To the student of science, accustomed to recognise the
operation of law in all phe-
nomena, even though the nature of the law and the manner of
its operation may be
unknown, there is something strange in the prevalent belief
in luck. In the operations
of nature and in the actions of men, in commercial
transactions and in chance games,
the great majority of men recognise the prevalence of
something outside law—the
good fortune or the bad fortune of men or of nations, the
luckiness or unluckiness
of special times and seasons—in fine (though they would hardly
admit as much in
words), the influence of something extranatural if not
supernatural. [For to the man
of science, in his work as student of nature, the word
‘natural’ implies the action of
law, and the occurrence of aught depending on what men mean
by luck would be
simply the occurrence of something
supernatural.]This is true alike of great
things
and of small; of matters having a certain dignity, real or
apparent, and of matters
which seem utterly contemptible.Napoleon
announcing that a certain star (as he
supposed) seen in full daylight
washisstar and indicated at the moment
the ascen-
dency of his fortune, or William the Conqueror proclaiming,
as he rose with hands
full of earth from his accidental fall on the Sussex shore,
that he was destined by
fate to seize England, may not seem comparable with a gambler
who says that he
shall win because he is in the vein, or with a player at
whist who rejoices that the
cards he and his partner use are of a particular colour, or
expects a change from bad
to good luck because he has turned his chair round thrice;
but one and all are alike
absurd in the eyes of the student of science, who sees law,
and not luck, in all things
that happen. He knows that Napoleon’s imagined star was the
planet Venus, bound
to be where Napoleon and his officers saw it by laws which it
had followed for past
millions of years, and will doubtless follow for millions of
years to come.He knows
that William fell (if by accident at all) because of certain
natural conditions affect-
ing him physiologically (probably he was excited and over
anxious) and physically,
not by any influence affecting him
extranaturally.But he sees equally well that
the
gambler’s superstitions about ‘the vein,’ the ‘maturity of
the chances,’ about luck
and about change of luck, relate to matters which are not
only subject to law, but
may be dealt with by processes of calculation. He recognises
even in men’s belief in
luck the action of law, and in the use which clever men like
Napoleon and William
have made of this false faith of men in luck, a natural
result of cerebral development,
of inherited qualities, and of the system of training which
such credulous folk have
passed through.
Let us consider, however, the general idea which most men
have respecting what
they call luck.We shall find that what they
regard as affording clear evidence that
there is such a thing as luck is in reality the result of
law.Nay, they adopt such a
combination of ideas about events which seem fortuitous that
the kind of evidence
they obtain must have been obtained, let events fall as they
may.
Let us consider the ideas of men about luck in gambling, as
typifying in small the
ideas of nearly all men about luck in life.
In the first place, gamblers recognise some men as always
lucky. I do not mean, of
course, that they suppose some men always win, but that some
men never have spells
of bad luck.They
arealways‘in the vein,’ to use the
phraseology of gamblers like
Steinmetz and others, who imagine that they have reduced
their wild and wandering
notions about luck into a science.
Next, gamblers recognise those who start on a gambling career
with singular good
luck, retaining that luck long enough to learn to trust in it
confidently, and then
losing it once for all, remaining thereafter constantly
unlucky.
Thirdly, gamblers regard the great bulk of their community as
men of varying
luck—sometimes in the ‘vein’ sometimes not—men who, if they
are to be successful,
must, according to the superstitions of the gambling world,
be most careful to watch
the progress of events. These, according to Steinmetz, the
great authority on all such
questions (probably because of the earnestness of his belief
in gambling superstitions),
may gamble or not, according as they are ready or not to obey
the dictates of gambling
prudence. When they are in the vein they should gamble
steadily on; but so soon as
‘the maturity of the chances’ brings with it a change of luck
they must withdraw. If
they will not do this they are likely to join the crew of the
unlucky.
