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Shaykh Scholar-Mujahid, Dr. Abdallah Azzam: The Individual Obligation to Join the Caravan in Defense of Muslim Lands: An Armed Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi Synthesis

From Bin Ladenism Back to Qa‘idat Al-Jihad? Back to the Future? Hubris, Delusion, Disaster, and the Remaking/Rebirth of a Post-Bin Laden, Post-Arab Spring Qa'idat Al-Jihad

“Zarqawism” vs. AQO: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi’s Worldview and Doctrine: 1989-June 7, 2006

From Non-Religious Violent Street Tough to Ultra-Sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Prison Tough: 1980-1999

Abu Musa’b Al-Zarqawi's Embrace of Abu Abdallah Al-Muhajir's Extremism in Takfir

Zarqawism Unveiled as Doctrine and Strategy: Al-Zarqawi’s Negotiation and Bay’ah to Osama Bin Laden

“Neo-Zarqawism”: The Birth and Declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq (Dawlat Al’Iraq Al-Islamiyyah), and Rise of the New Emirs

The History, Doctrines, and Worldview of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s “Caliphate”: May 2010-Present

Self-Proclaimed Emir Al-Muminin Abu Bakr Al-Hussaini Al-Qurayshi Al-Baghdadi: A Brief History

ISO’s Differentia Specifica: Four Essential Categorical Divergences from AQO

3. Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations for U.S. Government Policy and Strategy

Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat AQO and its Affiliates

FOREWORD

Dr. Kamolnick’s book is a meticulously documented investigation and comparison of the al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO) across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; and in the final chapter, specific implications, and recommendations for current U.S. Government policy and strategy. Through this comparison, he supplies far greater clarity on, incisive analysis of, and potential answers for such key questions as: How is each terrorist entity related historically and doctrinally to the broader phenomenon of transnational Sunni “jihadism”? What is the exact nature of the ISO? How, if at all, does ISO differ in strategically relevant ways from AQO? What doctrinal differences essentially define these entities? How does each understand and operationalize strategy? What critical requirements and vulnerabilities characterize each entity? Finally, what implications, recommendations, and proposals are advanced that are of particular interest to U.S. Government strategists and professional military educators?

Dr. Kamolnick’s book substantially advances the knowledge and strategy pertinent to combating these terrorist entities more effectively. I highly recommend it.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PAUL KAMOLNICK is a professor of sociology at East Tennessee State University, USA, where he teaches courses in classical and contemporary sociological theory, and the sociology of global terrorism. He has published articles and reviews in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism; Terrorism and Political Violence; Perspectives on Terrorism; and The Small Wars Journal. Dr. Kamolnick is also the author of two previous Strategic Studies Institute monographs focused on countering al-Qaeda-based anti-American mass casualty terrorism: Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda: A Jihad-Realist Approach (2012), and Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al-Qaeda: Fighting the War of Deeds (2014). He holds a Ph.D. from Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, USA.

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

It is declared U.S. Government (USG) policy to degrade, defeat, and destroy two transnational adversaries that conduct terrorism in the name of Sunni Islam: the al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO). The present book has been written to assist policymakers, military planners, strategists, and professional military educators to more effectively accomplish that objective. Chapter 1 documents the distinct history and doctrinal beliefs of each organization; Chapter 2 examines AQO’s and ISO’s basic strategic concept and terrorist modus operandi; and Chapter 3 recapitulates chief conclusions, considers strategic implications, and supplies select recommendations.

AQO and ISO claim to represent the true and abiding interests of the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us Sunnah), estimated to number 1.4 billion persons. This book finds that this is unsupported by the evidence. Instead, AQO and ISO may be conceived in the very terms of the Sunni Islam they themselves profess, as deviant criminal terrorist organizations guilty of committing reprehensible and forbidden acts, undermining Islamic interests, and besmirching rather than elevating Islam in the eyes of the non-Muslim world. A more optimistic prognosis for the future destruction of each entity is therefore warranted. The world’s Sunni Muslims must make that determination, however, and define for themselves where the bounds of faith, godly fear (taqwa), and righteous conduct begin and end; who may or may not legitimately claim to speak and act in their name; and who may or may not be deemed a genuine ally, fellow soldier, friend, or enemy in this historic endeavor.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite their common genus as violent transnational Sunni “jihadist” organizations, AQO and ISO are distinct species that substantially diverge in conceptions of doctrine and creed, strategy, and terrorist modus operandi. Doctrinally, the original AQO “idea” first arises in opposition to Palestinian-Jordanian Shaykh Dr. Abdallah Azzam’s conception of Sunni global jihadism. AQO shares with “Azzamism” a Sunni pan-Islamic ecumenical approach embodied in Azzam’s Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi fusion. This mission is originally one of lumping, not splitting, Church not sect, openness not exclusivity, and emphasizes intra-Sunni solidarity, unity, community, brotherhood, and the tolerance of differences among all fighting elements willing to serve as force multipliers and allies within broader alliances in a now-fermenting Arab Muslim world.

