

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL



THE NUREMBERG TRIALS

VOL. 6

International Military Tribunal

The Nuremberg Trials

(Vol.6)

Published by

MUSAICUM

Books

- Advanced Digital Solutions & High-Quality eBook
Formatting -

musaicumbooks@okpublishing.info

2021 OK Publishing

EAN 4064066381219

Table of Contents

[PREFACE](#)

[FORTIETH DAY Tuesday, 22 January 1946](#)

[Morning Session](#)

[Afternoon Session](#)

[FORTY-FIRST DAY Wednesday, 23 January 1946](#)

[Morning Session](#)

[Afternoon Session](#)

[FORTY-SECOND DAY Thursday, 24 January 1946](#)

[Morning Session](#)

[Afternoon Session](#)

[FORTY-THIRD DAY Friday, 25 January 1946](#)

[Morning Session](#)

[Afternoon Session](#)

[FORTY-FOURTH DAY Monday, 28 January 1946](#)

[Morning Session](#)

[Afternoon Session](#)

[FORTY-FIFTH DAY Tuesday, 29 January 1946](#)

[Morning Session](#)

[Afternoon Session](#)

[FORTY-SIXTH DAY Wednesday, 30 January 1946](#)

[Morning Session](#)

[Afternoon Session](#)

[FORTY-SEVENTH DAY Thursday, 31 January 1946](#)

[Morning Session](#)

[Afternoon Session](#)

FORTY-EIGHTH DAY Friday, 1 February 1946

Morning Session

Afternoon Session

FORTY-NINTH DAY Saturday, 2 February 1946

Morning Session

FIFTIETH DAY Monday, 4 February 1946

Morning Session

Afternoon Session

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH REPUBLIC,
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND, and THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

— *against* —

HERMANN WILHELM GÖRING, RUDOLF HESS, JOACHIM VON
RIBBENTROP, ROBERT LEY, WILHELM KEITEL, ERNST
KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROSENBERG, HANS FRANK,
WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS STREICHER, WALTER FUNK, HJALMAR
SCHACHT, GUSTAV KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH,
KARL DÖNITZ, ERICH RAEDER, BALDUR VON SCHIRACH,
FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, FRANZ
VON PAPEN, ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART, ALBERT SPEER,
CONSTANTIN VON NEURATH, and HANS FRITZSCHE,
Individually and as Members of Any of the Following Groups
or Organizations to which They Respectively Belonged,
Namely: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG (REICH CABINET); DAS
KORPS DER POLITISCHEN LEITER DER
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI
(LEADERSHIP CORPS OF THE NAZI PARTY); DIE
SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN
DEUTSCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (commonly known as the
“SS”) and including DER SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly

known as the “SD”); DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET STATE POLICE, commonly known as the “GESTAPO”); DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER NSDAP (commonly known as the “SA”); and the GENERAL STAFF and HIGH COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES, all as defined in Appendix B of the Indictment,

Defendants.

PREFACE

[Table of Contents](#)

Recognizing the importance of establishing for history an authentic text of the Trial of major German war criminals, the International Military Tribunal directed the publication of the Record of the Trial. The proceedings are published in English, French, Russian, and German, the four languages used throughout the hearings. The documents admitted in evidence are printed only in their original language.

The first volume contains basic, official, pre-trial documents together with the Tribunal's judgment and sentence of the defendants. In subsequent volumes the Trial proceedings are published in full from the preliminary session of 14 November 1945 to the closing session of 1 October 1946. They are followed by an index volume. Documents admitted in evidence conclude the publication.

The proceedings of the International Military Tribunal were recorded in full by stenographic notes, and an electric sound recording of all oral proceedings was maintained.