Fourthly, there are those, according to the ideas of
gamblers, who are pursued by
constant ill-luck. They are never ‘in the vein.’ If they win
during the first half of an
evening, they lose more during the latter half. But usually
they lose all the time.
Fifthly, gamblers recognise a class who, having begun
unfortunately, have had a
change of luck later, and have become members of the lucky
fraternity. This change
they usually ascribe to some action or event which, to the
less brilliant imaginations
of outsiders, would seem to have nothing whatever to do with
the gambler’s luck.
For instance, the luck changed when the man married—his wife
being a shrew; or
because he took to wearing white waistcoats; or because
so-and-so, who had been a
sort of evil genius to the unlucky man, had gone abroad or
died; or for some equally
preposterous reason.
Then there are special classes of lucky or unlucky men, or
special peculiarities of
luck, believed in by individual gamblers, but not generally
recognised.
Thus there are some who believe that they are lucky on
certain days of the week,
and unlucky on certain other days.The skilful
whist-player who, under the name
‘Pembridge,’ deplores the rise of the system of signals in
whist play, believes that he
is lucky for a spell of five years, unlucky for the next five
years, and so on continually.
Bulwer Lytton believed that he always lost at whist when a
certain man was at the
same table, or in the same room, or even in the same
house.And there are other
cases equally absurd.
Now, at the outset, it is to be remarked that, if any large
number of persons set to
work at any form of gambling—card play, racing, or whatever
else it may be—their
fortunesmustbe such, let the
individual members of the company be whom they
may, that they will be divisible into such sets as are
indicated above. If the numbers
are only large enough, not one of those classes, not even the
special classes mentioned
at the last, can fail to be represented.
Consider, for instance, the following simple illustrative
case:—
Suppose a large number of persons—say, for instance, twenty
millions—engage in
some game depending wholly on chance, two persons taking part
in each game, so that
there are ten million contests.Now, it is
obvious that, whether the chances in each
contest are exactly equal or not, exactly ten millions of the
twenty millions of persons
will rise up winners and as many will rise up losers, the
game being understood to
be of such a kind that one player or the other must win. So
far, then, as the results
of that first set of contests are concerned, there will be ten
million persons who will
consider themselves to be in luck.
Now, let the same twenty millions of persons engage a second
time in the same
two-handed game, the pairs of players being not the same as
at the first encounter,
but distributed as chance may direct. Then there will be ten
millions of winners and
ten millions of losers.Again, if we consider the
fortunes of the ten million winners
on the first night, we see that, since the chance which, each
one of these has of being
again a winner is equal to the chance he has of
losing,aboutone-half of the
winning
ten millions of the first night will be winners on the second
night too.Nor shall we
deduce a wrong general result if, for convenience, we
sayexactlyone-half; so long
as
we are dealing with very large numbers we know that this
result must be near the
truth, and in chance problems of this sort we require (and
can expect) no more. On
this assumption, there are at the end of the second contest
five millions who have
won in both encounters, and five millions who have won in the
first and lost in the
second.The other ten millions, who lost in the
first encounter, may similarly be
divided into five millions who lost also in the second, and as
many who won in the
second.Thus, at the end of the second encounter,
there are five millions of players
who deem themselves lucky, as they have won twice and not
lost at all; as many who
deem themselves unlucky, having lost in both encounters;
while ten millions, or half
the original number, have no reason to regard themselves as
either lucky or unlucky,
having won and lost in equal degree.
Extending our investigation to a third
contest,we find that 2,500,000 will be
confirmed in their opinion that they are very
lucky,since they will have won in
all three encounters; while as many will have lost in all
three, and begin to regard
themselves, and to be regarded by their fellow-gamblers, as
hopelessly unlucky.Of
the remaining fifteen millions of players, it will be found
that 7,500,000 will have won
twice and lost once, while as many will have lost twice and
won once.(There will
be 2,500,000 who won the first two games and lost the third,
as many who lost the
first two and won the third, as many who won the first, lost
the second, and won the
third, and so on through the six possible results for these
fifteen millions who had
mixed luck.) Half of the fifteen millions will deem themselves
rather lucky, while the
other half will deem themselves rather
unlucky.None, of course, can have had
even
luck, since an odd number of games has been
played.
