

Aristotle



*Organon - Prior
Analytics*

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Organon — Prior Analytics



Published by Good Press, 2022

goodpress@okpublishing.info

EAN 4064066465032

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Chapter 1

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It is first requisite to say what is the subject, concerning which, and why, the present treatise is undertaken, namely, that it is concerning demonstration, and for the sake of demonstrative science; we must afterwards define, what is a proposition, what a term, and what a syllogism, also what kind of syllogism is perfect, and what imperfect; lastly, what it is for a thing to be, or not to be, in a certain whole, and what we say it is to be predicated of every thing, or of nothing (of a class).

A proposition then is a sentence which affirms or denies something of something, and this is universal, or particular, or indefinite; I denominate universal, the being present with all or none; particular, the being present with something, or not with something, or not with every thing; but the indefinite the being present or not being present, without the universal or particular (sign); as for example, that there is the same science of contraries, or that pleasure is not good. But a demonstrative proposition differs from a dialectic in this, that the demonstrative is an assumption of one part of the contradiction, for a demonstrator does not interrogate, but assume, but the dialectic is an interrogation of contradiction. As regards however forming a syllogism from either proposition, there will be no difference between one and the other, since he who demonstrates and he who interrogates syllogize, assuming that something is or is not present with something. Wherefore a syllogistic proposition

will be simply an affirmation or negation of something concerning something, after the above-mentioned mode: it is however demonstrative if it be true, and assumed through hypotheses from the beginning, and the dialectic proposition is to him who inquires an interrogation of contradiction, but to him who syllogizes, an assumption of what is seen and probable, as we have shown in the Topics. What therefore a proposition is, and wherein the syllogistic demonstrative and dialectic differ, will be shown accurately in the following treatises, but for our present requirements what has now been determined by us may perhaps suffice. Again, I call that a "term," into which a proposition is resolved, as for instance, the predicate and that of which it is predicated, whether to be or not to be is added or separated. Lastly, a syllogism is a sentence in which certain things being laid down, something else different from the premises necessarily results, in consequence of their existence. I say that, "in consequence of their existence," something results through them, but though something happens through them, there is no need of any external term in order to the existence of the necessary (consequence). Wherefore I call a perfect syllogism that which requires nothing else, beyond (the premises) assumed, for the necessary (consequence) to appear: but an imperfect syllogism, that which requires besides, one or more things, which are necessary, through the supposed terms, but have not been assumed through propositions. But for one thing to be in the whole of another, and for one thing to be predicated of the whole of another, are the same thing, and we say it is predicated of the whole, when

nothing can be assumed of the subject, of which the other may not be asserted, and as regards being predicated of nothing, in like manner.

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SINCE every proposition is either of that which is present (simply), or is present necessarily or contingently, and of these some are affirmative, but others negative, according to each appellation; again, since of affirmative and negative propositions some are universal, others particular, and others indefinite, it is necessary that the universal negative proposition of what is present should be converted in its terms; for instance, if "no pleasure is good," "neither will any good be pleasure." But an affirmative proposition we must of necessity convert not universally, but particularly, as if "all pleasure is good," it is also necessary that "a certain good should be pleasure;" but of particular propositions, we must convert the affirmative proposition particularly, since if "a certain pleasure is good," so also "will a certain good be pleasure;" a negative proposition however need not be thus converted, since it does not follow, if "man" is not present with "a certain animal," that animal also is not present with a certain man.

Let then first the proposition A B be an universal negative; if A is present with no B, neither will B be present with any A, for if it should be present with some A, for example with C, it will not be true, that A is present with no B, since C is something of B. If, again, A is present with

every B, B will be also present with some A, for if with no A, neither will A be present with any B, but it was supposed to be present with every B. In a similar manner also if the proposition be particular, for if A be present with some B, B must also necessarily be present with some A, for if it were present with none, neither would A be present with any B, but if A is not present with some B, B need not be present with some A, for example, if B is "animal," but A, "man," for man is not present with "every animal," but "animal" is present with "every man."

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THE same system will hold good in necessary propositions, for an universal negative is universally convertible, but either affirmative proposition particularly; for if it is necessary that A should be present with no B, it is also necessary that B should be present with no A, for if it should happen to be present with any, A also might happen to be present with some B. But if A is of necessity present with every or with some certain B, B is also necessarily present with some certain A; for if it were not necessarily, neither would A of necessity be present with some certain B: a particular negative however is not converted, for the reason we have before assigned.

In contingent propositions, (since contingency is multifariously predicated, for we call the necessary, and the not necessary, and the possible, contingent,) in all affirmatives, conversion will occur in a similar manner, for if A is contingent to every or to some certain B, B may also be

contingent to some A; for if it were to none, neither would A be to any B, for this has been shown before. The like however does not occur in negative propositions, but such things as are called contingent either from their being necessarily not present, or from their being not necessarily present, (are converted) similarly (with the former); e. g. if a man should say, that it is contingent, for "a man," not to be "a horse," or for "whiteness" to be present with no "garment." For of these, the one, is necessarily not present, but the other, is not necessarily, present; and the proposition is similarly convertible, for if it be contingent to no "man" to be "a horse," it also concurs with no "horse" to be "a man," and if "whiteness" happens to no "garment," a "garment" also happens to no "whiteness;" for if it did happen to any, "whiteness" will also necessarily happen to "a certain garment," and this has been shown before, and in like manner with respect to the particular negative proposition. But whatever things are called contingent as being for the most part and from their nature, (after which manner we define the contingent,) will not subsist similarly in negative conversions, for an universal negative proposition is not converted, but a particular one is, this however will be evident when we speak of the contingent. At present, in addition to what we have said, let thus much be manifest, that to happen to nothing, or not to be present with any thing, has an affirmative figure, for "it is contingent," is similarly arranged with "it is," and "it is" always and entirely produces affirmation in whatever it is attributed to, e. g. "it is not good," or, "it is not white," or in short, "it is not this thing." This will however be shown in

what follows, but as regards conversions, these will coincide with the rest.

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THESE things being determined, let us now describe by what, when, and how, every syllogism is produced, and let us afterwards speak of demonstration, for we must speak of syllogism prior to demonstration, because syllogism is more universal, since, indeed, demonstration is a certain syllogism, but not every syllogism is demonstration.

When, then, three terms so subsist, with reference to each other, as that the last is in the whole of the middle, and the middle either is, or is not, in the whole of the first, then it is necessary that there should be a perfect syllogism of the extremes. But I call that the middle, which is itself in another, whilst another is in it, and which also becomes the middle by position, but the extreme that which is itself in another, and in which another also is. For if A is predicated of every B, and B of every C, A must necessarily be predicated of every C, for it has been before shown, how we predicate "of every;" so also if A is predicated of no B, but B is predicated of every C, A will not be predicated of any C. But if the first is in every middle, but the middle is in no last, there is not a syllogism of the extremes, for nothing necessarily results from the existence of these, since the first happens to be present with every, and with no extreme; so that neither a particular nor universal (conclusion) necessarily results, and nothing necessary resulting, there will not be through these a syllogism. Let the terms of being

present universally, be "animal," "man," "horse," and let the terms of being present with no one be "animal," "man," "stone." Since, then, neither the first term is present with the middle, nor the middle with any extreme, there will not thus be a syllogism. Let the terms of being present, be "science," "line," "medicine," but of not being present, "science," "line," "unity;" the terms then being universal, it is manifest in this figure, when there will and when there will not be a syllogism, also that when there is a syllogism, it is necessary that the terms should subsist, as we have said, and that if they do thus subsist there will evidently be a syllogism.

But if one of the terms be universal and the other particular, in relation to the other, when the universal is joined to the major extreme, whether affirmative or negative, but the particular to the minor affirmative, there must necessarily be a perfect syllogism, but when the (universal) is joined to the minor, or the terms are arranged in some other way, a (syllogism) is impossible. I call the major extreme that in which the middle is, and the minor that which is under the middle. For let A be present with every B, but B with some C, if then to be predicated "of every" is what has been asserted from the first, A must necessarily be present with some C, and if A is present with no B, but B with some C, A must necessarily not be present with some C, for what we mean by the being predicated of no one has been defined, so that there will be a perfect syllogism. In like manner, if B, C, being affirmative, be indefinite, for there will be the same syllogism, both of the indefinite, and of that which is assumed as a particular.