Robert Granville Campbell

Neutral Rights and Obligations in the Anglo-Boer War

Published by Good Press, 2022
goodpress@okpublishing.info
EAN 4064066164690

Table of Contents


PREFACE.
CHAPTER I.
Section 5287 provides for the enforcement of the foregoing provisions.. It leaves the cognizance of all complaints in the hands of the several. district courts, but empowers the President to employ the land and naval. forces to enforce all of the restrictions embodied in the neutrality. provisions. The following section empowers the President to compel. foreign vessels "to depart the United States in all cases in which, by. the laws of nations, or by the treaties of the United States they ought. not to remain within the United States," Section 5289 requires that a. foreign armed vessel shall give bond on clearance. Section 5290 empowers. the collectors of the customs to detain foreign vessels: "The several. collectors of the customs shall detain any vessel manifestly built for. warlike purposes, and about to depart the United States, the cargo of. which principally consists of arms and munitions of war, when the number. of men on board, or circumstances render it probable that such vessel is. intended to be employed by the owners to cruise or commit hostilities. upon the subjects, citizens or property of any colony, district or. people with whom the United States are at peace, until the decision of. the President is had thereon, or until the owner gives such bond and. security as is required of the owners of armed vessels by the preceding. section." Section 5291 defines the construction to be put upon the. neutrality laws. They are not to be construed to extend to any subject. or citizen of any foreign State who is only transiently within the. United States, nor directly to be construed in such a way as to prevent. the prosecution or punishment of treason, or of any piracy defined by. the laws of the United States. Possibly the alleged unneutral acts in. the territorial waters of the United States did not fall within the. strict letter of the restrictions contained in these laws. But if the. provisions of 1818 are construed so as to require the maintenance of a. perfect neutrality it would seem that they were evaded in the. transactions which were permitted at the port of New Orleans.
CHAPTER II.
CHAPTER III.
CHAPTER IV.

PREFACE.

Table of Contents

This essay is the outgrowth of work done in the Political Science Seminary of the Johns Hopkins University and is a portion of a larger study dealing with the causes of the Anglo-Boer War and the questions of international law arising during that conflict.

At the beginning of the war the English Government was inclined to view the contest as one which would not make it necessary to call into operation the neutrality laws of third parties. It was soon realized, however, that the condition of insurgency was not broad enough to sustain the relations between the two Governments. Toward the close of November Great Britain's declaration with a retroactive effect put the contest upon a distinctly belligerent basis and accepted the date of the Transvaal's ultimatum, 5 p.m., October 11, 1899, as the commencement of the war.

Other Powers which had awaited this announcement with some anxiety at once declared their attitude toward the war. Among the first to assume this neutral position was the United States with the announcement that its attitude would be in accordance with the requirements of the strictest neutrality.

It is the purpose of the first chapter to inquire how far these obligations were fulfilled by the United States Government, and in the second chapter the attitude of European Governments is considered. In the third chapter the rights and obligations of belligerents and neutrals are discussed with regard to neutral commerce. Under this topic the wide divergence of English practice from Continental as well as from American opinion on points of international law cannot fail to be noticed.

The chief sources of information used in the preparation of the present paper have been the British Blue Books; the Foreign Relations of the United States; the House and Senate Documents not included in the Foreign Relations; the Congressional Record, Debates in Congress, Resolutions and Reports in answer to requests for information. Other sources and authorities are indicated in the footnotes.

I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. W.W. Willoughby, not only for his careful criticism of this study during its preparation, and for the helpful suggestions by which he has attempted to correct some of its obvious deficiencies, but especially for his kindly inspiration at all times.

PREFACE

CHAPTER I. THE NEUTRALITY OF THE UNITED STATES

CHAPTER II. THE NEUTRALITY OF EUROPEAN POWERS

CHAPTER III. CONTRABAND OF WAR AND NEUTRAL PORTS

CHAPTER IV. TRADING WITH THE ENEMY

CHAPTER I.

Table of Contents

THE NEUTRALITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

The neutral attitude assumed by the United States was maintained throughout the war. With reference to any official recognition of the Transvaal as an independent State apart from the immediate purposes of war no action was taken. This view of the situation in South Africa was entirely consistent with the requirements of international law, and, in carrying out the obligations of a neutral to the belligerents, the governmental position was fully justified by a knowledge of the relations which had existed between the Transvaal and Great Britain in the past.

