Andreas Werner

NGOs in Foreign Policy

Security Governance in Germany and the Netherlands

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Contents

1. Introduction

> *Foreign Policy was not something subsequent to the state or the interstate system, but integral to their constitution. Foreign Policy was not a bridge between two distinct realms, but something that both divided and joined the inside and the outside, the state and the interstate system.*
> David Campbell (1998: 60)

In the beginning, there were war, military and the state; not always, not everywhere, but for the emerging discipline of *International Relations* (IR)[1] these three became beacons in the night, guiding research and debate for years. *Idealists* and the *Realist School* shaped the start of these great theoretical debates during the 1920s and 1930s: *Idealists* proposed the willingness of states to co-operate peacefully, *Realists* on the other hand emphasized the pursuit of power and thus war as a natural means for states to survive. Expressed simplified: security was actually the final goal on both sides, albeit by following contradictory roads. Out of this debate the theory of *Classical Realism* developed, won and became the dominant paradigm in the discipline for many years (Menzel 2001: 66–82). Since then, defense, the military and war dominated all other instruments for the pursuit of international security[2] and became high politics at their best. Hans Morgenthau's renowned work *Politics among Nations* (Morgenthau 2006) constituted the first climax of this development, Kenneth Waltz' structural version of *Realism*, so-called *Neo-Realism*, followed (Waltz 1979). In the 1970s, simultaneously with the end of the Breton Woods system and the OPEC-Oil crisis, other perspectives besides the *Realist School* slowly entered the mainstream IR-discourse. Most prominent developments during this period were the *Interdependence Approach* by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Immanuel Wallerstein's *World System Theory* or Keohane's *Regime Theory* (Menzel 2001).

However, besides these great IR debates, the 1970s also meant a significant change for the core of *security studies*, i. e. its notion and logic. During the beginning of the Cold War-era one of the most important topics for researchers had indeed been war and in particular the danger of nuclear war. But now the focus of *security studies* slowly started to change. In 1983, Barry Buzan published his well acclaimed work *People, States and Fear* (Buzan 1991) that marked one of the highlights in the debate about new horizons for *security studies*. Buzan argued, that until the 1980s the notion of security had a predominant emphasis on the

1 This work follows a suggestion by Nicolas Onuf who writes *International Relations* with big letters if the academic discipline is concerned and *international relations* with small letters as far as the relations of international politics are concerned (Onuf 1989: 1). The emergence of IR as a discipline is usually connected with the end of World War I and with first professorships in Wales, England and the United States during the 1920s.

2 As there were diplomacy, trade, regimes and other topics that later received much more attention.

military, was only focused with the state as the main reference object and thus constituted an underdeveloped concept (Buzan 1991: 5). In particular, he criticized "[…] the logic of simple-minded applications of security which ignore some of the contradictions they contain. For example, defense policies that raise threats by provoking the fears of other states may decrease security more than they increase it" (Buzan 1991: 15). The British-German arms race before World War I or the Cuba Missile Crisis in 1962 were examples for such contradictions. During the 1980s it became common that more and more IR-academics advocated to include new policy fields to *security studies*. Therefore, Buzan sought to clarify the difficulties and opportunities that surrounded the discussion about the security notion by introducing terms such as *economic security* or *societal security* as well as new reference objects like the individual (Buzan 1991: 12–15, 19). In doing so, he and others stood against proponents of the then dominant *Structural Realism* like Waltz (1979) and the whole field of *Strategic Studies* that still focused on war and the military. Acceptance for this new development by the IR-mainstream came with the end of the Cold War.

Security studies from now on was no longer limited to the state, the military and war alone. It was broadened to different directions. From today's perspective, Christopher Daase (2009) distinguishes four dimensions for the broadened notion of security: First, there is the factual-dimension that deals with the subject of security, e. g. *military security*, *economic security* or *human security*; second, he identifies a reference-dimension that focuses on national, societal or individual security; third, a space-dimension can be identified which takes a look at the local, regional, international or global level of security; fourth, an endangerment-dimension distinguishes security in threat, vulnerability and risk (Daase 2009).[3]

Unsurprisingly, this broadening of the notion of security was still not appraised by all scholars. Indeed it was strongly disputed. One of the most well-known critics of this development was Stephen Walt, expressed in his 1991 article *The Renaissance of Security Studies* (Walt 1991). He argued that broadening the notion of security also to non-military issues "[…] runs the risk of expanding 'security studies' excessively; by this logic, issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recession could all be viewed as threats to 'security'. Defining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems" (Walt 1991: 213). This is why for him "[t]he main focus of security studies is easy to identify […]: it is the phenomenon of war. […] Accordingly, security studies may be defined as *the study of the threat, use, and control of military force* […]" (Walt 1991: 212; *Italics in original*).

Despite Walt's concerns, security in its broad version today is widely used and accepted by academics, national governments and international organizations. Critics of the broad notion of security therefore were somehow caught up by reality.

