

Daniel Heider

Aristotelian Subjectivism: Francisco Suárez's Philosophy of Perception



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embody a distinct part in the object-subject
polarity of Suárez's philosophy of perception.*

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Abbreviations

- CDA* Francisco Suárez. (1978–1991). *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis de anima*, 3 Vols. S. Castellote (Ed.). Madrid.
- DA* Aristotle (2000). *On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath*. Translated by W. S. Hett. Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press.
- DM* Francisco Suárez. (1861). *Disputationes metaphysicae*. Vols. 1–2. In *Opera omnia*, Vols. 25–26. Paris: L. Vivès.
- GC* Francisco Suárez. (1575). *Thesaurus doctrinae circa libros Aristotelis De Generatione et corruptione*.
- Ord.* John Duns Scotus. (1950–2013). *Ordinatio*. In *Opera omnia*, Vols. 1–14. Civitas Vaticana: Typis Vaticanis.
- STh.* Thomas Aquinas. (1888–1906). *Summa theologiae*. In *Opera omnia*, Vols. 4–12. Rome: ed. Leonina.
- TDA* Francisco Suárez. (1856). *Tractatus De anima*. In *Opera omnia*, Vol. 3. Paris: L. Vivès.

Chapter 1

Introduction



1.1 Philosophy of Perception and Suárez's *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul*

The goal of this book is to reconstruct the complex philosophical theory of sense perception of Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), which is presented in his *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De anima*.¹ There is no such comprehensive and complex study available as yet in international scholarship. This is all the more surprising if we consider that Suárez's philosophy in general constitutes one of the crucial milestones in the transition from scholastic thought to early modern philosophy and that Suárez is rightly regarded as one of the most important representatives of the remarkable cultural-ideological phenomenon called Second scholasticism, which is confirmed by the large amount of secondary literature that has been published on his philosophy in the last decades and above all in the last several years.²

¹The Commentary was written in the first half of the 1570s when Suárez taught philosophy in Segovia, his first teaching period after his studies at the University of Salamanca (1566–70). The text was edited in 1619–21 and published posthumously by Baltasar Álvares in Lyon (1621). In the autumn of his life Suárez himself started to edit and revise the juvenile text to compose a volume that was supposed to serve as a fundamental psychological study for his theology, in the same way as *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1597) as an essential metaphysical text stood in the service of theology. However, he only managed to revise the first 12 chapters of the first book before he died. Symbolically, he stopped writing in the middle of his work at the arguments for the immortality of the human soul. For Álvares's note about the genesis of the text inserted in his edition, see Suárez (1856c), 'Intermissi operis ratio, eiusque supplementum ex eodem auctore', 69–70. For a synoptical overview of the genesis of the text, see Castellote in Suárez (1978, xxxix–xvi). For Álvares himself, see Santiago de Carvalho (2019).

²For a rich overview of the recent literature and conferences organized on Suárez's philosophy only in the Iberian Peninsula in recent years, see Lázaro Pulido and Zorroza (2018). For an almost exhaustive list of the secondary literature on Suárez's philosophy in general, see Penner (2020).

One of the perennial problems of a philosophical theory of sense perception and cognition in general is the issue of intentionality.³ How can we explain that our vision, often regarded by philosophers not excluding Suárez as *the* dominant sensory modality, is *about* this tree or that it is *related to* this tree or that our visual experience *tends* toward this tree that stands in front of us? What perceptual processes and what changes in the eyes have to take place for this intentional act directed to this tree to occur? It is not only the issue of the genesis of these acts but also the structural item that causes problems here. In what kind of relation does our mental state stand to the visual representation of this tree? Is it a relationship of similarity, or only a causal relation? Moreover, our mental events are often related to nonexistent fictitious objects or objects that are apprehended differently from the way they exist. The question is how to explain the intentionality of these operations. Should we say that they refer or must refer directly to some intramental objects with a special intentional being, the being that an extramental object acquires when it is known? Considering the principle of explanatory simplicity, should we not posit these immanent objects in all veridical acts including those related to existent objects? Admittedly, if these questions were answered affirmatively, we would get a representationalism or indirect realism according to which material objects are perceived indirectly by means of perceiving intramental representations, which was a view popular in early modern philosophy. If not, the doctrine of direct or naïve realism according to which external sensible objects are apprehended directly without this mediation, the theory dominant (but not exclusive) in medieval and post-medieval Aristotelian-scholastic philosophy, would be the outcome.

The problem of the intentionality of perceptual acts is also linked to the query about perceptual activity and passivity.⁴ Is perception a basically passive process that mirrors sensible objects by receiving their stimuli and likenesses? Or is it rather an active process searching for an object, much like a headlight searching for something in the darkness?⁵ If the second were the case, it would be clear that perceptual intentionality would not be reducible to the reception of the stimuli that are emitted from sensible objects. Reception would be only a part of the whole story. The production of perceptual acts would also require an activity or, more precisely, an attention or intention on the side of the percipient. Without attending no act could be produced and the reception of stimuli would be ‘dead’. If ‘mixture theory’, that is, the theory that includes both aspects were the case, the question is which phases can be distinguished in the overall genesis of perceptual operation. As is well known, significant problems concern these stimuli. Are these to be conceived as beings that are specifically distinct from the represented qualities, or should it rather be said that these are of the same kind as the represented items? If the first were the case, should

³For an introduction to the medieval problems of intentionality constituting the background of Suárez’s theory, see Perler (2004, 1–30).

⁴For a representative volume on the issue of activity and passivity in sense perception, see Silva and Yrjönsuuri (2014).

⁵For these metaphors, see Abrams (1953).

we posit such stimuli conceived by scholastics as representational items called intentional species actually in all the external sense modalities, that is, including the senses of touch and taste, which as 'contact senses' seem to operate in immediate contiguity with their sensibles?