Reviewing sections have verified in the four languages citations, statistics, and other data, and have eliminated obvious grammatical errors and verbal irrelevancies. Finally, corrected texts have been certified for publication by Colonel Ray for the United States, Mr. Mercer for the United Kingdom, Mr. Fuster for France, and Major Poltorak for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

FORTIETH DAY

Tuesday, 22 January 1946

[Table of Contents](#)

Morning Session

[Table of Contents](#)

M. HENRY DELPECH (Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr. President, Your Honors, I had the honor yesterday of beginning to explain before the Tribunal the methods of economic spoliation of Belgium by the Germans in the course of their occupation of the country.

Coming back to what was said in the course of the general considerations on economic pillage and on the behavior of the Germans in Norway and Denmark and in Holland, I have been able to show that in all places the determination to economic domination of National Socialism had manifested itself. The methods were the same everywhere, at least in their broad outlines. Therefore in immediate response to the wish expressed yesterday by the Tribunal and to fulfill the mission entrusted to the French Prosecution by the Belgian Government to plead its case before your high jurisdiction, I shall confine myself to the main outlines of the development, and I shall take the liberty of referring to the details of the German seizure of Belgian production, to the text of the report submitted to

the Tribunal, and to the numerous documents which are quoted in our document book.

I have had the honor of calling your attention to the existence of the black market in Belgium, its organization by the occupation troops, and their final decision to suppress this black market. One may, with respect to this, conclude, as has already been indicated in the course of the general observations, that in spite of their claims it was not in order to avoid inflation in Belgium that the German authorities led a campaign against the black market.

The day the Germans decided to suppress the black market, they loudly proclaimed their anxiety to spare the Belgian economy and the Belgian population the very serious consequences of the threatening inflation. In reality, the German authorities intervened against the black market in order to prevent its ever-growing extension from reaching the point where it would absorb all the available merchandise and completely strangle the official market. In a word, the survival of the official market with its lower prices was finally much more profitable for the army of occupation.

I now come, gentlemen, to Page 46 of my presentation, to the third Chapter—purchases which were regular in appearance; which had only one aim, namely the subjugation of Belgian productive power.

Carrying out their program of domination of the countries of Western Europe as it had been established since before 1939, the Germans, from the moment they entered Belgium in May 1940, took all the measures which seemed to them appropriate to assure the subjugation of Belgian production.

No sector of Belgian economy was to be spared. If the pillage seems more noticeable in the economic sphere, that is only because of the very marked industrial character of Belgian economy. Agriculture and transport were not to escape the German hold, and I propose to discuss first the levies in kind in industry.

Belgian industry was the first to be attacked. Thus, the military commander in Belgium, in agreement with the various offices of the Reich for raw materials and with the Office of the Four Year Plan and the Ministry of Economics, drew up a program the purpose of which was to convert almost the whole of Belgian production to the bellicose ends of the Reich. Already on the 13th of September 1940 he was able to make known to the higher authorities a series of plans for iron, coal, textiles, and copper. I submit Exhibit Number RF-162 (Document Number ECH-2) in support of this statement.

Also a report by Lieutenant Colonel, Dr. Hedler, entitled "Change in Economic Direction," states that from 14 September 1940 the Army Ordnance Branch sent to its subordinate formations the following instructions, to be found in the document book under Exhibit Number RF-163 (Document Number ECH-84). I read the last paragraph of Page 41 of the German text:

"I attach the greatest importance to the proposition that the factories in the occupied western territories, Holland, Belgium, and France, be utilized as much as possible to ease the strain on the German armament production and to increase the war potential. Enterprises located in Denmark are also to be employed to an increasing extent for

subcontracts. In doing so the operational directives of the regulation of the Reich Marshal as well as the regulations concerning the economy of raw materials in the occupied territories are to be strictly observed.”

All these arrangements quickly enabled the Germans to control and to direct Belgium’s whole production and distribution for the German war effort.

The decree of 27 May 1940, VOBEL Number 2, submitted as Document Number RF-164, established commodity control offices whose task was—and I quote from the third paragraph:

“. . . to issue, in compliance with Army Group directives, general regulations or individual orders to enterprises which are producing, dealing with, or using controlled commodities, in order to regulate production and ensure just distribution and rational utilization while keeping to the place of work, as far as possible.”