Our 20,000,000 players enter on a fourth series of
encounters.At its close there
are found to be 1,250,000 very lucky players, who have won in
all four encounters,
and as many unlucky ones who have lost in all four. Of the
2,500,000 players who had
won in three encounters, one-half lose in the fourth; they
had been deemed lucky, but
now their luck has changed.So with the 2,500,000
who had been thus far unlucky:
one-half of them win on the fourth trial.We have
then 1,250,000 winners of three
games out of four, and 1,250,000 losers of three games out of
four. Of the 7,500,000
who had won two and lost one, one-half, or 3,750,000, win
another game, and must be
added to the 1,250,000 just mentioned, making three million
winners of three games
out of four.The other half lose the fourth game,
giving us 3,750,000 who have had
equal fortunes thus far, winning two games and losing
two.Of the other 7,500,000,
who had lost two and won one, half win the fourth game, and
so give 3,750,000 more
who have lost two games and won two: thus in all we have
7,500,000 who have had
equal fortunes. The others lose at the fourth trial, and give
us 3,500,000 to be added
to the 1,250,000 already counted, who have lost thrice and
won once only.
At the close, then, of the fourth encounter, we find a million
and a quarter of
players who have been constantly lucky,and as
many who have been constantly
unlucky.Five millions, having won three games
out of four, consider themselves to
have better luck than the average; while as many, having lost
three games out of four,
regard themselves as unlucky.Lastly, we have
seven millions and a half who have
won and lost in equal degree.These, it will be
seen, constitute the largest part of
our gambling community, though not equal to the other classes
taken together. They
are, in fact, three-eighths of the entire
community.
So we might proceed to consider the twenty millions of
gamblers after a fifth
encounter, a sixth, and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in
dealing with the matter in
that way. But a sort of account must be kept in proceeding
from the various classes
considered in dealing with the fourth encounter to those
resulting from the fifth, from
these to those resulting from the sixth, and so
on.And although the accounts thus
requiring to be drawn up are easily dealt with, the little
sums (in division by two,
and in addition) would not present an appearance suited to
these pages. I therefore
now proceed to consider only the results, or rather such of
the results as bear most
upon my subject.
After the fifth encounter there would be (on the assumption of
results being always
exactly balanced, which is convenient, and quite near enough
to the truth for our
present purpose) 625,000 persons who would have won every
game they had played,
and as many who had lost every game. These would represent
the persistently lucky
and unlucky men of our gambling community. There would be
625,000 who, having
won four times in succession, now lost, and as many who,
having lost four times in
succession, now won. These would be the examples of luck—good
or bad—continued
to a certain stage, and then changing. The balance of our
20,000,000, amounting to
seventeen millions and a half, would have had varying degrees
of luck, from those who
had won four games (not the first four) and lost one, to those
who had lost four games
(not the first four) and won but a single
game.The bulk of the seventeen millions
and a half would include those who would have had no reason
to regard themselves as
either specially lucky or specially unlucky. But 1,250,000 of
them would be regarded
as examples of a change of luck, being 625,000 who had won
the first three games
and lost the remaining two, and as many who had lost the first
three games and won
the last two.
Thus, after the fifth game, there would be only 1,250,000 of
those regarded (for
the nonce) as persistently lucky or unlucky (as many of one
class as of the other),
while there would be twice as many who would be regarded by
those who knew of
their fortunes, and of course by themselves, as examples of
change of luck, marked
good or bad luck at starting, and then bad or good
luck.
So the games would proceed, half of the persistently lucky up
to a given game going
out of that class at the next game to become examples of a
change of luck, so that
the number of the persistently lucky would rapidly diminish
as the play continued.
