Table of Contents
Cover
Title page
Copyright page
Acknowledgements
Introduction
1 What is National Identity?
Identity
National identity
The dimensions of national identity
Constructing national identity
Challenges to a homogeneous national identity
National identity and citizenship
Finding new common enemies
Media and education
2 National Identity, Devolution and Secession
The rise of modern Quebec nationalism
Accommodating Quebec
Canadian nation-building: Trudeau’s vision
Failed attempts to recognize Quebec as a ‘distinct society’ within Canada
Quebec nationalism: a recurrent phenomenon
Canadians: for federation in spite of dissatisfaction with the government
Spain: symmetric devolution
Britain: asymmetric devolution
Does devolution promote single or multiple identities?
Does devolution foster separatism?
3 The Impact of Migration on National Identity
What is an ethnic group?
Ethnicity and the nation-state
Immigration, citizenship and national identity
Integration models: ghettoization, assimilation and multiculturalism
The birth of Austrian national identity
Austria’s migrants: origin and numbers
Migrants’ contribution to the economy
On Austria’s internal diversity: autochthonous minorities and immigrants
On Austria’s special relationship with South Tyrol
Migration: ‘cultural enrichment’ or ‘cultural threat’?
Immigrants as permanent ‘outsiders’: the FPÖ
4 On European Identity
The cultural frontiers of Europe
On what divides Europeans
On what unites Europeans
Towards a European identity?
On how Europeans regard the EU
The EU: a ‘non-emotional’ identity
Challenges to an EU identity
5 Rethinking American Identity
The melting pot metaphor
The hispanic challenge to american society
African-americans: an unresolved question
Native nationalism in the USA
European-americans: the new ethnicity
What does it mean to be American?
6 Reactions to the End of ‘Pure’ National Identities
Globalization as a transformation agent
The new radical right and identity in Western Europe
The dream of a ‘white Europe’
Against immigrants
For ‘pure’ national identities
Against multiculturalism
The return of white nativism in the USA
Ethnopluralism: a response to ‘too much diversity’
7 National Identity versus Cosmopolitan Identity
Cosmopolitanism: a multilevel theory
On global culture
On cosmopolitan culture
Cosmopolitanism: a Western theory
‘National’ versus ‘cosmopolitan’ identity
Cosmopolitanism versus nationalism
On cosmopolitan nationalism
Conclusion
References and Bibliography
Index
Copyright © Montserrat Guibernau 2007
The right of Montserrat Guibernau to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published in 2007 by Polity Press
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I would like to thank those who have supported me while I have been writing and thinking about this book. Rainer Bauböck, David Held, Tony Giddens, Maria del Mar Serrano, Michel Seymour and Anthony D. Smith have read parts of earlier drafts and offered their comments and criticism.
I started this book while working at the Open University, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank my former colleagues there, in particular Grahame Thompson, Linda Jones, Eileen Potterton, Marilyn Denman and Fran Ford.
At Queen Mary University of London, I would like to thank the Department of Politics, in particular Raymond Kuhn. I am also grateful to Anne Kershen for introducing me to the fascinating history of the East End of London.
A research fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust funded the research upon which this book is based, and it permitted me to enjoy a sabbatical period as visiting fellow at the Austrian Academy of Science (Vienna). Among my colleagues there, I would like to warmly thank Rainer Bauböck, Monika Mokre and Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann. I would also like to thank Bernhard Perchinig, Kurt Richard Luther, Lothar Hoebelt, Anton Pelinka and Ernst Bruckmüller for sharing with me their knowledge of Austrian politics and society. At Polity Press, I would like to thank Emma Longstaff and Gill Motley. A special thanks goes to Caroline Richmond for a thorough copy-editing of the manuscript.
Finally, my gratitude goes to those who have unconditionally supported me while writing this book: my husband, who deserves a very special mention for his constant encouragement, my parents, Antoni and Maria Dolors, and my nephew Joan.
