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# Global Secret and Intelligence Services III



Hidden Systems that deliver Unforgettable  
Customer Service

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"Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori."

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For my children

An intelligence agency is a governmental agency that is devoted to the information gathering (known in the context as "intelligence") for purposes of national security and defense. Means of information gathering may include espionage, communication interception, cryptanalysis, cooperation with other institutions, and evaluation of public sources. The assembly and propagation of this information is known as intelligence analysis.

Intelligence agencies can provide the following services for their national governments.

- \* provide analysis in areas relevant to national security;
- \* give early warning of impending crises;
- \* serve national and international crisis management by helping to discern the intentions of current or potential opponents;
- \* inform national defense planning and military operations;
- \* protect secrets, both of their own sources and activities, and those of other state agencies; and
- \* may act covertly to influence the outcome of events in favor of national interests

Intelligence agencies are also involved in defensive activities such as counter-espionage or counterterrorism.

Some agencies are accused of being involved in assassination, arms sales, coups d'état, and the placement of misinformation (propaganda) as well as other covert operations, in order to support their own or their governments' interests.

## **Intelligence agencies**

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## Poland

- \* Agencja Wywiadu (AW) (Foreign Intelligence Agency)
- \* Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (ABW) (Internal Security Agency)
- \* Wojskowe Służby Informacyjne (WSI) (Military Intelligence Service)

Although the first official service of the Polish government entrusted with espionage, intelligence and counter-intelligence was not formed until 1918, in the past centuries the Polish state developed a net of informers in surrounding states. Also, a number of envoys and ambassadors were used not only as diplomats, but also for gathering information, mostly by bribery. Among such spies was Jan Andrzej Morsztyn, a notable Polish poet of the 17th century. Polish kings, and the military commanders (hetmans) of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth like Stanisław Koniecpolski had espionage networks. The hetmans were responsible for espionage in the Ottoman Empire, its vassals and disputed territories (like Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania) and Muscovy, and also among the restless Cossacks. 1918-1921

Immediately after becoming an independent nation in 1918, Poland formed its Armed Forces. Under the influence of the French Military Mission to Poland, the office of the Polish General Staff was divided into several departments, each entrusted with different tasks:

1. Oddział I [Section I] - Organisation and mobilization
2. Oddział II - Intelligence and Counter-intelligence
3. Oddział III - Training and Operations
4. Oddział IV - Quartermaster

The Second Department, often called Dwójka (Polish for Number Two), was formed in October of 1918, even before



Poland declared its independence. Initially called Information Department of the General Staff, it was divided into several offices, called sections:

- \* Sekcja I - reconnaissance and close intelligence

- \* Sekcja II

  - IIa (East) - offensive intelligence in Bolshevik Russia, Lithuania, Belarusian People's Republic, Ukraine and Galicia

  - IIb (West) - offensive intelligence in Austria, Germany, France and United Kingdom

- \* Sekcja III - general intelligence and surveillance abroad (both in the East and in the West)

- \* Sekcja IV - preparation of a frontline bulletin

- \* Sekcja V - contacts with both the military and civilian authorities.

- \* Sekcja VI - contacts with attaches in Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Moscow and Kyiv

- \* Sekcja VII - Ciphers

The net of informers, both in Poland and abroad, was developing very rapidly. Although Poland, after suffering more than a century under foreign occupation, was in a tragic economic situation, this proved to be a vital factor in the creation of an extensive intelligence net. In the 19th century and early 20th century, the economic and political situation forced hundreds of thousands of Poles to emigrate to almost all countries of the world. With the advent of Polish liberty, many of them reported for duty in Polish intelligence agencies. Others, most notably Poles living in the former Russian Empire, were trying to return home through war-torn Russia, providing the Polish Army with priceless information on Russian logistics, order of battle and the situation of all sides fighting in the Russian Civil War.

Also, in Western Europe (most notably in Germany, France and Belgium), Polish diaspora often formed the backbone of heavy industry. In the Ruhr Valley alone lived approximately 1 million people of Polish descent. Many of them could provide the Polish state with information on industrial production and the economic situation in the surrounding countries.