An important part of the problem of intentionality is constituted by the topic of consciousness and self-consciousness.⁶ The philosophy of perception is expected to answer not only the enquiry into how percipients are related to the extramental world (the objective aspect) but also how they become aware of their own mental states (the subjective aspect). On the one hand, a philosopher can give a purely material and naturalized account describing only the physical and physiological changes caused by a visual scene in the eye, the nerves and the brain. This account, based largely on the third-person perspective, however, has its own pitfall in ignoring the subjective aspect of consciousness, which is a paramount phenomenon of the first-person perspective. On the other hand, we can render a completely phenomenological and, in a way, idealistic explanation of how perception proceeds and is established from the self. From the point of view of scholastic epistemological realism, this exposition, however, will have to face the difficulty that is related to the transition from the nonconscious world to conscious perception. In other words, this theory will bypass this transition since it does not start from the world. This is also why a sound theory of perception will be required to find a balance between these two distinct requirements.⁷ Yet, if such a theory were granted, how would we become aware of our vision of a tree? Does our seeing of the tree turn out to be the object of a higher-order perceptual act of reflection? *Or* do we experience this act of seeing non-reflectively, that is, simultaneously or by a same-order act with our vision of a tree?⁸

As accepted by all Aristotelians, perception constitutes the primary source of our knowledge about the external world. If perception did not provide us with reliable information, all post-sensory forms of cognition would turn out to be fallible and unreliable. This is the reason why epistemological questions about the veridicality of our perception are important for epistemology in general. But how certain and reliable are our senses?⁹ Can we speak about truth and falsity in perceptual acts, or do these belong only to the second mental operation of the intellect, which is the only power that can generate judgments since it is the only faculty that can compose and

⁶For an overview of the issue of consciousness and self-consciousness at the levels of both perception and intellection in medieval philosophy, see Cory (2021). For a systematic and historical introduction to this topic based on the fundamental distinction between the Aristotelian and the Augustinian model, see Perler and Schierbaum (2014, 11–68).

⁷Concerning this formulation of the philosophical problem of sensation in Suárez, see South (2001a). As regards the identical formulation of the issue in contemporary philosophy of perception, see Fish (2010, 1–3).

⁸For a detailed description of these two kinds of self-awareness in connection with Suárez, see Rode (2015, 13–6).

⁹Concerning the issue of scepticism in medieval philosophy, see Perler (2006) and Lagerlund (2010).

divide subject and predicate? And what are the conditions of veridical perception? Can they be stated? Given both the object-oriented Aristotelian epistemology and the brute fact of illusory perceptions, an Aristotelian is expected to develop an account of the conditions under which perception is veridical, and of those under which it is not. Moving the issue of perceptual scepticism to the level of thought experiments, which due to their theological setting abound in scholasticism, the question can be raised whether God or a wicked demon can intervene in our perception in such a way as to produce in us a visual percept of absent or nonexistent objects. Provided that no logical or metaphysical contradiction is involved in this state of affairs and this scenario is *de absoluta potentia Dei* possible, what ontological assumptions are implied? If this were possible, would we be able to discern veridical perceptions from false ones? If so, what would the criteria of such discernment be?

These questions are intimately connected with the extensive topic of the penetrability of perception by rationality. We not only receive data from the external environment through the external senses but also process this manifold information. Considering the *explanandum* in the form of a phenomenological criterion of perceptual unity (our perception is unified in many ways), what are the cognitive mechanisms by virtue of which we are aware not only of atomic qualities, such as the proper sensibles of colour, sound, odours etc., proper to the particular external senses, but also of a sensible *object* that has all these qualities together with other aspects and modalities, due to which we perceive it in the practical terms of its convenience or inconvenience, in its presence or absence? How do these aspects accrue to the fundamental sensation of those present atomic qualities? And to what degree is this epistemic processing realized by the intellect and its judgmental, inferential and discursive capacities, and to what extent is it part of the working of the internal senses and common to nonhuman animals that are also endowed with these senses? Moreover, if these acts of processing, such as judging, storing, recalling, interpreting, inferring, (re)identifying etc., were parts of internal sense apprehension, should we attribute them to really distinct senses or should we assign them only to a single interior sense? And, in general, are there any significant differences in the cognitive functions of both the external and the internal senses between human and nonhuman animals?

These and other issues revolving around the central problem of intentionality are pressing issues not only for contemporary philosophers of mind¹⁰ but were discussed also by Suárez in his *Commentary on De anima* (henceforth: *CDA*). Like his *Metaphysical disquisitions* (*DM*) *CDA* is not a text closely following Aristotle's model. It is much more a *systematic reconstruction* of Aristotelian theory of soul, which incorporates a large number of philosophical and theological sources from ancient philosophy, patristics, medieval and renaissance scholasticism including Arabic philosophy, and last but not least the Galenic and Renaissance medical tradition.¹¹ The highly systematic and pedagogical character of the *Commentary*

¹⁰For contemporary authors, see Fish (2010) and Siewert (2017), among many others.

¹¹For this assessment of Suárez's manner of commenting, see Simmons (1999).

significantly facilitates the precise demarcation of the textual segment corresponding to the main theme of this book. From the overall number of 14 disputations¹² the topic of sense perception both at the level of the external and the internal senses is *ex professo* treated in disputations 5–8 (*CDA* disp. 5–8). In *CDA* disp. 5 titled 'De potentiis cognoscitivis in communi' Suárez treats cognitive powers in general, that is, he approaches them indiscriminately with respect to whether they are external senses, internal senses, or the intellect. They are all conceived only in so far as they are cognitive faculties. If not explicitly restricted to this or that kind of apprehension, all conclusions from disp. 5 are applicable to both intellectual and sensory cognition. In fact, these conclusions concern the issues of the nature of the cognitive act, its principles and terminus, the questions regarding apprehension, judgment and discourse, and topics related to attention and its division. The following *CDA* disp. 6–7 are explicitly devoted to the external senses. While *CDA* disp. 6 called 'De sensibus in communi' analyses sense perception from a general point of view, that is, without specification related to whether an external sense is this or that particular sensory modality, such as sight, hearing etc., disp. 7 titled 'De sensibus exterioribus in particulari' is the most focused. Besides the comparison of the particular senses, this disputation aims at the specific features of the particular external senses, which largely bear upon the question about the nature and kinds of the proper sensibles. However, it is especially *CDA* disp. 6 that significantly complements *CDA* disp. 5. It is the analysis of the notion of the agent sense (*sensus agens*) that appends the debate about the principles of the perceptual act, that is, the issue of the activity and passivity of perceptual powers and the question about the nature and origin of the sensible species. *CDA* disp. 6, q. 4 elaborates the issue of perceptual self-awareness at the level of both the external and the internal senses. This elaboration complements Suárez's discussion of perceptual judgment in *CDA* disp. 5, q. 6. The *quaestiones* related to the sceptical issues on the plane of both the natural and the supernatural possibility of error (*CDA* disp. 6, qq. 3 and 5) are laid out as the systematic consequences of *CDA* disp. 5. Much of what is said in *CDA* disp. 5 and 6 is exploited also in *CDA* disp. 7. Although this disputation is largely dedicated to Suárez's scientific or, more precisely, anatomophysiological views on perception, a

