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MARSHAL (Col. Charles W. Mays): If it please the Tribunal, the Defendants Sauckel and Von Papen are absent.

DR. WALTER SIEMERS (Counsel for Defendant Raeder): Admiral, yesterday we finished with the somewhat involved Document C-32, and we had got as far as Point 11. We now come to Point 12, “Ammunition stocks in excess of the armament permissible.” May I remind the Tribunal that this is Document C-32, Exhibit USA-50, in Document Book 10 a, Page 8, Point 12, which contains three columns.

Defendant, may I ask what you have to say to the accusation that you exceeded the permissible amount of ammunition?

ERICH RAEDER (Defendant): Certain ammunition stocks were in excess of the permissible amount and some were below it. I cannot tell you at this date what the reason was in each particular case. I assume that this depended to a considerable extent on the amounts left over from the last World War.

In the case of the first two items, the 17- and 15-centimeter shells, the actual stocks rather exceeded the quantity permitted, whereas the third item, the 10.5-centimeter, falls very far short of it—instead of 134,000 there were 87,000. In the case of the 8.8-centimeter shells there was an excess, then again a deficit, and the same thing applies to the last item. But they are all very insignificant amounts.

DR. SIEMERS: In the copy before the Tribunal there appears to be a note in the third column—on the next page in yours, Defendant—saying that quantities of ammunition are partly manufactured and partly in course of delivery, and that the total amount permissible will soon be exceeded.

I only wanted to ask you: The list was made out in September 1933. Then are the figures stated correct for September 1933 or autumn 1933?

DR. SIEMERS: If it says in this document that measures to be taken later will bring the totals above the quantities permissible, which—according to this statement—they had not yet reached, then that is calculated as from autumn 1933.

RAEDER: That may be assumed, yes. Because new ammunition as well as new guns were being manufactured, and old ammunition then had to be scrapped.

It also must be noted that ammunition for heavy artillery, which is not listed here, was in every case short of the permissible amount. A comparatively large amount of heavy artillery ammunition had been granted us for heavy coastal guns, and we had by no means as much as we were allowed to have.

DR. SIEMERS: For the assistance of the Tribunal, I may point out that this last point is proved by the actual documents in the hands of the Tribunal. In the Tribunal’s copy under the Figure 12, Column 2, just beside the separate figures, there is a sentence which says, “... that the whole quantity permitted for heavy artillery has not been reached.”

We now come to Number 13: “Exceeding the permissible stocks of machine guns, rifles, pistols, and gas masks.”

RAEDER: Here, too, it must be admitted that in isolated cases stocks were a little higher than permitted. There were, for instance, 43,000 gas masks instead of the 22,500 permitted. Large numbers of rifles and machine guns were taken away even by individuals after the World War to farms, et cetera. They were later collected, and for that reason there was a comparatively large stock of them. But we are not dealing here with any considerable quantities. Similarly ammunition, bayonets, hand grenades, searchlights, fog equipment, et cetera, also exceeded the prescribed limits but not to any great extent.

DR. SIEMERS: Now, Figure 14: “Obtaining 337 M.G. C/30’s without scrapping equally serviceable weapons.” As I did not ...

THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Surely, Dr. Siemers, it would be possible to deal with all these various points in the documents in one statement as to why there were these excesses. We have a statement here which contains 30 different items, and you have only got as far as 13, and you are dealing with each one.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, personally I agree entirely. I am sorry that I caused the Tribunal so much trouble in connection with this document. As I am not a naval expert, I had a great deal of trouble finding my way through it; but I do not think that I was the cause of the trouble. The Prosecution, you see, have made use of the single points in evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the question is—I am not blaming you, but we want to get on. We are not blaming you. Can’t it be done in one explanatory statement, one short statement?

There is no need to say anything more about Numbers 15 to 17. I think these were the most important points. The points planned for a later date were not to be effective until the years ’33 and ’34. I may perhaps just point out to the Tribunal that Number 17 refers to the intended construction of reserve destroyers. The Versailles Treaty permitted the construction of these.

I pass over Number 18 because we have already dealt with that. Number 19, again, refers only to intended construction. Number 20 I may consider irrelevant; it concerns only the arming of fishing vessels. Numbers 21 to 29 ...

THE PRESIDENT: I think, perhaps, you should ask the Defendant to explain some of these observations in the third column. I mean in Number 18, for instance: “Difficult to detect. If necessary can be denied.”

