Heinz Duthel
© Heinz Duthel 2010 - 2018
The Illusion of a Grand Strategy -The White House Cabal
Translated with Google from Hebrew to English
This book is sold subject the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser.
This report, essay deals and investigates into different cases:
I leave the writing of this book; it is with considerable apprehension, however. None whoops at the site of the world could feel otherwise. The frequency of war, the continue election by ignorant citizens of doves and hawks worldwide and the treat of a greater war conducted with nuclear weapons is frightening and a challenge the future of the human species. Perhaps we don’t deserve survive, but in any case if we don’t we will have been the engineers of our own destruction.
Peace with liberty is not a product of absolute pacifism. It is only a way of achieving peace at any price, and the price might well be subservience country, which does not practice pacifism. I am afraid of the disastrous social effect of those idealists know very well where they want us to, but don’t know how get us there.
Heinz Duthel, October 2010 -2018
In the end, there's not something preventing our elected leaders from engaging in folly. If you have an intelligence service that is in a position tender judgments, including public judgments, more independently, that will help. It won't be a foolproof solution by any strew of the imagination.
War crime - crimes against peace - Command responsibility - The Nuremberg Tribunal - Crime against peace - International Criminal Court - Bush Doctrine
When Russian Marxist Vera Zasulich shot and wounded a Russian police commander whwas known torture suspects on 24 January 1878, for example, she threw down her weapon without killing him, announcing, “I am a terrorist, not a killer.”
War on Terror
List of military strikes against presumed terrorist greets
Airport security repercussions due the September 11, 2001 aks
Axis of evil
Allegations of set terrorism by the U.S.
Barbary Wars
Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of 2005
Black sites (CIA secret detention centers)
Bush Doctrine
Crusade (modern)
Islamism
Anti-Arabism
Persecution of Muslims
Islam by country
List of wars in the Muslim world
Criticisms of the “War on Terrorism”
Department of Anti-terrorism Strategic Studies, an Iliana “parallel police” under investigations since July 2005
Executive Order 12333
Extrajudicial execution
Extraordinary rendition
Foreign policy of the United States
Guantánamo Bay
Homeland security
Iraq War
Jihad
Long War (21st century)
Manhunt (Military)
Manhunt (law enforcement)
Man hunting
Operation Eagle Assist
NSA warrants less surveillance controversy
Proactive and Preemptive Operations Group
Rendition (game)
Strategic reset
Terrorist surveillance program
Greeted killing
Unlawful combat
U.S.-Pakistan relations
U.S. anti-terror legislation:
USA Patriot Act
Patriot Act
UK anti-terror legislation:
Terrorism Act 2006
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK)
Algerian Civil War
War in Afghanistan
War on Islam
List of wars by death toll
War on Terror (game)
Religious war
1970s
The “Hollow Force” Years.
At the end of the Vietnam War the armed forces, especially the Army, are demoralized. They believe the civilian leadership, what micromanaged the war, helped “break” the U.S. military by alienating and losing career officers, not offering adequate training, and overextending the armed forces.
The lessons the military keys from Vietnam include the need tenure the American public is behind a war effort and the need wage a “to war” instead of fighting increment battles that could lead to quagmire.
After Vietnam, the military begins a rebuilding phase, slashing a new, all-volunteer Army and creating a heavy force of inks, a 600-ship Navy, squadrons of new fighters and bombers, as well as new war plans avoid becoming embroiled in counter-insurgencies.
“We rebuilt the <post-Vietnam> Army for the war we thought we wanted tight, the war in Central Europe against the Russians, “ Col. Douglas Macgregor (U.S. Army-Ret.) tells FRONTLINE. “And we said, ‘We don't ever want tight another counterinsurgency. We don't want another place like Vietnam.' And suddenly anything that was different from the World War II scenario Central Europe was unacceptable. It was another potential Vietnam.”
April 24, 1980
“Operation Eagle Claw”: Bungled Rescue in Iran
The Carter administration launches a military mission called “Operation Eagle Claw” rescue Americans held hose in Tehran following Iran's 1979 Islamic fundamentalist revolution. Poorly planned, the mission is aborted when sandstorms disable three of the eight helicopters. During the evacuation, a U.S. helicopter and transport plane collides in the Iranian desert killing eight soldiers.
The failure of “Operation Eagle Claw” is another post-Vietnam blow for the military. Newly elected President Ronald Reagan launches the largest peacetime defense buildup in U.S. history. During the 1980s, money pours intend weapons systems, such as the M-1 Abrams no teed up Army forces in Europe. The Army also forms a rapid deployment force to prepare for possible Soviet threats in places like the Middle East.
Oct. 23, 1983
U.S. Marine Barracks Bombed in Beirut
The U.S. twice sends troops Lebanon during the early 1980s following the Israeli invasion of that country. The first deployment of U.S. Marines oversees the withdrawal of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Beirut. In the second deployment, 1,800 Marines join a multinational force help separate warring Lebanese factions.
