

International Military Tribunal



THE NUREMBERG TRIALS

Complete Tribunal Proceedings
(V. 14)

International Military Tribunal

**The Nuremberg Trials:
Complete Tribunal
Proceedings (V. 14)**

Trial Proceedings From 16 May 1946 to 28 May 1946

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ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST DAY

(THURSDAY, 16 MAY 1946)

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MORNING SESSION

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MARSHAL (Col. Charles W. Mays): If it please the Tribunal, the Defendants Sauckel and Von Papen are absent.

[The Defendant Raeder resumed the stand.]

DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Admiral, yesterday we finished with the somewhat involved Document C-32, and we had got as far as Point 11. We now come to Point 12, "Ammunition stocks in excess of the armament permissible." May I remind the Tribunal that this is Document C-32, Exhibit USA-50, in Document Book 10 a, Page 8, Point 12, which contains three columns.

Defendant, may I ask what you have to say to the accusation that you exceeded the permissible amount of ammunition?

ERICH RAEDER (Defendant): Certain ammunition stocks were in excess of the permissible amount and some were below it. I cannot tell you at this date what the reason was in each particular case. I assume that this depended to a

considerable extent on the amounts left over from the last World War.

In the case of the first two items, the 17- and 15-centimeter shells, the actual stocks rather exceeded the quantity permitted, whereas the third item, the 10.5-centimeter, falls very far short of it—instead of 134,000 there were 87,000. In the case of the 8.8-centimeter shells there was an excess, then again a deficit, and the same thing applies to the last item. But they are all very insignificant amounts.

DR. SIEMERS: In the copy before the Tribunal there appears to be a note in the third column—on the next page in yours, Defendant—saying that quantities of ammunition are partly manufactured and partly in course of delivery, and that the total amount permissible will soon be exceeded.

I only wanted to ask you: The list was made out in September 1933. Then are the figures stated correct for September 1933 or autumn 1933?

RAEDER: I did not quite understand you.

DR. SIEMERS: If it says in this document that measures to be taken later will bring the totals above the quantities permissible, which—according to this statement—they had not yet reached, then that is calculated as from autumn 1933.

RAEDER: That may be assumed, yes. Because new ammunition as well as new guns were being manufactured, and old ammunition then had to be scrapped.

It also must be noted that ammunition for heavy artillery, which is not listed here, was in every case short of the permissible amount. A comparatively large amount of heavy artillery ammunition had been granted us for heavy coastal guns, and we had by no means as much as we were allowed to have.

DR. SIEMERS: For the assistance of the Tribunal, I may point out that this last point is proved by the actual documents in the hands of the Tribunal. In the Tribunal's copy under the Figure 12, Column 2, just beside the separate figures, there is a sentence which says, "... that the whole quantity permitted for heavy artillery has not been reached."

We now come to Number 13: "Exceeding the permissible stocks of machine guns, rifles, pistols, and gas masks."

RAEDER: Here, too, it must be admitted that in isolated cases stocks were a little higher than permitted. There were, for instance, 43,000 gas masks instead of the 22,500 permitted. Large numbers of rifles and machine guns were taken away even by individuals after the World War to farms, *et cetera*. They were later collected, and for that reason there was a comparatively large stock of them. But we are not dealing here with any considerable quantities. Similarly ammunition, bayonets, hand grenades, searchlights, fog equipment, *et cetera*, also exceeded the prescribed limits but not to any great extent.

DR. SIEMERS: Now, Figure 14: "Obtaining 337 M.G. C/30's without scrapping equally serviceable weapons." As I did not ...

THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Surely, Dr. Siemers, it would be possible to deal with all these various points in the documents in one statement as to why there were these excesses. We have a statement here which contains 30 different items, and you have only got as far as 13, and you are dealing with each one.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, personally I agree entirely. I am sorry that I caused the Tribunal so much trouble in connection with this document. As I am not a naval expert, I had a great deal of trouble finding my way through it; but I do not think that I was the cause of the trouble. The Prosecution, you see, have made use of the single points in evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the question is—I am not blaming you, but we want to get on. We are not blaming you. Can't it be done in one explanatory statement, one short statement?

