

CITIZENSHIP FOR THE LEARNING SOCIETY

EUROPE, SUBJECTIVITY, AND EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH

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Preface

The topic of citizenship education in Europe has rightly received much attention, both at the national level and at that of the European Union itself. The changing status of the Union reflects both its deep history (in effect, the origins of Western thought) and a significant facet of the flux of contemporary global politics. The self-understanding of those who live and work within the Union, as well, no doubt, as the perspectives of many who do not, are profoundly affected by these changes.

There can be no doubt that in the time since Naomi Hodgson first conceived of *Citizenship for the Learning Society*, its pertinence has steadily increased. The European Union, habitually struggling with its identity, now finds itself challenged on two fronts. The strength of its internal cohesion, and indeed of the scale of the project, has been a source of continual self-examination – involving doubts about the viability of its formidable bureaucracy, contestation over the reach of its legislation, and differences over how far a common identity is desirable. Among its member states, the United Kingdom has been the most consistently quarrelsome, with its commitment to the Union newly in question. The new nationalisms that beset the wider Europe in the 1990s have shown a minor resurgence, albeit in more peaceful and democratic forms. At the same time, and in a darker and altogether more threatening way, the growing economic disparities within the Union have raised the prospect of the effective expulsion of some of its members. On another front, Europe finds itself newly challenged by global unrest. War, political upheaval, and economic desperation outside the Union have led to new and critical pressures in terms of

immigration, while the ongoing realignment of superpowers has created a dynamic whose implications are real enough, however hard they may be to assess. It is difficult to fathom the massive challenges these matters raise in terms of human rights and international law, or the tensions they cause along borders, within and around the Union, literal and metaphorical, even as it is hard to credit the petty anomalies that also arise, in, for example, puffed-up notions of national identity and the absurdities of citizenship tests.

Amidst these practical changes, the significance of citizenship comes more fully to the fore, in both legal and notional terms. The efforts of the Union over at least the past two decades actively to promote a sense of belonging and identity among citizens have inevitably turned to educational institutions as a means to put this into effect. But they have not just done this, for the vision has been one that has embraced the new age as that of the learning society. The rhetorical force of this expression, aligned no doubt with ‘the knowledge economy’ and a range of neoliberal assumptions, has not been lost on policy-makers and planners, and the reiteration of the term has become *de rigueur*.

The present book comes to the market, so it would seem, alongside a range of other worthy studies of these developments. Indeed the prestige of the study of citizenship education has earned it a respectable share of European funding research, just as it has been the focus of innumerable, often earnest, doctoral projects. But appearances can be deceptive. In fact, the book you are now reading is altogether more original and important. Let me explain why.

Hodgson leads the reader through a convincing demonstration of the ways in which research in citizenship

education has itself become an agent in the construction of European citizenship – an agent that is, for the most part, unrecognised, hiding as it does behind the cloak of objectivity and detachment. Given the scale of research funding and of the extent of European university education, this is a matter of wide-ranging importance. It is a major achievement of this book that it shows the significance of this surreptitious construction of subjectivity in the person of the researcher. The attentive reader will find here no simple, formulaic solution to this problem but rather a patient revealing of ways in which things might be done otherwise, with benefits to research and education, and ultimately to society as a whole.

The critique of research and research methods training embedded in the book is complemented by its innovative and experimental approach to its central topic – that is, to the nature of Europe, to its self-understanding and constitution, as manifested in notions of citizenship and the learning society. The book provides a series of vantage points that, in combination, offer the reader not only new ways of understanding what is at stake here but also new prospects for realising their own positioning in relation to the project of such research. Indeed, the implications of the argument are wider than these remarks indicate because appreciation of what is said in this text should lead to a radical reassessment of so many of the taken-for-granted assumptions in educational and social science research. It is a conscientious contribution to the renewal of that practice.

Hodgson brings to these complex matters a clarity of style and approach, as well as an unwavering personal commitment, that are exemplary for rigorous thought about philosophical questions regarding education. It is an invaluable addition to the series.

Paul Standish
Series Editor

Acknowledgements

Much of what is presented in the chapters that follow has been developed from articles or conference presentations.

Chapter 2 draws in part on the following publication:

> Hodgson, N. (2010a) ‘European Citizenship and Evidence-Based Happiness’, in Smeyers, P. and Depaepe, M. (Eds) *The Ethics and Aesthetics of Statistics*, Dordrecht: Springer. Reprinted with permission of Springer.

