book began with the organization of a series of sessions on theoretical approaches to globalization: first, on the occasion of the 2002 International Conference on Globalization that was promoted by the late Richard Harvey Brown of the University of Maryland, then on the occasion of the 2003 and 2004 meetings of the Eastern Sociological Society. The interest in those sessions and the debates that they generated prompted me to pursue the idea of a book that would systematically examine the theoretical bases of the globalization discourse and make explicit as much as possible the strategies for its study: these were the two explicit indications I gave to the prospective contributors to the book. I did, however, contact a larger group than the attendees to the three mentioned conferences in an effort to secure a representation of as many approaches to globalization as possible. Three years of correspondence, discussions, exchanges, and revisions of papers should assure the reader that this book is not a haphazard collection of conference papers loosely related to each other.

On the contrary, these papers ought to be approached as systematic formulations, often interactively produced, of alternative approaches to the study of globalization. Most of the contributors are sociologists, but the contributions of Jonathan Friedman (an anthropologist), Raymond Grew (an historian), and James Rosenau (international relations) bring a touch of interdisciplinarity. Obviously, an extensive representation of all social sciences could not be compacted in a single volume.

The essays are organized in three parts: in the first part there are theoretical papers on globalization, in general, and on cultural globalization, in particular; the chapters of Part 2 deal with theoretical and methodological issues in the areas of economic and political globalization; the chapters of Part 3 discuss research strategies and methodological issues encountered in the empirical study of globalization. The chapters were placed in different sections of the book on the basis of their major emphasis, although most of them contain elements relevant to more than one section of the book. When I introduce the chapters of one section, I utilize elements of chapters located in other sections when they are relevant to the theme of the section. Hopefully, this crossreferencing will help the reader to use this volume, not in a piecemeal fashion, but as an integrated totality. A detailed index will further enhance the usefulness of this book as a systematic introduction to central issues in the field of globalization.

The introduction to Part 1 is a bit more extensive not only because the chapters deal with foundational issues, but also because theoretical elements from chapters located in other sections of the book had to be brought into the systematic discussion.

Part 1: Theoretical Perspectives

Part 1 deals with conceptualizations, definitions, and frameworks for the analysis of globalization.

In the first essay, "Globalization as an Historical and Dialectical Process," I present a framework that analyzes globalization as a multifaceted and conflictual process. The historical, conflictual, macro- and microperspectives on globalization are integrated into one comprehensive framework for the study of technological, cultural, political, and economic processes and their interrelationship. The essay begins with the Weberian conception of societal order as consisting of cultural, political, and economic principles of social organization. The prevailing principle of social organization (cultural or political or economic) determines the type of society with which we are dealing (respectively, a prevalently cultural, prevalently political, or prevalently economic society). These societal types are analytic models and not evolutionary stages through which every society must evolve. I claim that the dominant principle of social organization tells us also whether transsocietal ties (globalization) are respectively mostly cultural or political or economic in nature. The most recent type of globalization is economic globalization in the form of capitalist globalization that

has produced commercial, industrial, and financial variations of capitalism, all of them based on finance capital.

In analyzing primarily Western types of societies I focus on a threefold level of societal concerns (see Table 1.3): (a) the local level of ethnic/religious/community concerns; (b) the level of national concerns (national heritage, national sovereignty, national identity, nationalism); (c) the level of international concerns regarding mostly issues of international economy. The conflictuality of globalization derives from two main structural factors: (a) conflicts or adaptive interactions among the cultural, political, and economic principles of social organization within each one of the three levels of societal concerns (local, national, international) (b) conflicts among the local, national, and international societal concerns. These conflicts occur in each society, but they are greatly augmented at the level of cross-national transactions by the fact that different societies are at different levels of socioeconomic development. For some nations cultural/religious issues are a priority, for other societies a nationalistic image and autonomous political regime, and for other societies global economic competitiveness.

The analytic models I developed are helpful for the analysis not only of macro issues, but also for understanding the formation of psychocultural identity in a globalizing world. Finally, the interaction between agency and structure (cultural, political, economic structures) within nations and cross-nations is singled out as a resource mechanism to negotiate conflicts and forge an intercivilizational path for a viable global future. The multidimensional and dialectic models presented in this essay can serve as a platform to interlink the perspectives and various levels of analysis contained in the contributors' papers.

The other chapters of Part 1 deal with the micro (Knorr Cetina), systemic (Friedman, Sklair), and supersystemic (*eigenstructures* of Stichweh) perspectives on globalization as well as with the conceptualization of globalization as a set of self-organizing complex systems (Urry).

A Major Bone of Contention Throughout These Papers Is the Definition of What Is "Global"

I begin from conceptualizations that use traditional categories of analysis. Saskia Sassen (see her essay in Part 3) argues that global spatialities and temporalities are partially overlapping and inserted and interacting with national relations. Privatized intermediary institutional arrangements for handling cross-border operations evolve into an institutional world that parallels the state and denationalizes its functions.

James N. Rosenau also uses traditional tools of analysis, but he starts from a totally different premise: "All the dimensions of globalization are sustained by individuals at the microlevel as well as by diverse organizations at the macrolevel." Rosenau defines the central task of globalization theory as one of developing propositions that link microinteraction (among individual actors) and macrointeractions (among states and organizations). The overall assumption is that globalization does not entail any new specific process beyond the actions and

interactions of individuals, states, and organizations. In contrast to Sassen's position, he seems to shy away from the notion of overlapping, partially intersecting, imbricating relationships between the micro- and macroorders of interaction.

In "Microglobalization" Karin Knorr Cetina argues that globalization is based upon structures of connectivity and integration that are global in scope, but microsociological in character. With the notion of microglobalization Knorr Cetina suggests that the texture of a global world becomes articulated through microstructural patterns that develop in the shadow of (and perhaps liberated from) national and local institutional patterns. Insofar as they are "liberated from national and local patterns," the "fields of practice that stretch across all time zones" seem to be "emergent" realities. Knorr Cetina hastens to clarify that the "emergent" reality is *sui generis*, because following are the characteristics of global microstructures: they are "light," institutionally speaking; they appear to facilitate a certain non-Weberian effectiveness; they cannot simply be reduced to networks; and they tend to be temporal structures because the systems of microglobal structures exhibit "flow characteristics." All these characteristics make them unpredictable, playful, temporal, self-organizing, and, even, intertwined with chaos (here Knorr Cetina refers to Urry's position). The new terrorism is a major exemplifying case of a global microstructure, and so are some global financial markets, for example, the foreign exchange market. The analysis of microglobalization helps to collect and assess empirical evidence for the architecture of a world society. Knorr Cetina suggests also that time mechanisms and temporal or sequential complexity substitute for the loss of spatially differentiated stability and articulation in global systems.