Article 4 of the same text indicated in detail the powers of these commodity control offices, and in particular they were given the right:

“To force enterprises to sell their products to specified purchasers; to forbid or require the utilization of certain raw materials; to subject to their approval every sale or purchase of commodities.”

To conceal more effectively their real objective, the Germans gave these commodity control offices independence and the status of a corporation. Thus, there were set up 11 commodity control offices which embraced the whole economy except coal, the direction of which was

left under the Belgian Office of Coal. Exhibit Number RF-165 (Document Number ECH-3), gives proof of this.

The execution of the regulations was ensured by a series of texts promulgated by the Belgian authorities in Brussels. They issued in particular a decree dated 3 September 1940, by virtue of which Belgian organizations took over again the offices which the Germans gave up.

These offices were to experience various vicissitudes. Although originating from the Belgian Ministry of Economics, they were closely controlled by the German military command. In this way, the seizure of Belgian production was completed by the appointment of "Commissioners of Enterprises," under the ordinance of 29 April 1941, submitted as Document Number RF-166. Article 2 of this text defines the powers of the commissioners:

"The duty of the Commissioner is to set or keep in motion the enterprise under his charge, to ensure the systematic fulfillment of orders, and to take all measures which increase the output."

The decline of the commodity control offices began with an ordinance dated 6 August 1942, establishing the principle providing for the prohibition of manufacturing certain products or for ordering the use of certain raw materials. This ordinance is to be found in the document book under Document Number RF-167. Supervision of the commodity control offices was soon organized by the appointment to each of them of a German Commissioner, selected by the competent Reichsstelle.

From the last months of 1943 on, the "Rüstungsobmann" Office of the Armament and War Production Ministry (Speer),

acquired the habit of passing its orders direct, without having recourse to the channel of the commodity control offices.

Even before this date measures had been taken to prevent any initiative that was not in accord with the German war aims. Further and even before the above ordinance of 6 August 1942, the ordinance of 30 March 1942 should be mentioned, which made the establishment or extension of commercial enterprises subject to previous authorization by the military commissioner.

In the report of the military administration in Belgium that has already been cited, the chief of the administrative staff, Reeder, specifies in Exhibit Number RF-169 (Document Number ECH-335) that for the period of January to March 1943 alone, out of 2,000 iron works, 400 were closed down for working irrationally or being useless to the war aims. The closing of these factories seems to have been caused less by the concern for a rational production than by the cunning desire to obtain cheaply valuable tools and machines.

In this connection, it is appropriate to point to the establishment of a Machine Pool Office. The above quoted report of the military administration in Belgium, in the 11th section, Pages 56 and following, is particularly significant in this respect. Here is an extract from the German text, the last lines of the last paragraph of Page 56, in the French translation, the last lines . . .

THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence):
That passage you read about the Defendant Raeder, was that from Document 169 or 170?

M. DELPECH: Mr. President, I spoke yesterday of the chief of the administration section, Reeder. He was section chief in Brussels. He has no connection with the defendant here.

THE PRESIDENT: I see, very well.

M. DELPECH: Exhibit Number RF-171 (Document Number ECH-10), second paragraph of the French text. The paragraph concerns the Machine Pool transactions:

“Proof may be seen by a brief glance at the pool operations dealt with and actually carried out. Altogether 567 demands have been dealt with, to a total value of 4.6 million Reichsmark.”