Chapter 4 is a reworking of the following papers:

> Hodgson, N. (2009a) ‘Narrative and Social Justice in Educational Research from the Perspective of Governmentality’, *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 43 (4) pp. 559–572. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons Inc.
> Hodgson, N. and Standish, P. (2009) ‘The Uses and Misuses of Poststructuralism in Educational Research’, *International Journal of Research and Method in Education*, 32 (3) pp. 309–326. Reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd.
> Hodgson, N. (2009b) ‘The Educationalisation of Social Problems and the Educationalisation of Educational Research: The Example of Citizenship Education’, in Smeyers, P. and Depaepe, M. (Eds) *Educational Research: The Educationalisation of Social Problems*, Dordrecht: Springer. Reprinted with permission of Springer. This appeared in revised form as: Hodgson, N. (2008) ‘Citizenship Education, Policy, and the Educationalisation of Educational Research’,

Educational Theory, 58 (4) pp. 417–434. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Hodgson, N. and Standish, P. (2006) 'Induction into Educational Research Networks: The Striated and the Smooth', *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 40 (4) pp. 563-574. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Hodgson, N. (2009c) 'The Language of Education and the Language of Educational Research: The Knowledge Economy, Citizenship and Subjectivation', in Smeyers, P. and Depaepe, M. (Eds) *Educational Research: Proofs, Arguments, and other Reasonings*, Dordrecht: Springer. Reprinted with permission of Springer.

Chapter 6 draws in part on:

Hodgson, N. (2011a) 'Citizenship and Scholarship in Emerson, Cavell, and Foucault', *Ethics and Education*, 6 (1) pp. 85–100. Reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Ltd.

Chapter 7 is a reworking of the following publications:

Hodgson, N. (2010b) 'What Does It Mean to be an Educated Person?' Winning essay of the PESGB Student Essay Competition 2009, *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 44 (1) pp. 109–123. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons Inc.
Hodgson, N. (2009d) 'European Citizenship: Economy, Parrhesia, and Sublimation', Proceedings of 2nd IoE-Kyoto Colloquium.
The following develop the work that informs Chapters 2, 3, 6, and 7:
Hodgson, N. (2011b) 'Dialogue and its Conditions: The Construction of European Citizenship', *Policy Futures in*

Education, 9 (1) pp. 43–56. Reprinted with permission of Sage.

Hodgson, N. (2012) 'Seeking a Common Language: European Citizenship and the Governance of Dialogue', in Besley, T. and Peters, M. (Eds) *Interculturalism, Education and Dialogue*, New York: Peter Lang. Reprinted with permission of Peter Lang.

Hodgson, N. and Standish, P. (2014) 'Professor, Citizen, Parrhesiastes', in Laker, J., Mjrnaus, K., and Naval, C. (Eds) *Citizenship and Democracy in the University: Theory and Practice in Europe, Canada, and the United States*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Reprinted with permission of Palgrave Macmillan.

Hodgson, N. (2016) '"Too Busy for Thoughts": Stress, Tiredness and Finding a Home in the University', in Smeyers, P. and Depaepe, M. (Eds) *Educational Research: Discourses of Change and Changes of Discourse*, Springer. Reprinted with permission of Springer.

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1
Introduction

CITIZENSHIP IN THE LEARNING SOCIETY

Educational responses to social problems are often triggered by a sense of crisis. Increased individualism, the breakdown of the traditional family, lack of voter engagement, a lack of skills in the workforce, radicalisation, globalisation, environmental degradation, and, of course, the global economic crisis are among the pressing issues currently seen to require (educational) policy solutions. Educational research is expected to produce findings that provide such solutions. Education policy is part of the solution to these present and future problems: it is to produce the right citizens with the right knowledge and skills to respond to and adapt to these socioeconomic challenges.

In this book, the focus is on how ‘citizenship’ is addressed in the context of education or, more specifically, learning, which is understood as central to the government of individuals and societies in Europe today. In particular, the focus is on the ways in which a form of European citizenship has taken shape, a form that no longer takes the nation-state as its frame of reference, that articulates the individual in relation to a shifted conception of time and space in which we are asked to account for ourselves in particular ways that make our citizenship evident.

Bernard Crick, who had chaired the UK Advisory Group on Citizenship, wrote:

> Nearly everywhere that there is citizenship education in schools – say in every country in the European Community (including now, or very soon, England, last of all as usual), the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand – some historically contingent sense of crisis has been the trigger, not a reflection that knowledge of the political and social institutions of a country should be a normal entitlement of children growing towards an all too adult world
>
> (Crick, 1999, p. 338).

