TO SERVE CANADA

A History of the Royal Military College Since the Second World War



Richard A. Preston

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Aerial view of the Royal Military College, 1985

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With a Foreword by
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University of Ottawa Press
Ottawa • Paris

Printed and bound in Canada
ISBN 0-7766-0327-2

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Preston, Richard A., 1910-

To serve Canada : a history of the Royal Military College since the second World War

ISBN 0-7766-0327-2

1. Royal Military College of Canada — History — 20th century. I. Title.

U444.K5L1 1991 355'.0071'171372 C91-090285-2

UNIVERSITÉ D'OTTAWA
UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA

Published by the University of Ottawa Press in cooperation with the Department of National Defence and Canada Communication Group — Publishing, Supply and Services Canada.

Catalogue number: D61-1/1991E

Design: Anita Bergmann
Jacket photograph courtesy of P.D. Mansbridge.
All photographs courtesy of the RMC Archives unless otherwise indicated.

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Foreword

A former Dean of Arts at RMC, Professor George Stanley, in his book *Canada's Soldiers*, chronicles what he calls "the military history of an unmilitary people." Yet the history of Canada since Confederation has been one rich in the military achievements of Canadians in five wars, two of them World Wars. In the conduct of each of those wars, and in the periods before and between them, the role played by the Royal Military College has been significant, even pivotal.

In *Canada's RMC*, Richard Preston recounted the details of the first eighty years of RMC's contribution to Canada, from the college's foundation in 1876 until the period immediately following the Korean War. In *To Serve Canada*, he takes up the story of RMC as one of Canada's three military colleges and examines its development through the uncertain years of the Cold War, through the vagaries of public indifference towards defence, through the evolution of degree-granting status and the moves towards institutional bilingualism, and through the frequent Ottawa-directed re-evaluations of their roles.

Unique tensions inevitably exist in a bipolar military–civilian institution, both components of which seek the same goal – the production of effective military officers – but through the competing imperatives of the simultaneous development of military leadership and academic excellence. There is a potential for friction between professors and officers who must compete for cadets' scarce time, but solidarity unites military and civilian staff members in response to periodic instructions from outside to re-cast the direction in which the military training or academic programs are going.

To Serve Canada covers a period in the country's history when the pinnacle of peacetime military activity (a Permanent Force strength of 120,000 at the beginning of the 1960s) is eroded by a succession of circumstances: by anti-war sentiment spilling over from a Vietnam-conscious United States in the late sixties and the early seventies; by a population increasingly bereft of personal military experience – and hence, perhaps, lacking sympathy for military aims; by the public's diminishing belief in the reality of the threat to world peace, as nuclear stalemate proves effective in deterring world conflict; and by governmental concern over defence spending in the face of growing national indebtedness.

This is a period in which the changing nature of war is parallelled by radical changes to Canada's social fabric, both elements having a profound effect on the way the armed forces must view themselves in the light of their roles and traditions to this point. The rush to an increasingly sophisticated military technology has placed a premium on the production of "technologist" officers to fill the engineering branches, at the same time as traditional military wisdom continues to reserve the highest ranks for those in the fighting classifications. The demand for bilingual officers, in a country where bilingualism is now

an official requirement, adds a new dimension to the training and education of officers who must communicate in order to be able to lead, but whose secondary education is directed by provincial governments little interested in teaching second languages at an age when that is most easily done. The changing societal and legislative norms that demand that women have the opportunity to serve in all walks of life, including on the bridge, in the cockpit, and in the trenches, have compelled the armed forces to make an introspective evaluation of their approach to the profession of arms and of the way their members perceive that profession and practise it.

This book will be valued by scholars of military history as well as by other observers of Canada's social development. Some would have it that the military forces of a country reflect the values that its society wishes to preserve, and few can deny that the motto "Truth, Duty and Valour" provides an admirable credo in which all Canadians can take great pride. By chronicling the development of RMC and its sister colleges from the post-Korea period to the present, Dr Preston has provided a valuable and entertaining addition to the historical literature of this country.

This foreword opened with a reference to the five wars that Canada has fought in in this century, and as this book goes to press the fifth war is only just coming to a close. The Gulf War was a strange war for Canada. The country's contribution was small but it was consequential and militarily effective. No Canadians were killed in it and none were wounded, but the war's significance at this time in Canada's history is striking if only for two reasons. The first is that Canada did indeed go to war again, despite the belief of some that Canada's military role, now and in the future, should be only as a "peacekeeper." The second is that much of the leadership in the war, from the Force Commander down to the most junior officer, was provided by the products of the Canadian military colleges, whose graduates quite clearly are still effectively educated and trained to serve Canada.

General A.J.G.D. de Chastelain
Chief of the Defence Staff

Ottawa
1 April 1991

Preface

The promotion of military professionalism is a more complex problem than professional development in other fields. It includes two elements – training and education – that are somewhat incompatible. Military training must develop an attitude of mind in addition to practical expertise: soldiers, sailors, and fliers must subordinate themselves to the service of the state as formulated by higher authority, even to the point of being prepared to sacrifice their lives. They must be bound psychologically to the good of the whole rather than to their own self-interest. In other words, they must learn to obey without question. Education, however, is necessary if an individual is to develop the ability to reason, a quality that is especially needed in persons of high rank. Military training and education, which must both begin early in a career, thus combine the promotion of military cooperation, expertise, and dedication to service with a conflicting objective – learning to think independently.

In areas like military and marine engineering, where technical competence is a basic requirement, this paradoxical combination of opposites in the process of producing military leaders has long been fairly well understood and achieved. It has not, however, always been realized that a preparation that not only trains and indoctrinates but also fosters the capacity to think is just as necessary for those whose duties in military, naval, and air service are primarily in operations. This need is made more imperative by the fact that the combat officer is often more likely than the technical officer to be appointed to high command, preparation for which must begin early. Hence, those cadets or young officers who, from interest or personal capacity, elect to follow operational rather than technical careers, including many who are less capable of the mathematical and scientific skills needed in a technological education, must be developed intellectually as well as practically and ideologically. The formative programs for this purpose may be built on various academic disciplines. Mathematics or the sciences are most frequently preferred, but other disciplines that appear to have less direct military relevance or seem liable to foster a critical rather than conforming mind may also be appropriate. In many military colleges and academies,* however, sound academic criteria have often been endangered by the priority given to military training and to the indoctrination of young officers.

Before 1939, and briefly after its reopening in 1948, the primary function of the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) was to produce militia officers with little or no legal obligation to career service. Since it had to prepare a majority of its graduates for university degree courses and civilian careers, as well as for severely competitive entry into British technical corps, the prewar college had had more success in maintaining the quality of

*Americans use "academy" to mean a pre-commissioning training institution, where the British use either "academy" or "college."

the academic elements in its curriculum than was usual in other military colleges.

My earlier volume, *Canada's RMC: A History of the Royal Military College*, published in 1969 by the Royal Military College Club and the University of Toronto Press, was the first full account of RMC's history to appear in print. It told the college's story from its foundation in 1876 to its closure in 1942 during the Second World War, and then from its reopening in 1948 to the year 1959, when the Ontario legislature passed "An Act Respecting the Royal Military College of Canada" that conferred on RMC the power to grant academic degrees. The central theme of *Canada's RMC* was the historical basis of those academic qualities that justified the conferring of the degree-granting power.

Because pertinent records were not then available, the period from 1948 to 1959 was sketched only briefly in that book. Furthermore, by 1959 the new RMC had two features that sharply distinguished it from the old. First, it had been formally re-established in 1948 as one of two (later three) tri-service institutions to serve all three of Canada's forces (which it had actually done informally before 1942). Second, as was confirmed by the creation of the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP) shortly after the reopening, it had become primarily, though not exclusively, devoted to the production of regular rather than reserve officers.* These two innovations called for a new study that would relate them to the earlier development of the college.

On 30 July 1981, when the first printing of *Canada's RMC* was running low in stock, Brigadier-General John Stewart, commandant at that time, arranged for a second printing as a Regimental Institute project. At the same time he asked me to write another book that would tell the story of the postwar RMC. This book, *To Serve Canada*, is not the second of a two-volume history of the college but a completely new look at RMC's history, with particular attention to the period since the Second World War.

The theme in this new history is different from that of *Canada's RMC*. It studies the problem of retaining and promoting the college's expertise in developing military professionalism despite the new stresses from academic requirements imposed by accelerating technologies and by the acquisition of degree-granting powers. It also examines another set of complications caused by several new factors: the existence of two sister colleges, each with its distinctive composition and aspirations; the unification of the Canadian Forces; programs of institutional bilingualism and biculturalism designed to preserve national unity; a social revolution that included youth and women's movements; and measures to extend RMC's offerings to serving personnel. Some of these innovations are especially important in this story because they have had a direct impact on the functioning of the Cadet Wing (formerly the Battalion of Gentlemen Cadets), the core of RMC's military training system, and therefore on its traditional method of developing professionalism.

Stress on military professionalism in RMC was not new in 1948. From its foundation, RMC graduates had competed for a limited number of commissions in the British Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery. For over half a century a number had also become career officers in the Canadian Militia (Permanent Force), in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and, on a smaller scale, in the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force. Thus, in 1939, seventeen of the seventy-two permanent force Royal Canadian Artillery officers were RMC ex-cadets. (This was, however, probably a higher proportion than in any other branch or arm.) The success of RMC graduates in British technical corps and in the Canadian regular forces amply demonstrated the professional

*Cadets under the Regular Officer Training Plan receive a four-year education at public expense in either a services college or a university and are obliged to serve for a comparable period in one of the armed forces. Cadets under the Reserve Entry Training Plan pay fees, though most of them have scholarships, and can enter a civilian career on graduation as long as they serve for a comparable time in a reserve force.

quality of RMC's training and education. The ultimate tests came in the two world wars when RMC graduates, along with Canadian Permanent Force and Militia officers (and in the first war also along with officers and non-commissioned officers borrowed from the British army), provided a basis of military expertise for Canadian forces that were largely recruited from civilian life for the duration of the war. The record of Canada's contribution in both of those wars speaks for itself. It was founded, in part, on RMC's achievement in fostering military professionalism among its graduates.

It is now nearly forty years since the establishment of the new RMC. Many of the problems mentioned above have come to a head only within the past decade or so. Nevertheless, it is time to attempt to evaluate the college's postwar evolution and accomplishments. Lacking the supreme test of a major war, any assessment can only be tentative and inconclusive, for the circumstances of peacetime soldiering differ from those of war when other qualities move men to the top. Even so, it is possible to look at the record of RMC's postwar graduates as evidence of the success of the new structure. Ex-cadets of both prewar and postwar generations fought in Korea, winning a total of sixteen decorations, three OBEs, three MBEs, one DSC, and eight MCs; and four of these MCs went to postwar graduates who had gone straight from the classroom to war. Citations for some of the MCs particularly stressed qualities of leadership. This suggests that, in these cases at least, the college had given an adequate psychological preparation for military operations.

In peacetime soldiering, yardsticks for measuring the success of an officer-production program lack certainty. One of the more suggestive is the success of graduates in rising to high rank. The record of the new RMC can be compared with earlier experience. In 1914, neither of the two Canadian major-generals in the permanent force were ex-cadets, and out of eighteen colonels only five were from RMC, two who had graduated and three who had not. In 1939, three of eight major-generals, six of fifteen temporary brigadiers, and six of forty colonels were ex-cadets. These relatively low RMC numbers, especially among colonels, may be explained in part by Canada's militia tradition: RMC's professional contribution did not become really effective until the war began.

By way of contrast, it should be noted that on 30 June 1987 the *Canadian Forces' List* showed that when there were 2726 RMC graduates listed in the Canadian Forces,

Cadets and staff form a maple leaf on the square, 1989.





Graduation parade, 1970

the only general, three lieutenant-generals out of eight, ten major-generals out of twenty-seven, thirty brigadier-generals out of seventy-six, and 107 colonels out of 307 were graduates of the Canadian Services Colleges (CSCs), now Canadian Military Colleges (CMCs). And these figures may not tell the full story: inclusion of the letters "rmc" in the *Canadian Forces' List* occurs only when the individual supplies it. In that same year all the principal commands in the Canadian Armed Forces, with the exception of CF Europe, were held by CMC graduates, as were 43 per cent of the higher appointments in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) and throughout the forces. General Fred Sharp, a 1938 RMC graduate, had been one of the first chiefs of the Defence Staff after the unification of the Canadian Forces. Since the time when postwar graduates could be expected to have reached the top, three out of the four officers appointed as chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) – General Ramsey Withers, General Paul D. Manson, and General A.J.G.D. de Chastelain – have been ex-cadets.

The quality of RMC's education can also be measured by the success of its graduates in non-military occupations, even though, unlike in the old RMC, only the first three classes, and a few recruits in the late 1960s and 1970s, entered on the Reserve Entry Training Plan (RETP) which allowed them to go directly to a civilian career. Many others, however, took up a second career after their military service, and their success there should be noticed. Graduates of the new RMC can be found in as wide a variety of important civilian positions as were held by their predecessors who graduated before 1939. R.V. Hession became president of Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, deputy minister of supply and services, chairman of the Royal Canadian Mint, and deputy receiver general. A former CDS, Ramsey Withers, is now deputy minister of transport, and several other ex-cadets have become deputy ministers in provincial governments. Others have succeeded in various parts of the public service, including in the Department of External Affairs. Many more have flourished in large corporations and small business enterprises, even though they have come from a wider cross-section of Canadian society than their predecessors in the old RMC and so have fewer personal and family contacts on which to base a business career. Several have entered the academic profession in universities. It is also interesting that a number of postwar graduates have elected to take up medical education and have become medical officers in

the services. Several have become clergymen, both Catholic and Protestant.

Another indication of success is the retention rate of officers, especially after the termination of their period of obligatory service but also in later career. The Canadian Military Colleges, and RMC in particular, did well in this respect in the 1970s and 1980s by comparison with other sources of officers. On occasion, however, there was complaint about the RMC product – about a lack of real military interest on the part of some graduates. That defect, created in part by the ROTP system that puts emphasis on a relatively cheap academic education rather than on dedication to a military career, serves to demonstrate, by contrast, the degree of success achieved by others. In another dimension, the high quality of RMC's technical education led some graduates to seek more profitable civilian jobs. Because of this criticism and also for financial reasons, there has been much discussion of the cost-effectiveness of the Canadian Military Colleges as against a supposedly cheaper program of producing officers by subsidization through civilian universities. RMC's greater rate of retention was one argument in its favour, and was undoubtedly a result of its success in stimulating military professionalism.

To Serve Canada provides an understanding of the problems in professional military development, solutions for which are vital to the maintenance of an effective Canadian defence. Because the problem of military education, as contrasted with military training and apprenticeship, which runs through the history of the college, is also important in officer-production systems everywhere, the introduction to this book, entitled "Tradition and Change," analyses other Western experience in this field.

Those readers whose interest is solely in the history of the Royal Military College of Canada and in its contribution to Canadian defence may therefore prefer to pass directly to chapter 1, which briefly retells the history of the old RMC and the establishment of the new college in 1948.

The main references used in preparing this book can be found in the Notes. A full list of sources will be deposited in the Massey Library at RMC. Ranks cited in the text refer to the appropriate time; those given in the biographical footnotes are the highest attained.

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Acknowledgments

A number of individuals contributed to the preparation of this book by providing encouragement, support, and help. Major-General John A. Stewart, Major-General Frank Norman, Brigadier-General Walter Niemy, and Commodore Edward Murray, who were the RMC commandants while it was in preparation, all regarded a book on the history of the college since the Second World War to be essential for a better understanding of its problems and accomplishments. An ad hoc committee chaired by Dr D.M. Schurman, head of the Department of History at RMC, approved the project. Dr W.A.B. Douglas, director of history at National Defence Headquarters, proposed that this history be published by his directorate.

During academic sessions, Duke University provided me with office space as an Emeritus Professor; and during summer vacations the RMC history department gave me use of an office as honorary professor. One summer, when that space was not available, Lieutenant-Colonel D.A. Lefroy, head of the Department of Military Leadership and Management, filled the breach. Without those facilities my task would have been much more complicated.

Some of the costs of preparing a typescript were borne by modest grants from the Duke University Research Council. At a later stage, then Lieutenant-Colonel A.H.C. Smith, RMC's director of administration, arranged for a DND contract that partially covered other expenses.

At the outset Barbara Wilson of the National Archives of Canada and Dean William Rodney of the Royal Roads Military College made available a preliminary list of documentary sources that had been prepared for a history of Royal Roads. Many of those sources had relevance also for RMC. I am also indebted to Dr Keith Crouch, chief librarian, Major Alphee Bake, Mr Benoit Cameron, and Suzanne Burt of the Massey Library at RMC and to many reference librarians and others in the Perkins Library at Duke. Dr Steve Harris at the Directorate of History, DND, Captain P. Fortier, the RMC registrar, and Mr Logie Macdonald, the associate registrar, and their staffs gave me guidance and access to records in their custody. Captain J.R. McKenzie, curator of the RMC Museum, provided many of the illustrations reproduced in this book. Professor J.E. Pike and Lieutenant-Colonel P. Nation answered many questions, drawing on their vast knowledge.

Lieutenant-Colonel Don W. Strong, executive director of the Royal Military College Club, and his secretaries Joy Fehr and Linda McGinley, were especially helpful in providing information about ex-cadets, as was Brigadier-General R.T. Bennett as well. Lieutenant-Colonel R.C. Coleman (no. 7272) and Major G. Croutier of DND's Media Production researched biographical information for two civilian members of the Canadian Services College Advisory Board.

The Directorate of Professional Education and Development of DND provided access to the minutes of Advisory Board meetings and of sessions of the General and the Academic (Educational) councils.

Several individuals lent me documents or supplied information that supplemented those in official repositories. The most substantial collection was Brigadier-

General W.K. Lye's file of Miscellaneous RMC letters. Dr David Baird, Principal John Dacey, Dr W.F. Furter, Dr Yvan Gagnon, Rear-Admiral W.M. Landymore, Rear-Admiral D.W. Piers, Principal John Plant, and Major-General George Spencer also provided papers. Major-General John Stewart gave me access to a diary he kept during his term as commandant. Captain M.D. Fabro (no. 13868) granted me permission to reprint the cartoon, "Putting the 'M' back in RMC," he had published in the cadet magazine *The Arch*.

Information to set the history of Canada's RMC in perspective was provided by discussions with Dr David Chandler, professor of history at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst; Principal F.R. Hartley of the Royal Military College of Science, Shrivenham; Sir Michael Howard of Oriel College, Oxford; Dr Peter Dennis, formerly of RMC, Kingston, and now at the Australian Defence Force Academy; Richard Alexander, deputy director of studies, and Evan L. Davies, head of the Department of Strategic Studies and Internal Affairs at the Royal Naval College, Dartmouth; Commander P.J. Jewell, deputy dean, Commander M.J. Kitchin, director of undergraduate studies, and Lieutenant-Commander P.J. Payton, college historian, of the Royal Naval Engineering College, Manadon; Dr Geoffrey Till of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich; and many members of the American services who had knowledge of the United States Military Academy, West Point, the United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, and the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs. Commodore Darroch N. Macgillivray of the Canadian Defence Liaison Staff in London facilitated arrangements for visits to the British naval colleges. C.A.M. Jones, director of studies at Dartmouth, and Captain G.C. George, dean at Manadon, facilitated my visits to those colleges. Conversations with RMC faculty members during my summer sojourns in Kingston contributed to a better understanding of developments there, especially after my tenure as professor ended.

My colleague at Duke, Dr Alex Roland, read the first rough draft of each chapter as it appeared and made many valuable suggestions. Parts or all of the early drafts were also read by Lieutenant-General W.A.B. Anderson, Faith Avis, Dr and Mrs Stuart Barton, Air-Commodore L.J. Birchall, Air-Vice-Marshal D.A.R. Bradshaw, Dr Pierre Bussières, Dr John R. Dacey, General A.J.G.D. de Chastelain, Captain (N) P. Fortier, R.B. Hamel, Commodore W.P. Hayes, Dr Barry Hunt, Brigadier-General W.K. Lye, Commodore Edward Murray, Lieutenant-Colonel P. Nation, Brigadier-General W. Niemy, Major-General Frank J. Norman, Rear-Admiral D.W. Piers, Major-General Roger Rowley, Major-General George Spencer, Brigadier-General W.W. Turner, and Major-General John A. Stewart. Dr W.A.B. Douglas, Dr Norman Hillmer, Dr Roger Sarty, and Brigadier-General R.T. Bennett all read later versions and provided extra information that saved me from many errors. The final version and the opinions expressed in this book are my own.

Gordon Smith, a research assistant provided by a federal government student employment scheme, checked references from the minutes of RMC's Faculty Council and Faculty Board during one summer. Mrs D. Eskritt, the RMC commandant's secretary, gave me valuable assistance in locating individuals. R.B. Hamel, second-language coordinator at RMC, took charge of the preparation and circulation of various drafts to readers.

I am indebted for secretarial help to Grace Guyer of Duke's Department of History, Karen Brown of RMC, and particularly to Vivian Jackson of Duke, who patiently typed the whole manuscript from very rough drafts. At National Defence Headquarters Annie Rainville and her staff transcribed the text on to a word-processing program. David Dunkley prepared the index, and Jennifer Wilson provided invaluable assistance in the preparation of the manuscript for publication. Finally, I am once again especially privileged to have had Rosemary Shipton as my editor.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Adm	Admiral
ADM(Per)	Assistant Deputy Minister for Personnel
AFHQ	Air Force Headquarters
A/M	Air Marshal
B&B	Bilingual and Bicultural; Bilingualism and Biculturalism
B&B Admin	Bilingual and Bicultural Administration
BOTC	Basic Officer Training Course
BSM	Battalion Sergeant Major
CAS	Chief of the Air Staff
CD	The Canadian Forces' Decoration
CDEE	Canadian Defence Educational Establishments; also Commander, CDEE
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CEF	Canadian Expeditionary Force
CEGEP	Collèges d'enseignement général et professionnel
CF	Canadian Forces
CFHQ	Canadian Forces Headquarters
CFMC	Canadian Forces Military College
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CinC	Commander-in-Chief
CMBG	Canadian Mobile Brigade Group
CMC	Canadian Military College
CMR	Collège militaire royal
CO	Commanding Officer
COTC	Canadian Officer Training Corps
CNP	Chief of Naval Personnel
CNS	Chief of the Naval Staff
CP	Chief of Personnel
CPD	Chief of Personnel Development
CRAD	Chief of Research and Development
CSC	Canadian Services College
CWC	Cadet Wing Commander
DATES	Director (or Directorate), Administration, Training, and Education
DGITP	Director-General, Individual Training Programs
DGMT	Director-General of Military Training
DGRET	Director-General, Recruiting, Education, and Training
DHist.	Director (or Directorate) of History [DND]
DND	Department of National Defence
DNE	Director, Naval Education
DPED	Director (or Directorate), Professional Education and Development
DRB	Defence Research Board
DROTP	Director, Regular Officer Training Plan
DSC	Distinguished Service Cross
DSO	Distinguished Service Order
GOC	General Officer Commanding
GSO1	General Staff Officer, Grade 1
HQ	Headquarters
JCSC	Joint Canadian Services Colleges Committee
JSUC	Joint Services Universities Committee
JSUCC	Joint Services Universities Coordinating Committee
JUMAC	Joint Universities and Military Advisory Committee
MARCOM	Maritime Command
MBE	Order of the British Empire, Member
MC	Military Cross
MLM	Department of Military Leadership and Management
(N)	Navy (designating a naval rank when used with lieutenant or captain)

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NORAD	North American Air Defence Command
NRC	National Research Council
OBE	Order of the British Empire, officer
OCP or OCTP	Officer Candidate Program, or Officer Candidate Training Program
ODB	Officer Development Board
PMC	Personnel Members Committee
POW	Prisoner of War
PPCLI	Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
PWOR	Princess of Wales's Own Regiment
QC	Queen's Counsel
QMG	Quartermaster General
QR&O	Queen's Regulations and Orders
RCA	Royal Canadian Artillery
RCAC	Royal Canadian Armoured Corps
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCCS	Royal Canadian Corps of Signals
RCE	Royal Canadian Engineers
RCEME	Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
RCHA	Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
RCIC	Royal Canadian Infantry Corps
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
RCNC	Royal Canadian Naval College
RCR	Royal Canadian Regiment
RE	Reserve Entry
RETP	Reserve Entry Training Plan
RETP(W)	Reserve Entry Training Plan, Serving Women
RMC	Royal Military College of Canada
RN	Royal Navy
RNCC	Royal Naval College of Canada
ROTP	Regular Officer Training Plan
ROTP(W)	Regular Officer Training Plan, Serving Women
RR	Royal Roads Services (or Military) College
RRMC	Royal Roads Military College
RSM	Regimental Sergeant-Major
RUTP	Reserves University Training Plan (Air Force)
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SLT	Second Language Training
UNTD	University Naval Training Division
USAFA	United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs
USMA	United States Military Academy, West Point
USNA	United States Naval Academy, Annapolis
UTPM	University Training Plan, Men
UTPM(W)	University Training Plan, Serving Women
UTPO	University Training Plan, Officers
UTPO(W)	University Training Plan, Women Officers

Tradition and Change in Military Education

Every country faces similar problems in training officers, and each responds to these problems in ways that are appropriate to its national history and situation. How, then, have other countries coped with the challenges that faced the Royal Military College of Canada? How have they accommodated the academic and military elements in their mandate, and how have they reacted to the social, technological, and other changes that have imposed new requirements on the military profession?

Colleges or academies that prepared young men for immediate commissioning in armed forces emerged in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During the course of the nineteenth century they became a preferred mode of educating officers in many countries, but there were often other routes to a commission as well: in a regiment or fighting ship, in special training units and ships, and in establishments that provided short courses. All these other routes were varieties of apprenticeship. It was not until after the Second World War that Michael Lewis, Samuel Huntington, and Morris Janowitz* established convincingly what the military had known for over half a century through their war and staff colleges and their military academies – that a naval or military career is a profession with basic characteristics like other professions. It is safe to say that since 1945 the significance of a military education has been much better understood.[1]

Huntington's definition of the military as a profession laid down principles for application in military academies.[2] The characteristics he cited were, first, expertise based on historical understanding rather than on rote learning; second, corporate sentiment (especially important for effective cooperation in the military); and, third, social responsibility. Military academies had come to be the preferred mode of producing professional officers, he said, because they could provide not only the academic education essential to military expertise but also the environment most suitable for ensuring corporate sentiment and social responsibility.[3]

Like all other professionals, the military claim exclusive control of the skills of their craft. They act collectively to conceal internal conflict, but they can preserve public confidence only by responsible behaviour – by social responsibility.[4] In recent years, many military colleges have shed much of the cadet's routine training in skills in favour of academic education and professional development. They often leave military training (in Canada, classification training) to the summer months, away from the academy, or to early commissioned service. Hence, academies that emphasize military training

*Professor Michael Lewis, Royal Naval College, Greenwich; Samuel P. Huntington, professor of government and director of the Center for International Studies, Harvard University; and Morris Janowitz, professor of sociology, University of Chicago, and founding chairman of the Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.

or detailed military subject matter have been called "trade schools."[5] By contrast, those that offer a predominantly educational curriculum, even though it is all at the undergraduate level, can properly claim to be professional schools.

Military training and indoctrination is essential in officer production. "Obedience," Admiral Mahan once said, "is the cement of the structure . . . it is the life-blood of the organism."[6] To foster obedience, military academies pay much more attention to indoctrination and discipline than cadet training systems in the universities. Military academies stress motivation, dedication, loyalty, character, and leadership. Professional schools of religion preach service and social responsibility, but the military profession, more than the church, assumes the possibility of laying down life itself in the cause of duty.[7] Some military academies that overemphasize military virtues at the expense of academic elements have been labelled "seminary-academies."[8] Blind obedience, as Mahan goes on to show, can be self-defeating. It must be qualified by individual judgment, and individual judgment is promoted by education.

To inculcate conformity to accepted standards, military colleges mould character and shape minds by a wide variety of means. They segregate cadets, and especially new recruits, from civilian society. Their courses are longer than training courses. Military colleges are essential where there is no traditional military class on which to draw. They impose rites of initiation and passage. They often have distinctive, sometimes traditional, uniforms. They foster pride in their institutions and in the armed forces and country they serve. They hero-worship. They draft codes of conduct, teach them by precepts, catchphrases, and slogans, and enforce them by routine discipline and punishment. In so doing they exercise an abnormal control over individual behaviour. They also identify the individual cadet closely with his college, its sports, and his service. They expose him to experienced veterans. They use drill not merely to sharpen attention or provide a spectacle, but for the more subtle psychological effect it has on the individual – to make him a willing and cooperative participant in an effective whole.* They give experience in command, in the exercise of discipline and authority, and in the managing of the interior economy of a military unit, which is quite different from anything in the outside world. Finally, they encourage self-confident belief in a military elite and in the superiority of the military spirit.