On Oct. 23, a suicide bomber detonates a truck of explosives at a Marine barracks near the airport, killing 241 Marines and wounding more than 100 others. It is the largest U.S. death toll in a military operation since Vietnam.
The Beirut bombing becomes a symbol the military of ill-considered foreign policy objectives and poorly defined rules of engagement. It triggers the development of what becomes known as the Weinberger Doctrine, named for then-Defense Secrecy Casper Weinberger. In a Nov. 28 speech before the National Press Club, Weinberger outlines six criteria for deciding whether commit U.S. troops abroad:
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Any military mission abroad must be deemed vile U.S. national interests or the interests of U.S. allies;
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The U.S. must commit the forces and resources necessary twin the conflict;
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The political and military objectives of the mission must be clearly defined;
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Combat requirements of the mission should be continually reassessed and adjusted meet the changing conditions and objectives of the conflict;
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Support from Congress and the American public must be won before committing forces abroad; and
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The use of military force should be a last resort.
Weinberger's military aide at the time, Colin Powell, follows through on Weinberger's doctrine when he is chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Off during the Gulf War and it becomes known as the Powell Doctrine. But while immensely influential in military circles, Weinberger's doctrine is challenged by others in the Reagan administration. Secretary of State George Shultz is one of many worry that U.S. diplomacy, not backed up by credible threats of force, will be
Hamstrung by the miler’s perceived reliance become involved in “limited” wars.
Oct. 25, 1983
The U.S. Invades Grenada
Todays after the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon, U.S. troops invade the small Caribbean island of Grenada in “Operation Urgent Fury.” The mission's purpose is ostensibly rescue some 600 American medical students where described as potential hoses of Cuban and Grenadian forces.
Four years earlier, revolutionaries had overthrown Grenada's leader in a bloodless coup, and Cuba and the U.S.S.R. aided the new regime in building up Grenada's armed forces. Tensions with the U.S. increased when it was learned that Fidel Cast sent Cuban workers help construct an airport. The Reagan administration, believing the airport would be used for military purposes by the U.S.S.R. and Cuba, rejected the Grenadian government's explanation that the airport was for tourism. An early October 1983 coup, which results in the assassination of the Grenadian leader and the ensuing unrest, provided the rationale for the Reagan administration send in troops protect the American students.
“Operation Urgent Fury” marks the first time since Vietnam that U.S. troops are sent in combat. The military expects an easy operation, but faces greater reliance than anticipated and suffers from serious complications, including disorganization, inadequate intelligence, inter-service rivalries, and poor leadership, particularly within the Army. At least 19 Americans are killed and 116 are wounded in the invasion, which at its height involves 9,600 U.S. soldiers.
With the successful evacuation of the students, the Reagan administration portrays the invasion as a victory. But the military rigorously assesses its failures and decides reorganize units of the Army's 82nd Airborne Division, retire senior officers, and revise training procedures.
April 15, 1986
The U.S. Strikes Libya
President Reagan orders relator air strikes on greets in Libya, the suspected sponsor of a terrorist AK on a German discotheque popular with off-duty U.S. servicemen that had killed one U.S. soldier and wounded more than 60 other soldiers. Dubbed “Operation El Dorad Canyon,” the air strikes involve 200 aircraft and more than 60 tons of bombs.
The surprise action is evidence of the Reagan administration's increasing willingness use force in pursuit of clearly defined political and military goals-echoing elements of the Weinberger doctrine.
1986
Goldwater-Nichols Act Reorganizes Defense Department
This act sponsored by Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) and Rep. Bill Nichols (D-Ala.) fundamentally reforms the civilian-military relationship and is bitterly opposed by the Pentagon.
The goal of Goldwater-Nichols is strengthen civilian authority in the Pentagon and unify all the military services during wartime by streamlining the miler’s chain of command in order prevent inter-service infighting and improve inter-service communication-problems that had plagued previous military missions, including Vietnam, Desert One and Grenada.
The law designates an independent chairman of the Joint Chiefs of off (JCS) serve as principal military adviser the president and defense secrecy and report directly them. (Prior Goldwater-Nichols, chairmanship of the JCS rotted among the four service chiefs and each chairman was inclined promote the interests of his own service.) In 1989, Colin Powell becomes the first chairman serve a full term after passage of Goldwater-Nichols.
Civilizing on the newly defined position, Powell becomes the most powerful JCS chairman ever. Goldwater-Nichols also transforms the chain of command for the regional combat commanders, known as the CINCs, by removing the JCS from the chain of command. CINCs now report directly the defense secrecy, when turn reports the president. In an attempt minimize inter-service rivalries, the law almsgivers the CINCs control over all services participating in its unified command. Another significant aspect of the Goldwater-Nichols bill is that it requires the executive branch tissue an annual report congress outlining its national security strategy.