DR. SIEMERS: I will try, Mr. President, and I will shorten it.

There is no need to say anything more about Numbers 15 to 17. I think these were the most important points. The points planned for a later date were not to be effective until the years '33 and '34. I may perhaps just point out to the Tribunal that Number 17 refers to the intended construction of reserve destroyers. The Versailles Treaty permitted the construction of these.

I pass over Number 18 because we have already dealt with that. Number 19, again, refers only to intended construction. Number 20 I may consider irrelevant; it

concerns only the arming of fishing vessels. Numbers 21 to 29 ...

THE PRESIDENT: I think, perhaps, you should ask the Defendant to explain some of these observations in the third column. I mean in Number 18, for instance: "Difficult to detect. If necessary can be denied."

RAEDER: These were explanations given to our League of Nations representative at the Disarmament Conference by the competent expert. It does not refer to local conditions. Construction of submarine spare parts, for instance, took place abroad or was to be prepared. It was actually carried out in 1934 and '35, and the first submarine was launched at the end of June 1935.

DR. SIEMERS: I may take it, Defendant, that only the construction and purchase of submarines was prohibited.

RAEDER: Yes, the construction in Germany.

DR. SIEMERS: I cannot prove until a later stage that no violation of the Treaty was involved by the construction of these spare parts; but I think you will have to give some indication of your reason for wishing to conceal it, in view of the fact that spare parts were not forbidden. I may remind you that this took place in September 1933 at a time when negotiations had already been planned.

RAEDER: At that period, before the German-English Naval Agreement was concluded on the basis of 35 to 100, Hitler was particularly eager to avoid everything which might

embarrass the negotiations in any way. The construction and preparation of submarine parts came under this heading as being a subject on which England was peculiarly sensitive.

DR. SIEMERS: Was there not an additional reason for this appendix and other remarks in this second column—namely, the unfortunate experiences which the Navy had caused in home politics, the fact that whenever the slightest action was taken a quarrel immediately ensued on the home political front?

RAEDER: Yes; and that went so far that the Reichswehrminister was attacked on occasions by Prussian ministers who disagreed with the Reich Government—for instance, Müller, Severing, Stresemann and later Brüning, who alleged to the Reich Chancellor that he took steps which he was not authorized to take. In reality, however, the Reich Government itself had sanctioned these things already and had accepted the responsibility for them.

DR. SIEMERS: So these things were kept secret for reasons of home policy, so that they should not be apparent...

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: With the approval of the Reich Government?

RAEDER: With the approval of the Reich Government. As regards the firms, a number of firms...

DR. SIEMERS: I would prefer now to refer back to Column 2, Number 20, as I see from the record that the Prosecution have also expressly raised this point in connection with the arming of fishing craft, emphasized it, and made it the basis of a charge, "Warning shots, play it down."

RAEDER: The two fishing boats were quite small vessels and were normally unarmed. They served to supervise the fishing boats in the North Sea right up to Iceland, to help them in case of emergency, to take sick men aboard and to afford protection against fishermen of other nations. We thought it advisable to mount at least a 5-centimeter gun on these ships since they were actually warships. "Warning shots" means that they fired a salute when they wanted to draw the fishermen's attention to something; so it was quite an insignificant affair and had no need to be artificially reduced to a bagatelle but was in fact a bagatelle.

DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Numbers 21 to 28. This is a list of various firms, including industrial firms working on armament contracts. The Versailles Treaty admitted certain firms for this type of work while it excluded others. In actual fact, other firms had received contracts. Perhaps you can make a general statement on this point.

