GLOBAL DISPLACEMENTS

The Making of Uneven Development in the Caribbean

Marion Werner

WILEY Blackwell

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Antipode Book Series Editors

List of Abbreviations

ADIH
Association des Industries d’Haïti (Haitian Industry Association)

APEDI
Asociación para el desarollo, Inc. (Association for Development, Inc.)

CARICOM
Caribbean Community

CBERA
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act

CBI
Caribbean Basin Initiative

CBTPA
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act

CD
Convergence Démocratique (Democratic Convergence)

CMT
Cut-make-trim

CNZFE
Consejo nacional de zonas francas de exportación (National Trade Zone Council)

CODEVI
Compagnie de Développement Industriel (Industrial Development Company)

DR-CAFTA
Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement

DSNCRP

Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté (National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction)

FEDOTRAZONAS
Federación dominicana de trabajadores de zonas francas (Dominican Federation of Trade Zone Workers)

FL
Fanmi Lavalas (Lavalas Family)

FTZ
Free trade zone

GATT
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP
Gross Domestic Product

GSP
General System of Preferences

GOH
Government of Haiti

HOPE
Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act

IDB
Inter-American Development Bank

IFC
International Finance Corporation

IFI
International financial institution

IHRC
Interim Haiti Recovery Commission

ILO
International Labor Organization

IMF

International Monetary Fund

ISI

Import substitution industrialization

ITUC

International Trade Union Confederation

MFA

Multifibre Arrangement

MINUSTAH

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

NAFTA

North American Free Trade Agreement

OAS

Organization of American States

OPT

Outward processing trade

PARDN

Plan d'Action pour le Relèvement et le Développement National d'Haïti (Action Plan for National Recovery and Development)

PNUD

Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el desarollo (United Nations Development Programme)

PRSP

Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

SOKOWA

Sendika Ouvriye Codevi Wanament (Union of Codevi Workers, Ouanaminthe)

UN

United Nations

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

WTO

World Trade Organization

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Acknowledgements

I owe a great debt to those who started me on this path and accompanied my journey long before I ever thought of writing a book: Altha Cravey, Tyrell Haberkorn, Leon Fink, Maria Mejía Perez, Monica Felipe Alvarez, Lynda Yanz, and Jennifer Hill, as well as the writings of Chandra Mohanty and Cynthia Enloe.

The research for this book began in 2004. I am grateful to the University of Minnesota's Department of Geography, the Graduate School, and the Interdisciplinary Center for the Study of Global Change (formerly the Macarthur Program) for generously funding my fieldwork and graduate studies. The University of Minnesota offered a vibrant intellectual community. I am deeply appreciative of my teachers and mentors who generously gave of their time and offered many insights as this project developed: Vinay Gidwani, Kale Fajardo, Abdi Samatar, Michael Goldman, and the community of graduate students in the Department of Geography and the Macarthur Program. I am especially grateful to Eric Sheppard and Richa Nagar who guided this project at its early stages and who have become role models and friends over the past decade as I entered the academy as a faculty member. Richa's indefatigable commitment to knowledge production that is accountable to working women and men in the global South has been a constant source of inspiration to me. I owe much to Eric's work on uneven development as well as to his singular style of accompanying an intellectual process: at once rigorous, respectful, and unbelievably patient.

Numerous individuals and institutions made my work in the Dominican Republic possible. Robin Derby connected me to local academics and persistently supported me to pursue a research agenda in the country. José-Leopoldo Artiles provided invaluable intellectual encouragement, insights, and contacts. I am also grateful to Pavel Isa, Miguel Ceada-Hatton, Lourdes Pantaleón, Leopoldo Valverde, Haroldo Dilla, and Bridgette Wooding. Andrew Schrank generously offered initial background information and contacts with the trade zone sector. I am grateful to the executive director and staff of the Association of Trade Zone Industries of Santiago who facilitated my research and my ability to gain access to firms. This book owes a great debt to the rank and file members and former workers of IA Manufacturing who shared their stories with me, and to the local organizers of FEDOTRAZONAS for helping me to connect with them. Since 2009, I have had the fortune of knowing Marcos Morales of the School of Geography at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo. I am grateful to Marcos and the School for their continued hospitality and for enriching dialogue.