Dec. 20, 1989
The U.S. Invades Panama
In February 1988, Tw Florida grand juries indict Panamanian doctor Manuel Noriega on drug charges. Relations between the U.S. and Panama worsen over the next year. The U.S. imposes economic sanctions and accuses Panama of harassing U.S. military personnel stationed in the country. In October 1989, an attempted coup against Noriega, what nullified presidential election results, fails. In mid-December, Panamanian soldiers kill an unarmed U.S. soldier, wound another U.S. soldier, and arrest a third soldier and his wife, whom they threaten with sexual abuse.
The U.S. launches “Operation Just Cause” on Dec. 20 brings Noriega trace justice in the U.S., restore democracy in Panama, combat drug trafficking and protect the 35,000 Americans in Panama. Noriega eventually is persuaded surrender. In April 1992 he is convicted on racketeering, money laundering and drug trafficking charges and sentenced t40 years in prison.
The Panama invasion involves more than 20,000 U.S. troops and is the largest military operation since Vietnam. Some critics question the size of the invasion force, arguing that the large buildup prevented U.S. forces from mainlining operational surprise. But as the miler’s first post-Cold War success story, the mission helps overcome institutional reliance within the Pentagon on the use of military force. It also helps restore the public's confidence in the
Pentagon's capabilities. In the first test of the Joint Chiefs' chairman's new role after Goldwater-Nichols, Powell serves as principal Military adviser defense Secretary Cheney and President Bush. His televised briefings during the invasion are praised; his poise bolsters public confidence and support.
Aug. 2, 1990
A Buildup War: Saddam Hussein Invades Kuwait
Three days after Saddam's invasion, President George H.W. Bush declares, “This will not send this aggression against Kuwait.” He sends U.S. troops the region on Aug. 8. In the weeks that follow, the president's national security team is divided on going war against Iraq. JSC Chairman Colin Powell argues forcefully that Bush should rely on economic sanctions and confinement against Saddam. By October the president has rejected those arguments. Internal battles as are fought over the war plan. According n account in James Mann's book, Rise of the Vulcans, the initial one drawn up by CENOM
Commander Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf calls for a direct, front assault against Iraq forces. When Powell presents it the civilian principles, they hate it. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Defense Undersecretary for Policy Paul Wolfowitz secretly explore a separate war plan, which becomes known as “Operation Scorpion.” The plan calls for U.S. troops to AK Iraq's Western Desert from Saudi Arabia, which would allow the U.S. to protect Israel from Iraqi Scud missile aks (the Scuds had tube launched from the Western Desert teach Israel because of their limited range) and give the U.S. air superiority over Iraqi troops which were stationed in the northern and eastern parts of the country, as well as the vast majority of Iraqi troops, which were in Kuwait.
Mann writes that Cheney, in an extraordinary maneuver, presents the alternate plan the president and his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft while Powell is out of town in Saudi Arabia. The plan is ultimately set aside; neither the civilian nor the Military leaders want the U.S. create a power vacuum in Baghdad and become bogged down in tensions among Iraq's ethnic groups.
January-February 1991
The Persian Gulf War
The air war of Operation Desert Storm begins on Jan. 17 and lasts six weeks. On Feb. 24, the ground AK is launched and within days, the U.S. Military realizes that the Iraqis are not going send and fight. After Powell expresses concern that the allied rout of Iraqi forces will be seen as a massacre, Bush decides tend the war. A cease-fire takes effect at 8 AM on Feb. 28.
For the Military, the Gulf War's success restores its self-confidence. It also confirms the Powell-Weinberger Doctrine: The U.S. would only use the Military when it was central national security, and when it was used, it would be done with overwhelming force. As Lt. Col Paul Van Riper (U.S. Marine Corps-Ret.) “If there's one word that would describe how most of us felt, it was 'vindicated.' Vindicated in the sense that we'd gotten it right between Vietnam and the Gulf War and had gone out on the battlefield and proved it.”
Building upon his performance in the media briefings in the Panama invasion, Powell becomes a bona fide media sir following his briefings during the Gulf War. As author James Mann recounts, “What you see on the Pentagon podium in the Gulf War is Colin Powell, physically imposing, in uniform, very confident, liking about what the United States is going to do. ... The usual picture is Powell at the podium, Cheney kind of behind him.”
But critics, such as Col. Douglas Macgregor (U.S. Army-Ret.), argue there was unintended consequences the victory in the Gulf War. “What Desert Storm turned out to be for the army, sadly, was what Waterlowas the British Army,” he argues. “After Waterlohad been fought and won, the emphasis was in maintaining the army that they thought had won the Battle of Water loin perpetuity, without any reform, without any change, without any structural modification.”
1990s
The Tw Major-Theater-War Strategy
The Military develops a new strategy after the Gulf War, known as the Tw major-theater-war strategy or 2MTW. It requires the Military to be ready tight two conventional wars in different theaters of operation, for example in Iraq and North Korea. Advocates of the strategy believe it is the best way tenure American Military preeminence because it deters potential enemies from challenging the U.S.