AQO differs from Azzamism in two key respects. Osama bin Laden sought to create an autonomous bin Laden-led army; whereas Azzam viewed his role as one of assisting, complementing, and subordinating Arabic volunteers to the Afghan-led Islamic forces fighting against the Communist-installed and backed Afghan regime. Second, for Azzam, Palestine occupied a privileged theater of future near-term operations, whereas the original AQO, instead, de-privileged Palestine and conceived itself as an Arab-led transnational military expeditionary force, a type of Arabic jihadi Foreign Legion, serving as a force multiplier. Consequently, they deployed high-quality operatives with advanced training possessed of the AQO worldview, belief-system, and a desire to co-opt localized insurgencies into various AQO nodes, fighting to first win Islamic lands with the intent of reestablishing an Islamic Caliphate, and eventually launching a future offensive jihad against the original infidels.

The AQO idea’s second chief opponent was jihadi takfirism, i.e., rigidly-extremist sectarians who extravagantly accuse other Muslims of apostasy (Ridda). Though bin Laden’s emergent “Base of the Jihad Organization” (Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad) viewed the Shia as a wayward and deviant sect, it did not at any time privilege a war against Shi’ism per se as the essential starting point for the purification and revivification of Sunni orthodoxy as a ruling imperium. Moreover, AQO in its training camps deliberately policed and opposed takfirism, and in its stead supplied indoctrination into the uniquely ecumenical AQO pan-Islamist Sunni jihadist vision of a vanguard Sunni armed organization whose singular mission was to unite disparate struggles into a broader transnational struggle to eventually restore a supranational Caliphal sovereign. The AQO idea is not exclusively Salafist, though it includes a significant number. It is not exclusively Salafi-Wahhabi or Wahhabi, though it also includes their number; it is not exclusively inspired by Sayyid Qutb, though he is recognized and honored as a pioneering jihadi thinker. It is rather a broad, transnational Church-like conglomerate whose vision, values, and mission statement prohibit extremely strict “Muslimness” tests or other instruments designed to split into ever-smaller numbers those considered virtuous enough to wage a united Sunni war against the occupying “Crusaders” of Muslim lands.

This original AQO idea was eventually transformed into a terrorist entity controlled by bin Laden and focused nearly exclusively on orchestrating highly symbolic mass casualty attacks against all Americans — civilian and military — wherever they may be found. Five key elements, according to AQO chief spokesman Adam Yahiye Gadahn, characterize this “bin Ladenism”: its global/international reach and membership as a type of “Islamic Internationale”; its exclusive focus on fighting America, the Crusader West, and the Jews; its lack of a written religious creed, doctrine, or specific strategy that every prospective member must agree to before joining; emphasis on the critical role of Muslim popular support for an enduring, long-term victory; and its unique privileging of, and subordination to, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (i.e., the Afghan Taliban).

Bin Ladenism is characterized by a unique mixture of profound ignorance, delusion, resentment, and hubris. It rests on a deeply flawed analogy between the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and a grossly caricatured understanding of the civil society foundations of enduring American power. Moreover, there is no precedent in Sunni Islam for bin Ladenism’s signature “Far Enemy” doctrine. It was never embraced by the vast majority of existing Sunni Islamist insurgents. Bin Laden was deeply criticized from within his own ranks for having caused the practical extinction of a decade’s long effort to recruit, train, deploy, and create a global Sunni jihadist movement, and by other Salafi-Jihadists as unlawful and at the very least imprudent. 9/11 may be usefully viewed as a “lone wolf” terrorist attack and AQO’s first and last great “one-off” based in treachery, criminality, and the USG’s unpreparedness for that plot’s unprecedented use of American civil aviation as a weapon of mass destruction.

AQO’s most lethal affiliate, Qa’idat al-Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has amended but not ended classical bin Ladenism. There is no discernible difference from classical bin Ladenism as doctrine, and its accompanying “Far Enemy” economic attrition conception of collapsing the American economy and forcing its withdrawal from Islamic lands.

ISO, in stark contrast, is that very type of extreme ultra-sectarian jihadi takfiri organization AQO opposes. ISO’s “idea” originates in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s “Zarqawism,” and is characterized by three principal doctrines: ultra-sectarianism, an abiding fundamental commitment to annihilate in masse all Shia Muslims, leader and lay; an unprecedented conduct of ultraviolence as a media-based spectacle; and focus on the immediate creation of an Islamic State as a base for the prophesied return of the Caliphate. Zarqawi’s original notions are later extended to “Neo-Zarqawism,” and its current incarnation as “Baghdadism.” Four doctrines uniquely characterize the present ISO’s “idea,” each of which starkly contrasts with the AQO’s species of Sunni global jihadism: apocalyptic and eschatological beliefs informing its sense of temporality and morality; its doctrine proclaiming the mass annihilation of all Shia Muslims; its prioritizing of the “Nearest” and “Near Enemies,” and postponement of jihad against the “original Kufr”; and, its belief in its right to monopolize and immediately declare the Islamic State/Caliphate. These key elements of ISO’s worldview and doctrine place it on the remote fringes not just of Sunni Islam generally, but also of the vast majority of Sunni global jihadist organizations.