Early in October, before war had actually begun, it was understood that Mr. Pierce, the Orange Free State consul-general in New York, had made every effort to induce President McKinley to request other nations to act with the United States as arbitrators in the dispute between the Governments of the Transvaal and Great Britain, but the close friendship existing between England and the United States and the very friendly attitude assumed by Great Britain during the Spanish-American War made such action impossible. The State Department at Washington announced that in the event of war the Government would maintain an absolutely neutral attitude, and issued instructions early in October to all American consuls in South Africa directing them to secure protection for all neutrals of the United States who had not affiliated politically with either Great Britain or the South African Republics, either by exercising the franchise or otherwise. While those whom this definition did not cover were not to be directly under the protection of the United States, the State Department expressed itself as ready to use its good offices in their behalf in case they were involved in trouble resulting from the war. Such had been the position of the Department in the case of Mr. John Hays Hammond, a citizen of the United States who had been involved in the Jameson Raid, although he had taken part in an expedition which was not officially approved by Great Britain and which was hostile to a Government with which the United States had no quarrel.[1]

[Footnote 1: For. Rel., 1896, pp. 562-581.]

On October 8, the day before the Transvaal ultimatum was presented to Great Britain, the British Ambassador in Washington confidentially inquired whether in the event of an attack upon the English forces by the Boers, rendering necessary the withdrawal of the British agent, the United States would allow its consul to take charge of the British interests in the Transvaal.[2] Consent was very properly given on the eleventh that the United States would gladly allow its consul at Pretoria "to afford to British interests in that quarter friendly and neutral protective offices."[3] On the thirteenth this courtesy was acknowledged and the information given that the British agent had withdrawn. On the same day Mr. McCrum was instructed, "with the assent of the South African Republic, to afford to British interests the friendly protective offices usual in such contingencies."[4]

[Footnote 2: For. Rel., 1899, p. 350, Tower to Hay, Oct. 8, 1899.]

[Footnote 3: For. Rel., 1899, P. 350, Hill to Tower, Oct. 11, 1899.]

[Footnote 4: For. Rel., 1899, p. 351, Tower to Hill, and Adee to Tower,
Oct. 13, 1899.]

Having thus assumed an attitude entirely in accord with the obligations incumbent upon a neutral, the United States refused to heed the popular demand to urge upon Great Britain its offices as mediator in a matter which directly concerned the British colonial policy. Secretary Hay properly refused to involve the Administration in the complications which would have followed any official interrogation addressed to the British Government with reference to its ultimate intentions in South Africa. Moreover, it was authoritatively stated that any concerted European intervention would not meet with favor in Washington, as such action would only tend to disturb general commercial relations by embroiling most of the nations of the world. Any attempted intervention would certainly have led to a conflict of the Powers, and would have involved questions of national supremacy, disturbed the balance of power, and raised the Chinese question, in which last the United States had an important interest. It was a sound policy therefore upon the part of the United States not to encourage any intervention by European nations in the affairs of Great Britain in South Africa.

This attitude not only reciprocated the friendly feeling shown by England during the Spanish-American War, but was in strict accord with the traditional American policy enunciated by Washington. The acquisition of the Philippines had only served to exemplify the soundness of this doctrine, and the State Department was not in a mood to take the initial steps which might lead to added responsibilities with reference to matters which, in this instance at any rate, were not directly of American concern. The part to be played by the United States was clearly that of an impartial neutral.

In his message to Congress in 1900 President McKinley stated that he was happy to say that abundant opportunity had been afforded in the situation at Pretoria to permit the United States consul there to show the impartiality of the Government toward both the combatants. Developments, however, were to show that things had not gone so smoothly there as was supposed at the time.

On December 8 the President had appointed Mr. Adelbert Hay, son of the Secretary of State, to succeed Mr. McCrum in his position as consul and instructions were sent to him to proceed at once to Pretoria. Mr. Hollis, the American consul at Lorenzo Marques, was directed at the same time to act ad interim at Pretoria after the departure of Mr. McCrum and until Mr. Hay could reach South Africa. On December 18 Mr. Hollis took charge of all British and American interests within the Transvaal while still keeping an oversight of the affairs of the United States in and around Lorenzo Marques.

Soon after the war had begun Mr. McCrum had reported to Washington, in reply to inquiries with reference to the British prisoners in the hands of the Boers, that it was the wish of the Republican Government that in the future all requests for the payment of money to officers or other prisoners, as well as inquiries regarding their welfare, should come through the regular military channels at the front. The Republic at the same time intimated that it could no longer recognize Mr. McCrum in any official capacity on behalf of Great Britain.[5] The British representative at once suggested that the United States consul be instructed to point out to the Transvaal that such an attitude was a departure from the usual practice in not permitting the American Government to use its friendly good offices on behalf of the English prisoners of war. Lord Salisbury called attention to the fact that during the Crimean War "moneys" for the British prisoners in Russia were distributed through the Danish representatives in St. Petersburg and London; and that during the Franco-Prussian War such small sums of money were handed to the French prisoners in Germany through the British Foreign Office. It was understood as a matter of course that reciprocal privileges would be extended to the Boer prisoners in the hands of the English commanders.[6]

[Footnote 5: For. Rel., 1900, p. 619, Hay to Pauncefote, Nov. 11, 1899.]