RAEDER: These were explanations given to our League of Nations representative at the Disarmament Conference by the competent expert. It does not refer to local conditions. Construction of submarine spare parts, for instance, took place abroad or was to be prepared. It was actually carried out in 1934 and ’35, and the first submarine was launched at the end of June 1935.

DR. SIEMERS: I may take it, Defendant, that only the construction and purchase of submarines was prohibited.

DR. SIEMERS: I cannot prove until a later stage that no violation of the Treaty was involved by the construction of these spare parts; but I think you will have to give some indication of your reason for wishing to conceal it, in view of the fact that spare parts were not forbidden. I may remind you that this took place in September 1933 at a time when negotiations had already been planned.

RAEDER: At that period, before the German-English Naval Agreement was concluded on the basis of 35 to 100, Hitler was particularly eager to avoid everything which might embarrass the negotiations in any way. The construction and preparation of submarine parts came under this heading as being a subject on which England was peculiarly sensitive.

DR. SIEMERS: Was there not an additional reason for this appendix and other remarks in this second column—namely, the unfortunate experiences which the Navy had caused in home politics, the fact that whenever the slightest action was taken a quarrel immediately ensued on the home political front?

RAEDER: Yes; and that went so far that the Reichswehrminister was attacked on occasions by Prussian ministers who disagreed with the Reich Government—for instance, Müller, Severing, Stresemann and later Brüning, who alleged to the Reich Chancellor that he took steps which he was not authorized to take. In reality, however, the Reich Government itself had sanctioned these things already and had accepted the responsibility for them.

DR. SIEMERS: So these things were kept secret for reasons of home policy, so that they should not be apparent...

RAEDER: With the approval of the Reich Government. As regards the firms, a number of firms...

DR. SIEMERS: I would prefer now to refer back to Column 2, Number 20, as I see from the record that the Prosecution have also expressly raised this point in connection with the arming of fishing craft, emphasized it, and made it the basis of a charge, “Warning shots, play it down.”

RAEDER: The two fishing boats were quite small vessels and were normally unarmed. They served to supervise the fishing boats in the North Sea right up to Iceland, to help them in case of emergency, to take sick men aboard and to afford protection against fishermen of other nations. We thought it advisable to mount at least a 5-centimeter gun on these ships since they were actually warships. “Warning shots” means that they fired a salute when they wanted to draw the fishermen’s attention to something; so it was quite an insignificant affair and had no need to be artificially reduced to a bagatelle but was in fact a bagatelle.

DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Numbers 21 to 28. This is a list of various firms, including industrial firms working on armament contracts. The Versailles Treaty admitted certain firms for this type of work while it excluded others. In actual fact, other firms had received contracts. Perhaps you can make a general statement on this point.

RAEDER: This was at a time when we had strong hopes that progress would be made at the Disarmament Conference. The Macdonald Plan, which brought about a certain improvement, had already been accepted; and we might have expected, in consequence, that the few factories still left to us would have to increase their output during the next few years. I may refer you to the shipping replacement scheme. Consequently, factories producing specialized articles were better equipped and supplied. There was, however, never any question of heavy guns or anything of that kind but of automatic fuse-igniters, explosives—for instance, mine containers, et cetera, small items but special items which could be made only by certain firms. But, apart from the firms admitted, other firms which had been excluded were also employed. Thus, for instance, the Friedrich Krupp Grusenwerke A.G. at Magdeburg, Number 25, was equipped to manufacture antiaircraft guns and antiaircraft barrels from 2-centimeters to 10.5-centimeters; similarly Number 26, a firm manufacturing antiaircraft ammunition, explosives; Number 27...

DR. SIEMERS: I have some questions which apply to all these figures. Is this not offset to a certain extent by the fact that some of the firms admitted had already dropped out for economic reasons?

RAEDER: Yes, you can certainly say that. These firms had comparatively few deliveries which were not sufficient to keep them going.

DR. SIEMERS: Defendant, I think one not only can—I think one must—say so. May I draw your attention to Point 22, Column 3, which reads, “The list in any case is out of date, as some firms have dropped out.”

DR. SIEMERS: That leaves us with Numbers 29 and 30. Number 29, “Preparations in the field of experiments with motorboats.” I think that these were preparations in a very small field.

DR. SIEMERS: I do not believe in any case that the Prosecution will attach any importance to it.

Then I only want you to make a final statement on Number 30, “Probable further concrete violations becoming necessary in the near future” up to 1934 inclusively. To all intents and purposes you have already answered the question by your reference to the negotiations planned with the British Government, some of which were already in progress.

DR. SIEMERS: These are matters, therefore, which were in any case due to be discussed in the course of the negotiations with the British Government, or rather the Admiralty.