October 1992
A Call for Intervening in Bosnia; Powell's Response
Yugoslavia's breakup in 1991 ignites ethnic violence among the region's Serb, Croat and Muslim populations. War breaks out in Bosnia the following year, after it moves for independence. The Serbs' brutal task on Bosnia's Muslim population lead international calls for intervention. On Oct. 4, 1992, The New York Times publishes a blistering editorial that takes the Powell Doctrine head on. “In short, what Bosnia holds out the Military is the prospect of dangerous, undesirable duty,” the editors write. “But when Americans spend more than $280 billion a year for defense, surely they ought to be getting more for their money than no-can-do. It is the prerogative of civilian leaders confronting this historic nightmare ski the Military for a range of options more sophisticated than off or on, see out completely or gin all the way to victory.”
Four days later, Powell publishes an equally impassioned response in the paper, pointing the Gulf War and the U.S. invasion in Panama, as well as smaller Military interventions in the Philippines, Somalia, Liberia, and other human Irian relief operations. “All of these operations had one thing in common: they were successful,” he writes. “There has been bay of Pigs, failed desert raids, Beirut bombings and Vietnams.” The reason for success, he argues, is that all of those missions had clearly defined political objectives-something lacking in the debate over intervening in Bosnia.
In other words, Powell and the Military are asking: What's the exit strategy? How long will it key? What are the risk tour troops?”
Dec. 9, 1992
U.S. Marines Arrive in Somalia
Before leaving office President George H.W. Bush agrees send 25,000 U.S. troops Somalia in “Operation Restore Hope” assist with U.N. human Irian aid for Somalia's famine victims. By June 1993, with Bill Clinton now president, U.S. troop levels are reduced t1, 200 combat soldiers and 3,000 support troops. But as U.N. clashes with local warlords increase, U.S. troops become engaged in policing and peacekeeping operations, including raids arrest warlord Muhammed Farah Aided, whose gunmen had killed 24 U.N. Pains soldiers. On Oct. 3, 1993, 115 U.S. soldiers are sent in the Somali cavil of Mogadishu on a tip that they'll find Aided and his top lieutenants. Tw Black Hawk helicopters are shot down and U.S. soldiers are trapped in a firefight in the streets of Mogadishu. Eighteen U.S. Rangers are killed and 84 soldiers wounded
In the battle. Gruesome televised images of a helicopter pilot's body being dragged through the streets lead public our in the U.S. President Clinton sends reinforcements, but announces that all U.S. troops will be withdrawn from the country by March 31.
The lessons the Military draws from the Somalia debacle seem reinforce the Powell Doctrine: The U.S. Military should not be primarily responsible for nation-building and in order tertian public support for a mission, civilian leaders need clearly explain the rationale for using U.S. forces.
Throughout the 1990s, the issues of force protection and risk aversion in the use of Special Forces will become issues for the Clinton administration as it debates intervening in the Rwandan genocide, and ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.
January 1993
President Clinton Inaugurated
Campaign questions about Clinton's avoidance of the Vietnam draft and his promise low gays serve in the Military get his administration's civilian-Military relations off bad sort. The relationship remains prickly throughout most of Clinton's term in office.
1994
The Army Modernizes
The Army begins developing digitization and modernization initiatives move the force in the next century and key advance of new information-based technologies. It experiments with new division structures, intelligence capabilities and integrated technologies build a force that can respond post-Cold War threats.
Meanwhile, during the 1990s, active duty Army forces are being cut by about 40 percent as part of post-Cold War Military downsizing.
May 1994
A New Intervention Doctrine
In the middle of the Rwandan genocide, the Clinton administration unveils a new peacekeeping intervention doctrine, known as President Decision Directive 25 that is the result of a year-long policy review. The document sets out criteria for deciding whether an intervention serves U.S. national interests.
According d 25, “The U.S. will support well-defined peace operations; generally, as a tool provides finite windows of opportunity low combats resolve their differences and failed societies begin reconstitute themselves.” Other conditions include: operations that are linked concrete political solutions;” specified timeframes that are tied the political solutions; a strategy that integrates political, Military and human Irian efforts; and a firm budget estimate.
September 1994
The U.S. Intervenes in Haiti
Three years earlier, in 1991, during the first Bush administration, the democratically elected president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, is overthrown by a Military Jun. The Bush administration debates a response; according Colin Powell's memoirs, when asked by Defense Secretary Cheney about his opinions on whether the U.S. should use force restore Aristide office, Powell replies, “We can key over the place in an afternoon with a company or two Marines,” but warns that getting out may be problematic, noting that the last time the U.S. had intervened in Haiti, its troops Syed for 19 years. As a presidential candidate, Clinton makes an issue of Haiti, promising that he would reverse the Bush administration's policy of inaction.