Reeder then gave a number of figures. I shall pass over these and I come to the end of the first paragraph, Page 57 in the German text:

“The legal basis for the requisition of these machines was the Hague Convention of 1907, Articles 52 and 53. The formulation of the Hague Convention which provides for requisitions only for the benefit and the needs of the occupying power, applied to the circumstances of the year 1907, that is, to a time when war actions were confined within narrowly restricted areas and practically the military front alone was involved in war operations. In view of such space restrictions for war, it was evident that the provisions of the Hague Convention, stipulating that requisitions be made solely for the needs of the occupying power, were sufficient for the conduct of operations. Modern war, however, which by its expansion to total war is no longer bound by space but has developed into a general struggle of peoples and economies, requires that while the

regulations of the Hague Convention should be maintained, there should be a sensible interpretation of its principles adapted to the demands of modern warfare.”

I pass to the end of this quotation:

“Whenever, in requisitioning, reference was made to the ordinance of the military commander of 6 August 1942, this was done in order to give the Belgian population the necessary interpretation of the meaning of the principle of the requisition regulations of the Hague Convention.”

Such an interpretation may leave jurists wondering, who have not been trained in the school of National Socialism. It cannot in any case justify the pillage of industry and the subjugation of Belgian production.

These few considerations show how subtle and varied were the methods employed by the Germans to attain their aims in the economic sphere. In the same way as the preceding statements on clearing operations and the utilization of occupation costs, they make it possible to specify the methods employed for exacting heavy levies from the Belgian economy.

Whereas in certain spheres, as in agriculture and transport, it has been possible to assess the extent of economic pillage with a certain exactitude, there are, however, numerous industrial sectors where assessments cannot yet be made. It is true that a considerable part of the industrial losses correspond to the clearing operations, particularly through requisition of stocks. It will therefore be necessary to confine ourselves to the directives of the policy practiced by the Germans.

We may examine briefly the way in which economic spoliation took place in three sectors: industry, agriculture, and transport.

First the industrial sector: The clearing statistics, in the first place, give particulars of the total burdens imposed upon the various industrial branches.

The report of the military administration in Belgium, to which I shall refer constantly, gives the following details, briefly summarized:

From the very beginning of the occupation the Germans demanded an inventory of supplies on which they were to impose considerable levies, notably textiles and non-ferrous metals.

I shall confine myself to some brief remarks on textiles and non-ferrous metals. The example of the textiles industry is particularly revealing: On the eve of the invasion, the Belgian textile industry, with its 165,000 workers, was the second largest industry in Belgium after the metal industry. Under the pretext of avoiding the exhaustion of the very important supplies then still available, an ordinance of 27 July 1940 prohibited the textile industry to work at more than 30 percent of its 1938 capacity. For the period from May to December 1940 alone requisitions were not less than 1,000 million Belgian francs. They particularly affected nearly half of the wool stock available in the country on May 10, 1940, and nearly one-third of the stock of raw cotton.

On the other hand, the forced closing down of factories constituted for the Germans an excellent excuse for taking away, on the pretext of hiring, unused equipment, unless it was requisitioned at a cheap price. The ordinance of 7

September 1942, which is to be found in the document book under Document Number RF-174, laid down the manner in which factories were to be closed in execution of the right accorded to the occupation authorities; and it also gave the right to dissolve certain business and industrial groups and to order their liquidation. Consolidation of enterprises was the pretext given. In the month of January 1944, 65 percent of the textile factories had been stopped.

I shall not go into the details of these operations and I shall pass on to Page 58. The report of the German military administration quoted above gives particularly significant figures as to production. Of a total output of the wool industry of 72,000 tons for the entire period May 1940 to the end of June 1944, representing a value of about 397 million Reichsmark, the distribution of the deliveries between the German and Belgian markets is the following: The German market, 64,700 tons, 314 million Reichsmark; the Belgian market, 7,700 tons, 83 million Reichsmark. The whole spoliation of the textile industry is contained in these figures.

Belgian consumption obviously had to suffer a great deal from the German policy of direction of the textile market. The same report of the military administration furnishes details, stating that in 1938 the needs in textile products amounted in Belgium to a monthly average of twelve kilos. The respective figures for the occupation years are the following: 1940 to 1941—2.1 kilos per head, 1941 to 1942—1.4, 1942 to 1943—1.4, 1943 to 1944—0.7. The diminution of Belgian consumption under the Germans is contained in

these two figures; twelve kilos per head in 1938; 0.7 kilo at the end of the occupation.