[Footnote 6: Ibid., p. 619, Hay to Pauncefote, Nov. 22, 1899.]

Mr. McCrum, following instructions from his Government, had placed the English view of the situation before the Transvaal authorities before he left Pretoria, and had called their attention to the fact that for them to permit the charitable and humane intervention of the United States consul under the circumstances was the regular course in time of war.[7] But not until Mr. Hollis reached Pretoria was the attitude of the Republic explained. He inquired of the Secretary of State as well as of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs with reference to the attitude he would be allowed to assume toward British interests; to what extent he might act on behalf of British prisoners of war in the Transvaal and Orange Free State; and how far he might exercise the usual consular functions on behalf of Great Britain during the war.

[Footnote 7: For. Rel., 1900, p. 620, Hay to Pauncefote, Nov. 28, 1900, and Hay to Pauncefote, Apl. 9, 1900.]

The report was made to Washington "from many official and consular sources that the late British agent at this capital [presumably Mr. Green] was always a thorn in the side of this Government, and that he is, in part, responsible for this present war."[8] It was pointed out that since this was the attitude of the Republican Government there existed at Pretoria a decided aversion to the recognition of any one who might claim to act as a British agent. The Transvaal Secretary of State expressed himself emphatically upon the point: "We got rid of the British agent on the eleventh of October last, and God willing, we will never have another one here."[9] Mr. Reitz even went so far as to express the confident hope that at the close of the war a British minister and British consuls would reside at Pretoria, but he was positive upon the question of receiving any one who was known as an agent of Great Britain. No one who assumed this relation toward the English Government would be acceptable to the Transvaal and Orange Free State.

[Footnote 8: For. Rel., 1900, p. 621, Hollis to Hill, Feb. 2, 1900.]

[Footnote 9: For. Rel., 1900, p. 621, Hollis to Hill, Feb. 2, 1900.]

The attitude which the Republic alleged it had been willing and was ready to assume was an unwillingness to recognize the consul of the United States or any other consular officer as the official representative of the British Government during the war; an objection to the transmission of the official communications of the English Government to that of the South African Republic, or of the official despatches of the English Government addressed to the British prisoners in the hands of the Transvaal, or of "moneys" or funds sent by the British Government to the English prisoners of war. On the other hand the Transvaal authorities were not unwilling to allow the United States consul at Pretoria to perform certain enumerated services in behalf of all British prisoners of war and their friends. No objection was made to the forwarding of letters and papers sent by friends to the prisoners, and, under the supervision of the War Office of the Transvaal, the Republic expressed itself willing to permit the distribution of funds sent to the English prisoners by their friends at home. But it was understood that such services would be reciprocal, and that the Republic would have the right to request similar services of the American consular officers on behalf of the Boer and Afrikander prisoners in the English possessions. The right was reserved to revoke any and all privileges to receive letters, papers, parcels and money, which were enjoyed by British prisoners in the Transvaal, should the fact be sufficiently proved that Boer or Afrikander prisoners in the hands of the English authorities were not receiving kind and humane treatment, or were being denied privileges similar to those enjoyed by British prisoners in the Republic. All concessions on the part of the Transvaal Government would be instantly revoked on these grounds as sufficient reason and cause for such action. The Republican Government asserted that this had been the attitude in accordance with which it had acted from the commencement of the war.[10]

[Footnote 10: For. Rel., 1900, pp. 621-622, Hollis to Reitz, Jan. 31, 1900, and Reitz to Hollis, Feb. 2, 1900.]

With reference to the recall of the American consul and the appointment of Mr. Adelbert Hay, it appears that there had been a certain amount of friction between Mr. McCrum and the English censor at Durban concerning the consular mails. In connection with this incident, and a little unwisely it would seem, Mr. McCrum had reported unofficially that his mail had been tampered with by the censor and had been forwarded to him only after Colonel Stowe, the American consul-general at Cape Town, had secured its release. He asserted: "I had the humiliation, as the representative of the American Government, of sitting in my office in Pretoria and looking upon envelopes bearing the official seal of the American Government, opened and officially sealed with stickers, notifying me that the contents had been read by the censor at Durban." And he continues, "when I accepted my post as consul I knew nothing of any secret alliance between America and Great Britain."[11] These charges brought forth in the House of Representatives a resolution which called upon the President to furnish information as to whether the consul's mail had been opened and read by the British censor and, if so, what steps had been taken in the matter. Information was also asked as to what truth there was in the statement that a secret alliance existed between the "Republic of the United States and the Empire of Great Britain."[12]

[Footnote 11: H.R., Doc. 458, 56 Cong., 1 Sess.]