The introduction of citizenship in general is understood by Crick as a response to the need to address particular social problems, then, not in the name of providing a political education. Educational research has provided numerous critical responses to the citizenship education introduced in the UK and elsewhere. For example, critics sought to show, from a social justice perspective, how the citizenship education curriculum further entrenched historical exclusions – for example, along race or gender lines – or from a neo-Marxist perspective, how the curriculum was designed to stifle dissent (reviews of such literature are provided by, for example, Davies, 2001 and Osler and Starkey, 2005). The lack of a strong political dimension to the citizenship education curriculum was seen to continue a historical trend of wanting to avoid the charge of indoctrination (see for example Davies, 1999; Pring, 1999). In the response of educational research, what ‘citizenship’ is has largely been taken for granted. That is, it is taken to refer to the relationship, or the contract, between the individual and the state, determined by one’s place of birth but also of residence. The ‘rightness’ of the current policy articulation of citizenship for a democratic society is thus often assessed according to normative accounts provided by liberal political theory, Critical Theory, feminist theory, etc. In philosophy of education, studies of citizenship often

drawn on liberal political philosophy in the Anglophone tradition (McLaughlin, 2000; Bridges, 1997; White, 1996). But as Andrew Barry *et al.* (1996) have argued, the current form of government cannot be theorised in term of 'the oppositions that have sufficed for so long: State and civil society, economy and family, public and private, coercion and freedom' (p. 2). These binaries cannot take account of:

> a form of government that combines action by political and non-political authorities, communities, and individuals. And the relations of force, of power, of subordination, of liberation and 'responsibilization', of collective allegiance and individual choice that are brought into being in these new configurations (p. 2).

The political context in which 'citizenship' is formulated today no longer refers to the discrete, sovereign nation-state in which the concept emerged. Furthermore, the role of education itself, and within this, of research, has also shifted as Europe and its member states, and the rest of the developed world, have sought to resituate themselves in a global knowledge economy in which they compete with emerging economies. Citizenship no longer refers only to legal rights and to residence or birth in a sovereign territory, but to a disposition towards or orientation to a set of values relating to learning and self-improvement in a particular environment. In this book, the work of Michel Foucault is drawn upon to provide not only a way in which to understand and to critique the current context, through the perspective of governmentality, but also, with reference to his historical work on subjectivity and ethics, to explore how we might understand ourselves differently within it. Part of Foucault's turn to a concern with subjectivity and ethics in the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition came not only from the seemingly abstract death of God and death of Man, but from what he observed as the very real failure of

political movements ‘to offer an alternative to the modes of subjectivity, to the way in which human beings were constituted as subjects in the modern world’, in their challenge to ‘the ossified political regimes of his time’ (Milchman and Rosenberg, 2007, p. 51):

> The political movements of the left based their opposition to the prevailing power relations in society on the existence of a purported authentic subject or self, buried under a false consciousness and technologies of power, from which humankind had to liberate itself. Foucault believed that there was no authentic subject, no hidden human essence, the discovery and liberation of which would free us from relations of domination. Instead, new forms of the subject had to be invented, created, if the prevailing technologies of domination and control were to be challenged (p. 51).

He did not claim that such invention was something one achieved once and for all. As his understanding of philosophy as a way of life indicates, practices of subjectivation and desubjectivation, in his terms, were and are ongoing. Foucault was drawn to Greco-Roman literature not for the content of its ethics, but for ‘the way in which the question of ethics was problematized’, and in particular to the form of philosophy made possible by Socratic thought, ‘based on care of the self, with a focus on self-fashioning’ (pp. 52–53).

Foucault introduced the term ‘subjectivation’ in the context of his concern with how we constitute ourselves as ethical subjects:

> While [his earlier term] *assujettissement* pertains to how one is produced as a subject through the exercise of power/knowledge, including the modalities of resistance through which that exercise can be modified or attenuated, subjectivation pertains to the relationship of the individual to him/herself; to the multiple ways in which a self can be construed on the basis of what one takes to be the truth (p. 54).

On this basis, one seeks a way of life, a way of acting in the world that corresponds to this truth and thus is an ongoing process of critique.

The concern in this book, then, is not primarily with how education can (through better designed curriculum or pedagogy) produce the desired form of active democratic citizenship for today's learning society or an imagined future society. Rather, it is with who the citizen is who is addressed by education understood as it currently is. This book is concerned in particular with the way in which 'European citizenship' is understood in current policy, the way in which the term 'citizenship' operates, and how learning is central to this. The focus is on European citizenship as a form of subjectivity; that is, the relation of the individual to him/herself that this understanding of citizenship constitutes. Examples of European educational and cultural policy and the practices that issue from it illustrate the particular self-understanding that is required of the European citizen by showing how we are addressed, and the ways in which we are asked to account for ourselves. The particular role that education plays in the constitution of citizenship, and thus of ourselves as subjects, requires an analysis that is not restricted to the educational scene but that takes into account the way in which education, or more specifically learning, appears across different policy areas concerned with fostering European citizenship. As such, examples are provided not

only of education policy but also cultural policy in order to show the particular way in which Europe and the European citizen are understood and addressed and the role of learning in this mode of government. It is shown that notions of having a voice, articulating one's perceptions and opinions, and reflecting on and articulating one's identity in relation to Europe as a particular configuration of time and space is constitutive of a particular mode of subjectivation today.