RAEDER: This was at a time when we had strong hopes that progress would be made at the Disarmament Conference. The Macdonald Plan, which brought about a certain improvement, had already been accepted; and we might have expected, in consequence, that the few factories still left to us would have to increase their output during the

next few years. I may refer you to the shipping replacement scheme. Consequently, factories producing specialized articles were better equipped and supplied. There was, however, never any question of heavy guns or anything of that kind but of automatic fuse-igniters, explosives—for instance, mine containers, *et cetera*, small items but special items which could be made only by certain firms. But, apart from the firms admitted, other firms which had been excluded were also employed. Thus, for instance, the Friedrich Krupp Grusenwerke A.G. at Magdeburg, Number 25, was equipped to manufacture antiaircraft guns and antiaircraft barrels from 2-centimeters to 10.5-centimeters; similarly Number 26, a firm manufacturing antiaircraft ammunition, explosives; Number 27...

DR. SIEMERS: I do not think we need the details.

RAEDER: No. And then engines for which there was also a great demand.

DR. SIEMERS: I have some questions which apply to all these figures. Is this not offset to a certain extent by the fact that some of the firms admitted had already dropped out for economic reasons?

RAEDER: Yes, you can certainly say that. These firms had comparatively few deliveries which were not sufficient to keep them going.

DR. SIEMERS: Defendant, I think one not only can—I think one must—say so. May I draw your attention to Point 22,

Column 3, which reads, "The list in any case is out of date, as some firms have dropped out."

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: That leaves us with Numbers 29 and 30. Number 29, "Preparations in the field of experiments with motorboats." I think that these were preparations in a very small field.

RAEDER: At the moment I cannot tell you exactly what this means.

DR. SIEMERS: I do not believe in any case that the Prosecution will attach any importance to it.

Then I only want you to make a final statement on Number 30, "Probable further concrete violations becoming necessary in the near future" up to 1934 inclusively. To all intents and purposes you have already answered the question by your reference to the negotiations planned with the British Government, some of which were already in progress.

RAEDER: Yes, that was the point.

DR. SIEMERS: These are matters, therefore, which were in any case due to be discussed in the course of the negotiations with the British Government, or rather the Admiralty.

RAEDER: You cannot say that of them all. For instance, Points 1 to 3 deal with mines. The number of mines was to

be increased and modern material was to replace the old. It goes on in the same way with the transfer of guns from the North Sea to the Baltic "A" batteries, not with the scrapping of guns.

DR. SIEMERS: To conclude the whole matter, may I ask you to say what impression the whole thing made on a naval expert like yourself. All things considered, would you say that these are minor violations, and how far are these violations of an aggressive nature?

RAEDER: As I said yesterday, most of them are very inadequate improvements in defense of an almost entirely defenseless position. The separate items, as I explained yesterday, are so insignificant that it is really impossible to spend very much time on them. I believe that the Control Commission also had the impression that very little weight need be attached to all these matters; for in 1925 when the Control Commission left its station at Kiel where it had worked with the organizations of the Naval Command, Commander Fenshow, Admiral Charlton's chief of staff and head of the Commission, whose main interest was guns and who had worked with a Captain Raenkel, a gunner and a specialist in these matters, said:

"We must leave now, and you are glad that we are going. You did not have a pleasant task, and neither did we. I must tell you one thing. You need not think that we believed what you have said. You did not say a single word of truth, but you have given your information so skillfully that we were able to accept it, and for that I am grateful to you."

DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-29, which is Exhibit USA-46. Mr. President, it is in Raeder's Document Book 10, Page 8 of the Prosecution's document book.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean 10a?

DR. SIEMERS: Number 10, Page 8. This document, too, was submitted during the general Indictment made by the Prosecution at the beginning of the Trial on 27 November. It consists of a speech, a document signed by Raeder, dated 31 January 1933, "General Directives for the Support of the German Armaments Industry by the Navy."

[*Turning to the defendant.*] The Prosecution pointed this out; and they have thought fit to conclude from it that on the day after Hitler's nomination as Chancellor of the Reich, you were already acting positively in his support through this letter. Will you define your attitude, please?

RAEDER: There is no connection whatsoever between this letter and Hitler's accession to power. You must admit that it would be impossible to compile so long and complicated a document—which was, after all, carefully prepared—between the evening of 30 and the morning of 31 January. This document results from the hope, which I mentioned before, that already under the Papen and Von Schleicher Government the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and the Disarmament Conference might be gradually relaxed, since the British Delegation had repeatedly said that they favored the gradual restoration of equal rights. We had, therefore, to get our industries into the best possible condition, as far as the manufacture of armaments was concerned, by

increasing their output and enabling them to overcome competition.