One may raise the question of how temporal, flowing, and underinstitutionalized microglobal structures can be the building blocks of the global architecture of the world. I discuss the implications of this question for global theorizing in my last essay.

Interestingly enough, Sassen speaks of a semi-privatized institutional world that is parallel to the local and national. For Sassen the global is only partial, because it is partially embedded in the national, and the latter is becoming more and more denationalized. For Knorr Cetina the global is parallel to the national as an emerging pattern of interaction, however fluid and temporal it may be. A logical question to be raised is how to resolve the controversy over the "emerging and parallel" versus "the partial and embedded" notion of the global when compared with Roseau's assumption that all dimensions of globalization are sustained by interactions among individuals (microinteraction) and interaction among organizations and states.

Rudolf Stichweh provides a solution to this dilemma. In his chapter "Structure Formation in World Society: The *Eigenstructures* of World Society and the Regional Cultures of the World," Stichweh starts his analysis from the notion of society as based on communication and from the conditions of access and exclusion from communication. Co-existence of societies and civilizations is an old phenomenon, but since the 15th century the European–Atlantic system has incorporated the rest of the world in one system. The unity of the world has not been

accomplished by reducing cultural differences (McDonaldization thesis) or by incorporating—and preserving—cultural differences within the world system (Einsenstadt's theory of multiple modernities). Both of these positions entail continuity with previous societies.

Stichweh utilizes Parsonian and Luhmanian ideas when he suggests that intercivilizational encounters occur not via clashes (Huntington), but via functional differentiation. Stichweh discusses many "functional systems" of modern society: world economy, world science, world law, world literature, education, mass media, sport, tourism, and so on. These structures differentiate a certain functional aspect of communication and produce a global semantics. Modern *eigenstructures* and *eigencultures* consist of generalized symbols that are based on the binary code of communication; the latter is disembedded from the material content of social relations. Moreover, these differentiated functional subsystems of communication are based on principles of functioning that are multiple, flexible, and transcend family, geographical, and cultural connections and imply transfers of personnel and knowledge. For all these reasons these symbolic systems overcome regional and cultural boundaries and penetrate world's regions with a global semantics. Other examples of *eigenstructures* are formal organizations, networks, epistemic communities, world events, and world city markets.

These structural forms are producers of diversity because they impose new structures over local and national structures, whereas the local is not necessarily a guarantor of diversity. The new social and cultural patterns do not replace preexistent cultural diversity, but they overlay old structures that are incorporated through a higher form of integration. It is not a question of a substitutive, but of a cumulative and multilevel model of structure, where the new structures (*eigenstructures*) reduce the informational relevance and frequency of activation of the old structures without extinguishing them. Some of the structures of world society go back to antiquity and Medieval Europe; these old structures interact with and make possible world society to the extent to which the old structures are themselves articulated and compatible with the world system.

Stichweh's heavy reliance on the disembeddedness of the symbolic systems of communication is consistent with the discussion on the "disembedded" nature of digital communication in the concluding essay. Moreover, Stichweh's position on the cumulative nature of *eigencultures* seems to be consistent with the findings of cross-national world value surveys that document the persistence in developing societies of traditional values and national values together with the gradual embrace of modern and postmodern values (see Inglehart's survey findings quoted in Rossi's essay on the dialectics of globalization).

Our theoretical itinerary has so far revealed differences that can be (partially) related to different starting points of analysis. Whereas Knorr Cetina and Stichweh focus on culture and digital communication, Sassen argues that the processes of economic globalization shape the cultural, political, and "subjective" dimensions of globalization. These different starting points of analysis lead to different definitions of global processes; if the distinctive characteristic of globalization lies in economic processes, we can understand why Sassen states

that the (unexplained) spatialities and temporalities of the global, that are produced by economic globalization, are not "emergent", but partially "imbricated" (overlapping and interacting) with the national; in other words, they are a matter of political economy, and the global is only a partial, although strategically important, set of relations. After all, IGOs such as the World Bank and IMF are intergovernmental organizations that are imbricated with the functions of national governments.

Similarly, if the starting point of analysis is interaction in the behaviorist sense, it follows that global transactions are sustained by and inseparable from the actions of individual, state, and corporate actors (Rosenau). On the other hand, if we focus on transnational interactions that are based on and sustained by the digital media of communication, the specificity of globalization consists of emerging structures of communication and interaction (different from local and national processes, Knorr Cetina and Stichweh). However, for Knorr Cetina global structures of interactivity are parallel (and flexible and horizontal) to national and local groups, whereas for Stichweh they are superimposed on local and traditional structures; the latter ones are subsumed by a higher informational order without being eliminated. Neither Knorr Cetina nor Stichweh is preoccupied with coordinating the national with the global level of analysis inasmuch as the latter is an emerging order, whereas this is a central task for Saskia Sassen.

One wonders how Knorr Cetina and Stichweh would deal with the issue of denationalization of sociocultural and political domains that is central in Sassen's analysis. Yet, Leslie Sklair will likely find Sassen's approach state-centric, and hence not effective for the analysis of globalization as Sklair conceptualizes it.

The next question to be examined is: what are the relationships among microglobal interactional structures? Some authors invoke the notion of system to interrelate the cultural, economic, and political dimensions of the global (Sklair); Friedman also uses the notion of system, but in a metaempirical and relational sense; others use the notion of flows (Knorr Cetina) and of self-regulating and co-evolving systems (Urry).