3 For the emergence and development of the notion from a different perspective cf. e. g. Busch (2012: 38–58).

Since the beginning of the 1990s the *United Nations* (UN) and other international organizations[4], followed by an increasing number of nation states, developed a comprehensive understanding of security which they implemented into concrete policies. This understanding also includes preventive and non-military measures and had significant consequences for international relations. One of the first stepping stones in this context was the famous *Agenda for Peace* from 1992 and the so-called *Human Development Report* from 1994, both published by the UN. The *Agenda* emphasized that "[…] the efforts of the [United Nations; *A.W.*] Organization to build peace, stability and security must encompass matters beyond military threats in order to break the fetters of strife and warfare that have characterized the past" (Boutros Ghali 1992: 3). One main endeavor to this end is the use of preventive means and post conflict reconstruction efforts in order to impede the breakout of violent conflicts or to resolve them afterwards (Boutros Ghali 1992: 3–4). This was accompanied by an increasing number of UN-peacebuilding-missions during the 1990s in countries like Somalia, Ruanda and later also expressed in NATO's military engagement in the Balkans and Afghanistan. These military missions were supported by a strong endeavor for development assistance implemented by thousands of aid organizations.

Contrary to the *Agenda for Peace*, that was mainly focused on states, the *Human Development Report* from 1994 focused on individuals and their security status: "For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. […] For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event" (UNDP 1994: 3). This had also severe consequences for the understanding of development co-operation and aid delivery: Since then development aid to conflict regions was laid under the umbrella of security.

Consequentially, security and development were more and more intertwined as recognized in the same report by stating that "[f]uture conflicts may often be within nations rather than between them […]. The search for security in such a milieu lies in development, not in arms" (UNDP 1994: 1). This brought more attention to aid delivery in the wider public and more funding for aid organizations than ever. However, as positive and shining this new aid-coin may have seemed at first glance, it had a dark side.

Mark Duffield in his influential work *Global Governance and the New Wars* (Duffield 2008) strongly criticized this relationship:

4 For a more detailed list of such documents and a comprehensive elaboration on this subject in the context of development co-operation cf. Duffield (2008: 1). For instance NATO did recognize multidimensional threats to economic and social development or other policy fields as early as 1991 as Böckenförde (2013: 47) emphasizes. Consequences to these new identified threats, however, were only implemented much later by NATO.

> "The mid-1990s incorporation of conflict into mainstream aid policy has played a catalytic role in this radicalisation of development. In this process, development and security have increasingly merged. Representing underdevelopment as dangerous not only demands a remedial process of social transformation, it also creates an urgency and belief ensuring that this process is no longer trusted to chance" (Duffield 2008: 42).

In other words: being poor was dangerous because it could lead to conflict. Furthermore and as a consequence development aid from then on always had to be thought with conflict resolution and the military in one interdependent context. Besides Duffield, however, this trend is also heavily criticized by other academics and by practitioners because it is seen as endangering the impartiality of aid.

Some authors therefore still criticize the broadened notion of security, particularly because it is so widely used and implemented into policies. Lothar Brock for example argued in a 2004 article that by broadening the notion of security a process of *securitization* is taking place that makes civil issues a matter of military planning. Such a process would lead to a dominance of the military over other perspectives of conflict resolution (Brock 2004: 342).

The mentioned process of *securitization* theoretically describes a danger for subjects to become subordinated to interests that stand against their actual purpose. Ole Waever, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde, prominent representatives of the so-called *Copenhagen School*, elaborated this issue in their work *Security – A New Framework for Analysis* (Buzan et al. 1998). In this book, security is understood as an inter-subjective linguistic process that turns a political issue into a matter of security, or put differently: Security becomes a speech act[5]. This speech act process follows a broadened *logic of security*: an actor utters towards a relevant audience that a reference object is existentially threatened and therefore requires extraordinary measures to secure its survival. If the audience accepts this story the issue becomes securitized and the implementation of such measures is legitimized (Buzan et al. 1998: 24–31; Werner 2011: 434–437). However, by uttering such a threat and by justifying the use of extraordinary measures outside the usual political realm to eliminate it, there is always the danger of instrumentalization. An actor could misuse this "threat text" (Stritzel 2007) to gain control over the reference object which then possibly violates its purpose, or more generally human rights or democratic principles. This is why Waever proposes to de-securitize issues in order to prevent such dangers (Waever 1995: 54). Such a de-securitizing move is basically what Brock, Duffield and others propose. It is supposed to bring back issues to the normal field of politics and its usual non-violent and democratic measures. Development co-operation and humanitarian aid therefore should not be viewed as issues of security but as issues of human assistance and economic support. Such

5 In their concept the authors follow the speech act approach by John L. Austin (1975) [1962] while mostly ignoring the further developments and clarifications of that philosophical theory by John Searle (1969) and others.

a step, however, today is far from realization. On the contrary the field of security gets more and more broadened.