So would the number of the persistently unlucky continually
diminish, half going out
at each new encounter to join the ranks of those who had long
been unlucky, but had
at last experienced a change of fortune.
After the twentieth game, if we suppose constant exact
halving to take place as
far as possible, and then to be followed by halving as near
as possible, there would be
about a score who had won every game of the twenty. No amount
of reasoning would
persuade these players, or those who had heard of their
fortunes, that they were not
exceedingly lucky persons—not in the sense of being lucky
because theyhadwon,
but of beinglikelier to winat any
time than any of those who had taken part in the
twenty games. They themselves and their friends—ay, and their
enemies too—would
conclude that they ‘could not lose.’ In like manner, the
score or so who had not won
a single game out of the twenty would be judged to be most
unlucky persons, whom
it would be madness to back in any matter of pure
chance.
Yet—to pause for a moment on the case of these apparently
most manifest examples
of persistent luck—the result we have obtained has been to show
that inevitably
there must be in a given number of trials about a score of
these cases of persistent
luck, good or bad, and about two score of cases where both
good and bad are counted
together.We have shown that, without imagining
any antecedent luckiness, good
or bad, there must be what, to the players themselves, and to
all who heard of or
saw what had happened to them, would seem examples of the
most marvellous luck.
Supposing, as we have, that the game is one of pure chance,
so that skill cannot in-
fluence it and cheating is wholly prevented, all betting men
would be disposed to say,
‘These twenty are persons whose good luck can be depended on;
we must certainly
back them for the next game: and those other twenty are
hopelessly unlucky; we may
lay almost any odds against their winning.’
But it should hardly be necessary to say that that
whichmusthappen cannot
be regarded as due to luck.There must
besomeset of twenty or so out of
our
twenty millions who will win every game of twenty; and the
circumstance that this
has befallen such and such persons no more means that they
are lucky, and is no
more a matter to be marvelled at, than the circumstance that
one person has drawn
the prize ticket out of twenty at a lottery is marvellous, or
signifies that he would be
always lucky in lottery drawing.
The question whether those twenty persons who had so far been
persistently lucky
would be better worth backing than the rest of the twenty
millions, and especially
than the other twenty who had persistently lost, would in
reality be disposed of at
the twenty-first trial in a very decisive way: for of the
former score about half would
lose, while of the latter score about half would win. Among a
thousand persons who
had backed the former set at odds there would be a heavy
average of loss; and the
like among a thousand persons who had laid against the latter
set at odds.
It may be said this is assertion only, that experience shows
that some men are
lucky and others unlucky at games or other matters depending
purely on chance, and
it must be safer to back the former and to wager against the
latter.The answer is
that the matter has been tested over and over again by
experience, with the result
that, as`a priorireasoning had
shown, some men are bound to be fortunate again and
again in any great number of trials, but that these are no
more likely to be fortunate
on fresh trials than others, including those who have been
most unfortunate.The
success of the former shows only that theyhave
been, not that theyarelucky;
while
the failure of the others shows that
theyhavefailed, nothing
more.
An objection will—about here—have vaguely presented itself to
believers in luck,
viz. that, according to the doctrine of the ‘maturity of the
chances,’ which must apply
to the fortunes of individuals as well as to the turn of
events, one would rather expect
the twenty who had been so persistently lucky to lose on the
twenty-first trial, and
the twenty who had lost so long to win at last in that event.
Of course, if gambling
superstitions might equally lead men to expect a change of
luck and continuance
of luck unchanged, one or other view might fairly be expected
to be confirmed by
events. And on a single trial one or other event—that is, a
win or a loss—mustcome
off, greatly to the gratification of believers in luck. In one
case they could say, ‘I told
you so, such luck as A’s was bound to pull him through
again’; in the other, ‘I told
you so, such luck was bound to change’: or if it were the
loser of twenty trials who was
in question, then, ‘I told you so, he was bound to win at
last’; or, ‘I told you so, such
an unlucky fellow was bound to lose.’ But unfortunately,
though the believers in luck
thus run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, though they
are prepared to find
any and every event confirming their notions about luck, yet
when a score of trials
or so are made, as in our supposed case of a twenty-first
game, the chances are that
they would be contradicted by the event.The
twenty constant winners would not
be more lucky than the twenty constant losers; but neither
would they be less lucky.