On the other side, the Belgian Government gives the following details on the pillage of this produce. Compulsory deliveries to Germany during the occupation amounted to:

Cotton yarn, about 40 percent of the production; linen, 75 percent; rayon, 15 percent.

Finally, out of the textile stocks remaining in Belgium a great percentage was still taken away by the Germans through purchases on the Belgian markets, purchases of finished or manufactured products. The equivalent of these forced deliveries can generally be found in the clearing statistics, unless it is placed under misrepresented occupation costs.

I have finished with textiles. As to the non-ferrous metal industry, Belgium was in 1939 the largest producer in Europe of non-ferrous metals, of copper, lead, zinc, and tin. The statistics included in the report of the military command, which are to be found in Exhibit Number RF-173 (Document Number ECH-11), will furnish the evidence for the Tribunal.

On the 18th of February 1941, in connection with the Four Year Plan, the Reich Office for Metals and the Supreme Command of the Army worked out a "metal" plan which provided for Belgian consumption; the carrying out of German orders; exports to the Reich.

These various measures did not satisfy the occupying authorities so they ran a certain number of salvage campaigns which were called "special actions" (Sonderaktionen) in accordance with the method they

applied in all the countries of Western Europe. I shall not go into the details of these actions which are described on Page 63 and following of the report; the salvage campaigns for bells, for printing lead, for lead and copper—from information given by the Belgian Government, Document Number RF-146, Page 65 of the report.

In other fields, but without admitting it, the Germans pursued a policy intended to eliminate or to restrict Belgian competition, so that in case of a German victory the economic branches concerned would have had to restrict themselves to the Belgian market, which would then have remained wide open to German business.

These attempts at immediate or future suppression of competition were clearly evident in the case of foundries, glass works, textile industries, construction works, car assembling, construction of material for narrow-gauge railroads, the leather industry, and especially shoe-manufacturing, for which reconstruction of destroyed factories was systematically prohibited.

But in addition, in the textile industry as well as in numerous sectors, especially in the iron-smelting industry, the weakening of the economy cannot be measured only by the scale of the compulsory deliveries but in relation to the policy practiced by the occupying power. Belgian industry, especially coal and iron, suffered considerable losses as a result of directives imposed to finance the war needs at a cheaper rate.

I shall pass over the question of prices of coal. The control of the coal industry was assured by the appointment of a plenipotentiary for coal and by centralization of all sales

in the hands of a single organism, the “single seller,” under Belgian direction but with a German commissioner. I am referring to the Belgian coal office, one seller to a single purchaser, “Rheinisch Westfälisches Kohlensyndikat,” which ordered deliveries to be made to the Reich, to Alsace-Lorraine and Luxembourg.

According to the same German report, Page 67, in spite of the rise in the price of coal agreed to on 20 August 1940, 1 January 1941, and 1 January 1943, the coal industry showed considerable losses in the course of the occupation years. In February 1943, the coal office having agreed to an increase of the sales price, the price per ton for the Belgian coal was higher than on the German home market. The German commissioner for the mining industry forced the Belgian industry to pay the difference in rate when exporting to the Reich by means of premiums.

From the figures indicated in Exhibits Numbers RF-176 (Document Number ECH-35) and 178 (Document Numbers ECH-26 and 27), the Tribunal may gather information as to the financial losses caused by exploitation. The report of the military administration gives in its eleventh section details regarding the iron-smelting industry: It suffered as greatly as had the coal industry during the occupation. In the Thomas smelting works in particular, the losses resulted from the increase in the cost price and from price fluctuations in respect to certain elements pertaining to the manufacture.