¹²While the early text, which in its various manuscripts was the source of Castellote's edition, is divided into disputations, questions and paragraphs (numbers), Álvares's *editio princeps*, called *Tractatus de anima* (henceforth: *TDA*), is structured into books, chapters and numbers. In Álvares's edition the overall treatment of sensory perception, together with the treatise on cognitive powers *in communi*, can be found in the third book (Suárez, 1856c, 613–712). Despite Álvares's statement 'Non erat tamen cur omnia plene prout ab eo accepimus non hic, tibi, Lectore benevole, immutata daremus [...]' (ibid., 567), this edition, as many scholars are not hesitant to note, does not correspond to the authentic manuscripts. This is also why I will make use of Álvares's edition especially in the parts related to the first 12 chapters of the first book that were revised by Suárez at the end of his life, i.e., in the sections 2.1 and 2.2. I will consider the other parts only where Castellote's critical edition seems to be either obviously false or where Suárez's text of the critical edition stands in need of clarification. The third book of Álvares's edition has to be considered also due to its frequent references to *DM* (especially) in the titles of the particular paragraphs. For the 'mutilated character' of Álvares's edition, see Castellote in Suárez (1978, xli).

substantial emphasis is put on philosophical issues. This disputation gives us evidence of the interconnection between philosophy and science, especially medicine in Suárez's account. It also shows that the Jesuit always deals with science in respect to philosophical problems. The theory of the sensible species and its propagation *in medio*, which is taken by Suárez as the necessary principle in *all* sensory modalities, represents one of the crucial philosophical topics in this disputation. Finally, in the brief two questions of *CDA* disp. 8 'De sensibus interioribus' Suárez approaches the issue of post-sensory modalities. Two topics dominate the discussion here. First, the issue of the number of the post-sensorial powers; second, the question about the cognitive functional scope of internal sense apprehension. Both topics are closely connected with what Suárez says about the external senses in the previous disputations and systematically anticipate and include what he says in *CDA* disp. 9 that is devoted to the subject matter of the intellect. In sum, and especially when compared with two other main early Jesuit commentaries on *On the Soul* from Francisco de Toledo (1532–1596) and the Coimbra Manuel de Góis (1543–1597), which follow more closely Aristotle's text,¹³ these four disputations give witness to how systematic and pedagogically mature the mind of the young Suárez was. It is all the more admirable if we recall that his philosophical psychology, as that of any philosopher who in a broad line follows Aristotle, is substantially determined by and issues from the *fundamenta* of his natural philosophy (physics) and metaphysics. Even though only in his mid-twenties, in the first half of 1570s he had already elaborated some of the metaphysical assumptions of his cognitive theory in some of his commentaries on Aristotle's other texts.¹⁴

1.2 State of Research

For many decades, most research in Suárez's philosophy was devoted largely to his metaphysics, philosophy of law and political philosophy. This is understandable, inasmuch as his views related to these disciplines are discussed in most of his philosophical volumes of the *Opera Omnia* and given their impact on early modern

¹³Francisco de Toledo, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in tres libros Aristotelis de Anima* (Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag, 1985; reprint of Cologne edition, 1615–6) and Collegium Conimbricensis, *Commentaria in tres libros de Anima* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2006; reprint of Cologne edition, 1609).

¹⁴Castellote in Suárez (1978, xxxviii–xxxix) says the following: '[...] la producción filosófica de Suárez realizada en los años de su docencia en Segovia (1571–1575). Durante este período compuso Suárez sus tratados filosóficos, comentarios casi todos a las obras del Estagirita, y que han quedado inéditos, si exceptuamos su curso De Anima, publicado póstumamente por el P. Baltasar Alvares en Lyon 1621 [...] La existencia de estos tratados filosóficos ha sido atestiguada por el mismo Suárez, quien en su tratado De Anima cita en varias ocasiones los siguientes: *Peri Hermeneias*, *Libri Posteriorum*, *Libri Physicorum*, *Libri Praedicamentorum*, *De Caelo*, *De generatione et corruptione*, y, posiblemente, una *Metafísica*. Además, por crítica externa, sabemos que ésta era la práctica de la docencia filosófica en las cátedras universitarias de la época'.

philosophy as such. It was chiefly due to Salvador Castellote's critical edition of *CDA* in particular and to the medievistic turn to the philosophy of mind in general that the situation has somewhat changed in the recent decades. Indeed, as it can be easily noticed, Suárez's philosophical psychology has become a widely discussed topic worldwide. This applies also to his philosophy of perception and cognition which has enjoyed different interpretations.

In this section, I aim to feature several representative studies on Suárez's cognitive theory by sorting them into distinct clusters according to the way of their exegesis. I dare say that his theory of cognition has been read in the following five distinct ways: (1) as a theory *sui generis* against the background of Aristotle's (peripatetic) and Aquinas's (Thomist) positions; (2) as a position criticized and (ideologically) rejected by orthodox Thomism; (3) as a doctrine defended against these attacks by Suarezians (frequently coinciding with (1)); (4) as a philosophy construed largely in light of Augustine's philosophy and medieval Augustinianism; and (5) as a conception anticipating the Cartesian turn to subjectivity (often overlapping with (2)).