The chances are that about half would win and about half
would lose.If one who
really understands the laws of probability could be supposed
foolish enough to wager
money on either twenty, or on both, he would unquestionably
regard the betting as
perfectly even.
Let us return to the rest of our twenty millions of players,
though we need by no
means consider all the various classes into which they may be
divided, for the number
of these classes amounts, in fact, to more than a
million.
The great bulk of the twenty millions would consist of
players who had won about
as many games as they had lost.The number who
had wonexactlyas many games
as they had lost would no longer form a large proportion of
the total, though it would
form the largest individual class.There would be
nearly 3,700,000 of these, while
there would be about 3,400,000 who had won eleven and lost
nine, and as many who
had won nine and lost eleven; these two classes together
would outnumber the winners
of ten games exactly, in the proportion of 20 to 11 or
thereabouts. Speaking generally,
it may be said that about two-thirds of the community would
consider they had had
neither good luck nor bad, though their opinion would depend
on temperament in
part. For some men are more sensitive to losses than to
gains, and are ready to speak
of themselves as unlucky, when a careful examination of their
varying fortunes shows
that they have neither won nor lost on the whole, or have won
rather more than they
have lost.On the other hand, there are some who
are more exhilarated by success
than dashed by failure.
The number of those who, having begun with good luck, had
eventually been so
markedly unfortunate, would be considerable.It
might be taken to include all who
had won the first six games and lost all the rest, or who had
won the first seven or
the first eight, or any number up to, say, the first fourteen,
losing thence to the end;
and so estimated would amount to about 170, an equal number
being first markedly
unfortunate, and then constantly fortunate. But the number
who had experienced a
marked change of luck would be much greater if it were taken
to include all who had
won a large proportion of the first nine or ten games and lost
a large proportion of
the remainder, orvice versˆa. These two classes
of players would be well represented.
Thus, then, we see that, setting enough persons playing at
any game of pure
chance, and assuming only that among any large number of
players there will be
about as many winners as losers, irrespective of luck, good
or bad, all the five classes
which gambling folk recognise and regard as proving the
existence of luck,must
inevitably make their appearance.
Even any special class which some believer in luck, who was
more or less fanciful,
imagined he had recognised among gambling folk, must
inevitably appear among our
twenty millions of illustrative players. For example, there
would be about a score of
players who would have won the first game, lost the second,
won the third, and so on
alternately to the end; and as many who had also won and lost
alternate games, but
had lost the first game; some forty, therefore, whose fortune
it seemed to be to win
only after they had lost and to lose only after they had
won.Again, about twenty
would win the first five games, lose the next five, win the
third five, and lose the last
five; and about twenty more would lose the first five, win the
next, lose the third five,
and win the last five: about forty players, therefore, who
seemed bound to win and
lose always five games, and no more, in
succession.
Again, if anyone had made a prediction that among the players
of the twenty
games there would be one who would win the first, then lose
two, then win three,
then lose four, then win five, and then lose the remaining
five—and yet a sixth if
the twenty-first game were played—that prophet would certainly
be justified by the
result. For about a score would be sure to have just such
fortunes as he had indicated
up to the twentieth game, and of these, nine or ten would be
(practically) sure to win
the twenty-first game also.
Wesee,then,thatallthedifferentkindsofluck—good,bad,indifferent,or
changing—which believers in luck recognise,are
bound to appear when any con-
siderable number of trials are made; and all the varied ideas
which men have formed
respecting fortune and her ways are bound to be
confirmed.