In this one sector, according to the memorandum of the Belgian Government, the respective losses may be assessed at 3,000 million Belgian francs. Still, according to the same

report, out of a total production of 1,400,000 tons, 1,300,000 tons of various products were exported to Germany not including the metal delivered to Belgian factories working exclusively for Germany.

According to information furnished by the Belgian Government, the Germans removed in bulk and transported to Germany material of very great value. The total industrial spoliation is estimated by the Belgian Government at a sum of 2,000 million Belgian francs, at the 1940 rate, of course.

These removals constitute a real material loss; and from the fragmentary indications given to the Tribunal, this sum of 2,000 million Belgian francs is the figure which I ask the Tribunal to note.

In view of the information available at present it is not easy to estimate the extent of the levies made on industry; it is even more difficult to evaluate it in the agricultural sphere, which I shall briefly present.

Apart from the admissible needs of the occupation troops, the German authorities made an effort to obtain a supplement to the food levies in Belgium for the purpose of increasing the food of the Reich and other territories occupied by its troops. After having employed direct methods of levying, the Germans used the services of unscrupulous agents whose job it was to purchase at any price on the illicit markets; and the black market in this field assumed such proportions that the occupying authorities were frequently alarmed and in 1943 had to suppress it.

Apart from the damage to livestock and to the woods and forests, which play an important part in Belgium, the damage resulting from abnormal cutting in the forests

brought about an excess in deforestation reaching a figure of 2 million tons; the damage to capital caused by this premature cutting can be estimated at about 200 million Belgian francs.

The military operations proper caused damage to an extent of 100 million Belgian francs; and according to the memorandum of the Belgian Government, the total damage caused to forestry reaches a figure of 460 million Belgian francs. Taking into account the damage caused by abnormal cutting in the forests and by the establishment of airfields, the Belgian Government estimates at approximately 1,000 million Belgian francs the losses suffered by its agriculture during the occupation.

It must be noted, without going further into this subject, that these are net losses in capital, constituting a veritable exhaustion of substance and a consequent reduction and real consumption of the nation's resources. With this I have concluded my presentation concerning agriculture, and I pass on to transport.

The conduct of war led the Germans to utilize to the utmost the railroad network and the canal and river system of Belgium. The result was that the railroads and river fleet are included in those branches of Belgian economy which suffered most from the occupation and the hostilities which took place on Belgian soil. German traffic was simultaneously a traffic of personnel as demanded by military operations and a traffic of merchandise, coal, minerals, pit-props, foodstuffs, not to speak of the considerable quantities of construction material required for the fortification of the coast of the North Sea.

Railroads: The report of the Belgian Government shows that the damages suffered by the railroads consisted of losses in capital as well as of losses in revenue. Losses in capital resulted first and principally from requisitions and removals, to which the Germans proceeded in a wholesale fashion from the moment of their entry into Belgium. Thus in particular they immediately drained the stock of locomotives under the pretext of recovering German locomotives surrendered to Belgium after the war of 1914-1918 as a means of reparation.

In addition to seizures of locomotives, the Belgian National Railroad Company was subjected to numerous requisitions of material, sometimes under the form of rental; these requisitions are estimated at 4,500 million francs at the 1940 value.

Against the losses in capital, losses in revenue (Page 77) resulted principally from the free transportation service required by the Wehrmacht, also from the price policy pursued by the occupying power. These levies and these exceptional costs could be borne by the organizations concerned only by making large drains on the treasury.

Regarding automobiles, I shall say hardly anything (Page 79). The losses amount to about 3,000 million Belgian francs, out of which individuals received as compensation for requisition approximately 1,000 million (at the 1938 value).

We come now to river transport: The carrying out of the plan for the economic spoliation of Belgium presented the occupying power with serious transportation problems, to which I have already called attention.