Leslie Sklair in "A Transnational Framework for Theory and Research in the Study of Globalization" offers a systematizing framework of the field of globalization and opens up the discussion of the cultural, economic, and political impact of globalization. He argues that much of the confusion in the literature is due to the failure to distinguish between generic globalization and its historical forms, actual or potential. He defines "generic globalization" in terms of the electronic revolution, the subsequent creation of transnational social spaces, and the emergence of transnational cosmopolitanism.

The paper distinguishes analytically among three competing approaches that have dominated theory and research in the study of globalization, namely internationalist (state-centrist), transnationalist (globalization as a contested world-historical project with capitalist and alternative forms), and globalist

(capitalist globalization as a more or less completed and irreversible neoliberal capitalist project).

The internationalist (state-centrist) approach is rejected on the grounds of theoretical redundancy and empirical inadequacy. The globalist approach is also rejected for its failure to theorize correctly the role of the state and the interstate system in sustaining the hegemony of capitalist globalization. The transnational approach is perceived to be the most fruitful, and it is based on the concept of transnational practices in the spheres of economics, politics, and culture-ideology. The transnational research strategy focuses on the characteristic institutional forms of transnational practices in these three spheres (major TNCs, the transnational capitalist class, and the culture-ideology of consumerism, respectively). Sklair argues that the transnationalist approach opens up conceptual and substantive paths for theorizing and researching alternative globalizations. Capitalist globalization cannot succeed in the longterm because it cannot resolve two central crises, those of class polarization and ecological unsustainability on a global scale. This makes the TNCs, the transnational capitalist class and the culture-ideology of consumerism wideopen to the attacks of an ever-widening antiglobalization movement that increasingly takes on anticapitalist forms.

Sklair explores one path out of capitalism through the connections among capitalist globalization (where we are), what can be termed co-operative democracy (a transitional form of society), socialist globalization (where we should be heading), and what can be termed the culture-ideology of universal human rights. Such a transformation could be achieved by the gradual elimination of the culture-ideology of consumerism and its replacement with a culture-ideology of human rights. This means, briefly, that instead of our possessions being the main focus of our cultures and the basis of our values, our lives should be lived with regard to a universally agreed system of human rights and the responsibilities to others that these rights entail. This does not imply that we should stop consuming. What it implies is that we should evaluate our consumption in terms of our rights and responsibilities. For this project to have any chance of success in the long run it will be necessary to experiment theoretically and practically with the electronic revolution, transnational social spaces, and transnational cosmopolitanism. The chapter concludes with an example of a research framework that links theory and substantive issues in the field of architecture and the built environment. His unit of analysis (transnational practices) is applied to the study of the capitalist global system in economic (TNCs), political (TCC or transnational capitalist class), and cultural institutions (consumerism). Sklair generates working hypotheses related to seven major debates surrounding capitalist globalization and his essay ends with an outline of a systematic research framework.

Douglas Kellner in his chapter placed in Part 2: “Globalization, Terrorism, and Democracy: 9/11 and Its Aftermath” wants to overcome dichotomizing pro versus con discourses and proposes a critical theory of globalization that distinguishes between progressive and emancipatory features, and oppressive and negative attributes of globalization. Kellner argues that the September 11 terrorist attacks

and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate contradictions and ambiguities embedded in globalization that demand critical and dialectical perspectives. Showing the ways that globalization and a networked society were involved in the 9/11 events and subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, he argues that the terrorrist attacks and the ensuing Terror War show contradictions in the nature of globalization; both positive and negative features of globalization are evident, and the free and open society, the Internet, and global flow of people, ideas, and commodities are full of ambiguities: they allow terror and destruction, commerce, and democratization.

Kellner states that

> Worldwide terrorism is threatening in part because globalization relentlessly divides the world into have and have-nots, promotes conflicts and competition, and fuels long simmering hatreds and grievances, as well as bringing people together, creating new relations and interactions, and new hybridities. This is the objective ambiguity of globalization that both brings people together and brings them into conflict, that creates social interaction and inclusion, as well as hostilities and exclusions, and that potentially tears regions and the world apart while attempting to pull things together. …
>
> Kellner's emphasis on the contradictions and ambiguities of globalization is consistent with the premises of my dialectical approach that is based on the many conflicts of globalization.

Other authors appear not to find too convincing, or relevant or, perhaps, too old-fashioned, the notion of dialectics and they readily discard the notion of "system" to opt for a more open-ended view of globalization as a set of flows and self-organizing and co-evolving systems.

Urry's chapter, "Globalization and Complexity" breaks away drastically from traditional social science categories by taking inspiration from chaos theory. He starts from the notion that new technologies produce global times and dematerialize distances between places and people. He systematizes the discourses so far emerged on globalization on the basis of five concepts (structure, flow, ideology, performance, and complexity) to opt for the last one. Taking inspiration from complexity sciences, he conceptualizes globalization as a "series of co-evolving self-organizing systems." The dynamics of these self-organizing systems is best understood not via structure and agency, micro–macro, system-world or life-world or recurrence or cause–effect relationships, and this is a pretty clear wholesale dismissal of the positions we have discussed so far. Co-evolving and self-organizing systems are transformed through iterations (large-scale, nonlinear and branching-off transformations) without necessarily implying an agency. The self-organizing systems are connected by complex relationality, continuous changes, and sudden new structures; they are in a state of orderly disorder, irreversibly evolve via positive and negative feedback with the environment, and co-evolve with agents and the environment. Such global systems are characterized by unpredictability and irreversibility; they lack finalized equilibrium or order. Iterative patterns of social ordering can heighten overall global disorder. Complexity theory is drawn upon to show how global systems operate on the

"edge of chaos." *Empire* by Hardt and Negri (2000) describes well the imperial sovereignty of the flexible and systemic structure of the single logic governing the world without governance. *Empire*, however, does not explain the internal dynamic, and especially, its operation in conditions of disequilibrium. For Urry, *Empire* is an "attractor" in the sense that societies are attracted to and compete with each other on the world stage. Urry states that "societies as empires develop new practices as systems develop . . ." and take . . . "new shapes moving in and through time space."

At this point, the global has become not only an emergent, but a chaotic and unpredictable self-evolving system: there appears to be some convergence between Urry's notion of globalization and Archer's statement on the "rapid, unregulated, and potentially explosive transformation" brought on by globalization; yet, the two authors start from different theoretical premises.