AQO and ISO exhibit similarities as transnational terrorist entities, but as the author’s Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA) heuristic confirms, they substantially diverge in their respective conceptions of strategy and terrorist modus operandi. Bin Ladenism’s sequenced strategy requires the removal of U.S. and allied militaries from the Arab Muslim world and territories, thus undermining U.S. military presence, power projection, and access to energy reserves; the overthrow of so-called apostate pro-Western regimes and replacing them with orthodox Sunni Muslim governments that adhere to strict Islamic legal orthodoxy; uniting Muslim states into a supra-state caliphate that shall serve as a religio-political base for further amassing Muslim power and conducting offensive jihad to confront the remaining world of infidelity (dar al-Kufr); and, a sustained, permanent offensive jihad to be fought until all other forms of worship and polity are overthrown.

The USG, while still focused on AQO external operations, intentions, and capacities, has practically decimated AQO. Assisted by recent upheavals in the Arab Muslim world, AQO has apparently shifted to focus far more on the Near rather than Far Enemy. This new direction suggests a more gradual, evolutionary insurgent strategy involving a greater emphasis on preaching (da’wa); embedding within various ongoing rebellions and working within and through the various nationalist-Islamist currents often dominant in these theaters; and rebranding as local supporters/helpers for the rule of Islamic law (Ansar al-Sharia), such as has appeared in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt.

AQO’s affiliate AQAP, while maintaining deep doctrinal affinities to AQO, has substantially departed in practice from the classic Bin Ladenist, top-down model for carefully planned, long-term, high-visibility, strategically symbolic “Far Enemy” targeting. AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi is based in what it calls “lone jihad” or the “lone mujahid” strategy. In its essence, it combines media and non-media terrorist operations to incite, galvanize, mobilize, train, and deploy individual persons — glorified in its media operations as “lone mujahids” whose martyrdom (Shuhada) destines them for the highest reaches of Paradise — to commit what the vast majority of Muslims consider forbidden terrorist acts, such as sabotage, targeted assassination, mass arson, mass-casualty bombings, and a vast array of highly deviant acts generally classified within religious law as major sins and crimes, and within secular law as intentional acts of malicious, felonious criminal conduct.

The ISO’s strategy and terrorist modus operandi is carefully outlined in its inaugural online publication Dabiq, and ideally comprises five key stages: (1) emigration from a hostile milieu to one where sanctuary exists or can be created through terrorist acts (Hijra); (2) creation of the nucleus jihadist organization (Jama’ah); (3) destabilization of the existing “infidel” regime through inflicting mass injury (Nikayah) eventuating in the collapse of existing authority, and thereby fomenting chaos and mayhem (Tawahhush); (4) creation and consolidation of a territory, resources, and base accompanied with the immediate declaration of the Islamic State (Tamkin); and (5) further consolidation and expansion of the Islamic State with the immediate declaration of the Caliphate (Khilafa).

However, this idealized five-stage blueprint for restoring the Caliphate (Khilafa) was not followed in practice. The very nature of the ISO as an ultra-sectarian jihadi takfiri organization led it to hereticize (takfir) virtually all other organizations, tendencies, groups, and movements. As a result, the stage of Fitnah (conflict, strife) — a stage not specified in their ideal model — has accompanied ISO from its beginnings in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi through each of its metamorphoses. Further, the ISO’s blueprint exhibits ambiguity regarding the precise timing for declaring a State and later Caliphate. ISO’s achievements have been substantially assisted by its fearsome and highly professional military leadership cadre, comprised of former Ba’athist military and intelligence officers, and by the revengeful anti-Sunni policies pursued by former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamil Mohammed Hasan al-Maliki in the context of a dramatically changed regional dynamic enervated by the “Arab Spring.”

Our findings largely support existing USG policy and strategy vis-à-vis classic bin Ladenism. What arose in its wake, however — though AQO classic “Far Enemy” attacks must still be countered — was an alternative “lone mujahid” terrorist modus operandi currently employed by AQO’s most lethal affiliate, AQAP. Current policy and strategy are sufficient to meet that latter challenge. Findings also substantially support current USG policy and strategy to degrade, defeat, and destroy ISO, though further recommendations are suggested by the present author to address its specific “stateness” dimension. Our findings also strongly support current USG explicit repeated declarations that the USG could temporarily defeat ISO within a brief period; however, the permanent defeat of the ISO idea will only occur when Iraqis themselves make the choice to create a new social compact in which its Sunni citizens are respected, represented, and protected.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Doctrine-independent recommendations include advocating well-known methods for combating terrorism. Doctrine-dependent recommendations include developing a deeper understanding of Sunni Islam, of AQO’s and ISO’s extreme deviance in relation to Sunni Islam, and of how Sunni Islamic orthodoxy, including some militant strands, may be leveraged to more effectively delegitimize, marginalize, and implode these unlawful criminal terrorist entities.