In this sphere the German military administration imposed upon Belgian river shipping very heavy burdens. According to the report of the Belgian Government, the losses suffered by the Belgian river fleet took three forms: Requisitions and removals by the Germans; partial or total damage through military operations; excessive deterioration of material. These three forms of damage amount to 500 million francs, of which only 100 million are represented in clearing. Damage to waterways (Page 81), rivers, streams, and canals, can be evaluated at between 1,500 million to 2,000 million francs, at the 1940 value, especially with respect to requisitions and removals of public or private harbor installations.

Fishing boats were requisitioned for marking the river Scheldt and then disappeared without leaving any trace. Others suffered damage through requisitions or hire for military maneuvers.

Before closing this chapter concerned with levies in kind, the question of removal of industrial material may be briefly mentioned (Page 82).

It has already been pointed out that the policy of production and reorganization as pursued by the military administration had as a result the closing of numerous enterprises, thus enabling the Germans to seize a great number of machines under the pretext that they were out of use.

There are no branches of industry which were not despoiled in this way. The metal industry seems now to be one of those that suffered most. Though we do not wish to try the patience of the Tribunal, it seems particularly

pertinent to draw its attention briefly to the actual technique used in the organization of the levies, details which were decided upon even before the entry of German troops into the territories of Western Europe, organization putting into play military formations, organization emanating from the economy bureau of the General Staff of the Army and hence from the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW.

The existence of these military detachments, veritable pillaging detachments, is proved by various German documents. Under the name of economic detachments, "Wirtschaftstrupps," or special commandos, these pillaging crews carried out nefarious and illegal activities in all the countries of Western Europe.

The secret instructions for the "economic detachment J," stationed at Antwerp, are found in the file under Document Number RF-183. They constitute a very important, irrefutable document on the German intention to pillage and an additional proof of the contempt of the National Socialist leaders for the rules of international law.

These instructions date from the last days of May 1940. I should like to read a few excerpts of these instructions to the Tribunal (Document Number RF-183, Page 1).

"The economic detachments are formed by the office for economic armament of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. They are placed at the disposal of the High Command of the Army for employment in the countries to be occupied."

I shall skip to the bottom of Page 1 of the German document.

“It is their task to gain information quickly and completely in their districts of the scarce and rationed goods (raw materials, semi-finished products, mineral oil, *et cetera*) and machines of most vital importance for the purposes of national defense and to make a correct return of these stocks.

“In the case of machines, the requisition will be effected by means of a label, in the case of scarce and rationed goods, both by labelling and by guarding.

“Furthermore, the economic detachments have the duty of preparing and, upon order of the Army Group, of carrying out the removal of scarce and rationed goods, mineral oils, and the most important machines. These tasks are the exclusive responsibility of the economic detachments.

“The economic detachments are to commence their activities in newly occupied territories as early as the battle situation permits.”

Machines and raw materials having thus been found and identified, the new organizations went into action to dismantle and put to use these machines and raw materials in Germany.

The above quoted document RF-183 gives precise and very curious information on the formation and the strength of detachment “J” at Antwerp. The eight officers are all reserve officers, engineers, wholesale dealers, directors of mines, importers of raw materials, engineering consultants. Their names and their professions are mentioned in the document. These men are therefore all specialists in

commerce and industry. The choice of these technicians cannot be attributed to mere chance.

According to the above instructions and more especially the instructions found under date of 10 May 1940, coming from General Hannecken (Exhibit Number RF-184), Document Number ECH-33, once the machines and the stocks have been identified, the offices set to work, the Roges on one hand, and the compensation bureaus on the other hand, to whose activities attention has already been called in connection with the pillage of Holland and of the Belgian non-ferrous metal industry.

Another document, which is likewise presented as Exhibit Number RF-184 (Document Number ECH-33), shows that the very composition of the economic detachments emanates from the High Command. Quoting from Page 6:

“The economic detachments already mentioned in Section I, which are composed of experts for the branches of industry found in the respective areas, shall gain information and secure stocks of raw materials and special machinery for the production of ammunition and war equipment which are at present important.”

THE PRESIDENT: Is that quotation set out in your dossier?