Again, Robin Derby offered invaluable advice and encouragement to pursue my questions to the border with Haiti and beyond. My study of the border trade zone and local politics in Ouanaminthe would not have been possible without the insights and support of Yannick Etienne, Delien Blaise, and Lorraine Clewer. I traveled to Haiti again in 2012 to conduct interviews on post-earthquake reconstruction. My research was made possible by the assistance of two extremely talented students while in Port-au-Prince, Nicolas Pradhally and Carson Lagrandeur. I am also grateful to Jane Regan and Haiti Grassroots Watch.

I wrote parts of this book during a post-doctoral fellowship funded by the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. During my time in Toronto, I benefited from the wisdom and support of Leah Vosko, Rachel Silvey, and Katharine Rankin. During this period, I also met Gavin

Smith and Winnie Lem, who have provided an academic home away from home on numerous subsequent visits to Toronto, for which I am extremely grateful.

This project took shape as a book over the past four years while I was at SUNY-Buffalo (UB). I am grateful to supportive colleagues in the Department of Geography, especially Trina Hamilton, and to friends and colleagues around campus. I am indebted to UB's Humanities Institute for a fellowship that permitted me to complete the manuscript. I also want to thank UB's Gender Institute for hosting a research workshop on a portion of the manuscript. Marissa Bell offered incredible assistance in preparing references and Andrew Lu did wonderful work adapting the cover image for publication.

Several colleagues and friends encouraged me to pursue this project and generously offered comments, critiques, and advice at various stages including Arturo Victoriano, Bradley Wilson, Joel Wainwright, Melissa Wright, and Beverley Mullings. Yasmine Shamsie and Alex Dupuy both contributed helpful comments on Chapter 6. Josh Barkan read this project at its various stages. I am indebted to his keen analysis of the problematic of the book – in the sense of this book's theoretical terrain *and* the university as a site of knowledge production – without which I am not sure this book would exist. The generous and insightful comments of two anonymous reviewers, I believe, have significantly improved the manuscript. Many of the concerns at the heart of this book were nursed and formed into intellectual arguments through my long-standing dialogue with Jennifer Bair. I am deeply indebted to Jenn for her unflinching critique and intellectual generosity over the past six years. All errors of interpretation are of course my own.

From manuscript to commodity: I want to acknowledge the support of Vinay Gidwani and Sharad Chari, as well as

Jacqueline Scott at Wiley Blackwell, who guided me patiently through the process. The commodity chain extends further to the (transnational) labor of copy editors, typesetters, press operators, bindery feeders, and transportation workers, whose hidden work I gratefully acknowledge. I also thank Hannah Lilien for her incredible care of my infant son during the last stages of this project.

Finally, I extend my deepest gratitude to close friends and family: Cynthia Tan, Hilary Masemann, Alison Chan, May Friedman, Ron Vida, Heather Walters, Jack Gieseking, Sara Koopman, Diana Ojeda, Libby Lunstrum, Anna Falicov, and Anyelina Fernandez, my brothers, Martin and David, and their wonderful families, and especially my parents, Beatrice and Daniel, who have been a source of constant love and support. Thank you. Jaume Franquesa not only supported this project intellectually and emotionally, but also afforded me innumerable mornings and evenings of extra time to finish the manuscript. His encouragement, love, patience, and care have made all the difference. And finally, I am grateful for life's treasures, Yannick and Biel.

Buffalo, New York
April 11, 2015

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Introduction
Power and Difference in Global Production

> *The violence of abstraction produces all kinds of fetishes: states, race, normative views of how people fit into and make places in the world. A geographical imperative lies at the heart of every struggle for social justice; if justice is embodied, it is then therefore always spatial, which is to say, part of a process of making a place.*
>
> – Ruth Wilson Gilmore, "Fatal Couplings of Power and Difference," p. 16

> *This is a geography, not of jobs but of power relations, of dominance and subordination, of enablement and influence, and of symbols and signification.*
>
> – Doreen Massey, *Spatial Divisions of Labour*, p. 3

Sundays in Los Almácigos, Dominican Republic

In the late afternoon on a Saturday in May, Ambrosina and I met up at the bus station in the city of Santiago, the inland industrial capital of the Dominican Republic's northern region, called the Cibao. We were headed back to her hometown of Villa de Los Almácigos, west of the city, about an hour from the Haitian border. Ambrosina lost her job in February along with 6,000 other trade zone workers when the garment factory where she worked, IA Manufacturing, closed down. She agreed to help me interview her former co-workers in her hometown.