One expression of this merge between development and security is the idea of a *comprehensive approach*[6]. This kind of governing tool can be found in numerous governmental documents concerning foreign and security policy all over Europe, Northern America and even Japan or Australia. At the same time this idea is hard to grasp in practice because it is often not reflected in a concrete organization, framework or structure. *Comprehensive approaches* follow the same logic as comprehensive security that is derived from the broadened notion of security. The simplistic idea behind it is a holistic one (Wendling 2010: 13–17), i. e. if all components in conflict resolution co-operate or at least co-ordinate with each other towards one goal, sustainable peace and security can finally be established. This logic is expressed in the (in)famous statement by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan: "[…] we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development […]" (Annan 2005: 6). That, however, is a classical circular statement. If development is necessarily the prerequisite for security and *at the same time* security is also necessarily the prerequisite for development, both can only exist together or not at all. In other words: the statement is illogical.

Implicit in these concepts of *comprehensive approaches* is not only the merging of development and security but also the incorporation of further policy fields. State institutions like ministries, but also the military, should be better co-ordinated with each other but also co-operation with non-state actors like *Non-Governmental Organizations* (NGOs)[7] should be enhanced. These approaches were created in an increasing number of NATO states since the early 2000s, mostly based on experiences made with post-conflict reconstruction in the context of military missions in the Balkans and since 2001 in Afghanistan (Wendling 2010: 19–21):

In Germany, for example, the *Gesamtkonzept der Bundesregierung: 'Zivile Krisenprävention, Konfliktlösung und Friedenskonsolidierung'*[8] (Die Bundesre-

6 While a *comprehensive approach* refers to the co-ordination of governmental and non-governmental actors, a *whole-of-government-approach* usually describes only the national co-ordination of governmental actors. A *3-D-approach* is focused on diplomacy, development and defense while a *comprehensive approach* is not specified and thus can also contain trade, environmental protection or other policy fields. For a contradictory perspective cf. Busch (2012), who argues that *comprehensive approaches* describe interactions in international organizations only and that a national co-ordination of governmental and non-governmental actors should be called a *whole-of-nation-approach* (Busch 2012: 66–67). At the same time, however, Busch ignores *3-D-approaches* in his discussion. His argument is refused here because *comprehensive approach* is an overall general notion for describing comprehensive frameworks, while the others (whole-of-government, 3-D-approach) are more specific descriptions. Cf. also Wendling (2010) for a similar understanding.

7 NGOs are a special type of non-state actor as will be revealed in chapter 2.2.

8 In English: Master Plan of the Federal Government: 'Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Peace Condolidation'.

gierung 2000) introduced a process that later on found expression from a military perspective in the *Weißbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr*[9] (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2006). There, the idea of *Vernetzte Sicherheit* (networked security) was presented (cf. Borchert/Thiele 2013). *Networked security* is Germanys attempt to develop a *comprehensive approach* for its foreign and security policy. In doing so, the German Government followed the European trend towards such approaches among European states that is later also described in the NATO strategy of 2010 (NATO 2010) and earlier announced in the *European Security Strategy* of 2003 (EU 2003).

Accordingly, a similar process can be witnessed in other European states, for example in the Netherlands. There, a so-called *3-D-approach* has been developed, which is supposed to interconnect the policy fields of *Diplomacy, Defense and Development* (the three "D"s) in order to implement an effective crisis management in foreign policy. The Dutch Government is concerned that conflicts in other regions might have a negative impact[10] on both Dutch and international security. By way of aid delivery and post-conflict reconstruction in such regions the government seeks to prevent such impacts, which is why all relevant actors in this context, including NGOs, should co-operate more closely (Dutch government 2005: 10).

Such comprehensive security strategies have led to an increased demand for civil-military co-operation in conflict areas. The only trouble: this form of comprehensive security is highly disputed by NGOs. First, they fear that by co-operating with the military their independence and impartiality might be in danger which aims at helping the people who are in most need. As mentioned above, they fear a *securitization* of their work. Second, they are also afraid that the life of their employees is threatened by being seen with military actors in dangerous areas like Afghanistan where NGOs consistently become victims of insurgency attacks (VENRO 2008; Klingebiel/Roehder 2004; Barry/Jefferys 2002).

As a summary, the broadened notion of security and the policy process accompanied by it since the early 1990s has led to an increased engagement of UN, NATO and EU in conflict areas. This engagement in so-called failed states, post-conflict environments or civil wars followed a logic of "no security without development, no development without security", which puts development co-operation in the focus of security policy (Duffield 2008: 15–17). State-building and even nation-building[11] were some of the main goals for European states in that

9 In English: White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr.

10 As negative impacts a number of possible consequences for the Netherlands are mentioned, for instance that conflict regions might become the home for criminal or terrorist organizations, that violent conflicts might cause an international flow of refugees or may damage the access to natural resources or otherwise threaten trade activities (Dutch government 2005: 10).

11 The difference between the two terms is that state-building is focused on building state institutions like a functioning legislative, executive and judiciary while nation-building focuses on the creation of national identity, e. g. if a country is characterized by a past

context. Implicit in this *securitization*-process of former pure humanitarian actions is an increased demand for civil-military co-operation between NGOs and NATO-troops that led to the creation of comprehensive security approaches. But these approaches are disputed and lead to conflicts between governmental and civil society actors (VENRO 2010a, 2009; Ankersen 2008; Rietjens/Bollen 2008; Klingebiel/Roehder 2004; Barry/Jefferys 2002).