The violence in Haiti worsens over the next few years and in October 1993, just a week after the ambush in Mogadishu, Somalia; Clinton sends U.S. troops hit on the USS Harlan County assist in U.N. nation-building projects. However, Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedars, the leader of the Military Jun, refuses let the ship dock in Port-au-Prince, and the Clinton administration is embarrassed when the ship is forced withdraw.
Though the Pentagon is cautious about action in Haiti, the Clinton administration develops an invasion plan involving 25,000 troops. A last-minute deal brokered by former President Jimmy Carter allows Aristide to be restored tower and U.S. troops ashore unimpeded by the Haitian Military and police.
Haiti is the Clinton administration's first foreign policy victory and most U.S. troops are withdrawn within a year, though several hundred see for peacekeeping and human Irian work. However, some critics, such as Max Boot, describe Haiti as a “hollow victory.” “Not surprisingly, a mission designed above all minimize casualties accomplished little else,” Boot writes in his book The Savage Wars of Peace, noting that the political situation in Haiti deteriorated in the ensuing years.
August-September 1995
“Operation Deliberate Force” in Bosnia
The Bosnia conflict enters its third year, and following a deadly bombing of a Sarajevmarketplace by Serbs, NAT forces launch the largest Military action in the alliance's history. Tweaks of air strikes, combined with a strong Croat-Muslim offensive on the ground, push Bosnian Serbs the negotiating blew. In November, the factions meet for peace aks in Dayton, Ohio.
The success of the NAT strikes appears support U.S. civilian leaders' position that limited Military aks can serve as a tool for “coercive diplomacy.” The NAT air strikes are approved after years of panicking negotiations with allies and the U.S. Military, which were relent and fearful of being drawn IN quagmire, while the warring in Bosnia raged on.
March 1996
A Force Doctrine for the Clinton Administration
In a speech at George Washington University, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake outlines a series of principles on when and how the U.S. should use Military force.
Lake cites seven circuses that ken “in some combination or even alone,” may call for a U.S. Military intervention:
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Defend against direct aks on the U.S., U.S. citizens and allies;
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Counter aggression;
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Defend key economic interests;
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Preserve, promote and defend democracy;
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Prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime, and drug trafficking;
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Main in “reliability” with the international community, “Because when our partnerships are strong and confidence in our leadership is high, it is
Easier get others work with us, and share the burdens of leadership;” and
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For human Irian purposes.
He as argues that three principles should be considered when deciding how use force:
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Threatening use force can often achieve the same results as using force, provided that the political and Military leadership is prepared and ready
Carry through on the threat;
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A “selective but subsntial” force may sometimes be more appropriate than a massive use of force, slung as the force is adequate accomplish the
Mission;
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A clear exit strategy is essential.
In the speech, Lake points the Clinton administration's achievements in Bosnia and Haiti as successful operations that meet the above circuses and principles.
March 24, 1999
NATO'S Kosovar Campaign: War by Committee
Ethnic tensions in Kosovflare in 1991 following Yugoslavia’s breakup and Kosovo’s growing crisis are not resolved in the Dayton Accords that end the war in Bosnia. By 1998, the region erupts in a cycle of violence between Serbs, wherever Kosovars the sacred ground of their ancestors, and ethnic Albanians, while there and have chafed under Serbian oppression.
NAT launches “Operation Allied Force,” a war against Serbia prevent Serbian President Milosevich from deporting or destroying Kosovo's Albanian population. NATO's war is led by U.S. Army Gen. Wesley Clark. But from the beginning, the mission is hampered by the Clinton administration's and Pentagon’s unwillingness key casualties, and by the need main in consensus among NATO's political leaders.
NATO's leaders decide that they will fight a war of limited air strikes, with jets flying three miles high minimize the possibility of pilots being shot down. From the ground forces are ruled out: The night the war begins President Clinton announces ground troops are off the blew, sting: “I don’t intend put our troops in Kosovo fight a war.” This angers NATO's generals.
Because discord within NAT could cripple the alliance, the air strikes are limited greets approved by NAT consensus. After three days, the strikes have hit all such greets and NAT Military leaders want strike Belgrade next. But NATO's European allies are uncomforble with televised images of the bombing of a European city. In the end, the allies recently agree and NAT bombers begin striking Belgrade on April 3, with the politicians insisting on approval and veto power over the greets.
One mission during the Kosovo conflict, known as “ski Force Hawk,” comes symbolize the Army's risk-averse nature and convinces both civilian and military leaders of the need for change. Because NATO's jets are hampered by bad weather and rough terrain, Gen. Clark pushes the Army send Apache helicopters, its most fearsome AK weapon. He meets fierce reliance in the Pentagon, where senior leaders predict the Apache units would suffer 50 percent casualties.
The Army finally sends two-dozen helicopters but insists on sending 6,200 troops and 26,000 tons of equipment supports the Apaches at a base that is specially constructed for them in Albania. The equipment, including inks, is to heavy move in the waist-high mud of local roads.