RAEDER: You cannot say that of them all. For instance, Points 1 to 3 deal with mines. The number of mines was to be increased and modern material was to replace the old. It goes on in the same way with the transfer of guns from the North Sea to the Baltic “A” batteries, not with the scrapping of guns.

DR. SIEMERS: To conclude the whole matter, may I ask you to say what impression the whole thing made on a naval expert like yourself. All things considered, would you say that these are minor violations, and how far are these violations of an aggressive nature?

RAEDER: As I said yesterday, most of them are very inadequate improvements in defense of an almost entirely defenseless position. The separate items, as I explained yesterday, are so insignificant that it is really impossible to spend very much time on them. I believe that the Control Commission also had the impression that very little weight need be attached to all these matters; for in 1925 when the Control Commission left its station at Kiel where it had worked with the organizations of the Naval Command, Commander Fenshow, Admiral Charlton’s chief of staff and head of the Commission, whose main interest was guns and who had worked with a Captain Raenkel, a gunner and a specialist in these matters, said:

“We must leave now, and you are glad that we are going. You did not have a pleasant task, and neither did we. I must tell you one thing. You need not think that we believed what you have said. You did not say a single word of truth, but you have given your information so skillfully that we were able to accept it, and for that I am grateful to you.”

DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-29, which is Exhibit USA-46. Mr. President, it is in Raeder’s Document Book 10, Page 8 of the Prosecution’s document book.

DR. SIEMERS: Number 10, Page 8. This document, too, was submitted during the general Indictment made by the Prosecution at the beginning of the Trial on 27 November. It consists of a speech, a document signed by Raeder, dated 31 January 1933, “General Directives for the Support of the German Armaments Industry by the Navy.”

[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution pointed this out; and they have thought fit to conclude from it that on the day after Hitler’s nomination as Chancellor of the Reich, you were already acting positively in his support through this letter. Will you define your attitude, please?

RAEDER: There is no connection whatsoever between this letter and Hitler’s accession to power. You must admit that it would be impossible to compile so long and complicated a document—which was, after all, carefully prepared—between the evening of 30 and the morning of 31 January. This document results from the hope, which I mentioned before, that already under the Papen and Von Schleicher Government the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and the Disarmament Conference might be gradually relaxed, since the British Delegation had repeatedly said that they favored the gradual restoration of equal rights. We had, therefore, to get our industries into the best possible condition, as far as the manufacture of armaments was concerned, by increasing their output and enabling them to overcome competition.

As I say in Paragraph c of this letter, almost every country was at that time making efforts in the same direction, even those which, unlike Germany, had no restrictions imposed on them. Great Britain, France, North America, Japan, and especially Italy made the most determined efforts to gain markets for their armaments industry; and I wanted to follow them in this particular sphere. In order to do this, there had to be an understanding between the various departments of the Naval Command Staff to the effect that industry must be given support in a way which avoided the secrecy of technical matters and developments to too petty a degree. That is why I explain in Paragraph c that secrecy in small matters is less important than maintaining a high standard and keeping the lead.

“To sum up, I attach particular importance to the continued support of the industry in question by the Navy, even after the expected relaxation of the present restrictions, so that the industry would command confidence abroad and would find a market.”

This has nothing at all to do with Hitler nor with any independent rearmament on my own behalf.

RAEDER: During the month of January. I may say that we had a conference—perhaps at the beginning of January—and after that I had it put in writing.

DR. SIEMERS: That would be certainly 2 to 3 weeks before this letter was written?

DR. SIEMERS: I think it happens rarely that one receives a letter from a government office one day after its being conceived by the head of that office.

May I ask you now to tell me one thing more in connection with the “relaxation of the present restrictions.” That means the relaxation of the Versailles Treaty, I presume, through the Disarmament Conference. You have mentioned that four times in this document, so that I assume that was your basis.

RAEDER: Yes, it was. The whole atmosphere at that time, under both the governments I mentioned, was such that one could expect an improvement.

DR. SIEMERS: And this was the basis for which, to quote a few names only, Stresemann, Brüning, fought.

DR. SIEMERS: I think there is no need for me to go into further details. I have read this document again and again, and have been unable to find any point on which the Prosecution could base the conclusion that you had National Socialist ideas.

I now come to Document C-140. It is Exhibit USA-51, and is in the Document Book 10a, Page 104.

RAEDER: May I interrupt you, please? Would it not be appropriate that I should say now what I wanted to say to supplement the statement in C-156 regarding aircraft?

DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It might be practicable to finish with the infringements of the Versailles Treaty before going on to another subject. I had forgotten that.

The Prosecution have submitted Document C-156. It is Captain Schüssler’s book from the year 1937 and contains almost the same list of infringements as Document C-32, so that that document can be disposed of at the same time. In addition, it deals with the case of the designing office for submarines in Holland, with which we have already dealt. But there is still one point on which I should like to have your comments, and that concerns certain preparations in connection with navy aircraft which might be permitted later.

RAEDER: All sorts of preparations had been made in the field of aviation long before I came into office. A number of aircraft had been purchased, as I see from this book. They were stored with a firm called “Severa G.m.b.H.,” which was known to the Reichswehrminister. The Versailles Treaty had permitted us antiaircraft guns both on ships and on the coast, as was mentioned yesterday; and for these antiaircraft, firing practice had to be arranged. The Control Commission had allowed us a certain number of aircraft to tow the necessary targets. These aircraft were flown by ex-naval pilots employed by this company. The company, in turn, was managed by an old naval pilot.

Since we were not allowed to train naval pilots or were not allowed to have any naval air force, we gave a year’s training in the civil aviation school to a number of prospective naval officers before they joined the Navy, so that through this 1-year training they developed into very good pilots. Then they joined the Navy and went through their ordinary naval training. The aircraft purchased in this way was temporarily in the possession of the “Severa,” which also had a good deal to do with the Lohmann affairs and for that reason was dissolved by Reichswehrminister Gröner in the summer of 1928. Reichswehrminister Gröner established a new company with similar assignments in the autumn of 1928, soon after I assumed office. But he had signed the agreement himself in order to control the correct management of the whole affair.

In this company, in addition to their ordinary work, the Navy pilots carried out experiments in connection with the development of aircraft for a later Navy air force. We had the Government’s permission to manufacture a model of every type likely to be of use, but we were not allowed to accumulate aircraft. The Government had expressly forbidden that. The result was that in the course of years the company developed a number of aircraft types which would be useful at a later date when we were once more allowed to have aircraft.

In the early period exercises in the Navy were carried out by the old naval pilots—that is to say, it was demanded that exercises in observation be taken and that the crews of ships learn how to act against aircraft. When these young naval pilots were assigned to such exercises, they were discharged from the Navy for that time. It was an awkward affair, but it was always carried out punctiliously.

DR. SIEMERS: I may now turn to Document C-140, which is in Document Book 10a, Page 104. It is a letter from Reich Defense Minister Von Blomberg dated 25 October 1933. It is addressed to the Chief of the Army, the Chief of the Navy, and the Reich Minister for Aviation.

On this document the Prosecution based their accusations that you, Witness, prepared military plans for an armed resistance which might become necessary in consequence of Germany’s withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. Perhaps you can briefly state your view.

RAEDER: I had no previous knowledge of our imminent withdrawal from the League of Nations. This directive came out 11 days after we had left the League of Nations, and it merely provides defensive measures in the event of sanctions being applied against Germany by other powers in consequence of her departure from the League of Nations. It says under 2c: “I prohibit any practical preparations in the meantime.” So, at first, nothing was done in consequence of this directive, and the Reich Defense Minister merely asked for a report from me as to what should be done.

As far as I remember, no practical preparations of any kind were carried out by the Navy at the time, because the situation remained absolutely quiet and there was no reason to assume that there would be any need for defense.

DR. SIEMERS: That is probably indicated by the words under Point 2a, “Preparation for defense against sanctions.” It concerns the defense only.

DR. SIEMERS: That the withdrawal from the League of Nations occurred 14 October 1933, 11 days before the document was written, is a well-known fact and has been mentioned by the Prosecution on Page 257 of the record (Volume II, Page 304).

Now we come to Document C-166. This is Exhibit USA-48. Mr. President, this is in Document Book 10, on Page 36. It is a document dated 12 March 1934. It emanates from the Command Office of the Navy and refers to the preparation of auxiliary cruisers for action. The Prosecution have quoted only the first two paragraphs of this document and have pointed out that it shows that auxiliary cruisers were to be built and describes transport ships “O” for camouflage purposes.

The two paragraphs sound incriminating, but they can very easily be explained. May I refer to Lohmann’s affidavit, Document Number Raeder-2, my Document Book 1, Page 5. I refer to Paragraph II. I quote:

“The Document C-166, submitted to me, a communication from the Office of the Naval Command of 12 March 1934, deals with the ‘availability of auxiliary cruisers’ which, as stated in the document, were marked as ‘Transport Ships O.’ These ships were not to be newly constructed but were to be selected from the stock of the German merchant marine in accordance with the demands enumerated in the document and were to be examined as to their suitability for the tasks to be assigned them. Then plans were made for reconstruction in case of necessity, but the boats remained in the merchant marine.”