On the bus ride, Ambrosina told me about her current job. After two months of pounding the pavement and handing out dozens of résumés, she had gone to work for her former supervisor as a final auditor at the country's largest surviving garment firm, Dominican Textile. This would be her fourth garment company since finishing high school and moving to Santiago seven years earlier to start university. For the next two hours, as we traveled through the verdant countryside, Ambrosina explained in detail the many things she disliked about her new job: more work, less pay, submissive employees, and frantic managers.

The previous week, her manager had increased her module's quota for Old Navy shirts from 5,000 to 6,000, offering the workers 200 pesos – a little more than 7 dollars – for the new weekly production goal. Ambrosina was galled by the operators' acceptance of such a measly bonus. Despite being proud of her rural roots, she attributed her co-workers' acquiescence to the fact that many were from the *campo* (rural area) where the factory was located just outside the city. She also resented the long commute to her new job, adding an extra two hours onto her already grueling 10- to 12-hour work shifts.

When I think of the things we used to complain about at IA, she lamented, *it seems unreal*. Ambrosina would repeat her complaints about her new job to family members and former co-workers whom we would visit the following day in Los Almácigos. They would shake their heads and chime in periodically with sympathetic exclamations, "Jesús!" "Muchacha!" She would quit a few months later.

The next morning, we started on foot down the two-lane, paved road that eventually links Los Almácigos to the border with Haiti, 60 kilometers away. Ambrosina was somewhat mortified to be seen walking in town but I hoped she would just blame it on me. Our time was tight and I felt that we could ill afford to wait for her father to return with his motorbike so that we could use it for travel to the houses nearby. As on our other weekend visits, our interviews were squeezed between morning house cleaning, lunch preparation, and other domestic chores at her parents' house, intensified by the fact that Sunday was the only day with some consistent electricity supply, and thus also the best day to do laundry and ironing.

After three brief visits to the houses of former co-workers, we arrived at Leidy's family's home. Leidy had returned to Los Almácigos just two weeks prior. She had worked in three different factories in the trade zone over six years. Her longest stint was at IA Manufacturing, where she sewed front pockets onto Dockers-brand pants. After the factory closed, she worked in a five-machine workshop sewing shorts and pants for the domestic market in one of Santiago's working class neighborhoods. She learned new operations, but didn't always get paid regularly and decided she couldn't risk more of her time working for free.

Leidy's mother joined our conversation. She and her husband, Leidy's father, had gone to the trade zone in Santiago with Leidy and three of her siblings in 1992, closing up their small house in Los Almácigos, and leaving behind the mother's plot of land. Her parents worked in a garment factory for a little more than a year. *Despite the problems today*, her mother said, *conditions were worse and wages were lower back then*. *We returned with nothing*, she concluded bitterly. At the age of 18, nearly a decade after her parents' failed attempt, Leidy told the family she was going to the trade zone. Her parents warned her against the move, but she went anyway as she was determined to find her independence. Now, back at her parents' place with her young daughter, Leidy was making arrangements to bring her belongings from Santiago. There was a small, one-room wood house behind her parents' modest *rancho* that she would make her home. *I'm not going back*, she told us. Although seemingly resigned, Leidy said she was waiting to hear from her brother-in-law about a possible modeling opportunity in the city. Ambrosina consoled Leidy by sharing her complaints about her new job at Dominican Textile. As we were leaving, Ambrosina offered to help Leidy obtain a social security benefit from the government for her daughter who had been born while she was still an employee (and thus she was entitled to a small monthly payment). *If only there were jobs here, there'd be no reason to have to go to Santiago*, Ambrosina told her as we departed. I wasn't so sure Leidy shared Ambrosina's love for her *campo*, but for now she would have little choice but to make her life there.

Situating Global Displacements

Why did Leidy not heed her parents' warnings? What expectations of progress motivated the migrants from Los Almácigos and other precariously employed trade zone workers? And what is at stake in situating a study of contemporary globalization that takes the threshold of these workers' idled garment factory as its point of departure? These questions are the fertile soil from which the present study has sprung.