It may be asked by some whether this is not proving that
there is such a thing
as luck instead of over-throwing the idea of luck. But such a
question can only arise
from a confusion of ideas as to what is meant by
luck.If it be merely asserted that
such and such men have been lucky or unlucky, no one need
dispute the proposition;
for among the millions of millions of millions of purely
fortuitous events affecting
the millions of persons now living, it could not but chance
that the most remarkable
combinations, sequences, alternations, and so forth, of
events, lucky or unlucky, must
have presented themselves in the careers of hundreds. Our
illustrative case, artificial
though it may seem, is in reality not merely an illustration
of life and its chances,
but may be regarded as legitimately demonstrating what must
inevitably happen on
the wider arena and amid the infinitely multiplied
vicissitudes of life. But the belief
in luck involves much more. The idea involved in it, if not
openly expressed (usually
expressed very freely), is that some men are lucky by nature,
others unlucky, that
such and such times and seasons are lucky or unlucky, that
the progress of events may
be modified by the lucky or unlucky influence of actions in no
way relating to them;
as, for instance, that success or failure at cards may be
affected by the choice of a
seat, or by turning round thrice in the
seat.This form of belief in luck is not
only
akin to superstition,
itissuperstition.Like all
superstition, it is mischievous.It is,
indeed, the very essence of the gambling spirit, a spirit so
demoralising that it blinds
men to the innate immorality of gambling. It is this belief
in luck, as something which
can be relied on, or propitiated, or influenced by such and
such practices, which is
shown, by reasoning and experience alike, to be entirely
inconsistent not only with
facts but with possibility.
But oddly enough, the believers in luck show by the form
which their belief takes
that in reality they have no faith in luck any more than men
really have faith in
superstitions which yet they allow to influence their
conduct.A superstition is an
idle dread, or an equally idle hope, not a real faith; and in
like manner is it with
luck.A man will tell you that at cards, for
instance, he always has such and such
luck; but if you say, ‘Let us have a few games to see whether
you will have your
usual luck,’ you will usually find him unwilling to let you
apply the test.If you try
it, and the result is unfavourable, he argues that such
peculiarities of luck never do
show themselves when submitted to test. On the other hand, if
it so chances that on
that particular occasion he has the kind of luck which he
claims to havealways, he
expects you to accept the evidence as
decisive.Yet the result means in reality
only
that certain events, the chances for and against which were
probably pretty equally
divided, have taken place.
So, if a gambler has the notion (which seems to the student
of science to imply
something little short of imbecility of mind) that turning
round thrice in his chair will
change the luck, he is by no means corrected of the
superstition by finding the process
fail on any particular occasion.But if the bad
luck which has hitherto pursued him
chances (which it is quite as likely to do as not) to be
replaced by good or even by
moderate luck, after the gambler has gone through the mystic
process described, or
some other equally absurd and irrelevant manœuvre, then the
superstition is con-
firmed. Yet all the time there is no real faith in it. Such
practices are like the absurd
invocation of Indian ‘medicine men’; there is a sort of vague
hope that something
good may come of them, no real faith in their
efficacy.
The best proof of the utter absence of real faith in
superstitions about luck, even
among gambling men, the most superstitious of mankind, may be
found in the incon-
gruity of their two leading ideas. If there are two forms of
expression more frequently
than any others in the mouth of gambling men, they are those
which relate to being
in luck or out of luck on the one hand, and to the idea that
luck must change on the
other.Professional gamblers, like Steinmetz and
his kind, have become so satisfied
that these ideas are sound, whatever else may be unsound, in
regard to luck, that
they have invented technical expressions to present these
theories of theirs, failing
utterly to notice that the ideas are inconsistent with each
other, and cannot both be
right—though both may be wrong, and are so.