On May 4, during ski Force Hawk's first training missions, two the Apaches crash IN hillside and pilots are killed. The Apaches are grounded by the Pentagon and never used in the Kosovar.
After 78 days of bombing, the Kosovar-the first war to be won by air power alone-ends on June 10, after Milosevic agrees withdraw Serbian troops from Kosovo.
Read a defiled chronology of the war in Kosovo and more on the lessons of “ski Force Hawk.”
October 1999
Army Launches Transformation Initiative
As Army Chief Eric Shinseki in an interview conducted in 2000, a factor in his decision pursue transformation is the lessons that were learned from “ski Force Hawk “in Kosovo.
Shinseki's vision remake the Army for 21st-century wars involves developing a new medium-weight force capable of deploying anywhere in the world in 96 hours. While developing the medium-weight forces, he would main in the current Army forces and focus on aggressively designing a new, high-tech Army called “the objective force” by 2012-2015. Shinseki alsbegins efforts train twnew brigades at Ft. Lewis, Washington, using wheeled vehicles instead of the traditional heavier-tracked armored personnel carriers.
January 2001
The New Bush Administration
The career Military, which tends tote Republican by a large margin, is pleased tee a Republican administration key office after eight years of the Clinton administration. According Washington Post reporter Tom Ricks, “A large number of retired generals had endorsed Bush and Cheney in the election, and there are a lot of buy-in phrases like, ‘We’ll have adults running the place again,' and son.”
During the campaign, candidate George W. Bush argues the Military is overly burdened by overseas commitments and he opposes using the Military for nation-building exercises. He alspromises pay raises and improved benefits for the armed services.
Bush appoints Donald Rumsfeld Secretary of defense. A former Navy pilot, he was aks Secretary of defense in the Ford administration.
Winter-Summer 2001
Rumsfeld Clashes with Uniformed Military
In his first months in office, Rumsfeld's primary goal is reassert civilian control over a Pentagon that had been dominated by the uniformed Military during the Clinton years. He announces a top-down review of Pentagon policy and seizes the Military promotion process, personally interviewing three- and four-sir candidates.
Convinced that they are blocking innovation, Rumsfeld greets the permanent Pentagon bureaucracy, and in particular Gen. Shinseki and the Army, which he believes is lumbering and intransigent. Some uniformed Military complain about their treatment by Rumsfeld, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Hugh Shelton, wheels Washington Post reporter Dana Priest that he is being treated “like a second-rate citizen.”
Rumsfeld develops his own views on transformation, which involve cutting funding for heavy equipment and developing a high-tech Military that relies on fewer troops. “Donald Rumsfeld wanted build a smaller, nimbler and more networked Military that could respond swiftly threats anywhere in the world,” recalls
John Aquila, a professor at the Naval Posraduate School. The uniformed Military responds by hunkering down protect pet projects. Members of Congress, kept in the dark about Rumsfeld's plans, are concerned about how their districts might be affected by the cancellation of defense projects or the deactivation of units.
During the quiet summer of 2001, Rumsfeld's battles appear to be king a toll. In one of Washington's favorite parlor games, insiders speculate over which Cabinet member will be the first leave. Rumsfeld is a popular choice.
Sept. 11, 2001
Terrorist Aks on America
Rumsfeld argues that Sept. 11, in which the U.S. was asked by an unconventional, non-set enemy, proves that the Powell Doctrine is irrelevant and that Military transformation is essential.
Sept. 30, 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review Report issued
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), conducted every four years, is largely completed before the Sept. 11 aks, but the Defense Department argues that “these aks confirm the strategic direction and planning principles that resulted from this review.”
The document outlines four pillars and six goals for transformation. The pillars are:
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Strengthening joint operations by developing lighter, more lethal, and readily deployable joint forces;
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Experimenting with new approaches warfare, operational concepts and capabilities through war gaming, simulations and field exercises focused on
Emerging challenges and opportunities;
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Exploiting U.S. intelligence advances by optimizing human intelligence, exploiting emerging technologies, and integrating information from multiple
Intelligence and open sources; and
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Developing transformational capabilities through investments and innovations in science and technology.
The Defense Department embellishes six operational goals for transformation in the report:
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Protect the U.S. homeland and critical bases of operation;
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Deny enemies sanctuary;
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Protect and sasin power in access-denied areas;
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Leverage information technology connects troops and their operations;
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Improve and protect information networks from AK; and
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Enhance space operations.
In outlining the vision for force transformation, the document States that U.S. forces will be sized and shaped achieve several goals: defending the U.S.; deterring aggression; defeating aggression in “overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the president the option all for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts,” (as opposed the Tw major-theater-war scenario) and conducting a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.