The experiences of former garment workers in Los Almácigos do not square easily with conventional accounts of the globalization of production. These accounts generally begin with the observation of a fundamental reorganization in the geography of production starting in the late 1960s. The substantial surge in manufacturing output outside of "core" capitalist countries prompted a broad swath of observers to proclaim the dawn of a new structural relationship between what was then commonly called the First and Third Worlds (Fröbel et al. 1980; Piore & Sabel

1984; Lipietz 1987; Harvey 1989). Up until the late 1970s, Third World states forged this reorganization of industry primarily through the promotion of strategic industrial sectors and the protection of domestic markets, while multinational corporations adapted to and, in turn, shaped these geographies through foreign direct investment. The demise of this import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy by the end of that pivotal decade dramatically transformed the configuration and organizational form of the global division of labor. As the United States sought new conditions to maintain its dominance in the face of the limits of the post-World War II economic arrangement (Arrighi 1994; Krippner 2011), much of the Third World faced insolvency brought on by high interest rates, capital scarcity, higher oil prices, declining resource prices, and a weakened industrial sector (McAfee 1991; Corbridge 1993).

By the end of the 1980s, Latin America’s primarily US creditors, together with multilateral development banks, implemented a series of policies that privileged so-called export-oriented industrialization, or the production of labor-intensive manufactured goods for Northern markets. This model, already in operation in a handful of experimental zones in the region such as the United States–Mexico border and the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince, would soon become dominant as states progressively re-regulated trade and investment in line with multinational corporations’ priorities. This turn towards what is commonly called neoliberalism was further entrenched in new generation trade agreements, beginning with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which sought to codify the priorities of multinationals and finance capital in global trade (Cox 2008).

The “global factory” – manufacturing facilities in Latin America, Asia, and Africa making the innumerable products filling seemingly endless store shelves in North America and Europe – has since become iconic of this reorganization of transnational production, and of globalization in general. Feminist ethnographers were quick to elucidate the gender dynamics of this new model, which was not simply export-led but also female-led (Standing 1999). From Indonesia and Malaysia to Mexico and Haiti, the workers in these factories were overwhelmingly women. In East and Southeast Asia, these young “factory daughters” (Wolf 1992) faced an intensification of household duties while also experiencing newfound forms of limited independence (e.g., Lee 1998; Ngai 2005; Ong 1987). In Latin America and the Caribbean, women in export factories were often taking on the “breadwinner” role under dramatically eroded wage conditions as their male kin faced the indignities of decline in import substituting industrial sectors (e.g., Elson & Pearson 1981; Fernández-Kelly 1983; Cravey 1998; Mullings 1999; Salzinger 2003; Wright 2006; see Bair 2010 and Cravey 2005 for reviews and discussion).

The present study is deeply indebted to this diverse body of feminist work and draws on its insights to extend feminist analysis to a period of major restructuring following more than 30 years of the low-wage export model. In the extensive body of English-language literature on the global factory, feminist and otherwise, scholars have tended to follow capitalist investment and contracting relationships to “far-flung” locations (from the perspective of metropolitan scholarship) and have theorized the resulting new divisions of labor therein. Far fewer, however, have paid attention to the transformation of these factory arrangements as initial low-wage production has given way to new combinations of technology and skill, together with mass retrenchment and disinvestment.[1] The aim of this book is to study this contemporary process of restructuring of the global factory, and in so doing, to inform thinking and action on the persistent and dynamic relations of inequality that articulate the global North and the global South.[2]

One obstacle to understanding the mutable yet structured global division of labor is the way that it is mapped onto sequentialist understandings of change and fetishized geographical categories. Consider, for example, the common “three worlds” classification of developing, newly industrializing, and post-industrial countries. As Fernando Coronil (1996) argued, such nomenclatures obscure the politics of these geohistorical categories: the ways in which places and their positioning in the global economy are forged through *connections* rather than distinct and sequential *transitions*. As we will see in the chapters that follow, while scholars, development experts, and activists dispute the merits of the global factory, few dispute the notion that these installations will either push, or fail to push, places along a path from farm to factory to the post-industrial. The global factory, then, is not only a relationship of subcontracting, outsourcing, investment, or exploitation; it is *also* a set of assumptions, discourses, and spatial imaginaries that reproduce the notion of development as one of traversing through a stage of industrialization.[3]