The means of understanding the current political context and the practices by which we are made subjects is taken in particular from Foucault's understanding of governmentality (Foucault, 2002a). This enables us to approach the question of European enlargement and integration not in terms of a top-down relationship between the state and individuals but rather in terms of power relations and the production of a particular type of power in the interrelationship between actions. More recent secondary work in governmentality studies, in the fields of educational philosophy, sociology, and anthropology, updates Foucault's analysis and illustrates the operation of the particular neoliberal mode of governance in which the European context can be understood.

In recent European policy, learning has been central to the conceptualisation of society and of the individual, as it has sought to recast Europe as a learning society (Masschelein *et al.*, 2007). Following Foucault's concept of governmentality in their analysis of this current political rationality, Maarten Simons and Jan Masschelein describe this interrelationship in terms of the 'governmentalisation of learning' (Simons and Masschelein, 2008b, p. 192). Delanty (2003) cites the introduction of citizenship classes for immigrants in the UK, the introduction of citizenship education in England and Wales, and the Austrian proposal for a compulsory cultural programme for immigrants, as

examples of the governmentalisation of learning and citizenship, or as he terms it, the ‘governmentalisation of citizenship as a learning process’ (Delanty, 2003, pp. 598–599). In this context, citizenship is something for which the individual is asked to be responsible, an aspect of one’s life with which we should be explicitly concerned. Alongside our work, health, education, personal relationships, and social life, our citizenship is an object for personal improvement, and thus forms part of how we are made subjects today: citizenship is now related to ‘projects to reform individuals at the level of their personal skills and competencies’ (Barry *et al.*, 1996, p. 1). The way in which the individual is addressed in terms of citizenship is analysed here, then, from an educational perspective in the sense that the account is concerned with how education is construed in a particular mode of government, rather than with what education ought to do to produce a particular form of citizenship.

The emergence of neoliberalism during the 1980s and 1990s is often summarised with reference to former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s phrase, ‘there’s no such thing as society’; society was rejected for the market, the citizen became a consumer (Delanty, 2003, p. 75). This political rationality, ‘based upon principles of rights designed to enhance individual choice’ (Ranson, 2003, p. 162), became pervasive in particular across the UK, America, New Zealand, and Australia. Its Thatcherite version was superseded, in the UK, by the New Labour version: Third Way-ism (Delanty, 2003). Developed by the sociologist Anthony Giddens (1998), the politics of the Third Way combines neoliberalism ‘with a basic commitment to the social welfare programme and the idea of the responsible state’ (Delanty, 2003, p. 75). But this commitment to social welfare is not a return to ‘the welfare state’; instead the individual citizen/consumer is addressed

in terms of their responsibility, the possibility of access to knowledge to empower the individual to shape their own life (p. 76). In recent years, the role of the state has shifted further, becoming an enabler of individual responsibility, providing the framework within which individuals can take responsibility for their own education, health, and social care needs and further enabling the market to provide the direct services the consumer might require.

Of course, governments across European Union (EU) member states are not uniform in their style nor in their position or attitude towards the EU. The creation of Europe, however, has required shared practices and standardisation that make competing activities measurable, compatible, comparable, and, by these means, governable. These changes are marked by a shift from the use of the term ‘government’ to the discourse of ‘governance’. The term is evident in the discourse of European integration, both at the level of the EU and its member states, but also across business and public services. The use of the term ‘governance’ is derived from academic texts, Cris Shore notes, and is described in one EU report as ‘the post-modern form of economic and political organisations’ (cited in Shore, 2006, p. 712). But ‘despite this evidence of scholarly reading, the Commission’s deployment of the term is noticeably narrow, partial and instrumental’ (p. 712). The discourse of governance is associated with, in Romano Prodi’s terms, ‘an inherently more levelling and democratic institutional arrangement’ (Prodi, 2000, in Shore, 2006, p. 712). Governance transcends government; it is ‘a system in which power is located not in bounded, singular, or sovereign states, but in rules, processes, and multi-level institutions’ (Shore, 2006, p. 712). It is a form of governing commensurate with the decentralisation associated with neoliberalism, but articulated in terms of

transparency, accountability, and social justice in accordance with Third Way thinking.