1.1 The Focus of Analysis

Besides the evolution of the broadened security notion and its implications, the proposed integration of civil society actors into comprehensive foreign and security policy via civil-military co-operation can also be explained as a consequence of the fundamental change of the state. Western industrialized countries are today no longer shaped by a clear separation of state and society. Rather a process of *Vergesellschaftung*[12] (Brozus et al. 2003) is taking place since the 1970s and leads to an intertwined network of governmental and non-governmental actors within and surrounding state institutions. More precisely, the modern state cannot deal with its complex duties and issues without support of non-state actors. Above all, it is dependent upon their expertise knowledge and capabilities (Voigt 1995). This process did also take place in foreign policy (Cohen/Küpcü 2005; Brozus et al. 2003) and in the field of international security (Krahmann 2003). Therefore, governing cannot be done purely with the hierarchical instruments of political steering anymore. Modern governing also requires voluntary processes of negotiation and compromise between state and non-state actors that play an increasingly important role. Academic studies and theories about this topic are often branded with the label *governance research* (Schuppert/Zürn 2008) and that is also what this PhD-thesis is about, albeit solely in the field of foreign and security policy with a special focus on NGOs. This form of governance then is called *security governance*. At the same time a comparative country study of Germany and the Netherlands will be undertaken.

For the implementation of comprehensive security approaches in foreign policy, countries like Germany and the Netherlands since the early 2000s sought to

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of civil war and former hostile societal groups shall be convinced to permanently live in peace (c. f. Fukuyama 2006, 2004).

12 In English more or less: socialisation/societalization. There is no definite translation into English that can grasp the true meaning of the notion. At best it can be described in this context as a process in which former state owned responsibilities are being transferred to the responsibility of societal actors such as NGOs, churches or non-profit organizations. So actually governmental duties are given back to non-governmental actors from which they came from originally before the emergence of the Westphalia state model in the 17th century. The word *Vergesellschaftung* here is therefore meant as the opposite of the original sociological German notion, which means more or less nationalization or collectivization of former privately owned possessions.

systematically integrate NGOs in their decision-making[13] in foreign and security policy. Thereby, the main goal has been, and still is, to increase the quality of conflict resolution, development co-operation and humanitarian aid for fragile states by consulting, co-operating and co-ordinating regularly with NGOs at home and abroad. In other words: governments sought to benefit from the NGOs expertise and in turn promised them a chance for influencing, and thus maybe even changing, foreign policy.

In Germany the *Action Plan Civil Crisis Prevention*, which was a further development of the *Gesamtkonzept* mentioned above, plays a significant role in this context. This policy paper announced the creation of a governance framework in which civil society actors advise different governmental ministries (Die Bundesregierung 2004).[14] A similar project in the Netherlands was the so-called *Peace, Security and Development Network* (PSD network), that brought together different state and non-state actors in order to co-operate more effectively in post-conflict areas and development countries (PSD network 2012a).[15]

However, it should not be concealed that especially the *Action Plan* in Germany was also the result of a longer demand by civil society groups to strengthen civil capacities in Germany's crisis prevention approach. It was, comparably to the Dutch *PSD network*, indeed a common project by the government and societal actors. Despite that, the German Government calls this framework a part of its *comprehensive approach*, namely *networked security* (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2006: 24–27).[16] Such frameworks and their actors will be examined in this book.

Why a comparative study is the best way of examining this topic will be explained now.

1.2 Comparing Germany and the Netherlands

The comparative method itself is one of the most traditional methodological approaches in *political science*. Dirk Berg-Schlosser even calls it the *Königsweg* (silver bullet) of the discipline (Berg-Schlosser 2005: 170). The method has a number of advantages to other ways of analysis, especially to the single case study, often pursued in qualitative research. Arnd Bauerkämper for instance argues that "[…] comparisons have called into question the established national straitjacket of academia" (Bauerkämper 2003: 30). By using a comparative analysis, political issues and phenomena can be narrowed and distinguished from each other. Thus, so far unknown objects can be explained and understood by using familiar ones as controlling cases (Jahn 2005: 56). Differences and similarities between the cases

13 More details on this topic will be discussed in chapter 2.1.2.

14 This framework and the German approach will be studied in more detail in chapter 5.

15 This framework and the Dutch approach will be studied in more detail in chapter 6.

16 In more detail this will be discussed later in chapter 5.

can be identified and highlight specific features or general results. Therefore the comparative method is also often used in other disciplines like for instance in *Historical Science* (Bauerkämper 2003: 30).

Transferred to the topic of comprehensive security a comparative country analysis of German and Dutch interaction frameworks of governmental and civil society actors can lead to new and fruitful results for this topic. If only one of the countries would be examined, the conclusion about the case could be overrated or underestimated. Only in comparison with similar findings in other countries, which may contain differences in their conception, structure, actors' behavior or lead to different results, one can make more generalized hypothesis about the integration of NGOs in decision-making of modern German and Dutch foreign and security policy.