Against Reifications: Globalization Understood from the Concrete

Adopting a structural-Marxist perspective, Jonathan Friedman advocates a global systemic approach that denies a reified status to the global. In his chapter, "Global Systems, Globalization, and Anthropological Theory," he begins with an historical excursus on anthropological theory where he criticizes the 1970s' focus on institutions and cultural meaning in society, the latter being approached as a closed and self-contained entity. Structural-functionalism, neoevolutionism, and Maoist Marxism equally rejected the notion that the constitution of a society can be explained by something larger than the society in question. The same closed perspective was present in the structural Marxism of that time which focused on the social reproduction of a given society in terms of its internal contradictions (he mentions himself and Maurice Godelier as examples of this approach; for essays by Godelier see *Structural Sociology* (Rossi, 1982) and *The Logic of Culture* (Rossi, 1982a)).

The importance of the global perspective began with Eric Wolf in the 1970s and in the ethnographic practice of some anthropologists, including Friedman himself. The globalization discourse is clear in R. Robertson, A. Appadurai, and U. Hannerz, but it has considerable shortcomings: the global is conceptualized as a culturally autonomous field, as a new phenomenon in history, sometimes considered in evolutionary terms, and studied from an empiricist and behavioral perspective. Friedman sees a sharp difference between this global approach and his own global systemic approach; in the latter, "the global refers to the total social arena within which social life is reproduced, and the global systemic refers to the properties of the complex cycles of global social reproduction, the way in which they constitute local institutional forms, identities, and economic and political cycles of expansion and contraction." In this framework the local is always part of the global, and this does not mean that the local is produced by the global. On the contrary, the global is nothing else than the local on a higher plane. The global is the properties of the systemic processes that connect the world's localities, and this includes their

formation as more or less bounded places. There is no global space floating above the local. The global is a purely structural concept in the sense that local institutions, identities, economies, and cycles of economic and political expansion and contraction are to be understood as an articulation of historically specific sets of practices together with the larger field of forces and conditions of reproduction. The local is understood as one aspect of larger relationships.

The relations constitute the parts, inasmuch as relationships to the whole are immanent in the parts; the latter are generated by the systemic properties of the larger global space; the priority of the whole over the parts is present in Hegel, Marx, and Levi-Strauss's works; for the latter see Rossi (1974, 1983, 1993). Friedman avoids the shortcomings of empiricism, evolutionism, and diffusionism and considers globalization as old as human social organization; in fact, social organization is really explained only when the relations among its constituent components (or its underlying structures) are understood or, in other words, when empirical social structures are apprehended in their logical organization (Rossi, 1983, 1993). This "logical organization" refers to the nonvisible systemic properties among visible (behavioral) relationships such as "expansion and contraction, the formation and demise of center-periphery relations, the cyclical and dialectic relations between cultural identity and global hegemony" (these relationships are analogous to the properties of business cycles). Hence, the notion of "glocal" is a misplaced concreteness, because the "global" is not a place different from the "local"; the global exists only in its local effects; the global is a perspective, an insight into the organization of the local.

I think that Friedman's perspective is analytically sound and effective in explaining global relations, global consciousness, and the emergence of cosmopolitanism. But aren't the cultural and organizational products of the global, for instance, the IGOs, something different from and constraining the local and national? Aren't the microglobal structures of Knorr Cetina referring to an important emergent global dynamics?

For Friedman, internal and external (global) relations have been always there as constitutive forces of social reproduction of a given society, so that globalization is not a new phenomenon. According to Friedman, Sassen understands the importance of the globalization of capital flaws but only for explaining global transformations and not the emergence of the global. Friedman focuses on the historical specificity and the cyclical nature of the new global system characterized, among other things, by the geographical decentralization of economic accumulation, and cultural and political fragmentation; this is a cyclical and recapitulatory system. This systemic perspective renders superfluous a state-centered perspective to analyze globalization; on this point Friedman concurs with Sklair's position. His perspective allows him to offer also engaging critiques of some common conceptualizations of hybridity, "creolization," nation-state, transnationalism, and various other anthropological notions.

Jonathan Friedman discusses the ethnographic implications of his position: culture cannot be approached as an abstraction or a "superorganic". "If the global is not a place, but merely a set of properties that informs and reproduces the local,

field work must deal with the existential and the concrete as much as with cultural objects." In fact, "The local is always an articulation between a specific historical and cultural and localized set of practices and its larger field of forces and conditions of reproduction."

Jonathan Friedman also elaborates on some methodological prescriptions for studying historical cycles of self-reproduction, including a phenomenological insight into processes of structuration and underlying ordering processes.

The discrepancies among the theoretical positions we have discussed may be partially understood by relating them to the empirical (Sassen, Rosenau), phenomenological (Knorr Cetina), systemic (Stichweh), and structural-Marxist perspectives (Friedman). Perhaps the notions of emerging spatiotemporalities that are separate and overlapping (Sassen), or in the shadow of (Knorr Cetina), or superimposed (Stichweh) on the local and national can be accepted as preliminary conceptualizations of the global as the objective relationships that condition the social production of the local (Friedman); but real understanding is achieved only through "structural analysis." For me empirical and structural analyses are two moments of the theorizing of the global.

The caution against the reification of the global is more than an artificial byproduct of a structuralist ploy à la Levi-Strauss. We saw this principle clearly stated by Rosenau and it is a central canon of the globalization perspective even for Martin Albrow.

Martin Albrow's chapter, "Situating Global Social Relations," reports on his London fieldwork in working-class housing and in international phonecalls, where he saw social practices being shaped by specific territories, by the nation-state, and by even larger entities. The social identity of social actors derives from a much wider social order than the village, town, region, or country. Affirmations of identity are made in reference to a frame outside the national territory. The homeless, women, blacks, whites "are located in global social relations." They recognize they have various issues in common and that these issues are the bases for common understandings and collective action. Even their national identity emerges in a global framework. "Nationality is quite essentially a tertiary relation. Tertiary or global relationships (such as identity relations with strangers) are constitutive elements of social practices that do not occur in a national context, but in an open field or flux of cultural, economic, and political relations."