(1) The first reading is undoubtedly the most widespread and historically most justified toward Suárez. In the English language scholarship, the most representative contributions exemplifying this reading have been written by James South. In his 'Suárez and the Problem of the External Sensation',¹⁵ South assesses Aquinas as an advocate of a passivist account of perception for whom sensation is said to be equivalent to nothing more than the reception of 'spiritualized' sensible species emitted from the sensible objects. Unlike the interior senses and the intellect, the external senses do not produce internal representations called 'expressed species' (*species expressa*). If they did, the direct realism of external sensation would be jeopardized. As South claims, the equivalence between the production of a sensorial act and the mere reception of species makes an act of perception in this theory into 'a black box'.¹⁶ Such a theory leaves aside the necessary explanation of the perceiver's contribution. Only the 'activist approach', embraced by Suárez, which leads to a substantial revision of Aquinas's theory of the sensible species, can result in a successful explanation of perceptual intentionality, South argues.

In his 'Suárez on Imagination',¹⁷ South discusses two topics which constitute Suárez's main agenda concerning the internal senses. While the first one concerns the issue of the number of the internal senses, the second one has to do with the query about the relation of the interior senses to the external senses and the intellect. Again, Aquinas's theory of four internal senses constitutes the main doctrinal background of his presentation of Suárez's reductionist view of a single internal sense power called 'phantasy'. Some attention is devoted also to the consequent reduction of the functional scope of this (single) interior sense. Suárez's view of the intellect and the privileged epistemological position of the external senses are introduced as two

¹⁵South (2001a).

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 224.

¹⁷South (2001b).

reasons of this reduction. The single interior sense is by Suárez conceived as a mere transmitter of sensory experience coming from the external senses to the intellect. The Jesuit's doctrine of a single power is contrasted with Aquinas's view motivated by the necessity to 'bridge' a gap between the senses that apprehend only singulars and the intellect which cognizes only universals.¹⁸ The paper's second topic concerns the origin of the *species phantastica*. Suárez is said to recur to the device of the agent sense productive of this species, which he identifies with the soul. The soul produces the sensible species on the occasion of the external sense's actual cognition that serves as an exemplary cause for the soul's 'depiction'. In an analogy to the production of the intelligible species, an act of the external sense is not the efficient cause but only an *exemplum* or *occasio* for the soul's production of the species. Employing the lexicon of *emanation*, the *species phantastica* is said by South to flow from the soul through the power of the phantasy in the same way as the intelligible species flows from the soul through the agency of the agent intellect on the occasion of exemplary phantasms. As South concludes, this emanation gives us evidence of 'Suárez's latent and dispositional innatism'.¹⁹

In his later 'Aspects of Intentionality in two 16th Century Aristotelians',²⁰ South supplements his older analysis of Suárez's view of the external sensation with a comparison with the doctrine of perception in Jacobo Zabarella (1533–1589). Zabarella is indicated as an author who identifies the same problems in Aquinas's theory as Suárez does. Zabarella sees the Angelic Doctor as a philosopher who undermines the immanent and the vital character of cognition by attributing too much of the causal efficiency to the sensible species. Both Zabarella and Suárez make sure that the intentionality of perception cannot be explained by a mere reception of the 'spiritual' species because the sensible species are only the material and imperfect *traces* of sensible objects. Perceptual intentionality must be explained (also) through a reference to the factor of selective attention. Additionally, South formulates a hypothesis related to a possible historical influence: Suárez's activist view of perception was not influenced by Augustine, but rather by some authors of the Aristotelian tradition, especially Averroes.²¹

The Thomistic point of reference represented by Cajetan's stance can be found in Cees Leijenhorst's study 'Cajetan and Suarez on Agent Sense: Metaphysics and

¹⁸For the centrality of this interior sense in Aquinas, see recent Lisska (2016, 194–218).

¹⁹South (2001b, 158).

²⁰South (2017).

²¹*Ibid.*, 739: 'Suárez, obviously, has a much more extensive acquaintance with Augustine, but does not refer to him in the context of his discussion of sensory experience. But if not Augustine, what is the source of his critique of the Aristotelian position? What follows is partly speculative on my part, but I do have some evidence'. What follows after this passage is a quotation from Averroes's *Long Commentary on the De Anima*, in which the Arab philosopher raises the question about the agent sense as a potential 'elevator' of sensibles to the level of intentional species. In Sect. 3.2 and elsewhere I show that this conception was sharply criticized by Suárez and that he refers also to Augustine (not frequently, though) in contexts that are relevant for his activist view of perception.

Epistemology in Late Aristotelian Thought'.²² In this chapter Leijenhorst develops the topic of the sensible species against the backdrop of the premise of the entire debate regarding the origin of these species that amounts to the axiom of the impossibility of ascendant causality. How can a sensible object generate the sensibles species, characterized as 'the form without matter', if the sensible species is more perfect than the sensible forms that are represented by it? Clearly, sensible species do not corporeally affect an organ in the way in which the reception of colour would result in colouring the eye. In this context, Leijenhorst presents an illustrative comparison of the Jesuit's theory of the agent sense with that of Cardinal Cajetan (1469–1534) who is frequently conceived by Suárez as a doctrinal arch-opponent. While for Suárez the agent sense is not necessary in the production of the sensible species of the external senses, Cajetan does endorse this 'ontological lift' that elevates the material sensibles to the level of the immaterial sensible species.

The same methodological approach is employed also in his 'Suárez on Self-Awareness'. In this study Leijenhorst compares Suárez's theory of sensory self-awareness with that of Aquinas.²³ As many others, he argues that the best way to understand Suárez's view is to conceive it as an attack on Aquinas's view. Aquinas is presented as denying self-awareness to the external senses.²⁴ This is why the Angelic Doctor stipulates the common sense as the power responsible for noting the acts of the external senses. Distinguishing between knowledge *quid est*, that is, scientific knowledge of what an act is, and knowledge *an est*, that is, knowledge *that* there is an act, Suárez insists that the external senses are aware of their acts since their simple apprehension is a vital affection (*immutatio vitalis*).²⁵ They are able to exercise not only same-order self-awareness but also a non-complex (imperfect) judgment. In this context Leijenhorst underlines the significance of the sensory memory in the argument for this self-awareness. There must be the '*an est*-experience' of a sensorial act since we remember not only an object that we saw in the past but also the act through which we saw it.²⁶

(2) With increasing awareness of the doctrinal distinction between the philosophy of Aquinas and Suárez in the first decades of the twentieth century, the criticism of

²²Leijenhorst (2007).