May I state at this point that in the English translation the word “Umbau” has been translated by the word “reconstruction.” I have my doubts as to whether this is quite correct. I presume that the interpreter has now translated it as “Umbau” accordingly. As far as I know, the German word “Umbau” only means much the same thing as the English word “changes”—that is, “Veränderung.”

“The order to select such boats from German shipyards was received, among others, by the Hamburg Office of the Naval Command where I was serving at the time.”

RAEDER: No. I can only emphasize again that there was no question of immediate construction but only of selecting suitable ships and examining them with a view to ascertaining the alterations necessary to enable them to function as auxiliary cruisers in the case of a general mobilization. The preparation of the plans and the plans themselves were to be ready by 1 April 1935, as laid down in Number 12. They were to be submitted to the naval administration so that in the case of mobilization the ship concerned could be taken from the stock of the merchant marine and converted.

DR. SIEMERS: I believe, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, that the whole misunderstanding would not have arisen if the Prosecution had translated two further sentences. The English version is very short and Point 11 is missing. I quote the text of Point 11:

“ ‘B’ is requested in co-operation with ‘K,’ first of all, to select suitable vessels and to ascertain how many 15-centimeter guns have to be mounted to achieve the required broadside...”

The word “selected” is used here so that the intention is not—as the Prosecution assert—the building of auxiliary cruisers but the making of a selection from merchant vessels.

RAEDER: Yes; and the ships continued to sail in the service of the merchant marine.

DR. SIEMERS: The second sentence, which I find has been unfortunately omitted from the English translation of the Prosecution, reads as follows:

“As long as only a restricted number of guns—at present 24—can be placed at our disposal for this purpose, preparations are to be made for only four transport ships (O). An increase of this number, presumably to six, will be postponed to a date when more guns are available. Until then we must await the results of the preparations for the first auxiliary cruisers.”

The fact that only four, or at the most six, merchant navy vessels were involved shows the insignificance of the whole matter.

I now come to Document C-189, USA-44. It is in Document Book Number 10 of the British Delegation, Page 66.

I should like your comments.—I beg your pardon. I should remind you that this concerns the conversation between Grossadmiral Raeder and the Führer aboard the Karlsruhe in June 1934.

Grossadmiral, will you please state your views on the three points mentioned in this brief document and which you discussed with Hitler in June 1934.

First question: Why was Hitler unwilling to reveal the increase in displacement of D and E—that is, the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau—when, according to this document, these were defensive weapons and every expert would notice the increased tonnage of these ships and, as far as I know, did notice it?

RAEDER: At that time we were considering what we could do with the two armored ships D and E, after the signing of the impending naval pact with England—that is, the two ships which Hitler had granted me for the Navy in the 1934 budget. We had definitely decided not to continue building these armored ships as such, since we could make better use of the material at our disposal.

DR. SIEMERS: But surely you realized that every expert in the British or American or any other Admiralty would see on a voyage, as soon as he had sighted the ship, that the 10,000 tons had now become 26,000?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, when you are examining a witness directly, you are not to ask leading questions which put into his mouth the very answer that you desire. You are stating all sorts of things to this witness and then asking him “isn’t that so?”

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. I shall make every effort to put my questions differently.

RAEDER: We are dealing here, in the first place, with plans: I asked permission to revise the plans for these two armored ships; first, by strengthening their defensive weapons—that is, the armor-plating and underwater compartments—and then by increasing their offensive armaments—namely, by adding a third 28-centimeter instead of 26-centimeter tower. The Führer was not yet willing to sanction, a new 28-centimeter tower because, as I said before, he did not in any circumstances want to prejudice the negotiations going on with Great Britain. To begin with, therefore, he sanctioned only a medium displacement of 18,000 to 19,000 tons; and we knew that when matters reached the stage where a third 28-centimeter tower could be mounted, the displacement would be about 25,000 to 26,000 tons.

We saw no cause to announce it at this stage, however, because it is customary in the Navy that new construction plans and especially new types of ships should be announced at the latest possible moment. That was the principal reason; and apart from that, Hitler did not want to draw the attention of other countries to these constructions by giving the figures mentioned or stating the very high speed. There was no other reason for not announcing these things.

DR. SIEMERS: I should like your comments on Number 2 of the document. That has been specially held against you by the Prosecution, because there you state the view that the fleet must be developed to oppose England later on.