The notion of a stage-like trajectory of capitalist development is inseparable from the reproduction of Eurocentric dualisms of West/non-West and developed/developing. I follow Anibal Quijano’s notion of Eurocentrism as “the paradoxical amalgam of evolution and dualism” that reproduces Europe and its settler colony extensions, principally the United States, as a self-actualizing center, which defines the Other in relation to the Self (2000a: 551). In exploring the links between Eurocentric dualisms and the global factory, my intention is neither to assert a particular “Caribbean” path of capitalist development nor to claim the failure of “Western” development in the Caribbean. Rather, my aim is to show how the operation of global factories is inseparable from a discourse that frames global production as a stage of development. In so doing, this discourse produces normative assumptions of how racialized and gendered subjects, and the places where they live and work, fit into the global division of labor (see Gilmore, epigraph). This discourse does not simply *describe* the world; rather, it seeks to *transform* it by reworking multiple livelihood strategies, colonial legacies, and discontinuous industrial trajectories into dual economy models, narratives of transition, and, ultimately, newfound objects of capitalist development.

The critique of the development discourse that I offer in the following chapters is a contribution to, but not a substitute for, a political project to reframe and forge global connections differently. Towards this end, *Global Displacements* offers the reader a set of conceptual tools and analytical insights to engage with the complex geography of industrial and deindustrial processes that find temporary stability in given arrangements of factories, workers, and consumers. I develop these tools by recuperating the notion of uneven development from the archives of Marxism towards the construction of a critical, feminist approach to the study of global production.

The concept of uneven development stems from early twentieth-century debates over the possibilities of socialist revolution in countries that remained primarily agrarian (Trotsky 1969 [1906]; see also Burawoy 1989). In the immediate post-World War II period, the concept was incorporated into theories of structural dependency between the Third and the First Worlds (e.g., Frank 1967; Amin 1976). In the throes of deindustrialization in the

North Atlantic in the 1970s and 1980s, Marxist geographers provided a spatially nuanced understanding that eschewed taken-for-granted scales of uneven development as either a relation among nations or between world regions. Instead, their work showed how the ordinary process of capitalist accumulation reproduced spatial unevenness. Capital sought to resolve contradictions between fixity and mobility, competition and monopoly, and exploitation and consumption through the production of novel spatial arrangements and scales (Massey 1995 [1984]; Harvey 1999 [1982]; Smith 2008 [1984]).

In the present text, I develop a formulation of uneven development through an understanding of global production arrangements as concrete determinations of social and spatial divisions of labor. The concept foregrounds relations of power – among capitals and between capital and labor – *and difference* – forged through colonial legacies and everyday politics – that are obscured by path-like notions of industrial change. I engage with Marxist and feminist approaches shaped and reinterpreted through my ethnographic work on production restructuring in the export garment industry in the Dominican Republic and Haiti. By confronting the messiness of daily life, the irreducibility of experience, and the complexity of difference, I consider the transformation of this accumulation strategy woven through these two deeply inter-related countries. My grounded and theoretically informed account of employment collapse and restructuring in the Dominican Republic, combined with a new factory boom in Haiti, reveals the historically patterned and contingent production of new geographies of uneven development in the Caribbean. What emerges is an understanding of uneven development as a process that is *made* through the production of place and social difference as workers and the unemployed forge their livelihood possibilities under conditions not of their own choosing. Before undertaking a more extended discussion of uneven development, I turn first to an explanation of why this approach has emerged from my study of the Caribbean.

From a Comparative to a Relational Geography of Haiti and the Dominican Republic

Perhaps nowhere in Latin America have emerging geographies of uneven development become more evident than on the island of Hispaniola. In the late 1960s, the Dominican Republic and Haiti had nearly the same gross domestic product (GDP), but by the 2000s, Dominican GDP was *eight times* that of Haiti.[4] Indeed, the Dominican Republic has enjoyed the second highest growth rate in Latin America since the turn to neoliberal regulation, a fact that is drawn upon by mainstream economists like John Williamson to extol the so-called Washington Consensus, or the structural adjustment policies that swept the region in the 1980s (Kuczynski & Williamson 2003). Haiti, on the other hand, has faced deteriorating economic and social conditions, a protracted political crisis and, as a result, profound vulnerability to socionatural disasters. In contrast to the celebratory narrative of neoliberal reform in the Dominican case, few mainstream economists attribute Haiti's dismal trajectory to the very similar, in fact even more radical, neoliberal policies adopted by the country in the 1980s and 1990s.[5]