[Footnote 12: H. Res. 149, 56 Cong., 1 Sess.; also H. Res. 160.]

In response the President reported through the Secretary of State that the Department had been in regular communication by mail and telegraph with Charles E. McCrum, late consul at Pretoria, since his entrance upon the duties of the office. Communications made to him had been answered by him. His despatches forwarded through the consulate at Lorenzo Marques had been regularly received during his incumbency in office. It was pointed out that the only instance of complaint had been in November, when a temporary stoppage of the mails had occurred at Cape Town, against which both Mr. McCrum and the consul at Lorenzo Marques had protested. But arrangements had been then made for the prompt delivery of all the consular mails to the United States consulate at Cape Town by which they were forwarded to the consul at Lorenzo Marques and thence to Pretoria. The delay had continued only a few days and the difficulty had not occurred again. It was pointed out also that this arrangement had been made known to both Mr. McCrum and Mr. Hollis as early as November 16, and that no obstacle had since existed to prevent the unhampered correspondence from Pretoria to Washington. Moreover, the Secretary of State asserted that Mr. McCrum had not officially reported "any instance of violation, by opening or otherwise, of his official mail by the British censor at Durban, or any person or persons whatsoever, there or elsewhere;"[13] he had not so reported since he left Pretoria, although ample opportunity was afforded him to do so by mail or in person when he reported to the Department on his return.

[Footnote 13: H.R., Doc. 458, 56 Cong., 1 Sess.]

In regard to the second charge made by Mr. McCrum it seemed hardly necessary to say that there was no truth in the statement that a secret alliance existed between Great Britain and the United States; that no form of secret alliance was possible under the Constitution since all treaties required the advice and consent of the Senate. Mr. Hay concluded, however, by emphatically assuring the members of Congress that "no secret alliance, convention, arrangement, or understanding exists between the United States and any other nation."[14]

[Footnote 14: H.R., Doc. 458, 56 Cong., 1 Sess.]

Mr. McCrum later appeared before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives and stated his side of the case. He declared that while at Pretoria he had understood that the British Government was in possession of the United States cable ciphers but he was unable to affirm this from personal knowledge. He based his belief, he said, upon the fact that when on November 6 he had cabled by way of Durban to the Department asking for leave of absence the incident had been reported to have been published in a Durban paper on the following day, although he had cabled in cipher. He was not able to say, however, whether the fact of his desiring leave was actually published on November 7, as he had not seen the paper, but had heard that the fact had been published. He asserted that the first actual evidence of the opening of his mail was in the case of two opened letters reaching him, but he admitted that he had not reported the matter to the Department. When Mr. Hay mentioned the matter to Sir Julian Pauncefote, the British Ambassador in Washington, the English Government replied that it had no knowledge of the incident, and gave the assurance that if it had occurred it had been contrary to instructions. Colonel Stowe later informed Mr. Hay that two letters from the consulate at Cape Town, one for Pretoria, the other for Lorenzo Marques, had been opened by the censor at Durban, but that Sir Alfred Milner, the British High Commissioner, had afterward offered a very satisfactory apology.

In view of these facts the committee of the House, before which Mr. McCrum appeared, made no report, and when Mr. Adelbert Hay reported that he had failed to find on the files of the consulate any evidence of the official mail having been tampered with, the incident was considered closed. Mr. Hay declared that as far as he could ascertain, no interference had occurred in the communication, either telegraphic or postal, between the State Department and the consulate.[15]

[Footnote 15: For. Rel., 1906, p. 20, Hay to Pauncefote, Apr. 9, 1900.]

The new consul at Pretoria also reported that everything was as satisfactory as could be expected under the circumstances of war, and his official intercourse with the Transvaal Government afterwards fully justified this assertion. The republics displayed a proper attitude toward the consulate not only as representing American interests, but as representing Great Britain during the course of hostilities. Every facility was afforded the American consul for performing his duties. For the efficient service he had rendered in connection with the British prisoners he was publicly thanked by the British High Commissioner, who expressed the feeling of gratitude which he said existed throughout the British Empire for the good work which had been performed by both Mr. Hay and Colonel Stowe, the latter at Cape Town.