After the outbreak of the Polish-Bolshevik War in early 1919, the intelligence in the East proved vital to Poland's survival in the war against a far superior enemy. A separate cell within the Polish intelligence was formed and took over most intelligence duties during the war. The organization was named Biuro Wywiadowcze (Intelligence Bureau), and was composed of seven departments:

1. - Organisation
2. - Offensive "A"
3. - Offensive "B"
4. - Offensive "C"
5. - Defensive
6. - Internal propaganda
7. - Counter-intelligence

The fourth department (Offensive intelligence "C") became the most developed as it carried out all duties connected to front-line reconnaissance and intelligence, as well as "long-distance" intelligence and surveillance in countries surrounding Bolshevik Russia, including Siberia (still in hands of the White Russians), Turkey, Persia, China, Mongolia and Japan. The third department, (Offensive intelligence "B") controlled the intelligence net in the European part of Russia.

Additional information was obtained from Russian deserters and POWs, who crossed the Polish lines in thousands,

especially after the Battle of Warsaw of 1920.  
1921-1939

After the end of the Polish-Bolshevik War and the Treaty of Riga, the structure and tasks of the Polish intelligence agency had to be modified in order to cope with new tasks. Although Poland had won most of border conflicts with surrounding powers (most notably the war with Russia and the Greater Poland Uprising against Germany), the international situation of the country was far from being perfect. By mid-1921 a new structure of the Dwójka was introduced. It was composed of three main departments, each commanding different offices:

\* Organisation Department

1. Organisation
2. Training
3. People
4. Finances
5. Own Ciphers and codes, communication and foreign press

\* Records Department

1. East
2. West
3. North
4. South
5. Statistical Office
6. Nationalities and minorities

\* Intelligence Department

1. Technology of intelligence
2. Central agents' bureau
3. Counter-intelligence

#### 4. Foreign Ciphers (Biuro Szyfrów)

#### 5. Radio surveillance and wire-tapping techniques

Until late 1930's, the Soviet Union was seen as a probable aggressor and the main enemy of the Polish state. Because of that, the 2nd Department developed an extensive net of agents both within the borders of Polish eastern neighbour and in other neighbouring countries. Apart from the so-called passive intelligence, that is radio surveillance, press reports and other similar activities, in early 1920's Polish intelligence started to develop a net of offensive intelligence. The Eastern Office (Referat "Wschód" in Polish) had several dozen of bureaus, mostly attached to Polish consulates in, among other towns, Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad, Kharkov and Tbilisi.

The short-range surveillance was carried out by the forces of the Border Defence Corps created in 1924. On several occasions the soldiers crossed the border disguised as smugglers, partisans or ordinary bandits and gathered information on dislocation of Soviet troops and morale of the society. At the same time the Soviet forces carried out similar missions on Polish territory. It was not until 1925 that the situation near the border became more stable and even then such missions occurred from time to time.

Overall, the efforts of Polish Intelligence in the interwar years supplied a very good picture of the capabilities of the main potential adversaries of Poland, Germany and the USSR. However, when war came in September, 1939, this was largely irrelevant. Good intelligence simply could not offset the overwhelming superiority of the German and Soviet armed forces. The conquest of Poland lasted only a few weeks, too short a time for intelligence services to make a significant contribution. With Poland conquered, Polish

Intelligence Services had to move its command outside of Poland, to the territory of its allies France and Britain.

Until 1939 the Polish intelligence services generally did not collaborate with the intelligence services of other countries. The only partial exception was France, Poland's closest ally, and even in this case the cooperation was mostly lukewarm, with neither side as a rule sharing its most precious secrets. (An important exception was the long-term collaboration between France's Gustave Bertrand and Poland's Cipher Bureau, headed by Gwido Langer.) The situation only began to change in 1939, when war appeared certain and Britain and France entered into formal military alliance with Poland.

The most important result of the subsequent sharing of information was the transfer to France and Britain of Polish techniques for breaking German Enigma machine ciphers. The initial break into these had been made in late 1932 by mathematician Marian Rejewski, working for the Polish General Staff's Cipher Bureau. His work had been substantially facilitated by intelligence provided by Bertrand. Subsequently, together with fellow mathematicians Henryk Zygalski and Jerzy Ró-ycki, Rejewski developed techniques to decrypt German Enigma-enciphered messages on a regular and timely basis.