M. DELPECH: The quotation is on Page 84, bis.

THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to break off?

[A recess was taken.]

M. DELPECH: Besides the economic detachments to which I have just drawn the attention of the Tribunal, detailed to remove and redistribute machinery either to

factories working in the country on behalf of the occupying power or to factories in Germany, these operations were directed by the Machine Pool Office.

Such offices were set up in all the occupied territories of Western Europe during the last months of 1942, upon the order of the Minister for Armaments and War Production, for example, the Defendant Speer, and the Office of the Four Year Plan, for example, the Defendant Göring.

The Machine Pool Office for Belgium and Northern France was set up upon the decision of the Chief of the Military Economic Section in Brussels under date of 18 February 1943. Its activity has already been outlined to the Tribunal in connection with the spoliation of non-ferrous metal industries. Its activity did not stop there; it is found in all branches of industry. The Exhibit Number RF-185 (Document ECH-29) can give us figures on its activity. This activity continued to the very last days of the occupation. Requisitions of machinery and instruments were not limited to industry; Documents Numbers ECH-16 and ECH-15 (Exhibits Numbers RF-193 and 194) show the extent of the requisitioning of scientific instruments.

I have finished with the levies on industrial material.

I shall present briefly in the fourth chapter the question of services, first of all:

1. The billeting of troops. By an ordinance dated 17 December 1940, Page 88, the Germans imposed the costs of billeting their troops upon Belgium. Having done this, the occupation authorities justified themselves by a rather liberal interpretation of Article 52 of the Hague Convention,

according to the provisions of which the occupying power may require levies in kind and in services.

The Wetter report (Document Number RF-186) wrongly contends that the Convention does not specify by whom the settlement should be made; Article 49 gives the right to make the occupied country defray the expenses.

Therefore Belgium had to meet expenses to the amount of 5,900 million francs for billeting costs, equipment, and furniture. The payments of the Belgian treasury for billeting is estimated in the report of the Belgian Military Administration at 5,423 million francs.

It is evident that under the pretext of billeting costs, other expenses were entered to the detriment of the Belgian economy, as in other occupied countries—the purchases of furniture which was to be sent to Germany.

2. Transport and Communications.

To assure transport and communications, the Belgian treasury had to advance a total of 8,000 million francs. As already pointed out to the Tribunal, the seizure by the occupation authorities covered even the river fleet to the extent that the transport plan restricted the use of rail to the operation troops.

According to Article 53 of the Hague Convention, the occupying army has the right to seize means of transport and communications provided that it returns them and pays indemnity. That army, however, does not possess the right to make the occupied country pay the costs of transport put at the army's disposal. That is, however, what Germany did in Belgium.

3. Labor.

The deportation of labor to Germany and forced labor in Belgium have already been explained to the Tribunal. It therefore seems unnecessary to stress this point (Page 91). At the most, we should recall certain consequences unfavorable to the Belgian economy. The measures concerning the deportation of labor caused an economic disorganization and weakening without precedent.

Secondly, the departure of workers and particularly of skilled workers inadequately replaced by unskilled labor—women, adolescents and pensioners—brought about a decrease in production at the same time as an increase in the cost price, which contributed to complicating the problem of the financial equilibrium of industrial enterprises.

Third observation: The requisition of labor was the cause of political and social discontent owing to the dispersion of families and the inequalities which appeared in the requisition of workers.

Fourth and last observation: The workers were required for spheres of work which were not necessarily their own, which resulted in a loss of their professional skill. Personnel were divided and unclassified. The closing of artisan workshops brought about changes more or less felt in certain branches of production. The losses thus suffered cannot be measured in terms of money, but they are none the less important to be submitted to your jurisdiction.

I have finished with this subject and will turn to a last chapter, Chapter V, the acquisition of Belgian investments in foreign industrial enterprises.

Since 1940 according to their general policy in all occupied countries of Western Europe, the Germans