While enforcing the obligations of a neutral State by an attitude of strict impartiality toward both belligerents, the United States was not inclined to allow popular sympathy for the Boers to lead to complications with foreign nations over a matter with which it was only remotely concerned. This position was known to the envoys of the Transvaal and Orange Free State before they left Pretoria. Ample opportunity to realize the situation had been afforded them before they left Europe for America after an unsuccessful tour of the capitals of the Continent. Nevertheless, they determined to appeal to the United States, and with this purpose in view arrived in Washington on May 17, 1900. A resolution introduced in the Senate by Mr. Allen of Nebraska on May 19, which would have extended the privilege of the floor to them, was laid on the table,[16] a decision the wisdom of which is unquestionable. The Senate stands before the world as an important part of the treaty-making power of the United States. Such a privilege, if extended to the mission, could have meant nothing to foreign powers but an official reception to the envoys of a government which was not recognized as legitimate by its former conventional suzerain. It was not the part of the Senate to inquire into the substance of the past relations between Great Britain and the Transvaal. Especially was this true since the governmental position had been declared early in the war and nothing had occurred to warrant any alteration in that position. This was the view which President McKinley took of the situation, and the policy of dealing with the problem was that of the strictest neutrality.

[Footnote 16: 56 Cong., 1 Sess., Record, pp. 5735, 5783-86.]

On May 21 it was officially announced that the delegates had called by appointment at the State Department. The notice given out to the press read: "They were cordially received and remained with the Secretary of State for more than an hour. They laid before the secretary at much length and with great energy and eloquence the merits of the controversy in South Africa and the desire of the Boer Republics that the United States should intervene in the interests of peace and use its influence to that end with the British Government."[17] The ambition of the envoys on leaving the Transvaal for Europe had been "for the purpose of seeking recognition and intervention," but the success of their mission at Washington was not to be greater than it had been in European capitals. Although Mr. Hay received them courteously their competence to treat directly with the State Department was not recognized. When they realized this fact they appealed directly to the people in the hope of bringing a certain amount of pressure to bear upon the President from that source. He fully realized, however, that under the circumstances no interference was advisable. A departure from this policy would have created a precedent which might later have been appealed to by any European government in behalf of its subjects in this country. As Presidential candidate, however, William J. Bryan, in effect, if not in express terms, promised a mediation that would mean something should the Democrats come into power, and it was hopes created by such utterances which encouraged the Boers to believe that intervention on the part of the United States was a possibility. Even the Senate passed resolutions of sympathy which only held out a vain hope and naturally caused a certain amount of criticism in England. In the end, however, the envoys became convinced that nothing was to be hoped for in the way of dictatorial interference by the United States.

[Footnote 17: Moore, Digest of Int. Law, Vol. I, p. 213]

In his message to Congress, in 1899, three months after the war began, President McKinley had been able to declare: "This Government has maintained an attitude of neutrality in the unfortunate contest between Great Britain and the Boer States of Africa. We have remained faithful to the precept of avoiding entangling alliances as to affairs not of our direct concern. Had circumstances suggested that the parties to the quarrel would have welcomed any kindly expression of the hope of the American people that war might be averted, good offices would have been gladly tendered." And in May, 1900, after the interview with the Transvaal delegation, Mr. Hay gave out a statement through his secretary in which it was declared that this entirely correct neutral attitude had been strictly adhered to: "As the war went on the President, while regretting the suffering and the sacrifices endured by both of the combatants, could do nothing but preserve a strict neutrality between them. This has been steadfastly and constantly done, but there never has been a moment when he would have neglected any favorable occasion to use his good offices in the interest of peace."[18] Mr. Hay also pointed to the fact that on March 10, 1900, at the request of the Republics, the United States consul at Pretoria had communicated with his Government with a view to the cessation of hostilities, and that the same proposal was made to European powers through their respective consuls.

[Footnote 18: Moore, Digest of Int. Law, Vol. VII, p. 19.]

The request of the Transvaal was at once despatched to London, and the earnest hope was expressed by the President that a way might be found to bring about peace, with the intimation that he "would be glad to aid in any friendly manner to promote so happy a result." The Transvaal was promptly informed of this action and the United States representative in London communicated the President's instructions to Lord Salisbury. In answer he was requested to "thank the President for the friendly interest shown by him," but it was unmistakably declared that "Her Majesty's Government could not accept the intervention of any power."[19] This reply was communicated to Pretoria, and no further steps were taken, since any insistence upon the part of the United States would have been an unfriendly act.

[Footnote 19: Moore, Digest of Int. Law, Vol. VII, p. 20.]