Over six and a half years after the initial Polish break into the Enigma cipher, French and British intelligence representatives were initiated into the Polish achievements at a trilateral conference held at Cipher Bureau facilities in the Kabaty Woods, just south of Warsaw, on July 25, 1939, a bare five weeks before the outbreak of World War II. This formed the basis for early Enigma decryption by the British at Bletchley Park, northwest of London; without the head start provided by Poland, British reading of Enigma might have been delayed several years, or the British effort might even have remained completely unsuccessful.

Key Polish Cipher Bureau personnel escaped from Poland on September 17, 1939, upon the Soviet Union's entry into eastern Poland, and eventually reached France. There, at "PC Bruno" outside Paris, they resumed breaking Enigma ciphers through the "Phony War" (October 1939-May 1940). Following the fall of northern France to the Germans, the Polish-French-Spanish cryptologic organization sponsored by French Major Gustave Bertrand continued its work at "Cadix" in the southern, Vichy "Free Zone" until that, too, was occupied by the Germans in November 1942.

After the September Campaign of 1939 practically the entire command apparatus of the Second Department managed to escape Poland through Romania and soon reached France and Britain. There it reactivated its networks of agents all over Europe, and immediately began cooperation with British and French intelligence. After the Fall of France the entire Second Department staff ended up in Britain, which at that time was in a difficult situation and badly in need of intelligence from occupied Europe, after rapid German advances disrupted its networks and put German forces in areas where Britain had few agents. After the personal intervention of Churchill and Sikorski in September 1940, the cooperation between British and Polish intelligence organisations entered a new era. The Polish Second Department and its network was put under partial British control and worked for the rest of the war under direct orders and direction of the SIS (Secret Intelligence Service).

Already in the first half of 1941 Polish agents in France supplied Britain with intelligence on U-boat sailings from French Atlantic ports. The network in France grew to 1500 members and supplied vital information about the German military in France before and in the course of Operation Overlord. Agents working in Poland in the spring of 1941 supplied extensive intelligence about German preparations

for their invasion of the Soviet Union. Polish spies also supplied extensive information on Auschwitz atrocities (Report of Witold Pilecki) and the German extermination operations in Poland during the Holocaust. Polish Intelligence gave the British key information about the Germans' secret weapons, including the V-1 and V-2 rockets, which allowed Britain to set back the German efforts by bombing the main development facility at Peenemunde in 1943. Overall, the Polish networks all over Europe and most importantly within Germany itself supplied the Allies with information on just about all aspects of the German war effort. During the war, their agents supplied 22,047 agent reports, out of 45,770 received by British Intelligence (about half).

The Second Department was officially shut down on March 15, 1946, and its archives were taken over by the British. At the time of its dissolution it employed 170 officers and 3500 agents, without counting its headquarters staff. It is quite likely that at least some of these agents continued to work, now directly for Britain, in the years of the Cold War.

After the war, the contribution of Polish Intelligence to the British war effort was kept a complete secret. Immediately after the war this was understandable, as the need for secrecy persisted due to the start of the Cold War. However, in later years, as the British official histories started to come out, the role of Polish Intelligence was barely mentioned. Only when the knowledge of the British breaking of the Enigma was revealed to the general public in the late 1970s, the key Polish contribution to that effort could not be passed over. Even then, the first versions of the story, based on partial knowledge, claimed that Polish Intelligence was only able to steal a German Enigma machine. Only gradually was it revealed that the Polish effort was much more sophisticated, relying primarily on methods of mathematical

analysis. However, the efforts of historians to gain access to documents describing the rest of the Polish Intelligence efforts were met with stonewalling and claims that all relevant archives have been destroyed.

In recent years British and Polish governments started efforts to jointly produce an accurate and adequate account of the Polish Intelligence contribution to the British war effort. The key Anglo-Polish Historical Committee Report on the subject, written by leading historians and experts granted unprecedented access to British intelligence archives, was published in July 2005.