²³Leijenhorst (2012); for sensory self-knowledge, see esp. 138–44.

²⁴It must be said, however, that this holds only for some of his texts and only for some periods of his carrier. For this, see Cory (2021). See also Sect. 3.7 below.

²⁵For this for Suárez important notion and its employment in late medieval philosophy, see Kaczmarek (1990); Rode (2015, 337–42); for Suárez (*ibid.*, 377–87).

²⁶Leijenhorst (2012, 143–4). In his recent study (Perler, 2014a), beside a useful classification of the various types of self-awareness in Suárez, Dominik Perler takes the same methodological point of departure. Additionally, he raises a question about the certainty of this self-awareness. He points out that unlike the possibility of error concerning the various kinds of sensibles, especially common and incidental sensibles, Suárez never raises a doubt about the certainty related to the cognition of these acts. This shows that the cognition of these acts is on a safe ground. When we attentively perceive an object X, it is not possible for us not to be aware of our sensorial act through which we see this object.

the Jesuit theory of cognition from the position of orthodox Thomism increasingly emerged. This approach is still espoused today as well. The incoherence related to the alleged representationalism, immanentism, voluntarism and scepticism that plague Suárez's philosophy of perception and his theory of cognition in general has become the target of many critiques written by Thomist-oriented authors. One of the recent Anglophone criticisms can be found in Anthony Lisska's book *Aquinas's Theory of Perception. An Analytic Reconstruction*.²⁷ In this book Lisska derives his evaluation largely from the earlier censure that had been formulated by John Deely.²⁸ If the sensible species ceases to be the formal cause and comes to be a 'seedy' virtual representation that generates only efficient causality, and if the external senses are the essentially active powers that produce their own termini (expressed species), the result can be nothing else than epistemological representationalism. Suárez leaves the preserve of direct realism centred in an object in favour of representationalism centred around the subject. In this Suárez unhappily anticipates early modern subjectivism and representationalism.

A similar evaluation can be found in Leopoldo Prieto López's articles.²⁹ Prieto López speaks about 'Suárez's problematization of the intentionality of cognition'. This 'problematization' originates in Suárez's admission of the possibility of the state of affairs, in which God (like the Cartesian *mauvais génie*) causes in the external senses an intuitive cognition of nonexistent objects. There is no contradiction in this hypothetical scenario since each secondary efficient cause can be substituted by the primary (divine) cause. Since the sensible species depends on the sensibles only in the order of efficient causality, its efficiency can well be supplanted by God. For Prieto López this testifies to an unfortunate influence of late medieval philosophers, such as Peter Auriol (ca. 1280–1322) and William Ockham (ca. 1287–1347), on Suárez's cognitive theory as such.³⁰

(3) One of the most extensive critical responses to these, albeit much older, Thomistic accusations of representationalism, immanentism etc.,³¹ and one of the most thorough defences of Suárez's direct realism can be found in the book *La gnoseología del Doctor Eximio y la acusación nominalista* written by Suarezian José María Alejandro.³² Alejandro rejects the abovementioned imputations by pointing to various aspects of Suárez's theory which are not consistent with these charges. These are Alejandro's claims: the perceptual act, which pertains to the category of quality,

²⁷Lisska (2016).

²⁸Deely (1994, 130, 135 and elsewhere).

²⁹See especially Prieto López (2016).

³⁰Ibid., 42–4.

³¹For a negative assessment of Suárez's theory from a Thomistic perspective of an earlier date, according to which the Jesuit is to be seen as a 'grand corrupteur de Saint Thomas', to be blamed for his 'erreur subjectiviste' and for having been responsible for early modern doctrinal errors, such as occasionalism, see Farges (1921, 183–7).

³²Alejandro (1948).

is transcendently related to extramental beings;³³ the act-quality is *vitally* assimilated to extramental things;³⁴ a *pictorial* theory of the impressed and expressed species is not a doctrine endorsed by Suárez;³⁵ intentional species are ‘ignota’; expressed species are not ‘that in which as if in the mirror’ (*id in quo*) an extramental sensible object is apprehended but ‘that by which’ (*id quo*) it is grasped etc. All in all, for Alejandro Suárez is a proponent of the ‘inmediatismo cognoscitiva real absoluto’.³⁶ Although in vision and in the operations of the other external senses we are always at the same time aware that we see, Suárez’s theory of the expressed species should be classified as substantially *object-oriented*.³⁷

(4) Unlike studies devoted to the topic of the agent sense and the activist view of perception, which largely remain within the preserve of a broadly conceived Aristotelian tradition, in his ‘Introducción a la teoría del conocimiento de Francisco Suárez’³⁸ Santiago Fernández Burillo goes beyond this tradition toward the broadly conceived lore of Augustinianism. Although he focuses on intellection, his conclusions (in line with Suárez’s own approach) can be extended to perception too. A crucial trait of Suárez’s cognitive and affective theories is the emphasis on the immanency and the vitality of the soul’s acts. Suárez’s cognitive theory and his philosophical psychology is said to be the philosophy of a ‘Molinist theologian’.³⁹ For a Molinist theologian, however, the most important power is free will. It is free will that postulates the crucial capacity of self-determination. No external influence, whether coming from God, stars, body etc., can compromise Molina’s libertarian account of freedom. As Burillo argues, this libertarian account of freedom constitutes a model for *all* immanent and vital operations in Suárez’s philosophical psychology. Consequently, this emphasis leads to a substantial relativization of the Aristotelian-Thomistic axiom ‘Whatever is moved is moved by another’. Rejecting this axiom gives rise to several important consequences, of which the most relevant one for us is the emphasis on the activity of the cognizant and appetent. This emphasis has led several scholars to a historical re-evaluation of Suárez’s cognitive theory: Especially due to the influence of Scotus and Olivi with his primacy of the power of will and his will’s activity conceived as the model for all cognitive activities, Suárez ought to be classified as a representative of medieval Augustinianism, rather than of Aristotelianism.⁴⁰

³³Ibid., 213.

³⁴The crucial notion of *assimilatio vitalis* in connection with cognition is a leitmotif of Alejandro’s book.

³⁵Ibid., 194.