As I say in Paragraph c of this letter, almost every country was at that time making efforts in the same direction, even those which, unlike Germany, had no restrictions imposed on them. Great Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy made the most determined efforts to gain markets for their armaments industry; and I wanted to follow them in this particular sphere. In order to do this, there had to be an understanding between the various departments of the Naval Command Staff to the effect that industry must be given support in a way which avoided the secrecy of technical matters and developments to too petty a degree. That is why I explain in Paragraph c that secrecy in small matters is less important than maintaining a high standard and keeping the lead.

I state in the final sentence:

“To sum up, I attach particular importance to the continued support of the industry in question by the Navy, even after the expected relaxation of the present restrictions, so that the industry would command confidence abroad and would find a market.”

This has nothing at all to do with Hitler nor with any independent rearmament on my own behalf.

DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us when, approximately, you drafted these directives?

RAEDER: During the month of January. I may say that we had a conference—perhaps at the beginning of January—

and after that I had it put in writing.

DR. SIEMERS: That would be certainly 2 to 3 weeks before this letter was written?

RAEDER: Yes, certainly.

DR. SIEMERS: I think it happens rarely that one receives a letter from a government office one day after its being conceived by the head of that office.

May I ask you now to tell me one thing more in connection with the "relaxation of the present restrictions." That means the relaxation of the Versailles Treaty, I presume, through the Disarmament Conference. You have mentioned that four times in this document, so that I assume that was your basis.

RAEDER: Yes, it was. The whole atmosphere at that time, under both the governments I mentioned, was such that one could expect an improvement.

DR. SIEMERS: And this was the basis for which, to quote a few names only, Stresemann, Brüning, fought.

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: As they felt it their duty to take certain advance precautions?

RAEDER: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: I think there is no need for me to go into further details. I have read this document again and again,

and have been unable to find any point on which the Prosecution could base the conclusion that you had National Socialist ideas.

I now come to Document C-140. It is Exhibit USA-51, and is in the Document Book 10a, Page 104.

RAEDER: May I interrupt you, please? Would it not be appropriate that I should say now what I wanted to say to supplement the statement in C-156 regarding aircraft?

DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It might be practicable to finish with the infringements of the Versailles Treaty before going on to another subject. I had forgotten that.

The Prosecution have submitted Document C-156. It is Captain Schüssler's book from the year 1937 and contains almost the same list of infringements as Document C-32, so that that document can be disposed of at the same time. In addition, it deals with the case of the designing office for submarines in Holland, with which we have already dealt. But there is still one point on which I should like to have your comments, and that concerns certain preparations in connection with navy aircraft which might be permitted later.

RAEDER: All sorts of preparations had been made in the field of aviation long before I came into office. A number of aircraft had been purchased, as I see from this book. They were stored with a firm called "Severa G.m.b.H.," which was known to the Reichswehrminister. The Versailles Treaty had permitted us anti-aircraft guns both on ships and on the coast, as was mentioned yesterday; and for these

antiaircraft, firing practice had to be arranged. The Control Commission had allowed us a certain number of aircraft to tow the necessary targets. These aircraft were flown by ex-naval pilots employed by this company. The company, in turn, was managed by an old naval pilot.

Since we were not allowed to train naval pilots or were not allowed to have any naval air force, we gave a year's training in the civil aviation school to a number of prospective naval officers before they joined the Navy, so that through this 1-year training they developed into very good pilots. Then they joined the Navy and went through their ordinary naval training. The aircraft purchased in this way was temporarily in the possession of the "Severa," which also had a good deal to do with the Lohmann affairs and for that reason was dissolved by Reichswehrminister Gröner in the summer of 1928. Reichswehrminister Gröner established a new company with similar assignments in the autumn of 1928, soon after I assumed office. But he had signed the agreement himself in order to control the correct management of the whole affair.