RAEDER: At first—as I intended to explain later—we had taken the new French ships as our model. The French Navy was developing at that time the Dunkerque class with eight 33-centimeter guns and a high speed, and we took that for our model, especially since, in Hitler’s opinion—as you will hear later—there was no question of arming against England. We intended to reconstruct these two armored ships on this pattern as battleships with nine 28-centimeter guns and capable of a high speed. But then we heard that the King George class was being designed in England with 35.6-centimeter guns and, therefore, stronger than the French type; and so I said that we would in any case have to depart from the French type eventually and follow the English model which is now being built with 35-centimeter guns.

There is an error in the translation—namely, “oppose England.” It says in my text that developments should follow the lines of British developments—in other words, that we should design vessels similar in type to the English ships. But they were out of date, too, shortly afterwards, because France was then building ships of the Richelieu class with 38-centimeter guns. Therefore, we decided that we too would build ships with 38-centimeter guns. That was how the Bismarck came to be built. The word “oppose” would have been quite senseless at a time when we intended to come to an agreement with Britain on terms under which we could in no way vie with her.

DR. SIEMERS: Now we come to Point 3 of this document, which the Prosecution regard as equally important. I quote:

“The Führer demands complete secrecy with regard to the construction of U-boats—in consideration, also, of the Saar plebiscite.”

RAEDER: I have already referred to the Führer’s wish for secrecy in connection with both the construction of submarines and the preparations for that construction. This is one of the points on which he was most sensitive, because in no circumstances did he wish to prejudice the negotiations. He himself was generally extremely cautious during this period and would not in any circumstances do anything which might sabotage the naval pact which he was so eager to conclude.

DR. SIEMERS: I do not quite understand the reference to secrecy in connection with the construction of submarines. These were as yet not under construction, were they?

RAEDER: No. I said secrecy in connection with the preparations for the construction of submarines; that is just a short way of expressing it.

DR. SIEMERS: We now come to Document C-190, Exhibit USA-45. It is in Document Book Number 10 of the British Delegation, Page 67. This is a conversation which took place between Hitler and Raeder on 2 November 1934 aboard the Emden. In the document before you Hitler informs you that he considers it necessary to enlarge and improve the Navy by 1938 and that, if necessary, he would instruct Dr. Ley to place at the disposal of the Navy 120 to 150 million marks from the Labor Front.

RAEDER: No, not actually with the raising of funds. I applied for funds to the Reich Defense Minister, who allocated them to me for the purpose of this rearmament. I presume that this statement was made because the allocation sanctioned for the Navy appeared too small to me, and for this reason the Führer said that if necessary he would get Ley to act. This did not actually happen. I received my funds only through the Reich Defense Minister.

DR. SIEMERS: Although the charge made by the Prosecution is not quite clear to me, since it is based on Hitler’s views—which have nothing to do with you—I want to come back to this sum once more. I may remind you that an armored cruiser of the old 10,000-ton class, which after all was small, cost 75 to 80 million. Could this figure of 120 to 150 million be large enough to put the Navy in a position to carry out rearmament on a large scale?

RAEDER: No, certainly not. Two battleships were also under construction, apart from those two armored cruisers. You can imagine that the costs continually increased.

DR. SIEMERS: Will you please go on, then, to Point 2. According to Point 2 of the document, you pointed out to Hitler during this conference that it might be necessary to assemble six submarines during the first quarter of 1935.

RAEDER: I said this because I knew that at the beginning of 1935 we were going to aim at the re-establishment of the Armed Forces; and I thought that this might create a critical situation in respect to sanctions, which Hitler always expected, too. I assume that we were talking about this and that is why I suggested that if the necessity for any special preparations should arise out of the re-establishment of the Armed Forces then six submarines should be assembled, at a date previous to their proper date of assemblage, from those parts which were obtained from abroad.

DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Document C-159, Exhibit USA-54. This document may be found in the British Delegation’s Document Book 10a, Page 110. This document is a letter written by Von Blomberg on 2 March 1936, dealing with the demilitarized zone. Did you, Witness, make lengthy military preparations for the action which took place on 7 March 1936?

RAEDER: No, I made no lengthy preparations; I heard of the plan only through this document of 2 March. I may refer you to Point 6 which says, “To preserve the peaceful character of the operation, no military security or advance measures are to be taken without my express orders.” It was made clear, therefore, that the entire action was to have a peaceful character.

DR. SIEMERS: You knew nothing at all about this entire action until the beginning of March?