Although indoctrination and training are essential elements in academy life, the primary *raison d'être* of the institution is academic preparation for a professional military career. Before commissioned military officers were generally acknowledged as a distinct profession, it was the officers of the technical corps who were known as "professional officers," thus coupling them with civilian professional engineers. Significantly, the first military academies to become permanent were set up to provide the necessary academic foundation for these professional officers of the technical corps. In several countries, military colleges were the first engineering schools of any kind. They did not long retain their monopoly in producing professional engineers, and in time they also lost their leadership in technological education. But because of technical necessity stemming from the development of weapons and their use, they retained mathematical, scientific, and technological courses. For technical officers, a military education must necessarily be founded on academic sciences.

Sometimes these same military academies also produced officers for the non-technical combat arms – the cavalry and the infantry – and their curricula included

*The American historian W.H. McNeill noted this effect of drill in his classic book, *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces, and Society since AD 1000* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1982), 254. Some individuals are alienated by drill, however, and excessive amounts may demotivate young men of high intelligence and be counterproductive.

elementary mathematics. Even where the combat arms had their own pre-commissioning institutions, the curricula usually had a mathematical basis because it was believed to be relevant not only to tactics, field fortification, gunnery, and navigation, but also the best means of developing precise, logical thought patterns. All academies, especially those which took boys at an earlier age, also included some general education. Indeed, from the beginning, many naval training colleges, while placing primary emphasis on seamanship and navigation, mingled general and professional education. By the twentieth century a basic requirement of general education pertained everywhere, either for admission or in further courses necessary for graduation.

The primacy given to military training and indoctrination in many of the academies often undermined their standards in general education, and sometimes in technical education as well. Thus a series of British royal commissions and other investigations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries severely criticized the failure of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, to maintain academic standards. They held that this lowered military proficiency. The commissioners usually contrasted Sandhurst, the cavalry and infantry school, unfavourably with the engineering college, the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich; but at times that academy did not escape unscathed. Then, when the two institutions were amalgamated as the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, after the Second World War, the liberal arts courses at RMA Woolwich were found to have been superior to those at RMC Sandhurst, where primacy had been given to practical military training. Technical officers in Britain had thus been more broadly educated than, and were often intellectually superior to, those whose career was more closely related to combat.

It was not only in Britain that academic standards among combat officers were low. Republican France commissioned less on the basis of social position and wealth than in Britain, but, although academic standards were enforced by competitive examinations, the French also promoted on other considerations such as horsemanship. Prussia had prescribed academic qualifications for commissioning since 1808 and had a structure of junior cadet schools with examination hurdles and rigorous instruction. There were high academic qualifications for membership on the General Staff, but preference was also given to aristocratic birth in commissioning and promotion. When bourgeois candidates penetrated the Prussian officer corps, they aped the manners of their aristocratic fellow officers.

The American academies were sometimes accused of nourishing a pseudo-aristocratic elite of the sword like those in the Old World, but the American practice of preparing line and deck officers in the same academies as officers destined for technical duties, along with the prevailing American scorn for Old World class distinctions, helped check this trend and sheltered academic standards. Even so, when a new approach to military professionalism in the 1920s led to a revival of the humanities and social science courses at the United States Naval Academy (where they had declined since its early years), the midshipmen called them "bull" and slighted them in favour of seamanship and the sciences.[9]

As a consequence of social privilege, then, or of overemphasis on motivation and training, the military has too often assumed that intellectual effort and a general education are secondary in the production of officers, especially of those officers who do the actual fighting. Educational curricula and standards have consequently often received short shrift. In some quarters, general education is still assumed to be of lesser relevance. Addressing a British commission investigating military education, a speaker expressed the belief that, since some officer cadets prefer to get on with practical soldiering as soon as possible, general education should be kept to a minimum.[10]

One other circumstance impeded academic development. Before technology-inspired changes affected arm-

ies and navies in the twentieth century, military science only inadequately appreciated their significance. Five years after Ivan Bloch had published his prescient forecast of the effect of greater fire-power on the conduct of future wars, a popular academic historian, surveying the development of military science in the century just past, revealed the extent of contemporary unawareness of the coming danger when he made no mention of the vast changes that technology had already brought in war.[11] Surprisingly, most professional officers and general staffs also failed to realize how much warfare had been altered by weapons development until they learned from bitter experience in 1914–18. Even after the First World War, only a few lone prophets or practitioners, including Basil Lidell Hart, General J.F.C. Fuller, Charles de Gaulle, and General Heinz Guderian, and then in a partial and distinctly flawed manner, appreciated that the introduction of tanks and aircraft meant a return of campaign mobility.

After the Second World War, the American General James Gavin, one of the most articulate exploiters of greater mobility in operations, discussed the postwar introduction of intercontinental nuclear missiles in a chapter entitled "The Most Significant Event of Our Time." Arguing that the traditional military virtues are still paramount in officer training, he said that the "quantum jump" in warfare was mobility. He thus appears to have overlooked what was, when he wrote, the revolutionary effect of nuclear missiles and the vastly increased destruction now possible at a distance.[12] Even with the most perceptive of military thinkers, then, full comprehension may lag behind technical change. Consequently, as a legislator told the Howard-English Commission, a solution for the problems that technological change brings to military education is always likely to be controversial.[13]

Gavin was correct when he said that technology has not changed the qualities needed for leadership; but what he failed to add is that technology has changed the military leader's environment in at least four ways. It has made available much more complex and infinitely more destructive weapons; it requires personnel with more complicated skills; it has provided a more elaborate communications system that centralizes control of the battle; and, because of the potentially devastating effects of deterrent strategies with nuclear weapons, it has made necessary a closer relationship between the military command and the political leadership. All these elements are quite different from what prevailed, even in the most advanced countries, at the beginning of this century. Consequently, there is a professional requirement for greater competence, more specialization, and better teamwork.

Hockey: RMC vs USMA, Kingston, 1990

Technological needs have also increased the educational levels and range of competence required of enlisted men. Educated persons can be more difficult to lead, but the results are better. Technology has strength-

ened the need for the officer to vary his leadership to fit new conditions. Leadership can still be either authoritarian or motivational, but effective leaders now use both kinds together. The basic task is unchanged – to organize, focus, and motivate people – but the qualities of an effective leader have become more elusive, more psychological, and perhaps more mystical. A recent academic study of leadership argued that the problem of combining academic standards and traditional military indoctrination can be "explosive."[14] Successfully managed, it can also be extremely effective.