1945-1989

Civilian branches

Following the occupation of Poland by the Soviet Union and formation of the new, puppet government, the Soviets formed new intelligence and internal security formations and agencies. But officer staff was trained by Soviet special services already from 1943 on. The same year a group of poles in number of 120 begin special training in a special NKVD school in the town of Kuybyshev, now Samara. At the same time, in special NKVD-NKGB schools all over USSR, hundreds of German, Romanian, Czechoslovakian and Bulgarian people proceeded through the same special training in order to prepare them for work in future special services in their countries.

In July 1944 in Moscow a temporary Polish puppet government was established by the name of Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego), or PKWN. In the PKWN structure organization, there were thirteen departments called resorty. One of them was Department of Public Security (Resort Bezpiecze-stwa Publicznego) or RBP, headed by long



time polish communist Stanisław Radkiewicz. The biggest and the most important department in RBP was Department 1, responsible for Counter-espionage and headed by Roman Romkowski. Department 1 was so big and so expanded that in September 1945 from this existing structure there additional departments were created and two separate Sections. In the end of 1944, in whole Department of Public Security there were 3000 people working. On December 31, 1944, the PKWN was joined by several members of the Polish government in exile, among them Stanisław Mikołajczyk. It was then transformed into Provisional Government of Republic of Poland (Polish: Rz-d Tymczasowy Republiki Polskiej, or RTRP, also all departments were renamed to ministries, Department of Public Security became Ministry of Public Security (Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego) or MBP, well known as UB (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa) or bezpieka, which was a part of MBP in field as - Wojewódzki Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (Provincial Office of Public Security) or WUBP, Miejski Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (City Office of Public Security) or MUBP, Powiatowy Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (District Office of Public Security) or PUBP, and Gminny Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (Communal Office of Public Security) or GUBP. Ministry of Public Security was responsible for both Intelligence and Counterespionage, as well as surveillance of citizens and suppression of dissent of any kind. They generally did not employ former officers of the "Dwojka" and follow the traditions of pre-war Polish intelligence services. Personnel were recruited for their "political reliability" or loyalty to the new regime. New formations were trained by soviet NKVD experts. Additionally, especially in the early years (45-49) Soviet officers in Polish uniforms overlooked their operations. After Stalin's death in 1953 and a couple of months later defection of Col. Józef -wiat-o, a high-ranking MBP officer to the West, one year later Ministry of Public Security was cancelled and replaced by two separate

administrations - Committee for Public Security (Komitet do Spraw Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego) or Kds.BP and Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych) or MSW.

Kds.BP - was responsible for: Intelligence and Counter-espionage, government protection as well as political police. And from September 3, 1955 to 28 November 1956, Główny Zarząd Informacji Wojska Polskiego (Main Directorate of Information of the Polish Army) which was the Military Police and Counter-espionage Agency, when under control of Kds.BP.

MSW - was responsible for: supervision of the local governments, Militsiya, correctional facilities and fire rescue, as well as border and internal guards.

Next big changes come already in 1956. Committee for Public Security was cancelled and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW) took over his responsibilities. Departments responsible for political police in Kds.BP, when under control to MSW as S-u-ba Bezpieczeństwa or.(SB) From 1956 to the fall of communism in Poland, besides the Ministry of Defense, MSW was one of biggest and strongest administrations in Poland, responsible for - Intelligence, Counter-espionage, antistate activity in country (SB), government protection, confidential communications, supervision of the local governments, militsiya, correctional facilities, and fire rescue. Ministry of Internal Affairs was divided on departments the most important departments were: 1st -foreign operations and intelligence-gathering, 2nd -Organizing and conduct battles with spy activities measured against People's Republic of Poland by capitalistic states, penetrate foreign intelligence centers by using secret agents, 3rd (S-u-ba Bezpieczeństwa) -anti-state activities in country and protection of state secrets. Except