But why exactly Germany and the Netherlands? There are several reasons why both constitute excellent objects for a comparative country analysis in the field of foreign and security policy.

First of all, in the past, both countries were engaged in the same conflict areas and thus probably made similar experiences. During the 1990s both engaged in the Balkan missions of NATO and especially in the Kosovo mission where the Netherlands were situated in the German sector. Later, both took part in the ISAF-mission in Afghanistan where their approaches of comprehensive security were "tested" in a real environment in the *Northern Regional Command* (Germany) and the southern province of Uruzgan (Netherlands). At the same time these approaches were implemented at home with frameworks like the *Action Plan* and the *PSD network* as described above. But unlike other countries both also share security institutions with each other like the *1st German-Netherlands Corps* in Münster, Germany, or the *CIMIC Center of Excellence* in Enschede, the Netherlands. The Corps, for example, led the ISAF-mission in 2003 and made a headquarter mission in Afghanistan in 2009 and 2013. It is also involved in communication processes with non-state actors through informal meetings and a joint civil-military exercise named *Common Effort* that took place in September 2011 (Offermans/Brosky 2011).[17] Both countries made good and bad experiences in their relation with NGOs in these conflict areas. They also share some of their military experiences via such bi-national institutions. Another similarity is the almost simultaneous emergence of their respective policy papers on comprehensive security, 2004 in Germany and 2005 in the Netherlands. Finally, both follow similar goals for their security issues and are deeply engaged with international development co-operation. So, compared to other countries' involvements these circumstances are quite remarkable.

Second, both countries try to lead a close dialogue with NGOs in various policy fields. This is both expressed in a number of policy papers for comprehensive security and also due to the fact that they traditionally put much emphasis on the co-operation with aid organizations. Especially in the Netherlands traditionally more

17 For more information cf. also: http://www.1gnc.org/archive/former-exercises/common-effort-2011/(last access: 31.12.2014)

people are engaged with civil society organizations than in any other European country (Wielenga 2004: 96). At the same time, this country with only 16 Million inhabitants spent 6.3 billion dollars on development aid following ODA-criteria[18] in 2011, which put it 6th place in total spending worldwide and even 4th place in relative spending compared to its *Gross National Income* (GNI). Moreover, in 2008 it was 1st worldwide in funding development co-operation via NGOs (Hoebink 2009: 441). Germany, in 2011, was 2nd place worldwide in total spending of development assistance with more than 14 billion dollars but, and there is a first difference to the Netherlands, only 12th place in relative spending compared to its GNI (BMZ 2013a, 2013b). Nevertheless these numbers illustrate the important status development aid possesses in German and Dutch foreign policy compared to other countries.

Third, both Germany and the Netherlands also share a number of general similarities that make them good objects for comparison. Both have similar political parliamentary systems, they follow a very close economic integration and interdependence with each other, possess cultural-linguistic similarities, and are characterized by pluralistic societies and a geographical proximity. These three similarities cannot be found in the same density with other European countries.

However, there are also differences between Germany and the Netherlands. First of all, while Germany has the biggest population in Europe with its more than 80 million citizens, the Netherlands belong to the middle-sized EU members with more or less 16 million inhabitants. Moreover, the Netherlands have gone through a different historical development than Germany, especially in the relationship between society and the state. While the state in Germany has always been the central driving force, the Netherlands relied more on society (Zimmer 2013: 8), which is also based on the long years of so-called pillarization that describes the separation of Dutch society on religious and social borders along the lines of Catholicism and Protestantism.[19] The Netherlands were a colonial power until the 1970s, that in the end 1940s fought a bloody war against insurgents in their former colony of Indonesia (Gieler 2013: 263–264), while Germany is characterized by its Nazi-past and destruction during World War II. Above all, Germany violently occupied its smaller neighbor during this time, which is a living memory in Dutch society until today. Unsurprisingly, the Netherlands followed a US-oriented direction in foreign policy during the Cold War-era while Germany concentrated on France and European integration (cf. Stöger 2008). Moreover, while the Netherlands traditionally put

18 Official Development Assistance (ODA) was defined in the 1970s by the UN. As ODA-aid all publicly initiated financial means for development co-operation can be counted that contribute to the economic growth or the increase of life circumstances in the developing country. ODA should be given by fair interest rates connected to the free international monetary trade. All participating states have already in the 1970s agreed to spend at least 0.7 % of their GNI for ODA, which is, however, failed by most states.

19 For a detailed account on Dutch pillarization cf. e. g. Lijphart (2007), van Dam (2011) (quotes taken from Wilp 2012: 40–49).

much emphasis on international law and multilateralism (Gieler 2013: 265; Stöger 2008: 302–303), Germany in the past 20 years increasingly also undertook unilateral actions in foreign policy (Stöger 2008: 302–303). Nevertheless both countries are counted as most similar systems, as also Zimmer (2013: 7–8) emphasizes, and as such they will be treated here.[20]

Before elaborating on the research question and research design of this PhD-thesis, let us take a look at what has been done in this research area of governance in comprehensive foreign and security policy so far and where this work will step in.