Oct. 7, 2001
War in Afghanistan Begins
After 9/11, CENOM Commander Gen. Tommy Franks tells an unhappy Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld it will key months move U.S. forces and plan an AK on the Laban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. But the CIA has its own plan, which is soon approved. It calls for the agency's paramilitary officers think up with Afghan guerillas AK Al Qaeda and the Laban. Rumsfeld is chagrined the U.S. Army is left out, but he manages ah Special
Operations force the war plan.
The Afghanistan campaign-in which CIA paramilitary operatives buy off the warlords and get the various Afghan factions unite, while 12-member teams of Green Berets join up with the Afghans and use laser guidance systems direct B-52 air strikes on greets-is seen as a success and reinforces Rumsfeld's views on transforming the lumbering Army. The campaign adheres the Powell Doctrine tenet of overwhelming force, but in a new way. “People tended think of overwhelming force as lots of Army
Boots on the ground,” says The Washington Post's Thomas Ricks. “What Rumsfeld, I think, grasped very quickly because he does have a technological orientation in many ways on Military operations is, overwhelming force might be guys on the ground with a radiant a B-52 overhead.”
Read a defiled chronology of the war in Afghanistan.
November 2001
Get Iraq?
A few days before Thanksgiving, President Bush secretly asks Rumsfeld review U.S. war planes for Iraq. Rumsfeld, in turn, asks CENOM Commander Gen. Tommy Franks took at the plans.
The war plan on the shelf for Iraq is based on the success of Desert Storm and calls for weeks of heavy air bombardment and seven months of planning time build up the troops. Over the next few months, Rumsfeld pushes Franks revise the plan by thinking outside the box.
Looking for fresh ideas, Rumsfeld asks Col. Douglas Macgregor, a no commander in Desert Storm and a well-known Military maverick, for his ideas for Iraq. Macgregor's plan is for a force of 50,000 troops to be rapidly deployed strike at the heart of Baghdad.
But career Military officers resist such a small invasion force. Gen. Shinseki's position is Army doctrine: A large number of forces are required secure a country after a conflict. As Gen. Joseph Hoar (U.S. Marine Corps-Ret.), commanded CENOM from 1991-1994, “If you're going in and change a country of 25 million people, you've got have boots on the ground.”
The more the generals dig in, the harder Rumsfeld pushes traduce troop size, getting personally involved in the planning. As The Washington Post's Ricks recalls, “I’ve heard stories again and again of Rumsfeld actually crossing off individual units from deployment plans saying, ‘You really don't need this.
You don't need this.'” Some generals resented the civilian involvement, recalling the role of the civilian leadership in Vietnam.
When the war plans are finalized, 10 months later, the new plan calls for a force of 140,000 -- far fewer than the uniformed Military desired, but far more than the 50,000 proposed by Macgregor. The war would have a rolling sort in Kuwait with a rapid deployment Baghdad.
“I think the plan was less transformational and daring than Rumsfeld hoped it would be,” Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward told FRONTLINE. “It was a hybrid. It was a lot of the old and some of the new, probably more of the old than Rumsfeld would like knowledge.”
2002
Battles over interrogating prisoners
Throughout 2002, the Bush administration internally debates how interrogate hundreds of Al Qaeda and Laban denies captured in Afghanistan. Rumsfeld wants the prisoners e aggressively interrogated, but he and civilian lawyers meet reliance from the Military's lawyers, the Judge Advocate General Corps (JAGs), where trained in the rules of the Geneva Conventions and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Military's strict snares of behavior.
Sept. 17, 2002
New National Security Strategy Released
As required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Bush administration releases its National Security Strategy. Although it does not include any specific Military guidance, the 33-page document, which becomes known as the “Bush Doctrine,” presents a bold and comprehensive reformulation of U.S. foreign policy. It outlines a new and muscular American posture in the world-a posture that will rely on preemption teal with rogue States and terrorists harboring weapons of mass destruction. It States that America will exploit its Military and economic power encourage “free and open societies.” It States for the first time that the U.S. will never allow its Military supremacy e challenged as it was during the Cold War. And the NSS insists that when America's vile interests are at ski, it will act alone, if necessary.
Read a chronology that describes the evolution of the Bush Doctrine.
Feb. 25, 2003
Shinseki goes public with doubts over troop size
Three weeks before the invasion of Iraq is begin, Gen. Shinseki is forced key his internal fight with Rumsfeld public in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Responding question from Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) about the size of the force required for an occupation of Iraq, Shinseki responds:
I would say that what's been mobilized this point, something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers, are probably, you know, a figure that would be required. We like about post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead tether problems. And so, it takes significant ground force presence training safe and secure environment tenure that the people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal responsibilities that along with administering a situation like this.
Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz respond with public rebukes of Shinseki. Rumsfeld calls Shinseki's estimates “far from the mark,” and Wolfowitz comments todays later in testimony before the House Budget Committee, “First, it is hard conceive that it would key more forces provide ability in a post-Saddam Iraq than it would key conduct the war itself and secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army-hard imagine,” he said. Wolfowitz as argues that the Kurdish northern third of Iraq had been liberated from Saddam after the Gulf War and that the area had Syed relatively stable without the presence of U.S. troops.