departments and sections, MSW had control over - Main Command of Militsiya (Komenda G-ówna Milicji Obywatelskiej) or KG/MO, Main Command of fire rescue (Komenda G-ówna Stra-y Poarnych) or KG/SP, Main Command of command of Territorial Anti-aircraft Defense (Komenda G-ówna Terenowej Obrony Przeciwlotniczej) KG/TOP, Main Management of Geodesy and Cartography (G-ówny Zarz-d Geodezji i Kartografii), Central Office of Health Services (Centralny Zarz-d S-u-by Zdrowia. Ministry of Internal Affairs also had control over command of Internal Troops, which was - Command of Internal Security Corp. (Dowództwo Korpusu Bezpiecze-stwa Wewn-trznego) or KBW, Command of Border Guard (Dowództwo Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza) or KOP, and Management of Information of Internal Troops (Zarz-d Informacji Wojsk Wewnetrznych). Through 1980's MSW was in numbers - 24 390 in Security Service (S-u-ba Bezpiecze-stwa) or SB, 62 276 in Citizens Militsiya (Milicja Obywatelska) or MO, 12 566 in Motorized Reserves of the Citizens Militia (Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej) or ZOMO, 20 673 Administratively-Economic Units (Jednostki administracyjno-gospodarcze), 4 594 in Ministry schools plus students. Military branches

First military special services in Poland after WW2 were created in 1943 as part of the Polish Military in the USSR. First organ that dealt with military counterespionage was called Directorate of Information by the commander-in-chief of the Polish Army (Zarz-d Informacji Naczelnego Dowódcy Wojska Polskiego -ZI NDWP) . November 30, 1944, commander-in-chief of Polish Army general Micha- Rola-ymierski in his #95 order transformed the ZI NDWP into the Main Directorate of Information of the Polish Army (G-ówny Zarz-d Informacji Wojska Polskiego) or. GZI WP. Then from 30 November 1950, GZI WP, became Main Directorate of Information of Ministry of Defense (G-ówny Zarz-d Informacji

Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej) or GZI MON. In September 1955, GZI MON became part of Committee for Public Security (Komitet do spraw Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego), with was the well known successor of Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego more known as Urząd Bezpieczeństwa or UB, and was called Main Directorate of Information of the Committee for Public Security or GZI KdsBP. In November 1956 GZI KdsBP separated from Committee for Public Security, and returned to previous role becoming again Main Directorate of Information of Ministry of Defense. After the reform instituted by Władysław Gomułka in 1956, and the role GZI played in repressions and executions, one year later in 1957 Main Directorate of Information of Ministry of Defense was cancelled and replaced by Military Internal Service (Wojskowa Służba Wewnętrzna - or. WSW). The WSW continuously operated as the main military police and counterespionage service until the fall of communism in Poland.

First Polish Military Intelligence after WW2 was Oddział II Sztabu Generalnego Ludowego Wojska Polskiego (2nd Section of General Staff of the Polish People's Army) or Oddział II Sztabu Gen LWP, so it bore the same name that his precursor from before world war 2. Oddział II Sztabu Gen WP, was established in July 18, 1945, but his origin reaches May 1943 when first reconnaissance company was created in Polish Army units in USSR. Between July 1947 and June 5, 1950, 2nd Section of General Staff of the Polish People's Army, operated in structure of the Ministry of Public Security together with civilian intelligence branch as a Department VII. In June 5, 1950, it has returned to the Ministry of Defense. The first head of Oddział II Sztabu Gen WP, was Colonel Georgij Domeradzki, in November 1945 this position was occupied by general Wacław Komar, and between October 1950 and March 1951 by soviet officer Konstantin Kahnikov.

The last in command of 2nd Section of General Staff of the Polish People's Army was Igor Suchacki.