³⁶Ibid., 207. ‘¿Se podrá hablar de un *inmediatismo* sensitivo del Doctor Eximio? Creemos que sí.’, 237.

³⁷Ibid., 222.

³⁸Burillo (1992).

³⁹Ibid., 212.

⁴⁰For this evaluation, see also Mendiá (1948); Müller (1968, 169–72); Abercrombie (1938, 81–4); Spruit (1995, 300): ‘Thus, Suárez’s philosophy of mind resumed essential aspects of the Augustinian and Olivean lore’.

Clearly, this Augustinianism is strongly mixed with Aristotelianism. While Benito Mendiya regards Suárez's synthesis of the Aristotelian and the (Neo)Platonic–Augustinian elements as constituting a coherent unity, others take it to be an amalgam of heterogeneous doctrines, Heinrich Rösseler formulates the following critical evaluation of Suárez's cognitive theory:

[...] in his teaching Augustinian-Scotistic thoughts are grafted onto Aristotelian-Thomistic foundations⁴¹ [...] However, since Suárez's system is constructed of building blocks that have not yet been sufficiently stripped of their mutually contradictory natures, the doctrine we present reveals in its entirety a lack of inner unity and integrity (*Geschlossenheit*).⁴²

While Augustinian features are represented by the activity of the sense powers and the essential impassibility of the soul through the efficiency of the material world, the *virtual* representation of the intentional species and the production of the expressed species in all the cognitive powers including the external senses, the Thomistic foundations are mirrored in his theory of the unicity of the soul, its parts and the doctrine of the real distinction of the soul from the powers.⁴³

(5) Several recent studies which have been devoted especially to the topic of (perceptual) self-awareness show that in Suárez's theory lurks a modern Cartesian subject. They emphasize Suárez's claim that already on the level of external sensation we are aware of our perceptual processes through which we perceive the extramental objects. We perceive them not through a higher-order act but simultaneously with the sensation of extramental objects. Christian Rode takes Suárez's theory of inner experience as being intimately connected with his theory of the soul, attention and consciousness, as substantially *transcending* the traditional Aristotelian psychology with its cognitive division of labour.⁴⁴ Behind internal experience a modern Cartesian subject operates, conceived as a main distinct agent.⁴⁵ Like other scholars, such as Joseph Ludwig,⁴⁶ Rode analyses the metaphysical underpinning of

⁴¹Rösseler (1922, 196).

⁴²Ibid., 198.

⁴³Ibid., 192–5. Clearly, this evaluation cannot be taken without a reservation. It does not always hold that when two say the same that it really is the same. As I will show below in Sect. 2.6, the last theory, namely the teaching of the real distinction between the soul and the powers conceived as *res*, cannot be attributed to Aristotle or Aquinas.

⁴⁴Rode (2015, 384–5).

⁴⁵For this historiographical assessment, see also Rozemond (2012, 167): 'But at the same time it is hard to resist the impression that some sort of Cartesian subject lies at the centre of Suárez's complex soul'; ibid., 172: 'Buried, as it were, in Suárez's complex Aristotelian Scholastic soul there is a single, unitary entity, whose involvement in its activities relies on attention, suggestive of Cartesian unitary conscious subject, an entity that is 'the same soul' that senses, imagines, and understands'.

⁴⁶Although old (published in 1929), this monograph still belongs to the best publications that have been written on the topic of the relationship of Suárez's philosophical psychology and his metaphysics (natural philosophy). It refers to a large number of useful texts from Suárez's *CDA* and especially *DM* that have been neglected by later scholars. For a recent mapping of Suárez's theory of the sympathy of powers rooted in a single coordinating soul and various epistemological applications of this theory in *CDA* and *DM*, see also García Cuadrado (2005), Knuuttila (2014)

Suárez's theory of substantial attention which he considers to be complementary to his theory of the sympathy of powers which are really distinct from the soul and which are all 'rooted' in the same soul. As one of the historical sources of this theory, Rode and other scholars mention Francisco Vallés (1524–1592) who, as we will see, can be regarded as a major authority for Suárez in physiological questions related to topics of the sense organs of the external senses.⁴⁷

This last interpretative approach seems to me to provide a fitting explanatory key to many issues of Suárez's philosophy of perception. Regardless of his object-centred Aristotelianism, the subjective 'colouring' of Suárez's peripatetic philosophy is a leitmotif of the whole part of *CDA* related to his cognitive theory. The emphasis on the soul's immediate activity in its operations accompanied, among others, by the subject's concomitant introspective consciousness can be regarded as a typical trait of Suárez's theory. As will become clear in Sect. 6.3, this subjective modification leads me to label his theory of perception 'Aristotelian subjectivism'.

1.3 Goals and Methodology

Although in recent years interest in Suárez's epistemology and cognitive theory has increased, no comprehensive treatment of his philosophy of external and internal perception in book format is available yet. The goal of this book is to amend this by presenting Suárez's *comprehensive* doctrine of the external and internal senses with a special (but not exclusive) focus on the human sensory powers, this being in line with the Jesuit's own approach.⁴⁸ Besides providing analyses of the particular issues related to perception, the primary goal of the volume is, on the basis of a thorough text analysis, to bring a *systematic* and *contextual* light on Suárez's account of perception, which is lacking in contemporary research as it remains largely at the level of case studies. My approach, however, will not be restricted to highlighting

and Tropia (2014). For this theory and its significance for Suárez's theory of free will, see the recent Anfray (2017).

⁴⁷Rode (2015, 394–7). For a relationship between Vallés and Suárez, see Amaral (1987–8). Of recent studies on Suárez and the medical tradition, see García Cuadrado (2017a). It must be said that while Suárez's theory of cognition in general and perception in particular have become a relatively frequent topic of research in recent years, Suárez's views about the particular sensory modalities and his scientific views have been much less elaborated. Leaving aside a brief outline in Knuuttila (2015, 205–7) and a survey in Castellote (1962, 143–155), there are no in-depth studies on topics related to the individual external sense modalities, which are treated in *CDA* disp. 7.