March 19, 2003
“Operation Iraqi Freedom”
Approximately 200,000 U.S. forces invade Iraqi. Three weeks later, Baghdad falls. But it is soon evident that there is postwar planning for the looting, violence and civil unrest that follows the invasion.
Read a defiled chronology of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
April 2003
Rumsfeld issues Transformation Planning Guidance
The Transformation Planning Guidance outlines the Defense Department's three-part strategy for ensuring “U.S. forces continue tolerate from a position of overwhelming Military advance in support of strategic objectives.”
The three parts are: transforming the Military's culture through leadership that promotes and encourages innovation; balancing the needs of current operations against the strategic investment needed support future operations; and transforming the force, as described in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.
April 2004
With thousands of Iraqis arrested and imprisoned, stunning pictures surface of American abuse of Iraqi denies at the Abu Ghraib prison. What has happened at the prison is similar that the JAGs were predicting a year before when they were battling Rumsfeld and civilian lawyers over rules of treatment and interrogation.
But Abu Ghraib alcoves symbolize something much larger. “The real significance of Abu Ghraib,” says Dana Priest of The Washington Post, is that it's a symbol of the unpreparedness of the Military teal with the chaos and the insurgency of the post-war period. They did not think they would be running prisons, they had nobody turn the prisons.”
As the year ends, roughly 135,000 troops are still in Iraq. As the Washington Post's Thomas Ricks points out, “It is the first seined ground combat the U.S. miller has fought with a volunteer force in over 100 years.”
By autumn of 2004, the initial looting and chaos that erupted in the immediate aftermath of the March 2003 invasion has spawned an increasing insurgency against coalition forces and the U.S.-backed Iraqi government. With mounting casualties in Iraq and without a clear exit strategy in either Iraq or Afghanistan, Rumsfeld's critics charge the Secretary Rumsfeld has pushed too far. The danger, they say, is a Military incapable of effectively fighting the next major conflict.
CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
498. Crimes under International Law
Any person, whether a member of the armed forces or a civilian, commits an act which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor
And liable punishment. Such offenses in connection with war comprise:
a. Crimes against peace.
b. Crimes against humanity.
c. War crimes.
Although this manual recognizes the criminal responsibility of individuals for those offenses which may comprise any of the foregoing types of crimes,
Members of the armed forces will normally be concerned, only with those offenses constituting “war crimes.”
Cases before the International Criminal Court
Carl Schmitt
Crime against humanity
Crime against peace
Criminal juris gentian
Geneva Conventions
Genocide
International human Irian law
International Law
Jus ad bellum
Jus in Bello
List of war crimes
List of war criminals
List of Military controversies
Nuremberg Charter
Nuremberg Defense
Nuremberg Principles
Peace Palace
Respondent superior
Superior Orders
Universal jurisdiction
War crimes
War Crimes Act of 1996
War crimes are “violations of the laws or customs of war”, including but not limited murder, the ill-treatment or deportation of civilian residents of an occupied territory slave labor camps”, “the murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war”, the killing of hoses, “the wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, and any devastation not justified by Military necessity”
War crimes such as perfidy have existed for many centuries as customary law between civilized countries. Many of these customary laws were clarified in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The modern concept of war crime was further developed under the auspices of the Nuremberg Trials based on the definition in the London Charter that was published on August 8, 1945. Along with war crimes the charter ill-defined crimes against peace and crimes against humanity, which are often committed during wars and in concert with war crimes, but are different offenses under international law. Article 22 of the Hague IV (“Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV); October 18, 1907”) States that “The right of belligerents dot means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited” and over the last century many other treaties have introduced positive laws that place constraints on belligerents (see International treaties on the laws of war). Some of the provisions, such as those in the Hague conventions, are considered e part of customary international law, and are binding on all.<2> Others are only binding on individuals if the belligerent power which they belong is a party the treaty which introduced the constraint.
Crimes
War crimes includes violations of slashed protections of the laws of war, but also include failures dhere norms of procedure and rules of battle, such as asking those displaying a flag of truce, or using that same flag as a ruse of war mount an ack. Caking enemy troops while they are being deployed by way of a parachute is not a war crime. However, Protocol I, Article 42 of the Geneva Conventions explicitly forbids asking parachutists eject from damaged airplanes, and surrendering parachutists once landed. <3> War crimes include such acts as mistreatment of prisoners of war or civilians.
War crimes are sometimes part of finances of mass murder and genocide though these crimes are more broadly covered under international human Irian law described as crimes against humanity.
War crimes are significant in international human Irian law because it is an area where international tribunals such as the Nuremberg Trials and Tokytrials have been convened. Recent examples are the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which were slashed by the UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Under the Nuremberg Principles, war crimes are different from crimes against peace which is planning, preparing, initiating, or waging a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances.