Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend
to discover anything new to the world in philosophy and the
sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own systems, by
decrying all those, which have been advanced before them. And
indeed were they content with lamenting that ignorance, which we
still lie under in the most important questions, that can come
before the tribunal of human reason, there are few, who have an
acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily agree with
them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive the
weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the
greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to
accurate and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust,
consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the
parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are every where to be
met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seem
to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself.
Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the
present imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble
without doors may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they
hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not
the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of
contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our
controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any
certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if every thing was
uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth,
as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle it is not
reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs
ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant
hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable
colours. The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage
the pike and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and
musicians of the army.
From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against
metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who
profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other
part of literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not
understand those on any particular branch of science, but every
kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some
attention to be comprehended. We have so often lost our labour in
such researches, that we commonly reject them without hesitation,
and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors and delusions,
that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And indeed
nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great
degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For
if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is
certain it must lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall
arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed
with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain
and presumptuous. I pretend to no such advantage in the philosophy
I am going to unfold, and would esteem it a strong presumption
against it, were it so very easy and obvious.
It is evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater
or less, to human nature: and that however wide any of them may
seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or
another. Even. Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural
Religion, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN;
since the lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by
their powers and faculties. It is impossible to tell what changes
and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly
acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and
could explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the
operations we perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are
the more to be hoped for in natural religion, as it is not content
with instructing us in the nature of superior powers, but carries
its views farther, to their disposition towards us, and our duties
towards them; and consequently we ourselves are not only the
beings, that reason, but also one of the objects, concerning which
we reason.
If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy,
and Natural Religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of
man, what may be expected in the other sciences, whose connexion
with human nature is more close and intimate? The sole end of logic
is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning
faculty, and the nature of our ideas: morals and criticism regard
our tastes and sentiments: and politics consider men as united in
society, and dependent on each other. In these four sciences of
Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended almost
everything, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with,
or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the
human mind.
Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for
success in our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious
lingering method, which we have hitherto followed, and instead of
taking now and then a castle or village on the frontier, to march
up directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to human
nature itself; which being once masters of, we may every where else
hope for an easy victory. From this station we may extend our
conquests over all those sciences, which more intimately concern
human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure to discover more
fully those, which are the objects of pore curiosity. There is no
question of importance, whose decision is not comprised in the
science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any
certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In
pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human nature,
we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a
foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they
can stand with any security.
And as the science of man is the-only solid foundation for
the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to
this science itself must be laid on experience and observation. It
is no astonishing reflection to consider, that the application of
experimental philosophy to moral subjects should come after that to
natural at the distance of above a whole century; since we find in
fact, that there was about the same interval betwixt the origins of
these sciences; and that reckoning from THALES to SOCRATES, the
space of time is nearly equal to that betwixt, my Lord Bacon and
some late philosophers [Mr. Locke, my Lord Shaftesbury, Dr.
Mandeville, Mr. Hutchinson, Dr. Butler, etc.] in England, who have
begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have engaged
the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public. So true it
is, that however other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us
in some other agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and
philosophy can only be owing to a land of toleration and of
liberty.
Nor ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the
science of man will do less honour to our native country than the
former in natural philosophy, but ought rather to esteem it a
greater glory, upon account of the greater importance of that
science, as well as the necessity it lay under of such a
reformation. For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the
mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it
must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and
qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and
the observation of those particular effects, which result from its
different circumstances and situations. And though we must
endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by
tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all
effects from the simplest and fewest causes, it is still certain we
cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to
discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at
first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.
I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so
earnestly to the explaining the ultimate principles of the soul,
would show himself a great master in that very science of human
nature, which he pretends to explain, or very knowing in what is
naturally satisfactory to the mind of man. For nothing is more
certain, than that despair has almost the same effect upon us with
enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with the
impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself
vanishes. When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of
human reason, we sit down contented, though we be perfectly
satisfied in the main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can
give no reason for our most general and most refined principles,
beside our experience of their reality; which is the reason of the
mere vulgar, and what it required no study at first to have
discovered for the most particular and most extraordinary
phaenomenon. And as this impossibility of making any farther
progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may derive
a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his
ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which
so many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses
on the world for the most certain principles. When this mutual
contentment and satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and
scholar, I know not what more we can require of our
philosophy.
But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles
should be esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture
to affirm, that it is a defect common to it with all the sciences,
and all the arts, in which we can employ ourselves, whether they be
such as are cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or
practised in the shops of the meanest artizans. None of them can go
beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not
founded on that authority. Moral philosophy has, indeed, this
peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that in
collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with
premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself
concerning every particular difficulty which may be. When I am at a
loss to know the effects of one body upon another in any situation,
I need only put them in that situation, and observe what results
from it. But should I endeavour to clear up after the same manner
any doubt in moral philosophy, by placing myself in the same case
with that which I consider, it is evident this reflection and
premeditation would so disturb the operation of my natural
principles, as must render it impossible to form any just
conclusion from the phenomenon. We must therefore glean up our
experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human
life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the
world, by men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their
pleasures. Where experiments of this kind are judiciously collected
and compared, we may hope to establish on them a science which will
not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility
to any other of human comprehension.