AUDIT, VOICE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The term ‘audit society’ has been used to describe these policy arrangements. In Shore’s terms, ‘audit society’ or ‘audit culture’ refer ‘to contexts in which the techniques and values of accountancy have become a central organizing principle in the governance and management of human conduct – and the new kinds of relations, habits and practices that this is creating’ (Shore, 2008, p. 279). While he does understand this shift as symptomatic of neoliberalism, he gives it greater historical significance as ‘a process that is remodelling our public sector institutions, refashioning working environments, and transforming our sense of our “selves”’ (p. 280). He relates it also to what is termed the ‘risk society’ (Beck *et al.*, 1994), seen in the concern with quality assurance, risk assessment, and the restoration of trust in professional and political life. Ranson indicates the implications of the growth in the demand for accountability, noting a shift since the 1980s from accountability being a ‘general expectation’, that is, being more or less taken for granted, to being ‘a process of increasing specification and regulation’ and ‘from being conceived as “an event” to being embodied as a disposition’ (Ranson, 2003, p. 167):

> There is an inexorable tendency for the event to become a continuous process, an orientation to shape and reshape the course of practice. There is an orientation to action embodied in the purposes and relations of accountability … Those who initiate schemes of accountability want it to become a routine disposition of public service professionals shaping their modes of thinking, feeling, speaking and acting (p. 169).

As this and the idea of the governmentalisation of citizenship and learning indicate, the demand for auditing, accountability, and visibility applies not only to organisations and governments, but also to individuals. Nowhere is this more apparent than in education, where not only are school children subject to unprecedented levels of testing, but these scores produce statistics that enable the benchmarking and comparison between individuals, schools, regions, and countries. The same is evident at all levels of education, from ‘early years’ to university settings, in academic, vocational, and work-place learning, and for the teacher, researcher, and administrator as much as for the student. We are all cast as learners: we must all be aware of our performance level and our learning needs, and are required to address them. In higher education, for example, a university department’s ranking depends on an individual’s understanding herself as ‘research active’ and on the production of rankable publications (see Shore, 2008). The concern with accounting not only refers to explicitly quantitative measures, however, but also to narrative accounts: for example, students’ individual learning profiles, the requirement for educators to maintain learning journals for reflective practice in order to facilitate continuous self-improvement, and the use of ‘blogs’ as a means of communicating one’s progress on a training course. Also, narrative and life history have become increasingly popular research methods in the social sciences in recent years. As Shore puts it, drawing on Foucault:

> [T]hese new systems of audit are not, as they claim, just neutral or politically innocent practices designed to promote ‘transparency’ or efficiency: rather, they are disciplinary technologies – or techniques of the self – aimed at instilling new norms of conduct into the workforce
>
> (Foucault, 1977; 1980; Rose, 1999) (Shore, 2008, p. 283).

This context requires and produces a particular form of subjectivity. Techniques of governance, such as the auditing practices found across all aspects of our lives today, are understood as requiring ‘flexible selves’ (Shore, 2008, p. 284; Fejes, 2008), ‘workers who do not need to be supervised but who “govern themselves” through the exercise of introspection, calculation, and judgement (Rose and Miller, 1992)’ (Shore, 2008, p. 284). The required form of subjectivity, as will be explored further in this book, has also been identified as responsibilised (Rose, 1999), adaptable, entrepreneurial (Masschelein and Simons, 2002), and ecological (Simons, 2009; Simons and Hodgson, 2012). This mode of governance ‘seeks to act on and through the agency, interests, desires, and motivations of individuals’ (Shore, 2008, p. 284).

The shift in the mode of governance coincident with the enlargement and further integration of the European Union has been subject to widespread critique largely on the basis of a concern for the accountability of governing bodies to their citizens and for the possibility of democratic participation in these new post-national configurations. In earlier accounts, for example, in the work of Delanty (2003), drawing on Axel Honneth, Pierre Bourdieu, and Richard Sennett, and also in the work of Stewart Ranson (2003), which draws on Alasdair MacIntyre and Jürgen Habermas, the solution to this democratic deficit and lack of accountability was seen to lie in more dialogic

arrangements, emphasising the value of narrative, and the need to enable citizens' voices to be heard in a reconfigured public space. Since then, such language has become central to the way in which European and national governments have sought to address issues of accountability to their citizens and to encourage participation. New technologies have changed the possibilities for participation and critique as well as for monitoring and measuring and have been harnessed by governments as a means not only of communicating with citizens but also of measuring participation.