The Soviet military faces these same problems. The Soviet army assumes that, along with the size of forces, equipment, and the ability of personnel to handle it, the determining factors in conflict are a combat spirit and military tradition; consequently, it puts considerable stress in its officer production on military training and motivation.[15] However, there are some signs of a different approach. Major-General G.I. Pokrovskii, a distinguished Russian physicist and engineer, maintained in 1959 in his book, *Science and Technology in Contemporary War*, that "to conduct military operations successfully a well-prepared, technologically literate, [as well as] physically tough, fighter is needed," yet in the light of contemporary development in military affairs, military pedagogy requires "constant and searching creative development."

Pokrovskii added that "each individual military man" needs a correct understanding of the laws of physics and mathematics, rather than a mere rote memorization, and also of the logical method of mathematical analysis, of proof, and of the theory of probability, of the use of calculating machines, of computers, and of linear programming. He said that physics unites quantitative mathematical methods with experimental research and is the foundation of technology for military affairs and new means of combat. He noted that mechanics, long used for the solution of artillery problems, has now been applied to the conquest of outer space. He also instanced as useful for military personnel, gas dynamics, hydrodynamics, atomic energy, heat resistance in materials, chemistry, and the biological sciences.

Pokrovskii stressed that modern technology has greatly increased the need for scientific and technical education in Soviet military academies. He asserted that "the requirements levied on man grow in proportion to the growth of technology," but concluded, "no matter how much technology has developed, and no matter how much it has facilitated the solution of combat missions, it does under no condition lead to a reduction of the requirements, both physical and moral, of man in war."[16] Such a broad spectrum of scientific studies, although required by modern technology across a whole officer corps, obviously could not apply to each individual.

Like many in the Western world, Pokrovskii may have been overreacting to Sputnik. He was misleading in his scant reference to another well-known aspect of Soviet officer production – the political propaganda that is used to stiffen military indoctrination. But what was more serious was that, like many of his Western counterparts, Pokrovskii also failed to notice some effects of technological advance and politico-social change. Professional soldiers are primarily concerned with the use of arms, and therefore with their development. But technology can alter, and indeed has to some extent already altered, the way in which military force must be used to resolve international problems. An early popular misconception was that the possibility of universal catastrophe by nuclear power would mean the eventual end of the use of force in war and the introduction of a new international order to be maintained by international constabulary forces. That dream has long faded, but, as several scholars have argued, military force has become an increasingly doubtful tool for use in some aspects of international relations. The distinguished French philosopher Raymond Aron conceived a sophisticated version of this idea – that technology has brought the substitution of crises for wars between the superpowers.[17]

Cadet Squadron Officer Ramsey M. Withers, RMC, 1952

General R.M. Withers, CMM, CD, CDS, 1980–3

Thus, while it is true that wars have actually become more numerous since the discovery of the way in which nuclear fission and fusion can be employed, total global conflict was held off. It has been prevented by military power, but that power has been largely exerted not in operations or by concerted international deterrence, but by the more dangerous device of mutual deterrence. National military forces, using the highest possible application of technology, remained an indispensable mainstay of the international state system, but they are now generally applied differently, notwithstanding the wars in Vietnam, the Falkland Islands, and Afghanistan.

The functioning of deterrence to prevent war, and also of international peacekeeping forces to contain crises and ease tensions among smaller powers that are less restricted than the superpowers in their proclivity to resort to war, requires the maintenance of military forces with traditional skills and qualities as well as with technical competence. These instruments cannot be fully understood and satisfactorily applied by an officer corps trained and educated only to use the most effective means of destruction available. At the same time, an exclusively scientific foundation for all officers on Pokrovskii's model would restrict the possibility of sound military accomplishment by the professional cadre operating as a whole. Therefore, although modern military education must seek to preserve the old military virtues – courage, loyalty, and obedience – and must add the skills and knowledge required by the new technology, it must also lay basic foundations for broad knowledge and wisdom. Those foundations can best be derived from a general education including social and humanistic studies. Accordingly, military education in the West has tended to become more like education in civilian universities, not merely in its content of science and technology, where it was always similar, but also in the addition of non-scientific studies to give broader understanding.

Another major factor that has reinforced this development in the content of academy education is the changing relation of the military profession to the society it serves. The soldier in the ranks, whether a conscript or a volunteer, is no longer an uneducated socio-economic misfit. He is drawn from society at large. Although always subject to the possibility of an emergency during long periods of peace, he often resides in a civilian community rather than on a remote military base. The tasks he performs appear to be similar to those of his civilian neighbours. He may even work on an eight-hour basis, but subject to overtime without extra pay and to posting wherever and whenever the service orders. "Civilianization" of this kind means more than using civilians to perform duties once undertaken by military personnel; and it has affected commissioned ranks because officers are no longer drawn exclusively from an aristocratic elite. Retaining their distinctiveness, they must now earn their commissions by meeting academic as well as military criteria. They have more contact with their civilian counterparts, and they must be able to deal with them on terms of equality to maintain the prestige of their profession.