> Albrow reconsiders of older community-based ways of thinking about society where social relations were dichotomized as primary and secondary. We can add a tertiary category to take account of identity relations and their potential global scope, and recast the conceptual scheme into three nonprioritized categories of intimacy, instrumentality, and identity.

Albrow refers to the postmodern emphasis on actor's narratives as a locus of lived experience and identity. This marks a shift in the conceptualization of social relations. The old Chicago school of primary and secondary relations implied spatial and temporal criteria (for instance, physical proximity, face-to-face relationships); for Marx social relations are based on class. With the postmodern emphasis

on identity we have a shift from class, essentialism, and space/time-based social relations to social relations based on intimacy, instrumentality (relations in terms of calculated advantage), and identity (socially ascribed identity independent of spatial and temporal categories). Albrow's redefinition of social relations is an intriguing one, and, certainly, entails a notion of global that is somewhat consistent with Rosenau and Friedman's notions that the local is constituted in global relations.

Conclusion to Part 1

These chapters represent a progression from microstructures to macrostructures, from structures to systems, and from historically cyclical systems to open, unpredictable, and self-organizing systems with a final "return" back to the concrete and to the local. Underlying these analytic differences are the empirical, evolutionist, phenomenological, structuralist (à la Levi-Strauss), and the ethnographic perspectives à la Geertz (Albrow). In this sense the essays of this book provide applications, extensions, and refinements of the large spectrum of socioanthropological theories.

Yet, it is interesting that we have some sort of theoretical triangulation on the notion that the global is concrete and nonreified from three different theoretical perspectives: Rosenau's interactionism, Friedman's structural Marxism, and Geertzian ethnography as applied by Martin Albrow.

We have too often referred to conflicts underlying global trends. Global conflicts are not just cultural and civilizational in nature but they are also economic and political, as we discuss in Part 2 of the book.

Part 2: Economic and Political Processes

Economic Integration, Disintegration, and Uneven Development

The field of economic globalization abounds in controversies. The first two chapters of part two deal with the crucial issue of whether globalization brings a new level of integration to the world or whether it increases economic disparities. We can say that we have greater integration in the sense of increased interaction among the world's nations (Chase-Dunn and Andrew Jorgenson); but on the vital question of whether all nations share equally in the economic benefits produced by increased economic transactions the answer is negative.

Christopher Chase-Dunn and Andrew Jorgenson focus on long-term processes of trade integration in their chapter, "Trajectories of Trade and Investment Globalization," where they discuss the definition and operationalization of various dimensions of global integration: economic, political, and cultural. They distinguish political globalization (or the political discourse about global integration and competition aimed at justifying policies) from structural globalization that they define as an increase in spatial scale (expansion) and in the intensity of political, economic, and cultural interactions. The greater integration and interdependence of the world is presented as an attribute of the whole world-system. Previous research has shown that trade globalization is a cyclical phenomenon with the highest peak

being reached in recent times. Chase-Dunn and Jorgenson in this chapter want to determine whether international capital flows and investments increase with the size of the world economy. The increase of structural integration is measured by the ratio of increase of transnational interactions over intranational interactions. Focusing on trade, they measure the average "open trade" globalization in terms of country ratio of GDP to imports. Chase-Dunn and Jorgenson also discuss measures of political globalization and investment globalization (another measure of economic globalization); the latter is conceptualized as the sum of all international financial transactions (involving claims of ownership and control of debt) over the size of the world economy (the sum total of national GDP). Having discussed the problem of lack of data, they offer further refine-ment of measurements, including various types of investment income. Finally, they analyze the data for the period for which adequate data are available, 1938–1999, and they find that after World War II there has been an upward trend of investment globalization; this has sharply increased since 1970 when regulations over international investments were established together with a deregulation of international monetary arrangements.

In a previous longer version of their papers, Chase-Dunn and Jorgenson had explained the cyclical nature of trade globalization:

> Our research shows that economic globalization is a cycle as well as an upward trend, and so periods of high economic integration in the past have been followed by periods of de-globalization. This shows that the reduction of transportation and communication costs is not the only cause of globalization; the latter is affected also by the institutional structures of global governance associated with the rise and fall of hegemonic core states.

The authors' reference to institutions of global governance recognizes the inseparability of economic and political processes and the avoidance of monocausal economic determinism.

Christopher Chase-Dunn and Andrew Jorgenson provide a well-documented illustration of what Arrighi calls temporal unevenness. Whereas Chase-Dunn focuses on structural integration as measured by increased interaction of trade and investment activities, Giovanni Arrighi focuses on ideological globalization. In his chapter, "Uneven Development and Globalization," he argues that much of what goes under the name of globalization is a reflection of the temporal and spatial unevenness of the processes of capital accumulation on a world scale. "Uneveness" brings to mind the opposite of integration; in fact, for Arrighi temporal unevenness concerns what some observers call long phases of predominant prosperity and predominant depression, and others call global turbulence. Spatial unevenness concerns the distribution and redistribution of prosperity and depression among the world's regions and political jurisdictions. Both kinds of unevenness originate in major clusters of innovations that recurrently restructure the world politically, economically, and socially.

The first part of the chapter deals with temporal unevenness, focusing specifically on financialization and ideological globalization as instruments of competition and class struggle in the global North. Post-World War Two expansion benefited the Third World countries up to the 1970s, because they received high prices for

their commodities and could rely on an abundance of cheap investments. Since 1980 the ideological globalization of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan drastically curtailed cheap capital and corporate taxes and increased interest rates and corporate freedom. The consequence was a worldwide recession with a contraction of demand for commodities and a decrease of cheap investment capital. At the same time, the so-called "development project" of post-World War II had encouraged import substitution within developing countries, but it was substituted in the 1980s and 1990s by the procapitalist or market-friendly strategies of privatization, free trade, and free movement of capital; the latter were promoted by the "Washington consensus." The result was a worldwide recession and a stagnation of low- and middle-income countries: the rate of growth of per capital income of these countries fell from 2.5% from 1960–1979 to 0% from 1980–1998. So much for an increase in structural integration: the key issue is which country is in control of structural integration and which countries benefit or suffer from it.