PROLOGUE

RELEVANCE

The present book holds relevance for military planners, strategists, and professional military educators whose mission demands a deep understanding of the strategically relevant differences between two transnational terrorist entities, the al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO). The only investment required is one’s willingness to sequester an afternoon or two for careful reading and reflection. It is presumed that a significant sub-set of readers do not possess requisite knowledge of Islam generally, and militant Islamic politics specifically; therefore, brief expository asides and explanatory notes clarifying key Islamic religious and religio-political concepts are sprinkled throughout.

INTRODUCTION

This book analyzes the AQO (Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad) and the ISO (Tanzim al-Dawla al-Islamiyya) and proposes U.S. Government (USG) strategies for their permanent defeat.1 AQO and ISO claim to represent the true and abiding interests of the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us-Sunnah), estimated to number 1.4 billion persons.2 It is the argument of this book, however, that grounds exist for why this need not be the case. AQO and ISO may be conceived in the theology they themselves profess as two deviant organizations guilty of committing major sins and besmirching the Islamic Call. I believe a more optimistic prognosis for the future destruction of each entity is warranted. It will be for the world’s Sunni Muslims (Ahl-us Sunnah) to make that determination; to define for themselves where the bounds of faith, godly fear and piety (taqwa), and righteous conduct begin and end; and who may or may not legitimately claim to speak in their name.

AQO and ISO have distinct doctrines, methodologies, and strategies of victory. Each entails distinct implications for USG strategy. This book is organized as follows. Chapter 1 documents the distinct history and doctrinal beliefs of each organization. In Chapter 2, AQO’s and ISO’s basic terrorist modus operandi is examined. Lastly, in Chapter 3, a summary of conclusions is first supplied, and implications and recommendations are then offered for further enhancing USG policy, strategy, and professional military educators’ effectiveness in expediting the demise of these two terrorist entities.

1. Describing each of these terrorist entities as “organizations” (Tanzim) is justifiable on the following grounds. First, this is actually the full and proper name chosen by “al-Qaeda” for itself in its original documents and nomenclature, despite the much-cited abbreviated form. Second, it is an accurate way to characterize how Sunni Muslims, including militant Sunni advocates of jihad who dissent from the Islamic State Organization’s (ISO’s) doctrine and methods, choose to describe this entity. The Islamic State (IS) is a terrorist organization that has declared itself the exclusive caliphate of the world’s Sunni Muslims. Until this self-designation triumphs more generally, its existence as an organization (Tanzim) should be recognized, yet owing to the centrality of its state-centered doctrine and methods, it is advisable to retain the concept “State” as well. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was self-declared on October 15, 2006; the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham/Levant (ISIS), was self-declared on April 7, 2013; and the IS was self-declared on June 29, 2014. Each self-declaration was made exclusively by a single terrorist organization and, despite pretensions otherwise, has not received recognition beyond a relatively small circle of adherents. For this notion that the IS is an organization, and not a state, in the writings of a highly-influential Salafi-jihadi, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi: The Case of ISIS and the Position of the Duty Toward It,” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted May 27, 2014, available from pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/05/27/abu-muhammad-al-maqdisi-the-case-of-isis-and-the-position-of-the-duty-toward-it/, accessed on December 9, 2014; For discussion on the naming conventions for this terrorist entity, see Zack Beauchamp, “ISIS, Islamic State or ISIL? What to call the group the US is bombing in Iraq and Syria,” September 17, 2014, available from www.vox.com/2014/9/17/6259923/isis-isil-the-islamic-state-daesh-what-is-isis-why-does-obama-use-isil, accessed on September 19, 2014; Hamid Lellou, “Lost in Translation: ISIS’s Intention Was in Their Name, But We Missed It,” August 4, 2014, available from smallwarsjournal.com/print/15998, accessed on August 4, 2014.

2. Pew Research Center, “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” October 7, 2009, available from www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/, accessed on October 4, 2013. The global total is estimated at 1.57 billion Muslims, with 87-90 percent affiliated as Sunni. The phrase “Defending Ahl-us Sunnah” (People of the Sunnah, or “Right Path”); or less frequently, Ahl-us-Sunnah wa’l-Gama’at (People of the Sunnah and Community), is frequently encountered in this terrorist literature.