⁴⁸Although Suárez lays emphasis on *human* sense perception and on the *rational* soul, there are several more extensive treatments in *CDA* that are *ex professo* devoted to a comparative analysis of perception in human and nonhuman animals. These treatments concern issues of perceptual judgment and discourse (*CDA* disp. 5, q. 6), interior sense operations in perfect and imperfect animals (*CDA* disp. 8, q. 2), and questions related to comparison of human and nonhuman external senses (esp. *CDA* disp. 7, qq. 15–6). All of these will be considered below too.

the connections between the acts of the external senses, of the interior senses and of the intellect. It will also include an introductory part on the metaphysical premises that systematically determine Suárez's perceptual theory. These metaphysical assumptions have to do with the definition of the soul, its relation to the body, its parts and powers. Besides this systematic and contextual perspective this monograph also aspires to be innovative in introducing issues that have been neglected or have been treated only marginally by scholars. These topics are associated especially with the particular sensory modalities, the division of attention and with the problem of corporeal pain in its relation to the sense of touch. Focusing on all these issues will allow us to see the subjective twist of Suárez's philosophy of perception more clearly. Unlike an uncharitable reading charging Suárez with internal inconsistency,⁴⁹ I will mostly apply a charitable reading.⁵⁰ I will argue that Suárez strives to find a dynamic balance between the abovementioned two theoretical demands which are supposed to be met by a successful philosophy of perception, namely between the epistemological (objective) aspect and the phenomenological (subjective) aspect. Considering the dichotomy of cognitive activism and passivism, it may be said that while the receptivist account of perception can readily accommodate the epistemological standard, it has to face difficulties related to the phenomenological criterion. On the contrary, while the activist view neatly fulfils the phenomenological canon, it finds itself in trouble when it comes to meeting the epistemological standard.

What do I mean by a *contextualizing* account? Although Suárez's exposition in *CDA* is a systematic adaption of Aristotle's *On the Soul* and as such is clearly structured, it is a historical fact that while Suárez was writing *CDA* he had already finished some of his commentaries on other Aristotle's texts, especially on his *Physics* and a part of his *Organon*. Commenting on the Stagirite's texts was a part of the standard curriculum at Spanish universities in his time.⁵¹ Unfortunately, with the exception of the commentaries on the *De anima* and the *De generatione et corruptione*, these texts have never been published and, unfortunately, seem to be lost.⁵² As shown by a large number of references throughout *CDA*, at the time of its composition Suárez had already formulated the basics of his metaphysics and natural philosophy. These commentaries and their conclusions are most often quoted in

⁴⁹It must be admitted, however, that there are many issues that evince 'dialectical tensions' in Suárez, especially if they are seen from the perspective of post-Suárezian philosophy. For these tensions in the Jesuit's metaphysics, see Novotný (forthcoming 2021).

⁵⁰One of the few exceptions will be the issue of corporeal pain and its relation to the object of touch (for this see Sect. 4.5.2).

⁵¹For the philosophical triennium at Jesuit universities, with the first year focused on logic (the *Organum*), the second on natural philosophy (*Physics*, *On the Heavens*, *On Generation and Corruption* and *Meteorology*) and the third year spent on *Metaphysics* and *On the Soul*, see Grendler (2019).

⁵²Scoraille (1911, vol. 2, 416) admits his search failed.

disp. 1–3, in which Suárez presents his theory of the soul, its parts and powers. However, some references can also be found in the disputations devoted to cognitive theory.⁵³ It is not difficult to determine why Álvares did not include them in his editorial plan. The reason could have been nothing else than the later publication of the comprehensive *DM*. In fact, we may be sure that *DM* covers all the issues of those juvenile texts. Although scholars have rightly pointed out some doctrinal shifts between *CDA* and *DM*,⁵⁴ some premises, theories and arguments connected especially with Suárez's theory of causality are nonetheless shared by the two texts, which are separated by a quarter of a century.⁵⁵ Accordingly, one of the traits of my procedure will be the *intertextual* incorporation of the relevant parts of *DM* and, in a lesser degree, also of some theological texts, not only in the exposition of the metaphysical assumptions of Suárez's perceptual theory in *CDA*, but also in other parts of the book.

In my interpretation of Suárez's theory, I will not restrict myself to the delineated segment of disp. 5–8, in which he *ex professo* deals with the issue of cognition and perception, and disp. 1–3. In *passim* I will be referring to the *whole* corpus of *CDA* since this commentary makes up a remarkable systematic whole. Accordingly, I will contextualize the Jesuit's views on perception also *intratextually*, namely by rearranging several parts of *CDA*.⁵⁶ Suárez's theory of perception is not an isolated segment in his *scientia de anima*. It cannot be separated from the context of the other disputations. Due to an important parallelism between sensory and intellectual processes it is above all impossible to omit *CDA* disp. 9, focusing on intellectual knowledge. It is not only a structural similarity related to the nature of the cognitive act, its principles and endpoint (*terminus*) that make Suárez's treatment of sensory and intellectual cognition parallel. Intellectual knowledge is important also for a contrasting reason. The intellect and its acts constitute a crucial point of comparison for issues such as (perceptual) self-awareness and judgment, cognition of incidental sensibles, memory, cognition of universals etc. Last, but not least, Suárez's treatise of the intellect cannot be set aside from an analysis of his view of perception also for another reason, which is related to his reductionist approach inspired by 'Ockham's Razor'. As he denies the real distinction between the agent and the passive sense, so he rejects the real distinction between the agent and the potential intellect. The same

⁵³These references are related especially to his metaphysical theories of efficient causality and the categories.

⁵⁴Des Chene (2000, 187) and Schmaltz (2008, 147), to name a few.

⁵⁵It is due to Suárez's genius that as a very young scholar he had already worked out the foundations of his later metaphysical system. Ángel Poncela González (2015, 275–6) characterizes this juvenile 'anticipation' as follows: 'Para este trienio filosófico (1571–1574) compuso, a modo de apuntes, una serie de comentarios a todo el corpus aristotélico. En estos apuntes, en su mayor parte perdidos, puede localizarse el sustrato de lo que, veintitrés años más tarde, serían las Disputaciones Metafísicas (1597)'.