One example is the EU's web portal 'Your Voice in Europe'. The site consists of three parts: Consultations, providing a list of links to current policy initiatives under consultation; Discussions, linking to online forums on 'Youth' and 'Multilingualism', and to the blogs of European Commissioners; and Other Tools, providing links to contact MEPs, committees, other sources of advice and information, and opinion polls to see 'what your fellow Europeans think about the EU'. The site therefore combines the interests of business with those of citizens in general, and encourages youth as well as adult participation. The site was 'set up in the context of the Interactive Policy Making initiative':

> The objective of the Interactive Policy Making (IPM) initiative is to use modern technologies, particularly the Internet, to allow both Member State administrations and EU institutions to understand the needs of citizens and enterprises better. It is intended to assist policy development by allowing more rapid and targeted responses to emerging issues and problems, improving the assessment of the impact of policies (or the absence of them) and providing greater accountability to citizens.[1]

The Initiative forms part of the Commission's Minimum Standards on Consultation and aims at improving European governance and introducing Better Regulation[2] (the capitalisation of which phrases shows that this refers to formalised standards and regulations, and is not just a general reference to the fact that they exist). The tools and possibilities of communication between the EU and its citizens here illustrates how across levels and sectors, particular forms of accounting for oneself have become part of political and social practice. It is not only citizens who are asked to give and to have an opinion on Europe; MEPs are also asked to account for themselves, for example, through blogging, and are made directly contactable by email. In turn such practices are measurable as evidence of the EU's accountability, its commitment to enabling citizens to have a voice, in a European public space.

The EU also seeks to engage its citizens through social media, which they might come across without directly seeking out a means of contact with the EU, through its EUTube channel on youtube.com[3] (slogan 'Broadcast Yourself'). The site provides access to videos promoting aspects of European Commission activity. For example, a video entitled 'Europe and You' presents, through images and text with upbeat backing music, the action the EU has taken for you, the European citizen. Alongside global political and humanitarian issues such as fighting hunger in the poorest countries, animal protection, and climate change, it names reducing mobile phone roaming charges, making online shopping hassle-free, and giving bank customers value for money, as well as fighting dementia. Here the claims are as much consumerist as they are political. In another video, 'Our Europe, Our Union', using a similar format and backed by a song entitled 'Bran Nue Dae' (Brand New Day), emphasis is placed on our

freedoms: ‘These freedoms are the achievements we Europeans have obtained through the European Union’. These include: the expansion of rights and justice to an enlarged Europe, illustrated with pictures of homosexual couples and a heterosexual couple with a young baby being cared for by the male partner; the freedom to travel afforded by the Schengen Agreement; the provision of health cover to Europeans by the national health systems of the member states; the abolition of the death penalty through the Charter of Fundamental Rights; and the possibility of student mobility through the Erasmus programme. These measures are described thus:

> The freedom to study, to live, to enjoy life without restrictions, to chase your dreams across a continent, to be who ever and what ever you wish, and the ultimate freedom … the freedom to vote for the party of your choice. The guarantee that our countries will be democratic and live with our fellow citizens in peace [sic].

The video tells us who the European is: she is free to choose how to live her life and where to live it, but that freedom hinges on her voting, on her upholding the democratic way of life as a central European value. The video expresses the mobility, flexibility, and entrepreneurialism of the European citizen, and interpellates the individual as European. Alongside the numerous videos from which one can choose there is also a forum in which one can participate. Unlike the more formal discussion that might take place on the ‘Your Voice in Europe’ forum, here the comments are more personal opinion than political analysis, as might be seen on other social media comment fora. The possibility of commenting in this way, and the access to advertisements/infomercials/public information films, is

indicative of the increasingly individual and personalised way we are addressed by and engage with media today. This has raised the question for many over how meaningful citizenship is in the context of privatised and personalised public space, in which the citizen is addressed as a consumer in terms of the lifestyle choice Europe might represent to her (e.g. Newman and Tonkens, 2011). The term ‘prosumer’ (Toffler, 1970) was coined to refer to the individual as both producer and consumer and became more commonly used to refer to the reflexivity present in our relationship to the production of knowledge and information: the constant feedback demanded and provided by citizens, the video footage provided to news producers by mobile phones (user-generated content), and the way in which the content that we access online determines those links and advertisements that will appear to us in the future. More recently the term ‘produser’ has been suggested in light of new modes of collaborative production (Bruns, 2009). The way in which public and private are reconfigured by processes of personalisation and privatisation of public services, and the implications of this for democracy, are beyond the scope of this book, but are necessary and important areas of scholarship, particularly in educational terms (see Masschelein and Simons, 2013; Peters and Britez, 2008).

The concern with voice, narrative, and accounting for oneself in the name of democracy and social justice has become central to the discourses and practices of citizenship in the learning society. The critical analysis offered here is not intended to suggest that the provision of open and direct means of communication with elected representatives does not really constitute democratic participation, or that such engagement is futile in the face of larger political agendas. There is no question that, for example, new technologies have enabled critical and

previously impossible communication of injustice and expression of dissent. The concern here is rather with the language in which formal participation is conducted, particularly in a context in which feedback and critique are now a central part of the functioning of democratic and personal accountability (Masschelein, 2004), and with the mode of subjectivation it effects.