The second part of the chapter deals with spatial unevenness that focuses on the differential impact of financialization and ideological globalization on the global South and global North. The period of "development project" favored manufacturing over agriculture and the service sector, for productivity reasons; the hope was that industrial convergence would narrow income differences between First and Third World countries. Industrial convergence occurred: whereas in 1960 the proportion of GDP produced by manufacturing in the Third World countries was 74.6% of that of the First World, in 2000 it was 17.1% higher. However, during these 40 years the income gap between the southern and northern hemispheres has remained unchanged: the per capita GNP of Third World countries was 4.5% of that of First World countries in 1960 and 4.6% in 2000. (These measures are weighted by population growth, which is much higher in the newly industrializing countries.) Arrighi argues that these two apparently contradicting trends are consistent with Schumpeter's theory of competition under capitalism and Raymond Vernon's closely related theory of the "product cycle".

In conclusion, it was political globalization that produced the income divide between the northern and southern hemispheres, and political globalization was dictated by the need to reverse the sliding power and prestige of the United States after the two sharp increases in oil prices. The increased interest rate rerouted massive capital toward the U.S. currency, increased the U.S. debt, and denied capital to the developing world. There was an exception: Southeast Asia took advantage of U.S. demand for cheap commodities. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the success of China and India who participate in structural globalization on their own terms. China succeeds on the global scene by substituting inexpensive educated labor for expensive machines and expensive managers as well; inexpensive educated labor is important also for China's research and development. Because of their size and educational capital, China and India can control the conditions of globalization, but not sub-Sahara or Latin America. In the final analysis, the prospect for economic development in the Third World countries is rather gloomy, with the exception of the two major countries of China and India.

Robert Schaeffer's chapter, "Globalization and Disintegration: Substitutionist Technologies and the Disintegration of Global Economic Ties," also focuses on a negative consequence of economic globalization, as the title itself suggests. Schaeffer's approach is grounded in world-system theory and in theories of "agro-industrial development" advanced by environmental scholars (Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson) who have contributed to the "sociology of agriculture" school. He grafts together elements of both schools for two reasons: he thinks that the world-system perspective needs a better appreciation of the role of technology as a force for change, which the sociology of agriculture provides; and, because environmental scholars need a wider understanding of the import of technological change, which the world-system perspective provides. His approach advances the work of agriculture school sociology by applying their theoretical insights about "dematerialization," not only to agricultural resources, but also to mineral resources (oil and metals).

Schaeffer starts from the premise that the emergence of the capitalist world-economy in the 16th century set the stage for an ongoing globalization of economic and political institutions based in Europe. The world economy that emerged experienced fairly long periods of expansion and contraction. Some expansionary periods have been characterized by a tendency to integrate production, trade, investment, and technology around the world. The periods from 1880–1914 and 1970–2000/present have been identified as two such periods, which have been theorized in a diverse literature (not exclusive to world-system theory) as "globalization". But although there has been considerable economic and political integration or globalization in the most recent period, two important technological developments—what I have called "substitutionist" and "dematerialist," after Goodman, Sorj, and Wilkinson—have contributed not to integration, but to a disintegration of long-standing economic ties between core and periphery. *Substitutionist* technologies are those that are used to replace one raw material input with another. *Dematerialist* technologies are those that reduce raw material inputs through conservation, waste reduction, and recycling. Using a theoretical framework derived from world-system theory (particularly the relation between core and periphery) and operational concepts from the sociology of agriculture (particularly dematerialization), this chapter examines the impact that new core technologies have had on peripheral producers of sugar, tropical oils, coffee, copper, gold, and oil. Chief among these technologies are high fructose corn sweeteners, wireless and fiber-optic telecommunications technologies, financial instruments, and energy-saving technologies. Schaeffer argues that new technologies in the core have contributed to a series of problems in the periphery: falling commodity prices, widespread unemployment, declining state revenues, trade deficits, currency devaluations, and growing indebtedness. These developments have resulted in a weakening of economic and political ties between core and periphery.

Schaeffer's approach to globalization differs from that of many scholars because he does not think that global change has a singular, universal social meaning. Instead he argues that global change—like that associated with dematerialist and

substitutionist technologies—has diverse social meanings in different settings; the new agroindustrial technologies wreak different kinds of havoc around the world.

The chapter, then, examines the implications of these developments for theories of globalization and future empirical research. First, it argues that the development of new core technologies will likely accelerate in coming years, contributing to the process of disintegration. Second, it maintains that although some new economic ties will be forged between core and periphery—chiefly by the development of export-manufacturing and tourist industries in the periphery—they will not replace or compensate for lost ties based on primary goods production. Third, the ongoing disintegration of economic ties will contribute to a growing reluctance by the core to invest economically or intervene politically in the periphery. The dissolution of important economic and political ties is a development that Schaeffer characterizes as "indifferent imperialism." Finally, the disintegration of important economic and political relations between core and periphery will bring an end to the core efforts aimed at "modernizing" or to "developing" the periphery, and will close the book on the theories of development that informed them.

In conclusion, although the globalization of investment, production, trade, and technology does provide some benefits to the periphery, the chief beneficiaries of globalization have been countries in the core of the world system. From this perspective, globalization has resulted in a greater integration of businesses and states in the core, but has simultaneously resulted in disintegration and a distancing of the core from the periphery.

Arrighi and Schaeffer's critical assessment of the inability of the South to catch up with the North documents some of the imbalances and conflicts on which Rossi's dialectic view is anchored. These chapters foreshadow Kellner's chapter on the political ambiguities of globalization.

World Governance, Terrorism, and Democracy

The area of political globalization is no less complex and controversial than the area of economic globalization. The chapters of this section deal with two central issues: is global governance possible and are global capitalism and democracy compatible.

In her chapter, "Social Integration, System Integration, and Global Governance," Margaret Archer argues that the penetrative power of economic, political, and cultural changes that go under the label of "globalization" have made all of us "denizens of one world," but not "citizens" of it. Archer makes a distinction between "social integration," that is, social relationships between people—individuals, collectivities, and groups on the global scene—and "system integration," that is, structural relationships of contradiction or complementarity between the parts (institutions) of global society. Archer argues that both are simultaneously dropping to low levels of integration, which represents a formula promotive of rapid, unregulated, and potentially explosive transformation. According to Archer, the state once supplied

legitimate channels and a relatively stable context for institutional operations (system integration), and a relatively secure environment for individual life-projects (social integration); these two types of integration regulated each other within the territorial boundaries of the state that provided, among other things, one national labor market, a national educational system, and citizenship. Ideological conflicts also produced mutual regulation, and so did the interface between state and civil society.