A player is said to be ‘in the vein’ when he has for some
time been fortunate. He
should only go on playing, if he is wise, at such a time, and
at such a time only should
he be backed.Having been lucky he is likely,
according to this notion, to continue
lucky. But, on the other hand, the theory called ‘the
maturity of the chances’ teaches
that the luck cannot continue more than a certain time in one
direction; when it has
reached maturity in that direction it must change. Therefore,
when a man has been
‘in the vein’ for a certain time (unfortunately no Steinmetz
can say precisely how
long), it is unsafe to back him, for he must be on the verge
of a change of luck.
Of course the gambler is confirmed in his superstition,
whichever event may befall
in such cases.When he wins he applauds himself
for following the luck, or for duly
anticipating a change of luck, as the case may be; when he
loses, he simply regrets
his folly in not seeing that the luck must change, or in not
standing by the winner.
And with regard to the idea that luck must change, and that
in the long run events
must run even, it is noteworthy how few gambling men
recognise either, on the one
hand, how inconsistent this idea is with their belief in luck
which may be trusted (or,
in their slang, may be safely backed), or, on the other hand,
the real way in which
luck ‘comes even’ after a sufficiently long run.
A man who has played long with success goes on because he
regards himself as
lucky. A man who has played long without success goes on
because he considers that
the luck is bound to change.The latter goes on
with the idea that, if he only plays
long enough, he must at least at some time or other recover
his losses.
Now there can be no manner of doubt that if a man, possessed
of sufficient means,
goes on playing for a very long time, his gains and losses
will eventually be very nearly
equal; assuming always, of course, that he is not
swindled—which, as we are dealing
with gambling men, is perhaps a sufficiently bold
assumption.Yet it by no means
follows that, if he starts with considerable losses, he will
ever recover the sum he has
thus had to part with, or that his losses may not be
considerably increased.This
sounds like a paradox; but in reality the real paradox lies
in the opposite view.
This may be readily shown.
The idea to be controverted is this: that if a gambler plays
long enough there must
come a time when his gains and his losses are exactly
balanced.Of course, if this
were true, it would be a very strong argument against
gambling; for what but loss of
time can be the result of following a course which must
inevitably lead you, if you go
on long enough, to the place from which you
started?But it is not true.If it
were
true, of course it involves the inference that, no matter
when you enter on a course of
gambling, you are bound after a certain time to find yourself
where you were at that
beginning. It follows that if (which is certainly possible)
you lose considerably in the
first few weeks or months of your gambling career, then, if
you only play long enough
you must inevitably find yourself as great a loser, on the
whole, as you were when you
were thus in arrears through gambling losses; for your play
may be quite as properly
considered to have begun when those losses had just been
incurred, as to have begun
at any other time.Hence this idea that, in the
long run, the luck must run even,
involves the conclusion that, if you are a loser or a gainer
in the beginning of your
play, you must at some time or other be equally a gainer or
loser. This is manifestly
inconsistent with the idea that long-continued play will
inevitably leave you neither a
loser nor a gainer. If, starting from a certain point when
you are a thousand pounds
in arrears, you are certain some time or other, if you only
play long enough, to have
gained back that thousand pounds, it is obvious that you are
equally certain some
time or other (from that same starting-point) to be yet
another thousand pounds in
arrears. For there is no line of argument to prove you must
regain it, which will not
equally prove that some time or other you must be a loser by
that same amount, over
and above what you had already lost when beginning the games
which were to put
you right.If, then, you are to come straight,
you must be able certainly to recover
two thousand pounds, and by parity of reasoning four
thousand, and again twice that;
and so onad infinitum: which is manifestly
absurd.