HERITAGE

Since the formal creation of European citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 (OJEU, 1992), numerous policies and schemes have been advanced to foster a ‘European’ identity among the citizenry. Cris Shore’s (2000) ethnographic work on European integration illustrates how history – or, more specifically, a cultural heritage – was used in early policy measures after 1992 to foster a sense of European identity:

> [T]he new Europe is being constructed on much the same symbolic terrain as the old nation-states of the last two centuries. Flags, anthems, passports, trophies, medals and maps are all icons for evoking the presence of the emergent state, only instead of national sovereignty it is the EU institutions and ideals that are emphasized and endorsed
>
> (Shore, 2000, p. 50).

In addition, European events were established to make Europe visible to its citizens such as competitions and the naming of Years and Days as events of European import, and educational schemes to encourage mobility. Since these early, large-scale symbols and events were introduced, reminiscent of the formation of nation-states as Shore suggests, the promotion of European citizenship has shifted. Early measures seeking to transcend the nation-

state, associated with the ideology of nationalism are now replaced or enhanced by more molecular and ingrained practices, which have accompanied the rise of the audit culture and produce the forms of accountability and participation that create 'Europe'. While early attempts to create a sense of European identity did mirror the way in which nation-states sought to produce national identity in the nineteenth century, through the production of large-scale symbols of nationhood such as maps, flags, currency, anthems, etc. (p. 50), analysis in terms of a nation-state/European state binary does not account for the role that member states play in the production of a mode of governance and of a particular orientation of its citizens to themselves. The centrality of learning to the self-understanding of the citizen does not so much inculcate a particular knowledge of history in the name of securing allegiance to a nation-state, or European superstate, but rather interpellates this citizen into a different relation to time and space.

The creation of a European space of higher education is an example of how the creation of Europe and of European citizenship entails a reconceptualisation of space: national borders are no longer barriers but markers of the diversity of Europe, which is understood as a resource on which it, and we, can capitalise. Space, in the form of Europe's heritage recast as part of the cultural industries, and time, in the form of history no longer as a fixed, linear evolution but as a series of events and opportunities, are both reconceptualised in the current mode of governance.

The Bologna Treaty[4] for the creation of a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) inculcates all higher education institutions, their systems of accreditation, their staff and students, into a regime of accountability that entails becoming compatible, comparable, and thus competitive, internally and externally. The rationale for the EHEA, as is

common to large-scale European policy initiatives, makes reference to the relationship between these present and future modes of governance and a shared European heritage:

> Building on our rich and diverse European cultural heritage, we are developing an EHEA based on institutional autonomy, academic freedom, equal opportunities and democratic principles that will facilitate mobility, increase employability and strengthen Europe's attractiveness and competitiveness (Ministers responsible for Higher Education in the countries participating in the Bologna Process, London Communiqué, May 2007; p. 2).[5]

The European heritage is referred to here in very general terms, as values rather than as specific historical events or movements. The use of heritage marks a shift from the way in which a national history was constructed and promoted during the formation of the nation-states, and from the promotion of Europe emphasising large-scale symbols such as flags and anthems. While there is not one European history that is promoted, the promotion of heritage as a learning resource and as part of the cultural industries, foregrounds particular aspects of history. As the description of the European Heritage Label scheme states: 'These sites celebrate and symbolise European integration, ideals, values and history. They are carefully selected for their symbolic value, the role they have played in the European history, and the activities they offer in order to bring the European Union and its citizens closer together.'[6] Now, heritage becomes part of and enables the promotion of the European values and lifestyle in relation to which the individual is asked to understand herself and her own personal narrative. Analysis of recent policy initiatives relating to the promotion of heritage in Europe in Part One

of this book will illustrate the relationship between heritage, citizenship, and learning. The active way in which individuals are asked to relate to their European heritage is measured as a form of participation, and therefore contributes evidence of active citizenship. It also promotes a particular relationship to history, in which it is presented as a learning resource, and thus as something on which the individual can capitalise for the future.

It is not the use of history or heritage to foster citizenship, or the particular narrative that is constructed of Europe in doing so that is the central focus of the critique here. Rather, the analysis draws attention to a shift in the way in which history as heritage operates in the self-understanding of the individual. Foucault is often noted for his historical accounts, genealogies, which precisely seek to disrupt a linear, totalising account of history. While the analysis here does not provide a genealogy of, for example, our current notion of citizenship, Foucault's account of genealogy, drawing on Nietzsche, indicates the relationship between the problematisation of history and of the subject that is relevant to the analysis here. In Foucault's essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' (Foucault, 1991a), he draws from across Nietzsche's writing to explore the implications of Nietzsche's critique of the traditional study of history. Nietzsche's opposition to history as a search for identity and as reminiscence shows how his thought informed not only Foucault's genealogical approach to the study of history but also his understanding of the subject and ethics.