The delinking of economy and culture from the state brought disintegration without introducing a new integrative mechanism.

> . . . The problem raised by globalization concerns guidance and participation. The absence of guiding agencies has been highlighted by sociologists in terms of a 'runaway world' (Giddens) or 'risk society' (Beck). The lack of participatory mechanisms has been captured by the concept of 'exclusion'. If participation means having a say through open channels, then the human family is worse off in these respects and it is becoming more so, although the costs are unequally distributed around the globe. To be affected by globalization, without any ability to exert a counter-effect, is the lot of the vast majority of the world's population. It means that global penetration is negatively related to participation. Not only is it unaccompanied by new forms of government and governance, it systematically disempowers those previous and hard-won agencies for guidance and participation—representative democracy, the institutions of civil society, trade unionism, and citizenship—which, until now, were associated with development; that is, the truly novel consequence of early globalization. To some sociological commentators, all that had seemed solid had melted, into the ether. What globalization left was a gaping void between free-floating global networks and the atomized individual, the two connected only by Internet. . . .

With the delegitimation of the state (and the state becoming less and less important to people) trends toward privatization and the exclusion of large social segments have emerged. Archer also faults neoliberalism that justifies the quest for cheap labor, deal-making with weak states accompanied by corruption, the flight of the technical elite toward industrial countries, the disintegration of indigenous populations, cybercrime, fundamentalist movements, and ethnic tribalism (p. 13).

What are the prospects of a Global Order? We lack a single agency for global governance, but we have the recognition of a finitude of resources and of the dangers of nuclear conflagration. Hence, we all recognize that we have common interests, rights, and obligations (p. 14). The new social movements under the aegis of "global civil society" (my use of the term) offer some hope of countering nationalism, fundamentalism, and disintegrating economic processes. Margaret Archer is, however, rather pessimistic about the possibility of a "cosmopolitan democratic community," because social movements are denied a role in decision making, and the IGOs are at the mercy of national interests.

One may want to raise the following questions: at whose expense was national integration achieved under the state? Was regulation imposed by strong social strata over weaker ones? Archer raises the issue of what the conditions of new

integration might be (namely, the bringing together again of social and systemic integration): it may well be that a common framework of co-existence may emerge from the recognized world's dangers. One wonders whether Archer pays sufficient attention to the declaration of universal human rights, the doctrines of international regimes, the emerging globalism and cosmopolitanism (see the works of J. Meyer and the "World Polity" group), the spreading of democracy, and global civil society as factors that may foster a greater integration of the world. Besides, many authors may question Archer's assumption about the delegitimation and the fading power of the state. (On this issue see the last essay in this volume)

The following chapter is relevant to this question: can a universally acceptable notion of democracy provide a global normative framework?

Douglas Kellner offers a sharp critique on the notion of democracy in capitalistic America and entertains a dialectic and critical discourse that points at certain convergences with the dialectic argument of Rossi's first chapter in this volume. In his chapter, "Globalization, Terrorism, and Democracy," Kellner argues that the terrorist attack of 9/11 and the ensuing war on terrorism show contradictions in the nature of globalization that requires a rigorous critique.

> I want to argue that in order to properly theorize globalization one needs to conceptualize several sets of contradictions generated by globalization's combination of technological revolution and restructuring of capital, which in turn generate tensions between capitalism and democracy, and haves and have nots. Within the world economy, globalization involves the proliferation of the logic of capital, but also the spread of democracy in information, finance, investing, and the diffusion of technology. Globalization is thus a contradictory amalgam of capitalism and democracy, in which the logic of capital and the market system enter more and more arenas of global life, even as democracy spreads and more political regions and spaces of everyday life are being contested by democratic demands and forces. But the overall process is contradictory. Sometimes globalizing forces promote democracy and sometimes inhibit it, thus either equating capitalism and democracy, or simply opposing them, are problematical. . . .
>
> Hence, I would advocate development of a critical theory of globalization that would dialectically appraise its positive and negative features. A critical theory is sharply critical of globalization's oppressive effects, skeptical of legitimating ideological discourse, but also recognizes the centrality of the phenomenon in the present age. It affirms and promotes globalization's progressive features, while criticizing negative ones and noting contradictions and ambiguities. . . . (p. 8)

Kellner stresses the importance of "reflecting on the implications of September 11 and the subsequent Terror War for critical social theory and democratic politics, envisaging a new global movement against terrorism and militarism and for democracy, peace, environmentalism, and social justice."

In conclusion, the chapters of Part 2 point to positive and negative aspects of globalization and in this sense reinforce the premises of a conflictual and dialectic view of globalization. It is also interesting to see in Kellner's work a reference to global civil society; this is a factor that plays an important role in my dialectic framework for the analysis of globalization.

Part 3: Methodological Approaches to the Study of Globalization

This section contains chapters related to the study of globalization as an historical and as a contemporary process.

The perspective on globalization as an historical process was briefly introduced by Rossi's essay at the beginning of the book. Raymond Grew offers a provocative analysis of key issues entailed by an historical analysis of globalization; the issues he raises present serious challenges to the discipline of history as well as to social sciences. Grew argues that the historical study of globalization can make use of established methods and specializations, but it requires asking new questions of the past and integrating empirical research with theory, especially through the use of comparison.

The overwhelming attention paid to theoretical issues by the contributors to this volume is consistent with the key importance given to them by John Boli (in private correspondence), Grew, and myself. Grew clearly states that the central problematics for globalization research is not related to methodology, but to proper theorizing. Globalization forces historians to ask new questions, and to make use of theory and comparison as well. This is a challenging call for the discipline of history that is well known for shying away from theorizing.

Grew suggests that the new questions can lead to the discovery of previously overlooked historical evidence of global relationships; such evidence should be used to produce testable hypotheses about globalization as an historical process. The results can be expected to challenge many current assumptions about globalization and, more important, to raise fundamental questions about established historical interpretations and also about contemporary globalization.