ISO RELATIVE DIVERGENCES FROM AQO

ISO’s less definitive divergences from AQO, though highly consequential, are more finely nuanced, require extensive elaboration, and suppose a specialized knowledge of Islamic theology and jurisprudence (Fiqh) exceeding that possessed by the present author.189 These debates concern such fundamental concepts as faith and its opposite, infidelity (Iman versus Kufr); and based on one’s answer to the questions, “What is faith? What is infidelity?” How one determines, in fact, whether one has veered too far from the “middle path” — claimed to be Prophet Muhammad’s true path — and instead has become either negligent and guilty of postponing (irja) essential acts of faith and thereby accused of belonging to the negligent postponers (Murj’ites); or on the other extreme, judge sinning itself as Kufr, and thereby exhibit an extremist ultra-radicalism like the early sect of Kharijites (Khawarij).190 Still other debates deal with key theological and theopolitical concepts such as: the doctrine of al Wala wa’l bara — the notion that a true Muslim must openly disavow, disassociate from, and hate idolaters — and on the other hand, exclusively avow, associate with, and love the advocates of monotheism; the doctrine of tawhid, or the absolute Oneness of Allah as Creator, Lord, and in His Names, and its opposite, shirk or idolatry, and what in fact counts as idolatry particularly in the modern world; the doctrine of Hakimiyyah, and the notion that a state can only be governed by the “Rulings that Allah Sent Down,” i.e., the Sharia, and how that is to be operationalized; and, the question of when and how the obligatory prescribed criminal punishments (Hudud) of lashing, permanent dismemberment, and stoning are to be enforced for the crimes of fornication, theft, adultery, and intentional homicide.

The point of greatest convergence and with which we conclude this section, is the genus “global Sunni jihadism” to which each of these deviant species subscribe. The definitive quality that marks these organizations off from every other form of Islamic activism is their claim that jihad fi sabil Allah — fighting and striving in the path of Allah to Raise Allah’s Word — is until the Day of Final Judgment, an immediate and unconditional obligation that is at the same time, the superlative means of worshipping Allah, expiating one’s sins, and purchasing (through sacrifices of blood and treasure) those superlative privileges only attained by those killing and being killed on this path (Shuhada) (re: Quran 9:111).191

189. The present author believes that the key source for understanding the deeper theological structure of these debates is, as earlier stated, Lav, Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology. Also of considerable value, are several scholarly contributions by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi expert: Joas Wagemakers, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” in Meijer, ed., Global Salafism, pp. 81-106; Joas Wagemakers, “A Purist Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, August 2009, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 281-297; Joas Wagemakers, “The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietist and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of al-Walā' wa-l-Barā,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1, February 2012, pp. 93-110; Joas Wagemakers, “‘Seceders’ and ‘Postponers’? An Analysis of the ‘Khawarij’ and ‘Murji’a’ Labels in Polemical Debates between Quietest and Jihadi-Salafis,” in Jeevan Deol and Zaheer Kazmi, eds., Contextualizing Jihadi Thought, London, UK: Hurst and Company, 2012, pp. 145-164; Joas Wagemakers, “What’s in a Name? A Jihadi Labels Himself,” Jihadica, blog entry, posted September 11, 2012, available from www.jihadica.com, accessed on March 27, 2014; Joas Wagemakers, “Everything you always wanted to know about al-Maqdisi (but were afraid to ask),” Jihadica, blog entry, posted June 25, 2012, available from www.jihadica.com, accessed on March 27, 2014; Joas Wagemakers, “Al-Maqdisi and the Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi Movement,” Jihadica, blog entry, posted December 1, 2012, available from www.jihadica.com, accessed on March 27, 2014; Wagemakers, A Quietest Jihadi; Joas Wagemakers, “An Inquiry into Ignorance: A Jihadi-Salafi Debate on Jahl as an Obstacle to Takfir,” in Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort, Kees Versteegh, and Joas Wagemakers, eds., The Transmission and Dynamics of Textual Sources of Islam: Essays in Honor of Harald Motzki, Leiden: Brill, 2011, pp. 301-327; Joas Wagemakers, “Protecting Jihad: The Sharia Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 2011, pp. 148-162; Joas Wagemakers, “In Search of “‘Lions and Hawks’: Abū Muhammad al-Maqdisī’s Palestinian Identity,” Die Welt des Islams, 2013, Vol. 53, Iss. 3-4, pp. 388-415; Wagemakers, “A Terrorist Organization that Never Was,” pp. 59-75. Finally, for very important insights into the nuanced possibilities leading to ultra-extremist and ultra-sectarian futures, see Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction.