These divergent trajectories have brought these two countries to broader public consciousness. In the popular book *Collapse* (2005), for example, author Jared Diamond dedicated a chapter to the profound disjuncture between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in Malthusian terms:

Haiti is a place that suffers from too many people and not enough land, he argued, with deforestation as the starkest marker of land pressures. Taking the island – and its two nations – as akin to a natural experiment involving two separate societies "growing" under similar conditions, Diamond ultimately attributed Dominican "success" to a more reasonable elite and cultural difference.[6]

Such comparisons between Haiti and the Dominican Republic produce sequentialist and Eurocentric framings of development *par excellence*. The Dominican Republic apparently has progressed along a natural path from an agrarian to an industrial to a service-oriented (or post-industrial) economy, while Haiti has apparently failed to traverse these stages of development. These are powerful motifs of linear and territorially discrete social change that inform the governing logics and discourses of development policy. The always becoming of capital is annexed to dual economy models and transition narratives, premised on a political amnesia. As a result, we will see that the global factory is presented as a development imperative for Haiti, and as a stage that has passed for the Dominican Republic.

The power of such development narratives, and the comparisons that they engender, lies as much in what they foreground as in what they render invisible. In this case, to begin with, such a framing erases the distinct incorporation of what we now call Haiti and the Dominican Republic into colonial capitalism, as colonial Saint-Domingue, a slave plantation society and the jewel of the French empire, and as Santo Domingo, a mixed-race, impoverished frontier society, respectively (Derby 1994). Accounts like Diamond's also minimize the significance of imperial legacies and neo-colonial occupations: for example, in the case of Haiti, a crippling indemnity paid to France as a condition for receiving metropolitan recognition.[7] Such comparisons mask the mass migrations from both sides of the border that have effectively created transnational nations, on the one hand, and states highly dependent upon migrant remittances, like the rest of the Caribbean, on the other. This transnationalism has been produced by migrant flows to the global North since the 1960s, where between one-ninth and one-eighth of Dominicans and Haitians, respectively, now live.[8] There is another dimension to this transnationalism, however: the nearly century-long migratory flows from Haiti to the Dominican Republic, instituted by the US occupation of the island. This intra-insular integration has constituted and reproduced racialized and segmented labor markets, the implications of which we will examine in the chapters to come.

In short, the comparative framework relies on the notion of these two countries as territorial containers and interprets their differences as evidence of national success or failure in a world of sequential development. In contrast, my argument in the pages that follow is for a *relational geography* of capitalist uneven development that foregrounds the ways in which places are iteratively forged in relation to one another. For if the Dominican Republic and Haiti have long been complex, heterogeneous, “modern”[9] and unevenly integrated societies, it is since the latter part of the twentieth century, with the rise of neoliberal globalization, that their divergence has increasingly become a basis for capital accumulation through the restructuring of global production. Before sharing with the reader how I undertook a grounded study of this process of restructuring in and through Haiti and the Dominican Republic, I introduce the reader to the theoretical tools that I have drawn upon to develop the notion of the uneven development that I use in this text.

Theorizing Uneven Development: Global Production Networks, Coloniality, and the Production of Place

To interpret the analytical significance of these divides in the Caribbean, I draw upon a mix of theoretical tools that I briefly sketch out here. Uneven development is a classic approach to understanding the material ways that places relate to one another through transfers of “surplus” from periphery to center. Throughout much of the twentieth century, scholars of Latin American development debated the forms of dependency that reproduced uneven development between Euro-American metropoles and the Third World. So-called *dependentistas* assigned primacy to these imperial-type relations among nominally sovereign states and attributed the persistence of global income inequality to them.[10] Their work was influential in the formulation of world-systems theory in Anglo-American scholarship, which argued for an understanding of capitalism at the world scale formed through exchange relations between a core, a semi-periphery, and a periphery. World-systems scholars Hopkins and Wallerstein (1977; 1986) introduced the concept of the commodity chain to disrupt predominant understandings of economic development as a national and sequential process by foregrounding the linked activities – from inputs to production, distribution and consumption – that produce a commodity.[11] Through unequal exchange along the commodity chain, they argued that hierarchy in the world system was reproduced. Core, semi-periphery, and periphery positions were not fixed, however. A certain mobility between positions existed as states and capitals collaborated and competed to shift from concentrating the production of lower value-added goods to higher value-added ones, or suffered reversals in such efforts (Arrighi & Drangel 1986).

Since its introduction by world-systems scholars, sociologists developed the idea of the *global* commodity chain as a meso-level framework to analyze how functionally integrated but spatially dispersed production activities shape development trajectories (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz 1994). Analysis of global commodity chains, now more commonly called global production networks, has facilitated scholars, as well as activists and policymakers, to gain analytical purchase on the complex and concrete determinations of the global economy (see Bair 2005; 2009).[12] The emergence of this analytical perspective parallels and documents a substantive shift in the organization of production over the past 40 years. Since the 1970s, multinational corporations either systematically disinvested from production, or increasingly made more profits from their financial and non-productive activities (Milberg 2008). In turn, these organizations shifted in form from vertical integration and direct control of production to relations of exchange and arms-length coordination and control between formally independent units (Piore & Sabel 1984; Harvey 1989; Arrighi 1994).

The study of the firm networks spanning the global North and South that have resulted from this shift from “fixity” to “flexibility” has yielded important insights into novel forms of unevenness produced through these relationships. Drawing on the work of Joseph Schumpeter (2008 [1942]), scholars have theorized the existence of higher value nodes in production networks, defined as activities that offer entrepreneurial “rents” – or above-average profits – through innovation and/or monopolization by a small number of firms (Kaplinsky 2000). In concrete terms, retailers and brands, based largely in the global North, occupy these more concentrated and monopolized nodes of the network, which offer greater returns. This “lead firm” position is reinforced by these firms’ ability both to control the terms of participation of suppliers by setting prices and standards and to pocket the bulk of profits. In contrast to lead firms, supplier firms – some of which have consolidated into multinational companies themselves based largely in East Asia – generate their profits primarily through the increasingly competitive activity of production. Over time, as we will see in the case of the principal garment firm in the Dominican Republic, these producers also seek to enter niches of the chain where rents are possible. Firm strategies to create or access higher value activities vary between production networks. They can involve, for example, using a higher ratio of capital to labor, which usually also corresponds to a shift in the mix of activities that a given firm undertakes.[13]

The most useful insight from global production network studies for theorizing uneven development is the observation that different returns created and distributed via these networks produce geographic concentrations of wealth and poverty at a variety of scales (Arrighi & Drangel 1986).[14] Each node of a production network is not a set of “firms” but rather a given economic activity, or set of activities, that represents a mix of capital, labor, and land (Arrighi & Drangel 1986: 16). How returns generated by participation in production networks are created and distributed can only be understood through an analysis of relations of production (i.e., between capital and labor), together with those of exchange between productive units (i.e., firms, farms, households). Moreover, states play a central role in trying to attract capital and stabilize the conditions for investment (Arrighi & Drangel 1986: 24; see also Glassman 2011). In short, hierarchies in the global economy are determined neither by participation in particular sectors (i.e., agriculture versus industry), nor by fixed geographical locations (i.e., G-8 countries versus the rest of the world). Rather, uneven development is shaped by the different returns accrued to the mix of spatially situated "core-like" and "periphery-like" economic activities or functions. These value characteristics of economic activities are not static, moreover. They stem from the techno-organizational strategies of capital, supported by states, to hold highly competitive functions – that is, those with razor-thin margins – at arm's length through subcontracting and outsourcing, while capturing the monopolized, core-like functions that offer above-average returns.

As we think through the actual geographies of global production in light of these insights, one truism emerges: while the positions of places are not pre-ordained, a hierarchical *field* of possible positions exists. *By definition*, not all places can form part of the core at the same time. Uneven development, or the reproduction of places that concentrate core-like, periphery-like, or a mix of these activities, together with places that are excluded entirely from such arrangements, is thus the necessary architecture of a global economy dominated by capitalist production. In fact, as even staunch critics of world-systems theory have acknowledged, this unevenness has a certain regulatory function in the global economy (Lipietz 1986). The immanent contradictions of capitalism, between competition and monopoly, for example, "find" their core, periphery, and semi-periphery arrangements for a time. To reproduce the global economy, then, different positionalities among places must also be reproduced.

If a production network perspective has much to commend it in foregrounding how these relationships reproduce uneven geographies of development, the approach is limited in several key ways. Let me focus here on the two limitations that are most relevant to the present study: the question of labor and the politics of place.

First, the focus on competition between capitals (i.e., firms) linked through production networks generally leaves the question of labor under-theorized. In response, much scholarship concerned with the role of labor considers labor as either an object impacted by global production arrangements, or as an active agent shaping the form and content of these arrangements through collective struggles (see Bair & Werner 2015). I offer a third approach here that eschews an understanding of labor as equivalent to its role in a given production network. Instead, I consider labor through the lens of colonial legacies that intersect with particular transnational production arrangements but are not reducible to them. This approach is a first step towards conceiving of labor as an active structuring agent in the production of place.

The work of Anibal Quijano and his notion of the coloniality of power, or the historical and material (dis)continuities between colonialism and contemporary capitalism, is a helpful starting point. Quijano argues that the racial hierarchies forged through the conquest of the Americas constitute a terrain of articulation, one that adapts historic patterns of exploitation to the contingent necessities and attendant conflicts of contemporary capitalist accumulation. Capitalism is realized through the stitching together of the wage relation with other forms of labor control, structured by the value hierarchies of racialized and gendered labor. Contemporary arrangements of production reproduce – with difference – gendered and racial hierarchies of labor rooted in colonial legacies and exerting a structuring effect on the global division of labor of our times (Quijano 1998; 2000a; 2000b). As Sylvia Federici has argued, what Marx described as primitive, or originary, accumulation, was not solely the instantiation of capitalist relations of production through the separation of peasants, crafts- and tradespeople from the means of production, but also the introduction of social divisions of labor through the production of hierarchies of domination:

> Primitive accumulation … was not simply an accumulation and concentration of exploitable workers and capital. It was *also an accumulation of differences and divisions within the working class,* whereby hierarchies built upon gender, as well as "race" and age, became constitutive of class rule and the formation of a modern proletariat.
>
> (Federici 2004: 63-64; emphasis in the original)

Federici offers an account of the devaluation of European women's labor in the process of the formation of capitalist relations of production in Europe, rendering women as devalued or value-less labor. In contrast, Quijano places greater emphasis on the originary relation between wages and European-ness/whiteness/maleness, and the correlating link between racialized and feminized subjects and unpaid work, forced labor, petty commodity production, and slavery.[15] For both, primitive accumulation is not a thing of the past but rather the on-going and uneven mix of forms of "extra-economic" violence and domination, together with the production of surplus value through labor exploitation, that create the conditions for capitalist accumulation and remake racialized and gendered hierarchies of labor.[16]

Quijano conceives of coloniality in the Americas as a "historical-structurally heterogeneous model of power with discontinuous relations and conflicts among its components" (2000a: 571). To put it simply, there is no straight line from the *encomienda* to the day laborers on Chiquita brand's contract banana plantations in Ecuador, or from slavery to the sewing operators in Levi's apparel suppliers in Haiti.[17] Moreover, Euro-centered racial categories and patriarchal gender formations constitute hierarchical systems of meaning, inextricably linked with, but irreducible to, capitalism. The notion of coloniality, then, does not presume any essential connection between subjects produced as Other through racialized and gendered material-symbolic hierarchies, and the actual relations of exploitation, domination, and exclusion of devalued subjects from market and wage relations. Neither capitalism, nor racism, nor patriarchy exists in a relation of necessary dependence. And yet, these structures are not simply analogical, as Spivak (1988) reminds us. Rather, there is a way in which accumulation proceeds through the iterative reproduction of coloniality: that is, through the reworking of hierarchies of social difference and forms of labor in order to recuperate profits from their interminable tendency towards stagnation and decline. In short, in global production networks, social difference serves as a resource to rework arrangements of exploitation, and to redraw the lines of inclusion and exclusion in the capitalist wage relation. To grasp this iterative reworking of coloniality, however, we must shift our analysis from the abstract lineaments of value and difference in global hierarchies of capital and labor to the concrete determinations and everyday politics of place production.

Places and regions are best considered as processes rather than pre-given objects for our analysis. As geographer Doreen Massey (1995 [1984]) argues, regions are themselves produced by complex, multi-layered social histories, and overdetermined by their integration in multiple space-times of accumulation. Their participation in (often) multiple circuits of capital accumulation is part of, but not reducible to, their on-going formulation (Massey 1995 [1984]). Massey's notion of place as process dovetails well with Gillian Hart's (1998; 2002) work on rural