November 15, 1951 Polish Defence Minister Konstantin Rokossovsky in his order (#.0088) transformed 2nd Section of General Staff of the Polish People's Army to 2nd Directorate of General Staff of the Polish Army (Zarz-d II Sztabu Generalnego Wojska Polskiego). Inside organization was transformed from Section to Directorates and Intelligence work among United States, Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria, has been expanded among to countries like Norway, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Israel. In 1990 2nd Directorate of General Staff of the Polish Army was join with military Counter-intelligence - Military Internal Service (Wojskowa S-u-ba Wewn-trzna - or. WSW, that way Intelligence and Counter-intelligence was working under one structure which was Zarz-d II Wywiadu i Kontrwywiadu - 2nd Directorate for Intelligence and Counter-intelligence. Then in 1991 2nd Directorate for Intelligence and Counter-intelligence was transformed on to Military information services - Wojskowe S-u-by Informacyjne (or. WSI). Military information services or WSI. Responsible for military Intelligence and Counter-intelligence, continues to function under this name to this day. 1989-present

After the changes of 1989 the S-u-ba Bezpiecze-stwa was disbanded by the first free government under the prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. A new agency, called Urz-d Ochrony Pa-stwa or UOP (State Protection Office) was formed and was staffed mainly by the former SB officers who successfully passed a verification procedure. Its mission was primarily general espionage and intelligence gathering as well as counterespionage and fight against high ranked organized crime. It was commanded by a career intelligence officer but was directly supervised by a civilian, government official Coordinator for the Special Services.

For most of the time agency evaded public attention although it was dragged into some political fighting over appointments of its chiefs, lustration and some perceived failures with organized crime cases. In 2002 the new, left-wing government reorganized the special services by dividing them into two agencies - Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (Internal Security Agency) and Agencja Wywiadu (Intelligence Agency). The move was widely perceived as a way of cleansing the higher ranks of the intelligence from the officers appointed by previous right-wing governments.

It's worth noting that the military intelligence continued to function under just slightly changed name (Wojskowe Służby Informacyjne) and without much organizational change - at least none that would be visible to the general public. New Polish conservative government declared dissolution of WSI and creating new services (October 2005) since the agency skipped serious external reforms after collapse of communism in 1989. Throughout the transformation WSI was involved in dubious operations, selling arms to the states embargoed by the UN and corruption scandals.

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## Militsiya

Militsiya (Russian: -----; Ukrainian: -и-и-и-; literally "militia") is the a short official name of the police in the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states, inherited by some post-Soviet states: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and some others. Due to the history of the term and the distinctive local features, the militsiya should be considered a special regional kind of policing system, not just a translation of the English

"police". Militsiya forces in all post-Soviet countries share similar traditions, tactics and methods, although the differences are increasing over time.

A similar name for police was used in some other countries: Romanian: Mili-ia; Serbo-Croatian: Milicija; Poland: Milicja Obywatelska. Name and status

The name originates from early Soviet history, when the Bolsheviks intended to associate their new law enforcement authority with the self-organization of the people and to distinguish it from the "bourgeois class-oriented police". Originally militsiya was the official name: the Workers' and Peasants' Militsiya was created in 1917. Eventually, it was replaced by Ministry of Internal Affairs (Russian: ---, MVD; Ukrainian: ---, MVS), which is now the official full name for the militsiya forces in the respective countries. Its regional branches are officially called Departments of Internal Affairs-city department of internal affairs, raion department of internal affairs, oblast department of internal affairs, etc. The Russian term for a regional department was "----" ("-----/------ ----- ----"), later renamed to "----" ("----- ----- -"). One reason why the name "militsiya" has persisted after the Communist system collapsed, may be to avoid confusion with the astonishing number and variety of words which start with pol- in Russian and related languages.

Functionally, Ministries of Internal Affairs are mostly police agencies. Their functions and organization differ significantly from similarly named departments in Western countries, which are usually civil executive bodies headed by politicians and responsible for many other tasks as well as the supervision of law enforcement. Soviet and successor MVDs are usually headed by a militsiya general and predominantly consist of service personnel, with civil employees only filling auxiliary posts. Although such



ministers are members of the respective country's cabinet, they usually do not report to the prime minister and parliament, but only to the president. Local departments are subordinate to their national ministry and are not controlled by local government organisations (although they do formally report to them).

Internal affairs units within the militsiya itself are usually called "internal security" departments.

The official names of particular militsiya bodies and services in post-Soviet countries are usually very complicated, hence the use of the short term militsiya. Laws usually refer to police just as militsiya.