DR. SIEMERS: Then I will turn to Document C-194, Exhibit USA-55, in the British Delegation’s Document Book 10a, Page 128. This document is a communication from the High Command of the Wehrmacht to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy dating from 1936—the wording seems to indicate 6 March 1936. It deals, therefore, with the same subject as the last document. May I have your comments.

RAEDER: The Reich Defense Minister had sanctioned a certain air reconnaissance to take place over the North Sea on 6 March—that is to say, the day before the occupation of the Rhineland. He intended to withhold his decision as to whether U-boats were also to be sent out on reconnaissance assignments in the West as far as the Texel until the next day. I thereupon issued an order on 6 March 1936 and gave special instructions...

[Turning to the Tribunal.] I would like to point out that Raeder’s order of 6 March 1936 is appended to the same document and that the text is therefore before the Tribunal.

RAEDER: I prepared this decree of 6 March concerning the planning of the U-boat line and the reconnaissance to take place in the German bay on 7 March. I pointed out especially that everything must be avoided which might create a false impression of the Führer’s intentions and thus put difficulties in the way of this peaceful action.

DR. SIEMERS: I would like to add to your statement that these words taken from the decree of 6 March 1936 are to be found under Point 5. They are in the last two lines.

RAEDER: Those were all precautionary measures in case of a hostile counteraction.

DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the two last documents dealing with the topic of the Versailles Treaty and rearmament, Document C-135, Exhibit GB-213, Document Book 10, Page 20—that is the British Delegation’s Document Book 10—which is headed, “History of the War Organization”—that is, the “War Organization and Mobilization Scheme.” This dates from 1938. This document was read in its entirety by the Prosecution and a very grave charge was based upon it, because the document contains a statement to the effect that Hitler had demanded that in 5 years—that is, by 1 April 1938—a Wehrmacht should be created which he could employ as a political instrument of power and also because the document mentions the Establishment Organization Plan 1938 and the Combat Organization Plan.

Considering the significance of this point, I asked Vice Admiral Lohmann for his comments on this rather technical question. We are dealing with Exhibit Number Raeder-2, in my Document Book 2, under part III, on Page 5. I think the Prosecution have misunderstood the meaning of certain terms. The terms “Kriegsgliederung” (Combat Organization Plan) and “Aufstellungsgliederung” (Establishment Organization Plan) have been misunderstood.

I ask permission, therefore, to read this affidavit in conjunction with the documents I have submitted in evidence. I quote:

“III. Referring to Documents C-135 and C-153, Armament Plan, Mobilization Plan, Establishment Organization Plan—Aufstellungsgliederung, A.G.—and Combat Organization Plan—Kriegsgliederung, K.G....”

I would like to add that C-153 and C-135 are connected. I have taken them together for the sake of simplicity. Therefore, I would like to state for the record that 153 is Exhibit USA-43 and may be found in British Document Book 10a, Page 107. It is headed, “Armament Plan (A.P.) for the Third Armament Period.” It is a rather long document and is dated 12 May 1934.

“The above-named documents submitted to me deal with the Establishment Organization Plan, the Combat Organization Plan, the Mobilization Plan, and the Armament Plan. The first three plans, or orders of distribution, deal with the same matters and differ only in manner of composition. The Armament Plan differs from the other plans inasmuch as it deals with new construction and the required new materials and is hence less extensive.

“The German Navy, like the Armed Forces as a whole—and, no doubt, the Armed Forces of every nation—made such plans in order to be able, in the case of a conflict or of military complications, to prepare in time and use efficiently the means of combat available. Owing to changing conditions, military developments, changes in personnel, and advances in technique, such plans were revised every year. An essential part of these preparations, self-evident in the case of any Armed Forces, consisted of the establishment, mobilization, or combat organization, which provided a survey of all naval installations on land and sea, their local defenses, and tactical subordination—as well as of all combat material on hand or to be secured, increased, or reorganized by a specified date. All operations envisaged by the military command were based on this Combat Organization Plan, and it also served the political leaders as an indication of the possibilities according to the strength and number of the military resources available.

“The Combat Organization Plan always had to be prepared with great foresight and was issued by the High Command of the Navy generally 1½ years before it was to go into effect, in order to enable the responsible offices to attend in time to such necessary preliminaries, such as applying to the Navy Budget Office for funds and materials—such as iron, steel, et cetera—and for the preparation of accommodation insofar as all this was not already covered by the peacetime development of the Navy.