For the emergence of Zarqawism, through the April 18, 2010 killing of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, see Kazimi, “A Virulent Ideology in Mutation,” pp. 59-73; Nibras Kazimi, “Interesting Jihadist Critique of the ‘Islamic State of Iraq’,” blog entry, posted on January 11, 2007, available from talismangate.blogspot.com/2007_01_01_archive.html, accessed on August 15, 2016; Nibras Kazimi, “Al-Qaeda is Losing It,” blog entry, posted on February 3, 2007, available from talismangate.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html, accessed on August 15, 2016; Nibras Kazimi, “Blackout of the Press,” The New York Sun, February 8, 2007, available from www.nysun.com/opinion/blackout-of-thepress/48291/, accessed on October 13, 2014; Nibras Kazimi, “Oh Brother, Where Art Thou?,” blog entry, posted on February 28, 2007, available from talismangate.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html, accessed on August 15, 2016; Nibras Kazimi, “Jihadist Meltdown,” The New York Sun, March 12, 2007, available from www.nysun.com/opinion/jihadist-meltdown/50244/, accessed on August 19, 2014; Nibras Kazimi, “Let Beasts Devour Beasts,” The New York Sun, June 19, 2007, available from www.nysun.com/opinion/let-beasts-devour-beasts/56857/, accessed on August 18, 2014; Nibras Kazimi, “The Caliphate Attempted: Zarqawi’s Ideological Heirs, Their Choice for a Caliph, and the Collapse of Their Self-Styled ‘Islamic State of Iraq’,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Vol. 7, July 1, 2008, available from www.hudson.org/research/9854-the-caliphate-attempted-zarqawi-s-ideological-heirs-their-choice-for-a-caliphand-the-collapse-of-their-self-styled-islamic-state-of-iraq, accessed on September 7, 2016; Kazimi, “And so ends the saga of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi . . . “; Kazimi, “CONFIRMED: It WAS al-Baghdadi and al-Muhajir.”

On Zarqawism/Neo-Zarqawism and Syria: Nibras Kazimi, Syria Through Jihadist Eyes: A Perfect Enemy, Stanford, CA: Hoover University Press, 2010; Nibras Kazimi, “A Perfect Enemy,” [essay adapted from Kazimi, Syria Through Jihadist Eyes], Defining Ideas, August 17, 2011, available from www.hoover.org/research/perfectenemy, accessed on August 15, 2014; Nibras Kazimi, “Western Inaction, Lebensraum for Jihad,” The Caravan, Iss. 1201, February 23, 2012, available from www.hoover.org/research/western-inaction-lebensraum-jihad, accessed on October 10, 2014.

190. For a highly informative examination of the Kharijites, see Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self-Destruction.

191. For a critical examination of this fallacious reduction of Islam’s means of raising the Word of Allah to “jihadism,” see Paul Kamolnick, “The Egyptian Islamic Group’s Critique of Al-Qaeda’s Interpretation of Jihad,” pp. 93-110; Paul Kamolnick, “Al Qaeda’s Shari’a Crisis: Sayyid Imam and the Jurisprudence of Lawful Military Jihad,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 36, No. 5, May 2013, pp. 394-418, available from www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1057610X.2013.775478.

TQA: THE ISO “STATE/CALIPHATE-FIRST” STRATEGY

ISO declares five necessary stages (see Figure 3) marking the path to the restoration of the Sunni Islamic Caliphate:

Emigrating to an ideal locale (Hijrah);

Establishing the jihadist state-building nuclei (Jama’ah);

Using terrorist “vexation and exhaustion” operations to attack, collapse, and destroy existing state authority (Nikayah), to create mayhem/chaos (Tawahhush);

Controlling territory, persons, resources, and consolidating an alternative Islamic State structure (Tamkin); and finally,

Declaring, consolidating, and expanding the Islamic State/Caliphate (Khilafa). These may be visually represented using the TQA heuristic.

ISO declares very clearly its ultimate religio-political objective. It is stated thrice: “[e]stablishing Khilafah”; “reviving the Khilafah”; and “The goal of Khilafah without hesitation.”221 What ISO meant precisely by “without hesitation” is unclear, since this could mean: “We must begin now to work toward the Caliphate” or “We must now without hesitation declare The Islamic State of the Caliphate.” In practice, it appears the latter course was taken, and if so, this contradicts ISO’s own self-declared stage strategy by placing the Caliphate far ahead of the other necessary stages it posits are essential to its effective “remaining and expanding.” We shall leave this for now, as it will soon reappear as an essential ingredient of ongoing Fitnah and ISO’s civil war with other Islamic, Salafi, and Salafi-Jihadist organizations.

The ISO lays out a very brief and telling summary of its grand strategy. It clarifies for us exactly how it envisions strategy, and the essential phases for realizing its end state. This description is based on its recapitulation of the stages it claims al-Zarqawi’s initial organization followed:

In short, these phases consist of [1] immigrating [hijra] to a land with a weak central authority to use as a base where a [2] jama’ah can form, recruit members, and train them. (If such a land does not exist or hijrah is not possible, the place can be formed through long campaigns of nikayah [vexation and exhaustion] attacks carried out by underground mujahid cells . . . These attacks will compel apostate forces to partially withdraw from rural territory and regroup in major urban regions.) The jama’ah would then take advantage of the situation by [3] increasing the chaos to the point of leading to the complete collapse of the taghut regime in entire areas, a situation some refer to as ‘tawahhush’ (‘mayhem’). The next step would be to fill the vaccuum by managing the state of affairs to the point of [4] developing into a full-fledged state [tamkin], and continuing expansion into territory still under control of the taghut [emphasis added].222

A concluding sentence, in boldface type and a larger font size, supplies our final stage. “This has always been the roadmap towards [stage 5] Khilafah for the mujahidin.”223 Let us now attempt to follow this path.