The term 'parodic' is used by Foucault to indicate Nietzsche's opposition to history as reminiscence or recognition. The term reflects Nietzsche's disdain for the way in which history traditionally renders a poor imitation of life. He sees such history as devoted to veneration and thus accuses it 'of barring access to the actual intensities and creations of life' (Foucault, 1991a, p. 94). In his

development of the idea of genealogy, Foucault states that Nietzsche challenges ‘the pursuit of the origin (*Ursprung*)… because it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities; because this search assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession’ (p. 78). Foucault takes from Nietzsche that: ‘What is found at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things. It is disparity’ (p. 79). For Foucault, the idea of disparity or discontinuity is paradoxical: ‘because it is both an instrument and an object of research’ (Foucault, 2005 [1972/1969], p. 10). It is this that offers the historian his object of study: ‘on what basis, in fact, could he speak without this discontinuity that offers him history – and his own history – as an object?’ (p. 10). The identification of disparity provides for Foucault the focus for the problematisation of the assumption of the inevitable linearity of history and the essential givenness of aspects of it.

Nietzsche contrasts history as the search for origins with genealogy’s identification of *Herkunft*, ‘the equivalent of stock or descent’ (Foucault, 1991a, p. 80). The idea of descent is not used in an essentialising sense. For Foucault: ‘The analysis of descent permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition and displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost events’ (p. 81). This displacement refers to that which is seen in traditional history as the obstacle the account needs to smooth over becoming the focus of interest for genealogy, as it is here that shifts in a mode of being are located. Foucault is keen to stress that this approach to history is not oriented toward the instatement of another truth, that of the way in which ‘the past actively exists in the present, that it

continues secretly to animate the present' (p. 81). Neither is it concerned with evolution and destiny:

> On the contrary, to follow the complex course of descent is to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents (p. 81).

Neither is genealogy concerned solely with the search for descent. Foucault draws attention to Nietzsche's focus on *Enstehung*, emergence. Emergence, indicating a shift or change of form, is produced through the interaction and struggle of forces through which, for example, degeneration of the species is avoided and strength regained (pp. 83–84). Even when there is not a threat from outside, a form of struggle takes place internally between, in Nietzsche's terms, 'egoisms turned against each other' (p. 84). Emergence 'always occurs in the interstice' (p. 85), implying the product of the interaction, the new form that emerges in conflict within and between, and it is this to which the attention of genealogy is oriented.

Nietzsche's critique of history in the traditional sense was also directed at the suprahistorical – that which aimed 'to compose the finally reduced diversity of time into a totality fully closed in upon itself' (p. 86): 'Effective history deprives the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature, and it will not permit itself to be transported by a voiceless obstinacy toward a millennial ending. It will uproot its traditional foundations and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity. This is because knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting' (p. 88). The

‘effective history’ that Foucault identifies in Nietzsche’s work has been defined by Mitchell Dean as historicising ‘that which is thought to be transhistorical … An effective history both refuses to use history to assure us of our own identity and the necessity of the present, and also problematises the imposition of suprahistorical or global theory’ (Dean, 1994, p. 18).

The critique of the traditional understanding of history, then, has implications for the understanding of the history or narrative in relation to which the subject is asked to situate herself, which is taken up here in relation to the use of heritage. In Foucault’s thought there is a problematising of the unquestioning inheritance of bodies of knowledge as given entities through an acknowledgement of their questionability, and through the possibility of cutting, perhaps to reveal their internal construction and so to dismantle it.

The target of Foucault’s critique is not only the understanding of history, but also the fixed understanding of the human subject. On this basis he criticises the academic adoption of Marxism, which he identifies as exhibiting ‘a very serious defect’: ‘that of assuming that the human subject, the subject of knowledge, and forms of knowledge themselves are somehow given beforehand and definitely, and that economic, social and political conditions of existence are merely laid or imprinted on this definitively given subject’ (Foucault, 2002c, p. 2). In Foucault’s thought, it is the human subject itself that remains a question. Configurations of power, history, culture, and politics provide the conditions for the possibility of a particular subject to appear. This is the focus of Part One of this book: identifying the language of citizenship and education, and its distinction from earlier forms, which brings about new forms of subjectivity and, therefore, requires a new mode of critique.