As mentioned, the social science chapters in this volume pay overwhelming attention to theoretical issues, especially to the proper definition of global relations; but theoretical issues inevitably surface even in chapters that deal more directly with questions of methodology. The methodologies referred to or used in this volume reflect the diversity of approaches prevailing in social sciences: statistical methodologies (Chase-Dunn and Sassen), historical analysis (Friedman, Sklair, Arrighi, Archer), ethnographic analysis (Friedman, Albrow), "grounded theory" (Rosenau), phenomenological analysis (Knorr Cetina), dialectic and critical analysis (Rossi and Kellner), as well as structural Marxism (Friedman).

This theoretical and methodological diversification that is typical in the social sciences is reflected in different research strategies in the field of globalization. Some authors, such as Sassen, prefer to start globalization research from the global, whereas Rosenau and Albrow start from the local, and others deny any real distinction between the two (Friedman).

Saskia Sassen's chapter, "Theoretical and Empirical Elements in the Study of Globalization," entails a heavy usage of statistical data, and new analytical concepts.

She begins with an analysis of the interaction and overlapping between the national and the global. Her point of entry is the global and she focuses on three

elements to develop instruments for theorization and empirical specifications of globalization. The empirical instantiations of each of these elements lend themselves to detailed studies and a variety of research techniques, including some developed by anthropologists.

In the first section Sassen develops the question of place as central to many of the circuits constitutive of economic globalization; she conceptualizes the global economic system as partly embedded in specific types of places and partly constituted through highly specialized cross-border circuits. The second section develops some of these issues by focusing on microenvironments with a global span and what this entails for understanding the local. These microenvironments may actually be oriented to other such microenvironments located far away, thereby destabilizing the notion of context that is often imbricated in that of the local and the notion that physical proximity is one of the attributes or markers of the local. The third section concerns the national as instantiated in national states and the consequences of the partial embeddedness of the global in the national described in the first two sections. Her interpretation of the outcome is a partial denationalization of what has been constructed over the last century or more as "national" (in the sense of the national state, not national people) territories and institutional domains.

The headings and subheadings of her chapter provide a good idea of her key analytical concepts: "Place in a Global and Digital Economy," "The Material Practices of Globalization," "Global Cities are Centers for the Servicing and Financing of International Trade, Investment, and Headquarter Operations," "New Geographies of Centrality and of Marginality," "A New Transnational Politics of Place?," "Sited Materialities and Global Span," "A Networked Subeconomy," "The Intersection Between Actual and Digital Space," and "Denationalized State Agendas and Privatized Norm-Making."

Saskia Sassen has been using economic data, but more recently she has expressed the need to incorporate cultural data to carry out adequate globalization research.

James N. Rosenau in a short chapter called "Toward a Viable Theory of Globalization" offers "a grounded-theory" strategy to theorize about globalization starting from the smallest instances of interaction. He starts from the premise that "all the dimensions of globalization are sustained by individuals at the microlevel as well as by diverse organizations at the macrolevel." It follows that the central task of globalization research for him is to ascertain how leaders and officials (macroperspective) and the numerous individuals composing the public (microperspective) influence the other's orientations and behavior. If we assume "that all globalizing actions originate with individuals who may then form aggregate entities that engage in salient behavior, then it clearly follows that an adequate theory of globalization must perforce allow for micro–macro interactions." This position counters the usual attention that is given to the macroperspective.

To carry out his micro–macro perspective Rosenau suggests starting with the question, "Of what is this an instance?" where "this" "refers to anything we observe, whether it is in personal, professional, political, or global life and irrespective of whether it occurs in our immediate environment, is read in print,

or is seen on television. If the instance is seen as indicating that cultural flows can move from west to east as well as east to west, globalization theorists can avoid the trap of assuming that globalization consists of the spread of American values and are thus in a better position to integrate the cultural dimension into their theoretical framework. He concedes that this "journalistic method" does not provide any guidance on how to integrate insights about cultural flows with generalizations and, hence, how to generate micro–macro theoretical propositions. "For this purpose a more encompassing micro–macro perspective is needed, one that combines the fruits of the what-is-this-an-instance question with a scheme that identifies the sources of globalization and generates hypotheses as to how they might operate in a micro–macro context."

Starting from the definition that globalization consists of "all those processes whereby flows expand across national borders, flows of goods, ideas, people, pollution, drugs, crime, disease, technology, and a host of other phenomena that are part and parcel of daily and national life," he identifies eight sources of flows; these sources contain micro- and macrocomponents that aggregate at four levels: micro, macro, micro–macro, macro–macro (see his complex table). The eight sources of flows are: Microelectronic Technologies, Skill Revolution, Organizational Explosion, Bifurcation of Global Structures, Mobility Upheaval, Weakening of Territoriality, States, and Sovereignty, Authority Crises, and Globalization of National Economies. These flows are analyzed through a 32-cell matrix (eight sources, each with four levels of aggregation).

I find that this approach can produce a practical tool for the empirical documentation of interaction flows. However, the linearity of flow sequences is a gratuitous assumption that needs to be demonstrated, because there are actions and counter-actions all along the flows. I also do not see a clear analytical distinction made among the cultural, political, and economic sources of flows and their dialectical interface. On the basis of my framework (discussed in the first essay of this volume), I find it more intellectually cogent to document the dialectical interaction within and among cultural, political, and economic flows at the local/national/international levels of societal interaction. Responding in a personal communication to my essay on the dialectics of globalization, Rosenau finds that our two approaches are complementary. Certainly, some operational complementarity can be worked out, but I would prefer operational guidelines that are derived from a clear analytical distinction among cultural, political, and economic flows.

Rosenau has added a methodological third step in his essay prepared for this book. Applying his micro–macro interaction theory to power relations, he rightly asserts that power is not a possessional attribute, but depends on the relation between those who exercise authority and those toward whom the authority is exercised. At the core of a viable theory, therefore, are relational phenomena.

> Power analysis can be avoided by abandoning the concept of power and replacing it with two concepts, capabilities for the possessional factors and control for the relational factors. Such a conceptual adjustment ensures that the outcome of situations