1.3 State of Research

First of all, governance research in comprehensive foreign and security policy belongs to the discipline of *International Relations*, same as NGOs. In general, foreign policy can be divided into two sides of the same coin: an international level at which it is executed and implemented and a national level at which foreign policy is planned, decided and debated. Both levels are intrinsically linked with each other (Oppermann/Höse 2007; Wilhelm 2006: 91; Campbell 1998: 60; Putnam 1988). However, while the topic of NGOs on the international level is excessively studied and researched (e. g. Adolphsen 2014; Schwenger 2013; Akkaya 2012; Baehr 2009; Seifer 2009; Frantz/Martens 2006; Zürn 2006; Stickler 2005; Curbach 2003; Schade 2002; Take 2002; Zimmer 2002) the integration of NGOs at the national level of foreign policy remains understudied, the same as the interconnection between the two levels. This is why the focus of this research project is at the national level. Without having studied this area the interconnection and its execution cannot be fully understood. Due to a limited space an overall analysis of both levels must be postponed to later and more enhanced studies. This PhD-thesis focuses on security and leaves other topics of foreign policy like trade, environment or health policy aside. But what exactly has been researched in the field of NGOs in comprehensive foreign and security policy so far?

On the international level of security policy, first and foremost there is the big field of civil-military co-operation that takes a look at NGOs in peace missions and conflict areas in their relationship with the military. Here, numerous studies exist about individual UN or NATO missions in Africa (e. g. George 2005; Abiew 2003; Weiss 1999), the Balkans (e. g. Voget 2008; Rollins 2004; Evans-Kent/Bleiker 2003; Bollen 2002; Pugh 2000; Weiss 1999) or Afghanistan (e. g. van der Lijn 2011; Homan 2010; Rietjens 2010, 2008a, 2008b; Rietjens et al. 2009; Feichtinger/Gauster 2008; Klem/van Laar 2008; Preuß 2008; Savage 2008; Monshipouri 2003) and also about the role, principles and work of NGOs in such difficult environments (e. g. Murdie 2014; Schultz 2011; Irrera 2010; Schade 2007; Debiel/Sticht 2005; Dijkzeul 2004; Carey/Richmond 2003; Gaer 2003). The general field of civil-military co-operation and the question how the interactions of NGOs and

20 More details on the comparative analysis will be discussed in chapter 4.3 and chapter 7.

the military could be improved has also received much attention (e. g. Olsen 2011; Roberts 2010; Brett 2009; Rietjens et al. 2009; Ankersen 2008; Rietjens/Bollen 2008; Klingebiel/Roehder 2004; Barry/Jefferys 2002). Another focus of researchers is the civil-military actions of the EU (e. g. Seifer 2009; Mayer 2008; Ehrhart 2007) and lately, the privatization of security and the security status of NGOs is increasingly being researched (e. g. Schneiker/Joachim 2012; Schneiker 2011; Birke 2010; Hofmann 2008; Avant 2007).

The national level of foreign and security policy was mostly viewed from a pure governmental perspective. Here, the topic of *comprehensive approaches*, *whole-of-government-approaches* or *3-D-approaches* received most attention. However, most authors merely examined this field with a focus on governmental institutions alone and their interaction among each other (e. g. Ehrhart 2010; Wendling 2010; Egnell 2009, 2008; Pospisil 2009; de Coning 2008; van der Gaag-Halbertsma et al. 2008; Patrick/Brown 2007).

Only a few studies covered the national level of foreign policy by involving NGOs: Rainer Baumann and Frank A. Stengel (2014) for example focus on the role of non-state actors (NSA) in the research field of foreign policy analysis (FPA). In doing so, they also take a look at NSAs' role in national decision-making of foreign policy. Their intention is, however, not to empirically examine the role of these actors but to provide an analysis of publications in FPA between 2005 and 2010. One of their detections is that many scholars tend to focus on governmental actors. Only very few articles covered NGOs. Baumann and Stengel conclude that NSAs' access to decision-making remains an understudied field and that more research need to be done in order to evaluate the role and influence of NSAs on foreign policy (Baumann/Stengel 2014).

Jeanette Schade (2010) for example focused on the role of NGOs in US-foreign and development policy. In particular she examined the institutional and ideological foundations of US-civil society organizations' funding in development policy (Schade 2010). Gero Erdmann (2007) covered the topic of aid-NGOs and churches and their influence on foreign policy, but regrettably without going into much detail. He describes their history and some of the biggest organizations, but admits that this field lacks a sufficient amount of research (Erdmann 2007: 312). Gunter Hellmann (2006) elaborated a little bit more on the influence of NGOs on foreign policy, by explaining which strategies these organizations pursue in order to bring their perspectives into the policy decision-making process. Unfortunately, due to space restrictions, he also remained on the surface. The author only took a quick look at the case of international climate policy negotiations, which in turn refers back to the role of NGOs at the international level. Hellmann regardless concludes that NGOs indeed have an influence on foreign policy issues (Hellmann 2006: 153–171).