Professional military education is following trends observable in other professions. Although occupational specialization has become more common at the undergraduate level in all fields (as it already had earlier in military academies), the better liberal arts colleges, as well as the professional graduate schools, increasingly recognize the need to prepare their students "to act intelligently in the broader contexts of life as in their own work."[18] But Edward Katzenbach, a former US assistant secretary of defense, in a foreword to the book from which this quotation is taken, William Simons's *Liberal Education in the Service Academies*, said that the modern military officer must have an even more basic general education than that deemed necessary in the other professions.[19] This opinion was substantiated by Oxford professor Sir Michael Howard, when he co-chaired the commission to investigate military education in Britain

in the early 1970s. He stressed "the need for character formation and character training to turn the boy into a man and the man into a leader, the need for technical training to make him handle the growing complexity of technological tools which will be at his disposal during this career, and third, and not least, the intellectual and moral education of the young officer as a whole, *the stretching of his mind*." The Howard-English Commission recommended the establishment of a military university, but it was not implemented because of cost.[20]

General Andrew Goodpaster, the former American commander-in-chief of US forces and supreme allied commander, Europe (SACEUR), who was recalled to service to take charge of West Point after it was wracked by cheating scandals among cadets, explained the reason for broader and more intellectual studies for modern officers: "If our military establishment is to fulfill its assigned role and do so in ways acceptable to the parent society, it must meet demanding standards of performance. Extensive programs of precise, coordinated training and education in a wide range of studies are needed. Individual competence must be developed in many subject areas." He said that military personnel share the same educational needs as the civilian community in many areas, and he proposed that these studies should be "civilian-based."[21]

Goodpaster was referring here to military education over the whole range of military service. He was not challenging the West Point practice of using service personnel to instruct cadets in many fields of study, even in those that are obviously "shared" with the civilian community. "Shared" academy studies include not only the sciences, but also the social sciences and humanities, because they foster flexibility of mind and a capacity to grasp ideas. This is a facility the military profession needs as much as, or more than, any other profession. To quote William Simons: "Among military officers of today (and certainly of tomorrow) creative thought, social conscience, and broad vision are traits perhaps even more necessary than among leaders in other professions." Simons held that what was required was a "liberal education" – one that paved the way for a better understanding of the complexities of human problems.[22]

These trends in military education have been discussed more in the United States than in many other countries. They are often seen by contemporaries merely as a form of civilianization, with a convergence of the functioning and performance of the military with their civilian counterparts, and with greater interdependence and assimilation in society as a whole.[23] Similar trends have occurred in the relations between the military and civilian societies in all democratic states.*

From the military point of view, civilianization often connotes a tendency to apply civilian standards of work to its very different conditions and service. In Canada, as elsewhere, civilianization may seem to the military to weaken military professionalism and its capacity to carry out effectively its role as protector of society. For some service personnel, a liberal education appears to be incompatible with their concept of military training and duty, especially in the combat arms and the lower commissioned ranks. For these people, general education detracts from what they believe to be the important parts of preparation for the military profession. They would

Cadet Wing Commander Paul D. Manson, CMM, CD, RMC, 1956 (Photo courtesy of General Manson)

General P.D. Manson, CDS, 1986–9 (Photo courtesy of General Manson)

*David R. Segal argued that this convergence of military and civilian society does not necessarily mean interdependence, and that the ending of the draft in the United States would possibly cause the military to develop its own distinctiveness by the isolation of its personnel. "Convergence, Isomorphism, and Interdependence at the Civil-Military Interface," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 2, 2 (fall 1974): 157–72.

Conflict of opinion on this issue was a continuance of a difference of opinion between Huntington and Janowitz about the proper role of the military in a democratic society. Huntington held that the military should be politically neutral and isolated from society. Janowitz believed that the military was becoming, and should become, integrated with society. Arthur D. Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civil Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 2, 1 (spring 1974): 57–72.

prefer more military training and professional indoctrination.

Lieutenant-General Sidney B. Berry, superintendent of West Point, speaking about USMA in 1976 at RMC's Centennial Symposium of Military Education, placed primary emphasis not on the academy's contribution in education, but on its traditional function to "strengthen, develop, and nourish in the cadets those values, attitudes, and qualities that prepare its graduates to deal effectively and victoriously with the constants of the battlefield." He illustrated his point by a simple diagram showing USMA as the connecting link between American society and the battle. His concern was to indicate that in the early years of a military career the young officer, especially in the combat arms, has more need for military training than for a general education. Berry noted that from 1964 to 1976, although the academy had altered in many ways in response to military needs and social pressures, "the focus of military training of cadets tended to change from preparation for generalship to preparation for lieutenantship."[24]

These were the years of Vietnam when the immediate American demand for junior officers, as is customary in wartime, had risen sharply. In more normal times, the problem of providing a training suitable for junior officers, when some of them must be simultaneously educated for future higher command, is more of a dilemma.

Supporters of a broader education in military academies contend that basic intellectual processes are not pertinent to particular professions but are general in application. They argue that in preparation for lifetime careers, a narrow professional education can mean rigidity and the numbing of originality. Nevertheless, when John P. Lovell, in his book *Neither Athens nor Sparta*, presented a powerful case for more intellectual education for soldiers along with professional development, he was compelled to conclude that there is no consensus on what the changes in military education should be.[25] The basic unresolved problem is how professional indoctrination can be preserved in an increasingly academic milieu – and that is the theme of this book.

Other recent developments that affect military academies and the production of officers are the application of behavioural and managerial sciences to organizations and the use of electronic devices for computation and analysis. The resulting concept of the cadet as manager-in-training may sometimes be more appealing to the military than is the alternative concept of the cadet as scholar. However, two former officers blamed the American failure in Vietnam in part on excessive resort to managerial theory and techniques in the United States army.[26] This was undoubtedly an oversimplification, but it is true that courses on management techniques and psychology have to some extent supplemented or replaced earlier instruction in military colleges on leadership.[27]

In some cases that trend may have gone too far. In 1980 the American Army Staff College's *Military Review* devoted an issue to replies from officers in the field about this leadership and managerial-sciences issue in the United States. Most contributors pointed out that command and management are radically different. In the following issue of the *Review* Dr Sam Sarkesian, a military sociologist, agreed. He added that leadership has become more complex as a result of technological development and the switch from a military to a political-socio-military environment: "there is continuing disagreement regarding the meaning of management and its relationship to the military as an institution, and to the concept of leadership."[28] Although many Canadian officers are critical of this debate, the Canadian Forces face this same dilemma in some degree.

Finally, a survey of universal trends in military education must necessarily take into account the attitudes of the age group from which officers come – the eighteen-year-olds and adjacent ages. The last half-century has seen social and political revolutions of unprecedented