In the beginning is Emigration (Hijra). Conceived on the model of Prophet Muhammad, ISO envisions its origins in emigration from a land of persecution to one where the rudiments of a new organization may be planted and defended. For al-Zarqawi, this new land is “a place where they could operate without the threat of a powerful police state,” and ISO asserts that this led him from Afghanistan (recall his Jund al-Sham based in Herat), to Kurdistan, “as a base to form Jama’atut-Tawhidi wal-Jihad [italics added].”224

Interestingly, Dabiq asserts that the creedal core of Zarqawism is the way of moderation, or the middle way, and that the ISO is based on Quran, Sunnah, and a Salafism “free from the extremities,” i.e., neither negligent (murji’ite) nor equating sin with disbelief (khawarij). Further, it is based in the doctrines of tawhid, al-wala wa’l bara, and the demand that all governance be based in Sharia. It views “jihad as its fundamental means for change” (citing, Quran 8:39), and that jihad be based upon “hijrah [emigration], bay’ah [an oath of loyalty to the emir], sam’ [listening], ta’ah [obedience], and i’dad [training], leading to ribat [manning frontiers] and qital [fighting], then Khilafah or shahadah [martyrdom], [italics added].”225 Having claimed to adhere to what seems like a mainline Salafi-Jihadi creed, however, we soon learn otherwise. Zarqawism is presented instead as the exclusive “bridge” to the Caliphate, with all others accused of varying degrees of intolerable deviance.

The story begins in the Afghanistan camps, the era of united fronts, anti-Communist coalitions, and Azzamist defensive jihad. Because of the overwhelming emphasis placed on fighting a “common enemy,” it is claimed this led to “ignoring all matters that distinguished them from each other, even if those matters were an obstacle in the pursuit of Khilafah,” with the most significant of these being “nationalism” and other “serious innovations that destroyed the creed and healthy body of the Muslim jama’ah required for reviving the Khalifah.”226 Note here ISO’s declared opposition to Azzamism and AQO-based Church-like “lumping” strategies. Those ecumenical conceptions of “Muslimness” were vehemently opposed to sectarian splitting and internecine warfare at the expense of the “apostate” government installed by the “original Kufr,” in this case the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). For al-Zarqawi and the ISO, however, what is decisive is “all matters that distinguished them [each fighting group] from each other.” In other words, it is only the purity of the Pure Sect that ensures the True Muslimness of the Muslim, and therefore it is in the process of winnowing wheat from chaff and True Believers from hypocrites, negligence, heresy, and outright apostasy, that Khilafa can and should be restored. The Caliphate can only be built from steel. It is “the creed and healthy body of the Jama’ah” cleansed of “serious innovations” that will be the instrument for the restoration. Moreover, many “would become the bridges upon which jihad would pass over toward the awaited Khilafah,” the one of greatest consequence “was that of the mujaddid (reviver) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.”227

It is essential to pause for a moment to see that this second stage of — Jama’ah — Zarqawism, by its very nature, views itself as operating on two key battle fronts. The least important is the front that fights “the occupier” in the wake of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and involves a number of Islamic, nationalist, Ba’athist, and other opponents;228 the most important was the al-Zarqawi-incited civil war against other Islamic groups for their alleged failure to rigidly adhere to his particular variant of ultra-conservative, ultra-sectarian Wahhabi-Salafi jihadism. This second front is the front against the nearer (Shia) and nearest enemies (insufficiently Muslim Sunnis); and as we have already learned, is the essential, obsessive front that sectarians must first — and forever — fight. It is only in this purging, cleansing, and destruction of opponents (i.e., the tribulations that are the oven that separates the pure and impure) that Allah opens the way for Allah’s True Soldiers and exposes and destroys hypocrites, sinners, heretics, and apostates, to create the State of the Caliphate. The moment al-Zarqawi’s Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad is born (Jama’ah), Fitnah is also born. We shall treat this more extensively in the following section, but for now “Fitnah,” defined as intra-Muslim “tribulation,” “trial,” or “conflict,” refers to a state of civil war or conflict among jihadist groups based on a state of enmity, fundamental disagreement, and is characterized by the outbreak of overt hostilities. Its deeper meaning for ISO is that it is Allah’s method for refining and distilling through trials, tribulations, conflict, and fighting, that steel from which the true bridge to Khalifa shall be built.

Phase 3: Injury, Vexation, Exhaustion (Nikayah), and Collapse, Chaos, Mayhem (Tawahhush).