The short term for a police officer (regardless of gender) is militsioner (Russian: -----, Ukrainian: -i-i-i----). Slang terms for militsioner include ment (plural: -----, menty) and musor (plural: , musora). Although the latter word is offensive (it literally means "trash" or "garbage"), it originated from an acronym for the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department (---, short for ----- ----- ----) in Imperial Russia.

Ment is a close equivalent to the English slang term "cop".

Throughout the first half of the 1990s, the Russian militsiya functioned with minimal funding, equipment, and support from the legal system. The inadequacy of the force became particularly apparent during the wave of organized crime that began sweeping Russia after the beginning of perestroika. Many highly qualified individuals moved from the militsiya into better-paying jobs in the field of private security, which has expanded to meet the demands of companies needing protection, while others joined the organized crime itself. Frequent taking of bribes among the

remaining members of the militsiya has damaged the force's public credibility. Numerous revelations of participation by militsiya personnel in murders, prostitution rings, information peddling, and tolerance of criminal acts have created a general public perception that all militsioners are at least taking bribes. Bribery of officers to avoid penalty for traffic violations and petty crimes is a routine and expected occurrence, as well as tortures and abusing of suspects in the custody.

In a 1995 poll of the public, only 5 % of respondents expressed confidence in the ability of the militsiya to deal with crime in their city. Human rights organizations have accused the Moscow militsiya of racism in singling out non-Slavic individuals (especially immigrants from Russia's Caucasus republics), physical attacks, unjustified detention, and other rights violations. In 1995 Minister of Internal Affairs Anatoliy Kulikov conducted a high-profile "Clean Hands Campaign" to purge the MVD of corrupt elements. In its first year, this limited operation caught several highly placed MVD officials collecting bribes, indicating a high level of corruption throughout the agency. According to experts, the main causes of corruption are insufficient funding to train and equip personnel and pay them adequate wages, poor work discipline, lack of accountability, and fear of reprisals from organized criminals.

The Day of Militsiya is held on November 10 in Russia. The results of a poll conducted on November 10, 2005, published by Izvestia, show that 72% of people are afraid of militsiya because the militiamen are thought to often take illegal actions against innocent people.

#### Oil Secrets of the Polish Intelligence

On February 8, 2006 officers of the Polish ABW (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego - Internal Security Agency)

arrived at the offices of J&S Energy S.A Company (a Polish subsidiary of the J&S Group Ltd) in Warsaw. The local media was ecstatic following the "raid" as the accusations reverberating around the scandal by the official, ex-official and mostly anonymous sources were bombastic. The company was allegedly called "The Russian FSB creature", a tool for taking over the Polish oil market. Its owners were represented as Russian citizens -agents. Zbigniew Wassermann, Chairman of the Polish Sejm Commission for the Special Services, told the media that the offices were raided following data received in the case of PKN Orlen. He added there were serious suspicions that J&S turned the oil supply to Poland from Russia into a monopoly and alleged that commissions were paid to politicians and officials who helped the company reach its present position and avoid paying taxes. Poland's former intelligence chief, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, was even more critical, saying the company was connected to the Russian secret services through a member of the Board of directors of the Russian Inter RAO Unified Energy Systems, Vladimir Alganov, a former SVR and KGB chief agent in Poland, who already had tried to bribe Polish businessmen in the past. And another media, the Russian one, was full of reports on the ABW raid. It quoted different anonymous Polish sources, noting that the owners of J&S preferred to stay in the shadows, never meet the press or photographers, and managed to keep stable the turnover of the company at \$2 billion. Strangely enough no official or non-official reaction to the claims of FSB-KGB involvement was published. Despite very tense relations between Russia and Poland the case was interpreted as a local Polish corruption case, and other scandals were mentioned as background. Maybe this became one of the reasons to believe that the raid had the strange scent of a set up, as it turned out, for example, that Polish journalists were informed of it and awaited the arrival of the secret services near the office.