Brozus et al. (2003) in their standard work in this context focused on the topic of sustainable development in a comparative analysis of the Netherlands, USA, Brazil and the Philippines. In this study, the alteration of political steering towards more co-operative styles of governing was examined by following a constructivist

approach that focused on the influence of ideas on actors' behavior (Brozus et al. 2003: 215–216). Their book can therefore be counted to the field of governance literature. Amongst others they showed that the integration of NGOs in policy processes in the Netherlands is relatively strong and common. Environmental NGOs thereby mostly take the role as controlling and consulting partner of companies and governmental institutions in sustainable development (Brozus et al. 2003: 100–103).

Ulrich Rösler focused on the integration of humanitarian aid organizations in the steering capacities of German foreign policy (Rösler 2002: 11). In his study he examined interactions of these organizations with governmental actors in the *Co-ordination Committee Humanitarian Aid* in the *Auswärtige Amt* (AA) from the 1990s until 2002. He argues, that although within the *Committee* NGOs and governmental actors would be working at eye-level (Rösler 2002: 75) the steering and control capabilities of governmental actors towards NGOs would be strengthened with an increasing institutionalization of co-operative structures, both nationally and internationally (Rösler 2002: 94). Although Rösler sufficiently analyzed the interactions of NGOs and the state in the *Committee*, he did not cover a wider national scope in his study. Moreover, his examination ended in 2002, which means that it remains unclear whether his results can still be confirmed today.

The academic debate in and about the Netherlands mostly focuses on the Dutch military missions abroad (e. g. Holthausen 2012; Homan 2010, 2005; Box 2009a, 2009b; Anten 2009; Koster 2009; Jansen 2008; Kamminga 2008) and also neglected security institutions at the national level, let alone by including NGOs. In Germany there are indeed publications about the national and international sphere but there are almost no comprehensive studies or even a systematic comparative analysis with other European states, not to speak of a study about civil society actors in this context. However, by undertaking such a comparative analysis one could in the end explain why one concept works better than the other and what ought to be done to improve comprehensive security, civil-military co-operation and the relationship between the state and civil society in foreign policy.

As a short summary, many scholars recognize NGOs as important actors in foreign policy, but most of them fail to go deeper into the matter or are out of date. This is a general problem of NGO research as Kerstin Seifer (2009) argues. She calls NGOs overrated by most scholars because in the majority of studies there would be a lack of systematic empirical analysis. As she points out, there are numerous studies about lobbying activities and influence of NGOs, but most of them equal access to political agenda setting processes with actual influence which would not be the same in reality (Seifer 2009: 202–203).

Last but not least the theoretical area of *security governance* was widely covered, however, also mostly with a focus on the regional, international or global level (cf. e. g. Lucarelli 2013; Schroeder 2011; Daase/Friesendorf 2010; Ehrhart 2010; Rinke 2010; Sperling 2009; Daase/Engert 2008; Mayer 2008; Kirchner 2007; Bryden/Hänggi 2005; Krahmann 2003). Only recently studies about the local level of domestic *security governance* emerged (e. g. Schulze 2013; Frevel/

Schulze 2010). But no approach so far covered the national level of foreign policy. This, however, led to inappropriate assumptions about governance in this policy field, which in addition have sometimes even been made a priori instead of being the result of empirical studies.

In conclusion, particularly the role of NGOs on the national level of comprehensive security policy is neglected in most academic studies. Moreover, there are only few comparative analysis. The vast majority of examinations instead focuses on governmental institutions alone, including the military. NGO-research on the other hand mainly covers their organizational character or the operational level, i. e. NGOs engagement in conflict regions or aid missions. Almost no publications are available that deal with NGOs in comprehensive security on the national level of German or Dutch foreign policy where decision-making is situated. However, this area is of crucial importance if central questions in modern foreign policy shall be answered. If one seeks to evaluate the performance of comprehensive security and the roles that actors play in the context of *security governance,* all relevant actors and all levels of analysis should be included. Above all: if one argues that national and international political levels are merging and that there is a fundamental change of the state that forces governments to integrate NGOs into its decision-making, examining the national level of foreign and security policy is essential for understanding how modern politics actually work. If this focus of analysis is ignored, conclusions about modern foreign policy will be misguided and contain the risk of arriving at wrong theses.

1.4 Research Questions and Cases under Study

In the development of interaction frameworks like the *Action Plan Civil Crisis Prevention* or the *PSD network*, both the German and Dutch Governments emphasized that they would foster a mutual adjustment between civil society and governmental actors for taking action in fragile states and civil crisis prevention abroad. Both sides should co-ordinate their actions in this context in order to become more effective. Such a co-ordination would imply horizontally structured interactions of NGOs and the state. Additionally, both governments promised to treat them as serious and important partners within these relations (Dutch Government 2008: 14–15; Dutch Government 2005: 34; Die Bundesregierung 2004: 44–46, 63–64). However, it has not been answered empirically by scholars so far whether there are really horizontally structured relations between NGOs and the German and Dutch Governments in the context of comprehensive security.