Cambridge, March 2007
In 2000 I visited Montreal and Quebec City to participate in a conference on nationalism. In the opening session, and after a staunch defence of the right of Quebeckers to self-determination, a member of the audience challenged the speaker and claimed that all that rhetoric on partnership with Canada and democratic Quebec nationalism was false. He defined himself as an English Canadian feeling excluded within Quebec and fed up with Quebeckers’ recurrent demands for greater autonomy, ‘when in truth’, he argued, ‘what they really want is independence’. He added: ‘How could we possibly allow this? You are a mere province of Canada. Who do you think you are?’ The speaker replied: ‘We are a nation’. That triggered a lively debate in which mutual recriminations and arguments were employed to support antagonistic views, not only on the current status of Quebec and its eventual political future within Canada, but also on the cultural and public policy measures adopted by Canada to reinforce its national identity.
The views of Indian nations – called First Nations – living within the territory of Quebec were also represented in the debate. They came across strongly against Quebec nationalism and the granting of further devolution to the province, their main argument being that their ancestors had signed treaties with Canada in which their status as nations was recognized. Canada had to fulfil its duties towards them and not ‘dump’ them with the Quebeckers, with whom they had never entered into any type of agreement. The atmosphere was tense, and the ideas and arguments being debated mattered a great deal to those defending them.
In a matter of seconds, at least four different nations with their own national identities had come to the fore. They were of different sizes and age and had different cultures, languages and traditions, and all of them were claiming their right over parts of the same territory. Thus Canada was confronted by Quebec’s national demands, while simultaneously Quebec was being challenged by the existence of smaller nations, such as the Hurons and the Mohawk, claiming their rights over their own homelands currently included within Quebec’s territory.
* * *
The complexity of the Canadian–Quebec–First Nations relationship brings to the fore territorial issues, but it also opens up questions about how to accommodate national diversity within a multinational democracy. From a cultural perspective, it raises concerns about the nature, components, strength and strategies employed in the construction of national identity; such concerns were further stressed by my own experience as a Catalan.
As an adolescent I witnessed the rise of democratic Catalan nationalism after Franco’s death (1975). I observed the sanctioning of a democratic constitution in 1978 and a new statute of autonomy for Catalonia in 1979. I saw the transformation of a highly centralized, conservative and authoritarian regime into a decentralized, democratic and modern nation-state included in the European Union and NATO. At that moment, I was still unable to participate in the political process, but I remember vividly the tremendous optimism and excitement of people who, for the first time in over forty years of dictatorship, were able to vote in a free and democratic election and express their views on the constitution and the statute. People believed that the future was in their hands, that from then on they would have a voice and could make a difference. At school, our teachers were bringing newspaper articles and newly published books for us to learn about Catalonia’s re-established political institutions, their background, the civil war and exile. Even more crucially, I remember a young teacher avidly learning herself and simultaneously teaching us about the ideas and practices of social democracy and political pluralism that neither she nor we had ever encountered previously.
Still today, when Catalans define themselves as a nation, they obtain a heated reaction from some Spaniards who, as the 1978 constitution declares, regard the constitution as ‘based upon the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible patria of all Spaniards’.1 Catalans reply that Catalonia has a distinct national identity and has constituted a nation since the Middle Ages – a time when Catalonia became a key power in the Mediterranean and enjoyed its own constitutions, independent government and laws. They regard the current lack of recognition of Catalonia as a nation as part of a legacy of years of oppression by the Castilian yoke. In the War of the Spanish Succession, Catalonia supported the cause of the Austrians against Philip V (Felipe V) of the Bourbon dynasty. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) confirmed Philip V as king of Spain, and Catalonia was left alone to face the might of the Franco-Spanish armies. Catalonia maintained its rights and liberties until 1714, when, on 11 September, after a massive Franco-Spanish attack that followed a siege of fourteen months, Barcelona surrendered. Philip V ordered the dissolution of the Catalan institutions and Catalonia was subject to a regime of occupation. Catalan was forbidden and Castilian (Spanish) was proclaimed as the official language.
As I was growing up in Barcelona, I became a spectator of the stark contrast between a peaceful and democratic Catalan nationalism and the recurring violence perpetrated by some sectors of the Basque nationalist movement. ‘Why are the Basques prone to violence and the Catalans are not?’ I have had this question thrown at me on innumerable occasions, and I must confess that I still do not have a clear-cut answer to it. The response invariably has to include some references to the different components of national identity, that is, to the historical experiences, influences, values and principles defining the nation in each case.
The symmetrical decentralization of Spain effected after 1978, and referred to as ‘coffee for everyone’, involved the division of Spain into seventeen autonomous communities, some of them with historical roots and a strong sense of identity – Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia – others artificially created where no sense of a separate identity had ever existed – La Rioja and Madrid among many others. One of the most striking consequences of Spanish devolution has been the emergence of distinct identities being constructed within the newly created autonomous communities – an indication that multilevel governance tends to favour the generation of multiple identities operating at different levels. Right now some define Andalucía as a nation and defend its right to self-determination. Of course, nations are not eternal, they are born, transformed, and some of them disappear. But when does a nation come into being? How do nations construct their identities? In what circumstances does a nation declare itself as a demos, that is, a community with the right to decide on its political future?
In Spain, transformations affecting national identity were not limited to a sub-state level. The victory of the PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers Party) in the 1982 general election initiated a dramatic transformation of the traditional definition of Spanish identity inherited from Francoism and defined primarily by its centralism, conservatism, Catholicism and anti-Europeanism and the pre-eminence of Castilian culture and language. The redefinition of Spanish identity was completed after the landslide victory in 2000 of the PP (Popular Party). Since then Spain has become an established democratic, modern, progressive (no less progressive than other European countries) nation-state, which is also decentralized, prosperous, pro-European, industrialized, secular, and enjoying a welfare system in constant development. In spite of this, it could be argued that Spanish identity still includes some hindrances from the past, such as the passion for centralism and the predominance of Castile; however, no one could deny that Spain has dramatically transformed its identity. How do nations transform their identities? What strategies do they employ? Is there a core that remains constant within all national identities in spite of their dynamic advancement?
* * *
It is just before 8 a.m. when I usually get off the train at Liverpool Street Station and take the 25 bus to the university. In a matter of seconds, the bus leaves the already busy streets of London’s financial district (‘the City’), with its combination of skyscrapers, old buildings and churches, sleepy cafes, posh restaurants and shops, and heads towards the heart of the area recently termed Londonistan.2
The racial, cultural and social diversity of Mile End Road is easily captured as I look through the window. The imposing silhouette of the East London Mosque on the right; a bit further, on the left-hand side, dozens of vendors are rapidly arranging their stalls in what in an hour’s time will become a buzzing street market, evoking some memories of those of Lahore or Karachi. The range of produce available and the dress code of most vendors, clients and passers by reveal a profound mixture of origins and traditions. The bus gets busier at every stop: some English working-class people – only a couple today; a big Jamaican lady with her son; some Urdu-speaking young men; a quiet group of about six or seven young girls, with their blue uniforms and headscarves, heading to one of the single-faith schools in the neighbourhood; two men in their mid-twenties speaking in an Eastern European language, their hands toughened up by manual work; and myself, a white Southern European woman. I wonder how many nationalities, languages, religions and national identities fit into a single bus in one of the most heterogeneous areas of London.
My short trip to work reveals the great diversity present in most Western cities, a trend already expanding to the countryside. Immigration is not a novel phenomenon; it has been around for centuries, and London offers a very good example of it. But, suddenly, difference has acquired unprecedented relevance in some Western societies, now uneasy about the consequences of multiculturalism. Does it contribute to the reification of differences rather than to the construction of a cohesive society? To what extent does having a British passport ensure loyalty to the nation and solidarity towards fellow citizens? Is there a growing gap between citizenship and national identity? Is citizenship cherished solely as an entrance-card to a prosperous labour market and mobility within the EU while loyalty and social commitments remain elsewhere?
The Britishness of the 7 July 2005 London bombers, rising tensions between some Asian and white youth in various locations, and the emergence of areas where people from different ethnic origins never mix are raising a certain degree of anxiety among significant sectors of the population. Trevor Phillips, head of the Commission for Racial Equality, has recently proclaimed that Britain is ‘sleepwalking into segregation’, with some districts ‘on their way to becoming fully fledged ghettos – black holes into where no one goes without fear and trepidation and from which no one ever escapes undamaged.’3 How do citizens of migrant origin define their national identity? Has Britishness, a concept strongly connected with the British Empire, been successfully redefined to embrace a wide range of peoples of various provenance? Are indigenous populations prepared fully to accept and regard as their own fellow citizens who are physically, culturally or religiously different from the majority?
* * *
Reflection on the various experiences I have just mentioned triggered the project to write this book, with the aim of studying how the identity of Western nations is being transformed from below, from above and from within. The book examines the meaning and main pillars of national identity as well as the strategies employed by nation-states engaged in processes of nation-building before and after the current intensification of globalization processes. It studies bottom-up movements for recognition and self-determination organized by national minorities living within the boundaries of the nation-state. In particular, it focuses on the ways in which Western nations react to such demands and the consequences this may have on national identity and social cohesion.
At the same time, the book reflects on top-down pressure exerted by the construction of novel supranational political institutions, such as the EU, which actively seek to instil a shared sense of common identity among a diverse citizenry. A further source of transformation points at dramatic changes in attitudes, values and perceptions of ethnic and religious diversity by significant sectors of the indigenous population. This takes place at a time when some communities of migrant origin are voicing strong claims to maintain their separate distinct identity – cultural, linguistic and religious – within the nation-state of which they are citizens. Simultaneously, other ethnic communities are advocating the right to contribute to and transform the identity of the nation within which they live. Still others despise the values and principles of the society of which they are citizens and defend their right to opt out of a common project uniting the nation because they place their allegiances elsewhere.
The outcome mirrors a polyhedron reflecting various reactions on behalf of the indigenous population, which regards its own national identity, and the bonds of solidarity and social cohesion legitimizing its actions as a political community, as being under threat. Western nations are unsure about how tolerant they should be and what they should tolerate. Tragically, the West is uncertain about the content of its own values and principles and, in some cases, it seems prepared to nurture the seeds of its own decline as a civilization.
Rising doubts about multiculturalism, a greater sensitivity towards difference, fears – justified or not – of being swamped by immigrants who contribute to lowering wages, greater unemployment, crime, and the stretching of welfare services are giving arguments to the new radical right, who are playing by the rules of democracy and presenting a primarily anti-immigrant programme aimed at defending the rights of an indigenous population ‘abandoned’ by the political correctness, tolerance and multicultural policies implemented by mainstream parties in recent years. Renewed calls for preserving the ‘purity’ of national identities are on the rise.
In contrast, a cosmopolitan elite stands in favour of a hybrid cultural view of the world. They denounce the perniciousness of nationalism and often ignore and dismiss the value that national identity has for millions of people who regard the nation as some kind of extended family, as a community within which they have a stake, as a homeland within which they matter and they can expect to be assisted when in need.
Outline of the Book
This book explores how the identity of nations is being transformed by the impact of devolution, migration and the construction of supranational institutions in the age of globalization. It analyses some of the reactions to the end of ‘pure’ identities and invites the reader to reflect on the growing influence of a primarily anti-immigrant political agenda designed by the new radical right. It also explores the nature of cosmopolitanism and its possible compatibility, or lack of compatibility, with nationalism and national identity.