## The Other Side of the Story

We contacted Rafal Kaspro, the managing partner for MDI Strategic Solutions, which represents J&S Energy S.A. Company, to hear another side of the story, which turned out to be even more interesting. First of all, he showed us that over 90% of the information published about the “raid” was bogus. “The search” in the J&S Energy S.A. office was not related to the so-called “case of PKN Orlen”. The Polish Agency for Internal Security (ABW), acting upon a request from the Cracow prosecution office conducting an investigation unrelated to J&S, entered the J&S Energy S.A. office to verify the existence of trade documents related to transactions with third parties being subject to such investigations, and to hand over any such documentation. Neither J&S Energy S.A., nor its employees are suspects in the aforementioned investigation. The investigation does not concern the alleged “J&S monopoly”, or “commissions” paid to politicians, or the company’s “tax evasion”. The Prosecution Office in Cracow investigates some other companies, (none of which is related in any way to the J&S Group) that are suspected of illegal practices in the sales of petrol.

As Mr. Kaspro underlined, there are no cases instigated against J&S and its subsidiaries anywhere around the world. Also there is no case and no investigation against it in Poland. But there is a war between the local “fuel mafia” and the Company, which is the leading one in the Polish market. And the other side is using rumors to spread misleading information and lies through the media, as the journalists who publish them claim that their sources are anonymous.

Kaspro: “We are talking about small companies, evading taxes, blending fuels, bribing. They have been our opponents for several years. There is an investigation into

these companies (totaling 1263, note the AIA sources in Poland ), and not against us. We are cooperating with the authorities, we promote the Polish economy, constantly improving our services - we have had 40 % improvement through the last years in the fuel market. Our activity destroys these criminal mafia groups..."

AIA: But it seems that these groups have some sort of protection from the higher ranks of authority. How they can use state secret services to fight J&S as happened the last time- Who are those who send these secret services to haunt the company-

Kasprow: If you study a bit about this "fuel mafia" you can see that its roots are in the secret services. They have very good connections with the military secret service. There were several articles in the local press describing relations between Military Intelligence (WSI, Wojskowa S<sup>3</sup>użba Informacyjna, which was recently reformed and split in two because of corruption - AIA) and the "fuel mafia". As we are increasing the sales of oil products, we are harming their interests, so the level of confrontation is rising. I will reiterate that we have no connection to this mafia and to the cases, which are being investigated today. It is the mafia that does not pay taxes, not the J&S. These allegations are empty as only last year J&S Energy SA paid the Polish Treasury over 1 billion PLN in taxes.

AIA: But can you throw in some names- Who is behind these people- Zbigniew Siemiatkowski-

Kasprow: Oh yes, Mr. Siemiatkowski is one of them. He was behind this PKN Orlen case, when he sent secret service agents in 2002 to illegally arrest the President of this company to prevent him from signing a deal with J&S. He had a personal interest in that. Mr. Zbigniew Siemiatkowski

inspired several media attacks and personally and repeatedly slandered J&S Group and its founding shareholders in public. We have set up a legal case against him, and we intend to win it. Mr. Zbigniew Siemiatkowski has discredited himself as a politician, civil servant and a man of honor. He was not only unable to substantiate the charges - the Investigating Committee of the Polish Sejm found them to be groundless (see below -AIA) - but as a result of the Committee's investigation (<http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki4ka.nsf> (document nr. 4430), he is himself now the subject of several cases, which the Committee formally referred to the Prosecutor's Office. As a result of its proceedings, the State Prosecutor has already presented several criminal charges against Siemiatkowski.

AIA: And what about these allegations of the Russian secret services involvement that came up- And why not, let us say, German, for example- The Russian media was very active, describing the case. What is the connection- Maybe it's because Mr. Sławomir Smolokowski and Mr. Grzegorz Jankilewicz - the heads of the company, originally came from the Soviet Union-

Kasprow: These allegations are pure fiction. The sources of the allegations are, as always happens, anonymous; it is impossible to find out who said what! And as for the Soviet roots of Mr. Sławomir Smolokowski and Mr. Grzegorz Jankilewicz - they have roots in Poland! They are Jewish by origin, their families escaped the Holocaust and came to the USSR. They both were born in the Soviet Union, they were musicians and in the mid eighties they left for Poland, escaping the Soviet regime. They both got married here, became citizens and opened a business - dealing in electronics and clothing. They thrived on it and entered the oil business, again starting from a small company, which has grown rather quickly. They never were "Russian