In this company, in addition to their ordinary work, the Navy pilots carried out experiments in connection with the development of aircraft for a later Navy air force. We had the Government's permission to manufacture a model of every type likely to be of use, but we were not allowed to accumulate aircraft. The Government had expressly forbidden that. The result was that in the course of years the company developed a number of aircraft types which would be useful at a later date when we were once more allowed to have aircraft.

In the early period exercises in the Navy were carried out by the old naval pilots—that is to say, it was demanded that exercises in observation be taken and that the crews of ships learn how to act against aircraft. When these young naval pilots were assigned to such exercises, they were discharged from the Navy for that time. It was an awkward affair, but it was always carried out punctiliously.

DR. SIEMERS: I may now turn to Document C-140, which is in Document Book 10a, Page 104. It is a letter from Reich Defense Minister Von Blomberg dated 25 October 1933. It is addressed to the Chief of the Army, the Chief of the Navy, and the Reich Minister for Aviation.

On this document the Prosecution based their accusations that you, Witness, prepared military plans for an armed resistance which might become necessary in consequence of Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Perhaps you can briefly state your view.

RAEDER: I had no previous knowledge of our imminent withdrawal from the League of Nations. This directive came out 11 days after we had left the League of Nations, and it merely provides defensive measures in the event of sanctions being applied against Germany by other powers in consequence of her departure from the League of Nations. It says under 2c: "I prohibit any practical preparations in the meantime." So, at first, nothing was done in consequence of this directive, and the Reich Defense Minister merely asked for a report from me as to what should be done.

As far as I remember, no practical preparations of any kind were carried out by the Navy at the time, because the situation remained absolutely quiet and there was no reason to assume that there would be any need for defense.

DR. SIEMERS: That is probably indicated by the words under Point 2a, "Preparation for defense against sanctions." It concerns the defense only.

RAEDER: The defense only.

DR. SIEMERS: That the withdrawal from the League of Nations occurred 14 October 1933, 11 days before the document was written, is a well-known fact and has been mentioned by the Prosecution on Page 257 of the record (Volume II, Page 304).

Now we come to Document C-166. This is Exhibit USA-48. Mr. President, this is in Document Book 10, on Page 36. It is a document dated 12 March 1934. It emanates from the Command Office of the Navy and refers to the preparation of auxiliary cruisers for action. The Prosecution have quoted only the first two paragraphs of this document and have pointed out that it shows that auxiliary cruisers were to be built and describes transport ships "O" for camouflage purposes.

The two paragraphs sound incriminating, but they can very easily be explained. May I refer to Lohmann's affidavit, Document Number Raeder-2, my Document Book 1, Page 5. I refer to Paragraph II. I quote:

"The Document C-166, submitted to me, a communication from the Office of the Naval Command

of 12 March 1934, deals with the 'availability of auxiliary cruisers' which, as stated in the document, were marked as 'Transport Ships O.' These ships were not to be newly constructed but were to be selected from the stock of the German merchant marine in accordance with the demands enumerated in the document and were to be examined as to their suitability for the tasks to be assigned them. Then plans were made for reconstruction in case of necessity, but the boats remained in the merchant marine."

May I state at this point that in the English translation the word "Umbau" has been translated by the word "reconstruction." I have my doubts as to whether this is quite correct. I presume that the interpreter has now translated it as "Umbau" accordingly. As far as I know, the German word "Umbau" only means much the same thing as the English word "changes"—that is, "Veränderung."

I continue to quote:

"The order to select such boats from German shipyards was received, among others, by the Hamburg Office of the Naval Command where I was serving at the time."

Thus far Admiral Lohmann.

Witness, is Lohmann's statement correct? Have you anything to add?

RAEDER: No. I can only emphasize again that there was no question of immediate construction but only of selecting suitable ships and examining them with a view to ascertaining the alterations necessary to enable them to

function as auxiliary cruisers in the case of a general mobilization. The preparation of the plans and the plans themselves were to be ready by 1 April 1935, as laid down in Number 12. They were to be submitted to the naval administration so that in the case of mobilization the ship concerned could be taken from the stock of the merchant marine and converted.