The real fact is, that while the laws of probabilities do
undoubtedly assure the
gambler that his losses and gains will in the long run be
nearly equal, the kind of
equality thus approached is not an equality of actual amount,
but of proportion.If
two men keep on tossing for sovereigns, it becomes more and
more unlikely, the longer
they toss, that the difference between them will fall short of
any given sum.If they
one or the other being a loser of at least a thousand
pounds.
the amount won by one altogether, to the amount won
altogether by the other, is
at the end of twenty millions of tossings, one player is a
winner of 1,000
must have won in all 10,000,500l., the other having won in
all 9,999,500l. the ratio of
ratio of 10000 to 9999, or is scarcely distinguishable,
practically, from actual equality.
happened that one would have won five or six times, while the
other had only won
Yet with a ratio of 5 to 3, or 3
to 1, against the loser, he would
. in the other; while in the other
pounds.
proves as much on one side as on the other; for if one player
loses the other must
the prevalent ideas of many respecting gambling games, the
chance of winning were
Where a man is so foolish that the chance of having more
money than he wants is
the power of getting what is necessary for himself and for
his family, such reasoning
it has no value whatever.
gambling transaction, by a man of moderate means, definitely
reduces the actual
has a hundred pounds available to meet his present wants
wagers 50l.
or an equal chance, he is no longer worth 100l.
He
worth 150l., or he may be worth only 50l. All he
canhis property at is
about
as soon as they have made the bet; and when the wager is
decided, the average value
having his 100l.(or
increased as 2 to 3), than the loser suffers by
Similar remarks apply to participation in lottery schemes, or
the various forms of
it is staked, a depreciation of the gambler’s property; and
would mean that, even
But this is
are always retained in favour of those who work the lottery
or the gambling system.
in it. Winners of course there are, and in some few cases
winners may retain a large
it is manifest that, apart from the circumstance that
theof the gambling
gains
effects
there is always a large deduction to be made on account of
the wild and reckless waste
ruin to the unfortunate winner:
unaccustomed to the position, he has ridden ‘straightway to
the devil.’
they are so large a majority of all communities, that the
bait may be dangled for
have yet been known the hook has been patent, and the evil it
must do if swallowed
A most remarkable illustration of the folly of those who
trust in luck, and the cool
is presented by the Louisiana Lottery in
America.
kind now permitted in America.
Louisiana; but practically the whole country takes part in
it, tickets being obtainable
The
peculiarity of the lottery is
admission, in all advertisements, that it is a gross and
unmitigated swindleThe
dollars, shares of one-fifth being purchasable at one
dollar.
Generals Early and Beauregard—control the drawings; so that
we are told, and may
to all parties.We see that each month,
sold, the sum of 500,000 dols. will be paid
in.
deduct 1,000 dols. paid to each, of the commissioners, and
perhaps some 3,000 dols.
expenses, machinery, sums paid to agents as commission on the
sale of tickets, and so
is ‘incorporated by the State Legislature of Louisiana for
charitable and educational
set aside to represent the proceeds of the concern, and
justify the use of so degrading
Probably it might be
supposed that 24 per cent. per
entirely free from risk. This would amount to 9,800 dols., or
say 10,000 dols., monthly.
which would leave 480,000 dols. to be distributed in prizes.
They distribute 215,000
If the
on the transaction is not less than 225,000 dols., or 45 per
cent. on the total amount
on a capital of 500,000 dols. But in reality it amounts to
much more, as the lottery
being disreputable in the sense in which all lotteries are
so. What would be thought
5l., and taking the sum of 500l
gamblers, will now proceed; 265l
follows’ (indicating the number of prizes and their several
amounts); ‘the rest, this
., which I have here separated, I
will put into my own pocket’ (suiting
The Louisiana
by being on a very much larger scale.
submit to swindling so gross as this, we can scarcely see any
limit to its operation.
large sum, at the expense of a small sum almost certainly
lost, and partly stolen.
moths away from the destruction to which they seem
irresistibly lured—that gambling
There is no sum, however
which is not certain to be absorbed at
some time in the continuance of a
Gamblers with moderate fortunes
In their idea, mistaken as it is,
that luck must run even at last, they
may have gone. If they were content even to stay
till—possibly—gain balanced loss,
such an aim as that?
on till great gains have been made. And no gambler was ever
yet content to stay his
The fatal faith in
Every gambler has this faith, and no gambler who holds to it
is likely long to escape