“In 1933, when Hitler in his Five Year Plan demanded that by 1 April 1938 an armed force should be created which he could throw into the balance as an instrument of political power, the Combat Organization Plan for 1938 was worked out independently of the scheduled yearly Combat Organization Plan, and up to 1935 it dealt mostly with the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles which had not yet been exhausted and with the question of supplementing the naval strength with craft not subject to limitation in type or number. After the Naval Pact of 1935, the Combat Organization Plan 1938 was replaced by a “Combat Organization Plan Ultimate Goal” (K.G. Endziel), which regulated the number of warships of all types existing or to be built in the proportion of 35:100 measured by the tonnage actually existing in the English Fleet. In consideration of monetary and material resources, the capacity of the shipyards, and the length of time required to build large warships, this ultimate goal was in the meanwhile fixed for the year 1944-45.

“There remained always the possibility of postponing it further, in accordance with the building program of the English Fleet.

“The various terminologies have only a naval technical significance and do not permit conclusions as to political plans.”

I would like to indicate a slight error in translation in the English text. The translation of the word “Terminierungen” by “terminology” is, in my opinion, not correct. It should probably be “dates” or “deadlines.”

Witness, are Vice Admiral Lohmann’s statements correct? Can you add anything to this basic point of view?

RAEDER: These statements contain everything which can be said on this matter. All these arrangements are, in my opinion, preparations which must be made by every navy if it is to be systematically equipped and made ready for operation.

It says somewhere—in Document Number C-135, Page 1, under Point 2—that, “The growing tension between Germany and Poland forced us to make practical instead of theoretical preparations for a purely German-Polish conflict.” That was interpreted to mean that at some time—I believe in 1930—we planned a war of aggression against Poland.

I testified yesterday that our main object was and had to be, nor could it have gone any further than, to oppose with force any aggression committed by Poland against East Prussia. That was the object of our work—to protect Germany from an invasion by the Poles. At that time, it would have been madness for German forces, which were still very inadequately armed, to invade Poland or any other country.

Then too, since the dates 1938 and 1944-45 constantly recur, I would like to point out again that the year 1938 first came into question as the final date for the first phase of the Shipping Replacement Plan. The last ship of this Shipping Replacement Plan was to be built from 1936 to 1938.

[Turning to the Tribunal.] I would like to call your attention to the fact that this is Document Number Raeder-7.

RAEDER: [Continuing.] Then Hitler decreed a Five Year Plan, which happened also to cover the years 1933 to 1938 and in accordance with which the Combat Organization Plan was to be fixed for the year 1938. The Combat Organization Plan Ultimate Goal was fixed for 1944-45; and the reason for fixing this date, as stated in the document which you have just read, was the fact that in fixing our program we had to take into consideration the funds and material at our disposal, the capacity of our shipbuilding yards, and the length of time needed to build big warships. A reasonably strong fighting force could not be created before that date. Later on the Combat Organization Plan appears again in several of my letters. But there was no date given which, on our part, was intended as the appointed time of attack.

DR. SIEMERS: The statements in Document C-135 are in accordance with the German-English Naval Agreement. Is that correct?

Perhaps I did not formulate my question clearly. The statement that a new program was set up implies then that it was done in accordance with the German-English Naval Agreement?

DR. SIEMERS: In any case, the reference to Document C-135, Point 8, is probably to be interpreted in that way since it says, “...A modern fleet, bound only by the clauses of the German-British Naval Agreement.”

Grossadmiral, when did you meet Hitler, and did you have any connection with National Socialism before 1933?

RAEDER: I met Hitler on 2 February 1933 when I saw him and talked to him for the first time. It was at an evening party arranged by General Von Blomberg at the home of General Von Hammerstein, the Chief of the Army Command Staff, at which Reich Defense Minister Von Blomberg intended to present to Hitler senior generals and admirals. I shall describe the proceedings later.

Up to that time, I had had no connection whatsoever with National Socialism. I knew Admiral Von Levetzow only from the first World War. He was on the staff of Admiral Scheer whom I knew well and who had obviously met Hitler at a comparatively early date. It was through him, however, that I heard that Hitler took a very active interest in naval matters and was surprisingly well-informed about them. On the other hand, I believe that Von Levetzow had also spoken to Hitler about the reputation of the Navy and his own opinion of the Navy at that time. But I had no connections beyond that.

DR. SIEMERS: What were your reasons for remaining in office in 1933, Grossadmiral, when you had no connection with National Socialism?

Table of Content

ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST DAY
(Thursday, 16 May 1946)

Morning Session

Table of Content

ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST DAY (Thursday, 16 May 1946)

Morning Session

ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST DAY
(Thursday, 16 May 1946)