Phase 3 commences as al-Zarqawi’s organization Jund al-Sham, and later Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, destroy all that is not him, and leaves chaos in his wake: “In short,” Dabiq claims:

he strived to create as much chaos as possible with the means permitted by the Shari’ah using attacks sometimes referred to as operations of ‘nikayah’ (injury) that focus on causing the enemy death, injury, and damage . . . [And] [w]ith chaos, he intended to prevent any taghut [idolatrous] regime from ever achieving a degree of stability that would enable it to reach a status quo similar to that existing in the Muslim lands ruled for decades by tawaghit. . . . To achieve maximum chaos, the Shaykh focused on the most effective weapons in the arsenal of the mujahidin for creating chaos — vehicle bombs, IEDs, and istishhadiyyin [specialized suicide ops brigades].230

What truly distinguished al-Zarqawi’s organization, however — and not adequately captured in the previous quote — was not his attacks on regime targets or American forces, or even on those in the highest levels of leadership who could be reasonably accused of voluntarily aiding and abetting the occupation. Instead, virtually all Islamic insurgents could agree on the objective of launching “daily operations against the crusader forces in Iraq whose main goal was to set up an apostate puppet regime loyal to them.”231 Zarqawism as Zarqawism was defined rather by its legitimation of targets deemed by the vast majority of these insurgents as forbidden on Islamic grounds or detrimental to the insurgency on practical grounds. It is through al-Zarqawi’s use of ultra-takfiri epithets and euphemistic language that this dramatic expansion of theretofore forbidden targets is condoned.

For example, it is stated that: “He [al-Zarqawi] would order [persons] to carry out nikayah operations dozens of times in a dozen areas daily, targeting and killing sometimes hundreds of apostates from the police forces and Rafidah.”232 However, “hundreds of apostates from the police forces” refer not just to leadership and collaborators, but everyday persons, Sunni and Shia, who are far from a chain of command and are the sons of the Iraqi masses. “The Rafidah,” of course, refers to al-Zarqawi’s wholesale slaughter of the Shia, leaders and led; this is deemed reprehensible and indeed forbidden (haram), even among deeply conservative Sunni Salafi-Wahhabis. This panoply of prohibited targets and forbidden conduct is further celebrated as Zarqawism’s fodder in this phase whose proximate objectives are maximum injury, chaos, and collapse. But the list of al-Zarqawi’s permissible targets is further clarified, and extended. “In addition,” Dabiq declares:

he tried to force every apostate group present in Iraq into an all-out war with Ahlus-Sunnah. So he targeted the Iraqi apostate forces (army, police, and intelligence), the Rafidah (Shia markets, temples, and militias), and the Kurdish secularists (Barzani and Talabani partisans). . . . In his speech titled ‘Hadha Bayanullin-Nasi wa li Yundharu Bih’ (This is a Declaration for the People That They May Be Warned by It), he threatened war on any Sunni tribe, party, or assembly that would support the crusaders. . . . Then when some so-called ‘Islamists’ entered into the democratic political process — ignoring what it entails of clear-cut major shirk — he officially declared war on them in his speech titled ‘Wa li Tastabina Sabilul-Mujrimin’ (And Thus the Way of the Criminals Becomes Evident).233

Let us consider these now licit targets, i.e., Iraqi “apostate” forces, the Rafidah (Shia markets, temples, and militias, Kurdish secularists, any Sunni tribe, party, or assembly that would support the Crusaders, and so-called Islamists [that] entered into the democratic political process. Count the bodies, count the souls. Recall that these were the days (2004-2006) of dozens of bombs and bombers, in dozens of cities, leading to hundreds and hundreds of dead, mangled, wounded, shocked, displaced, and horrified. This is the precise moment (see Chapter 1) that al-Zawahiri, al-Maqdisi, and Atiyatullah al-Libi, among others, privately registered their deep reservations on legal-moral and prudential grounds. Moreover, following the October 17, 2004, bay’ah to bin Laden, this would all be publicly attributed to AQO’s Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn. Those darkest days marked by violence, injury, chaos, and mayhem were precisely the days sought during this third phase, supposedly marking the path to the Caliphate. Moreover, in Dabiq’s telling, no sacred blood had ever been targeted or spilled in this strategic phase. “Obviously,” Dabiq asserts:

Supposing facts do matter, this is a blatant falsehood. Based on a detailed study of open source data on reported terrorist incidents in Iraq — using exclusively the Arabic language press to enhance credibility — from 2004-2008 a very different conclusion is revealed:

Al-Qaeda & Islamic State: History, Doctrine, Modus Operandi and U.S. Strategy to Degrade and Defeat Terrorism Conducted in the Name of Sunni Islam

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

CONCLUSIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS

PROLOGUE

RELEVANCE

INTRODUCTION

ISO RELATIVE DIVERGENCES FROM AQO

TQA: THE ISO “STATE/CALIPHATE-FIRST” STRATEGY