Some academics support the statements of the German and Dutch Governments. Krahmann (2003) for example claims that *security governance* is a "[…] horizontal dispersion of authority among public and private actors at different levels. Decision-making proceeds through negotiation and the formal and informal acceptance of structural inequality […]" (Krahmann 2003: 13). Ehrhart goes even further by claiming that *security governance* would be a collective security guar-

antee provided by a plurality of governmental and non-governmental actors who share a horizontal relationship with each other, use different means, instruments and methods to reach a common goal on basis of joint norms, values and/or interests (Ehrhart 2010: 25).

However, as Seifer (2009) correctly argues, one problem with governance approaches in general is that they often tend to take horizontal relationships between different actors for granted. Furthermore, I follow her argument that contrary to such concepts it should indeed be an empirical questions whether certain actors are really performing in a symmetrical interaction, including an equal autonomy, or whether they act in a hierarchical environment (Seifer 2009: 87–90, 114). The phenomenon of an increasing number of horizontal interactions in the modern state does not necessarily mean the absence of hierarchical elements. As a matter of fact they are still widely used (cf. Kooiman 2003). At the same time a "horizontal dispersion of authority" does not match a "structural inequality", as Krahmann (2003) argues in the above quote. Structural inequality means unequal power and thus leads to unequal relationships, including authority of one actor over the other and low autonomy for the later. The mere acceptance of such unequal power distributions does not erase them. In order to create a horizontal dispersion of authority, there must in fact also be horizontal structures within the specific context. However, which structure of interaction is empirically evident in the German and Dutch cases will be shown at the end of this work. As another example, Ehrhart's claim that state and non-state actors via *security governance* strive for a common goal on the basis of joint interests and/or values is at least debatable in the field of security. Especially the relationships between German and Dutch governmental actors with NGOs are characterized by numerous conflicts, disagreements and oppositional interests as several studies convincingly reveal (e. g. Rietjens/Bollen 2008; Frerks et al. 2006; Klingebiel/Roehder 2004). Even when some of these actors take a pragmatic approach in dangerous environments like Afghanistan this does not mean they necessarily share the same goals or values. This might also be the case on the national level of foreign policy as will be examined in the empirical chapters.

Out of these reasons both governmental and theoretical statements mentioned above must be criticized as premature in this context. In fact there is almost no current literature empirically examining in detail how integration processes of NGOs in foreign and security policy work and what kind of integration is actually pursued by the state. Is a symmetrical or an asymmetrical structure used, are the interactions of a hierarchical or co-operative type? Especially NGOs are a unique type among non-state actors, which is often ignored in academic studies.[21] Therefore the following central research question arises:

1) In which way do governments grant NGOs structural access to decision-making in the context of comprehensive security?

21 This will be covered in more detail in chapter 2.2.

In more detail, the following sub-questions will also be answered:

2) Do NGOs get access to decision-making in a horizontal fashion or in a hierarchical way?
3) What kinds of NGOs are participating in such interactions and which are excluded?
4) Are they structurally involved in the formulation of policies or are they only consultants for political actors?
5) What kinds of formal interaction frameworks can be found and how are they funded?
6) What interests and goals do the governments follow during their engagement and why do they participate?
7) What interests and goals do NGOs follow during their engagement and why do they participate?
8) What consequences does this have for what we know about modern foreign and security policy?
9) What consequences does this have for the definition of the concept of security governance?

The first seven questions will be answered for each country respectively. Questions (8) and (9) will be answered after the comparative analysis. As time period that is examined, the years between 2004 and 2012 for Germany, and the years between 2005 and 2012 for the Netherlands have been chosen. The reason for this choice is that both countries started their concepts of comprehensive security around 2004 and 2005 and accordingly a number of governance frameworks in their aftermath. However, in Germany two of the examined frameworks started earlier: The *Co-ordination Committee Humanitarian Aid* was founded in 1994 and *FriEnt* started in 2001. Both of them will be analyzed from 2004 onwards while their general history until that date will still be described in order to present a full picture of the respective institution. The final year, 2012, was chosen because at that point sufficient material from interviews and policy documents had been acquired for analysis. Important to notice is that this study pursues a structural top-down perspective (cf. Blum/Schubert 2011: 20). Nevertheless, it still takes a look at NGOs' perspectives too, in order to catch as many relevant information as possible. However, it is not being examined what degree of influence NGOs have in the planning and formulation of concrete policies or what lobbying strategies they pursue. Such an examination would demand a different set of research questions and research design as will be shown in the following subchapter. Instead, here it is of interest whether NGOs are structurally integrated by the state into decision-making or not, i. e. whether they get access to these processes or not. The perspective of NGOs in this context is crucial for the understanding of such governance structures. It is not sufficient to look at governmental structures and actors alone, if the goal is to conclude about the interaction with non-state actors. For that reason the NGOs' perspectives constitute an important part of the analysis and serve as a kind of