The book is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 offers a detailed analysis of the role and relevance of national identity in contemporary societies. It emphasizes the difference between national identity, that is, the collective sentiment of belonging to the nation – understood primarily as a cultural community – and citizenship, which basically refers to membership of the state – a political institution granting rights and imposing duties on its members. Here, I examine the strategies regularly employed by the state in the construction of a shared national identity among its usually diverse population, a national identity in the end destined to legitimize the state’s own existence. In so doing, I consider the transformations prompted by globalization of traditional mechanisms destined to build national identity in modern societies.
Chapter 2 focuses on various institutional arrangements intended to accommodate within liberal democratic states the nationalism of nations without states. It argues that political decentralization, when accompanied by a substantial degree of autonomy, the constitution of regional institutions and access to significant resources, promotes the emergence of dual identities – regional and national – without necessarily diminishing the latter. Besides, this chapter shows that political decentralization does not tend to foster secession, that is, devolution does not usually challenge the integrity of the nation-state’s boundaries. I justify my claims by comparing Britain, Canada and Spain as three cases which, so far, prove that decentralization – including political autonomy and federalism – tames secessionism, both by offering significant power and resources to the national minorities it seeks to accommodate and by enticing regional political elites with the power, prestige and perks of devolution.
Chapter 3 introduces the concept of ethnicity to complement the study of nations and nationalism developed in the two previous chapters. Max Weber called ethnic groups ‘those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or of both, or because of memories of colonization or migration.’4 This chapter focuses on migration and its impact upon Austrian national identity. It explores the role of ethnicity in the construction of national identity and analyses various integration models ranging from ghettoization to assimilation and multiculturalism. In addition, it considers the role of immigrants within the new Austria emerging after the Second World War and looks carefully at the rise of the radical right Freedom Party.
Chapter 4 investigates whether a transnational political institution such as the European Union could foster the emergence of a novel type of shared identity among its citizens. The EU provides a new environment within which individuals and groups seek recognition and organize their participation in politics. The big question concerns whether the development of a political institution such as the EU and the harmonization of Europe through the implementation of EU Directives will result in the emergence of a common identity accompanied by sentiments of loyalty and attachment to the EU or, on the contrary, whether national loyalties and interests are to prevail and prevent the emergence of a European identity.
Chapter 5 concentrates on the main challenges currently being faced by American identity. Here, I highlight the tremendous ethnic and racial diversity included in the USA. In particular, I focus on the gradual replacement of assimilation by integration within a wide range of ethnic groups endowed with their own cultures, which often include their own separate sub-economic structures. I analyse the impact of large Hispanic immigration upon America’s traditional culture and monolingual status, the pervasive discrimination against African-Americans and their renewed nationalism, and the socio-political transformations brought about by the adoption of multiculturalism in the post-civil rights era. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the meaning of American identity in the early twenty-first century.
Chapter 6 examines the rise of the new radical right and its defence of what I refer to as ‘pure national identities’. This chapter looks carefully at the new radical right’s anti-immigration discourse and its position against multiculturalism. In so doing, I draw from the study of a range of European new radical right-wing parties – among them, the Austrian Freedom Party, the French Front National and the Italian Lega Nord. I also establish a connection between the European new radical right’s defence of ethnoculturalism and white nativism in the USA.
In Chapter 7, I establish a distinction between ‘global’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ culture and focus on the ethical component absent from most theories of cosmopolitan culture and identity. The chapter compares national and cosmopolitan identity by examining five dimensions: psychological, cultural, historical, territorial and political. It concludes by assessing whether nationalism and cosmopolitanism are able to coexist and investigates the specific conditions that would render this possible. At this juncture, I argue that the political agenda for the future of nations should embrace a commitment to cosmopolitan ideals and values capable of informing political action and adding a new moral dimension to national identity. The advent of cosmopolitanism requires the pledge to eradicate social, political and economic ideologies based upon the exploitation of individuals and nations. In so far as this remains out of reach, cosmopolitanism will remain a utopian ideology.
Notes
1 Constitución Española, 1978, Artículo 2.
2 Phillips (2006).
3 Phillips (2005).
4 Weber ([1968] 1978, p. 389).