All these proposals for mobilization were, of course, kept secret.

DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, that the whole misunderstanding would not have arisen if the Prosecution had translated two further sentences. The English version is very short and Point 11 is missing. I quote the text of Point 11:

“ ‘B’ is requested in co-operation with ‘K,’ first of all, to select suitable vessels and to ascertain how many 15-centimeter guns have to be mounted to achieve the required broadside...”

The word “selected” is used here so that the intention is not—as the Prosecution assert—the building of auxiliary cruisers but the making of a selection from merchant vessels.

RAEDER: Yes; and the ships continued to sail in the service of the merchant marine.

DR. SIEMERS: The second sentence, which I find has been unfortunately omitted from the English translation of the Prosecution, reads as follows:

“As long as only a restricted number of guns—at present 24—can be placed at our disposal for this purpose, preparations are to be made for only four transport ships (O). An increase of this number, presumably to six, will be postponed to a date when more guns are available. Until then we must await the results of the preparations for the first auxiliary cruisers.”

The fact that only four, or at the most six, merchant navy vessels were involved shows the insignificance of the whole matter.

I now come to Document C-189, USA-44. It is in Document Book Number 10 of the British Delegation, Page 66.

I should like your comments.—I beg your pardon. I should remind you that this concerns the conversation between Grossadmiral Raeder and the Führer aboard the *Karlsruhe* in June 1934.

Grossadmiral, will you please state your views on the three points mentioned in this brief document and which you discussed with Hitler in June 1934.

First question: Why was Hitler unwilling to reveal the increase in displacement of D and E—that is, the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*—when, according to this document, these were defensive weapons and every expert would notice the increased tonnage of these ships and, as far as I know, did notice it?

RAEDER: At that time we were considering what we could do with the two armored ships D and E, after the signing of the impending naval pact with England—that is, the two ships

which Hitler had granted me for the Navy in the 1934 budget. We had definitely decided not to continue building these armored ships as such, since we could make better use of the material at our disposal.

DR. SIEMERS: But surely you realized that every expert in the British or American or any other Admiralty would see on a voyage, as soon as he had sighted the ship, that the 10,000 tons had now become 26,000?

RAEDER: Yes, of course.

DR. SIEMERS: So that there was merely the intention...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, when you are examining a witness directly, you are not to ask leading questions which put into his mouth the very answer that you desire. You are stating all sorts of things to this witness and then asking him "isn't that so?"

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. I shall make every effort to put my questions differently.

RAEDER: My answer is different anyway.

DR. SIEMERS: Yes?

RAEDER: We are dealing here, in the first place, with plans: I asked permission to revise the plans for these two armored ships; first, by strengthening their defensive weapons—that is, the armor-plating and underwater compartments—and then by increasing their offensive armaments—namely, by adding a third 28-centimeter instead of 26-centimeter

tower. The Führer was not yet willing to sanction, a new 28-centimeter tower because, as I said before, he did not in any circumstances want to prejudice the negotiations going on with Great Britain. To begin with, therefore, he sanctioned only a medium displacement of 18,000 to 19,000 tons; and we knew that when matters reached the stage where a third 28-centimeter tower could be mounted, the displacement would be about 25,000 to 26,000 tons.

We saw no cause to announce it at this stage, however, because it is customary in the Navy that new construction plans and especially new types of ships should be announced at the latest possible moment. That was the principal reason; and apart from that, Hitler did not want to draw the attention of other countries to these constructions by giving the figures mentioned or stating the very high speed. There was no other reason for not announcing these things.

DR. SIEMERS: I should like your comments on Number 2 of the document. That has been specially held against you by the Prosecution, because there you state the view that the fleet must be developed to oppose England later on.

RAEDER: At first—as I intended to explain later—we had taken the new French ships as our model. The French Navy was developing at that time the *Dunkerque* class with eight 33-centimeter guns and a high speed, and we took that for our model, especially since, in Hitler's opinion—as you will hear later—there was no question of arming against England. We intended to reconstruct these two armored ships on this pattern as battleships with nine 28-centimeter

guns and capable of a high speed. But then we heard that the *King George* class was being designed in England with 35.6-centimeter guns and, therefore, stronger than the French type; and so I said that we would in any case have to depart from the French type eventually and follow the English model which is now being built with 35-centimeter guns.

There is an error in the translation—namely, “oppose England.” It says in my text that developments should follow the lines of British developments—in other words, that we should design vessels similar in type to the English ships. But they were out of date, too, shortly afterwards, because France was then building ships of the *Richelieu* class with 38-centimeter guns. Therefore, we decided that we too would build ships with 38-centimeter guns. That was how the *Bismarck* came to be built. The word “oppose” would have been quite senseless at a time when we intended to come to an agreement with Britain on terms under which we could in no way vie with her.

DR. SIEMERS: Now we come to Point 3 of this document, which the Prosecution regard as equally important. I quote:

“The Führer demands complete secrecy with regard to the construction of U-boats—in consideration, also, of the Saar plebiscite.”

RAEDER: I have already referred to the Führer’s wish for secrecy in connection with both the construction of submarines and the preparations for that construction. This is one of the points on which he was most sensitive, because in no circumstances did he wish to prejudice the negotiations. He himself was generally extremely cautious during this period and would not in any circumstances do anything which might sabotage the naval pact which he was so eager to conclude.

DR. SIEMERS: I do not quite understand the reference to secrecy in connection with the construction of submarines. These were as yet not under construction, were they?

RAEDER: No. I said secrecy in connection with the preparations for the construction of submarines; that is just a short way of expressing it.

DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Document C-190, Exhibit USA-45. It is in Document Book Number 10 of the British Delegation, Page 67. This is a conversation which took place between Hitler and Raeder on 2 November 1934 aboard the *Emden*. In the document before you Hitler informs you that he considers it necessary to enlarge and improve the Navy by 1938 and that, if necessary, he would instruct Dr. Ley to place at the disposal of the Navy 120 to 150 million marks from the Labor Front.

Did you have anything at all to do with raising funds for rearmament?

RAEDER: No, not actually with the raising of funds. I applied for funds to the Reich Defense Minister, who allocated them to me for the purpose of this rearmament. I presume that this statement was made because the allocation sanctioned for the Navy appeared too small to me, and for this reason the Führer said that if necessary he would get Ley to act. This did not actually happen. I received my funds only through the Reich Defense Minister.

DR. SIEMERS: Although the charge made by the Prosecution is not quite clear to me, since it is based on Hitler's views—which have nothing to do with you—I want to come back to this sum once more. I may remind you that an armored cruiser of the old 10,000-ton class, which after all was small, cost 75 to 80 million. Could this figure of 120 to 150 million be large enough to put the Navy in a position to carry out rearmament on a large scale?

RAEDER: No, certainly not. Two battleships were also under construction, apart from those two armored cruisers. You can imagine that the costs continually increased.

DR. SIEMERS: So that this sum was not final?

RAEDER: No, it was not final.

DR. SIEMERS: Will you please go on, then, to Point 2. According to Point 2 of the document, you pointed out to

Hitler during this conference that it might be necessary to assemble six submarines during the first quarter of 1935.

RAEDER: I said this because I knew that at the beginning of 1935 we were going to aim at the re-establishment of the Armed Forces; and I thought that this might create a critical situation in respect to sanctions, which Hitler always expected, too. I assume that we were talking about this and that is why I suggested that if the necessity for any special preparations should arise out of the re-establishment of the Armed Forces then six submarines should be assembled, at a date previous to their proper date of assemblage, from those parts which were obtained from abroad.

DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler actually give the order?

RAEDER: No, the order was not given.

THE PRESIDENT: We might break off now.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-159, Exhibit USA-54. This document may be found in the British Delegation's Document Book 10a, Page 110. This document is a letter written by Von Blomberg on 2 March 1936, dealing with the demilitarized zone. Did you, Witness, make lengthy military preparations for the action which took place on 7 March 1936?

RAEDER: No, I made no lengthy preparations; I heard of the plan only through this document of 2 March. I may refer you