⁵⁶In Chap. 4 I will premiss parts on the number and comparison of the external senses, introduced by Suárez in the last two questions of *CDA* disp. 7, before all the topics analysed in the preceding questions of the disputation, among others.

reductionism can be observed also in Suárez's treatment of the appetitive powers. In a direct connection with his denial of the plurality of the internal senses, Suárez dismisses Aquinas's real distinction between the concupiscible and the irascible appetite.⁵⁷ The affinity of his perceptual and appetitive theory is clear also from the issue of whether bodily pain constitutes the tactile power's proper sensible object, or whether it is rather an emotion. At the same time, as I have said in the previous section, Suárez's conception of the rational appetite (analysed in *CDA* disp. 12) makes a prototypical model of vital and immanent operating that needs to be considered too.⁵⁸

Not differently from most studies devoted to interpreting the Jesuit's philosophy, in historiographical contextualization (in line with the first abovementioned reading) I will consider Aristotle and Aquinas as the main referential points and the immediate background and contrast for Suárez's views of perception. Although his text is framed as a commentary on Aristotle's *On the Soul*, it can be at the same time regarded as an ample gloss on Aquinas's 'Treatise on Man' (*Summa theologiae* I, qq. 75–89). This contrasting will occasionally go hand in hand with references to Augustine and medieval Augustinianism. Although the primary goal of this book is *not* historiographical in the sense of analysing a plethora of historical influences and antecedents of Suárez's theory of perception, I will claim that Suárez's views can often be best understood against the background of other medieval and especially late medieval authors, such as Peter John Olivi (ca. 1248–1298), John Duns Scotus (1266–1308), Peter Auriol (ca. 1280–1322).⁵⁹ Especially in the treatises of the particular sensory modalities I will refer to the theories of the representatives of the medical tradition, such as Claudius Galen (ca. 130–ca. 210), Francisco Vallés (1524–1592) and Andreas Vesalius (1514–1564). Above all in the context of the theory of the sensible species and its propagation *in medio* I will consider the theories developed by proponents of the medieval science of optics (*perspectiva*) as well. Especially in the historical contextualization of the problems of the internal senses and the agent sense I will delve into the Arabic tradition represented by Avicenna and Averroes, and in the case of the latter I will take into account the tradition of medieval and Renaissance Latin Averroism represented by John of Jandun (ca. 1285–1328). From a contrastive point of view, I will be frequently referring to the doctrinal perspectives of Cardinal Cajetan who, rather than Aquinas,

⁵⁷For his denial of the real distinction between these two powers, see King (2002) and Heider (2016a).

⁵⁸Additionally, I will not leave aside the last disp. 14 'De anima separata'. In this disputation, Suárez provides the reader with information about the ontological status of the human soul (its essence and subsistence) in an embodied composite. However, only occasionally will I also consider topics related to the vegetative part of the human soul (*CDA* disp. 4) and the locomotive power of the sentient part of the soul (*CDA* disp. 13).

⁵⁹In connection with Olivi, who is not explicitly quoted by Suárez but whose influence seems to be the undercurrent in many places of *CDA*, I will refer especially to Toivanen (2013b), a recent comprehensive account of the Franciscan's theory of perception.

is often taken as *the* main rival by Suárez. Although my goal is not to locate Suárez's theory in the context of early Jesuit philosophy, let alone in the context of Second scholasticism and early modern philosophy represented by Descartes, Locke and others,⁶⁰ I cannot entirely refrain from comparing Suárez with some of his Jesuit contemporaries, such as Francisco Toledo (1532–1596) and the Coimbra Manuel de Góis (1543–1597), who both wrote commentaries on the *De anima*. Nor can Suárez's scholastic followers be completely left aside. Every so often I will refer to Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578–1641) and Francisco de Oviedo (1602–1651). Of non-Jesuit authors I will occasionally employ theories formulated by the Thomist John Poinot (1589–1644) and Scotists Bartholomeo Mastri da Meldola (1602–1673) and Bonaventura Belluto (1600–1676), whose insights into Suárez's philosophy can be regarded as exceptional. However, considering the book's central topic and size, the theories of these medieval and post-medieval authors can be discussed only in a cursory way.

Considering all these and other primary sources I hope that this volume will, in its modest degree, contribute to contemporary historiography of philosophy by filling in the gap that exists in the mapping of the continuities and discontinuities between medieval (first) and early modern (second) scholasticism. This book thus subscribes to the 'Continuity Thesis', a highly indigent approach in contemporary historiography of medieval and post-medieval scholasticism, according to which there is actually no radical discontinuity between the intellectual developments in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and the early modern period.⁶¹

⁶⁰Each of these contextualizations would deserve a special book. Without a doubt these comparisons are a challenge for the future.

⁶¹For this 'Continuity Thesis', see Pasnau (2011a).

Chapter 2

Metaphysics of the Soul, Its Parts and Powers



A philosophy of perception presupposes many metaphysical assumptions. Leaving aside now those that come from the side of objects, such as the ontological status of the proper sensibles and their representational forms, the general premises on the perceiver's side, namely the soul, its parts and the powers, are analysed in the first three disputations of *CDA* called 'De substantia animae in communi', 'De substantia trium animarum in particulari' and 'De potentiis animae in communi'. In all of them Suárez starts from the fundamentals of Aristotle's natural philosophy to which he adds his own twist. Before dealing with these topics, in the *Proemium*,¹ among other topics, he situates the *scientia de anima*, which means for him largely *scientia de anima rationalis*, in the context of other sciences. What is relevant for our topic is his claim that the treatise of the rational soul is absolutely (*simpliciter*) a part of natural philosophy. Since a soul in general, including the rational soul, is essentially characterized through its ordering to the body, investigating it must belong to the field of natural philosophy. At the same time, however, Suárez is sure that in a certain respect (*secundum quid*), that is, in respect to its incorporeal, subsistent and immortal character, treating of the soul pertains also to metaphysics.² Given this and considering the abovementioned metaphysical framework of the treatise of causality and the categories in *DM*, his conclusions and theories concerning the topics of the soul, its parts and powers can be indicated as the *metaphysical* premises of Suárez's philosophy of perception.

These premises can be divided into four thematic clusters:

¹This *Preface* (*CDA* t. 1, 4–53) is a comment on Aristotle's *On the Soul* I.1.

²See *CDA*, *Proemium*, t. 1, n. 16, 26. This stretch between metaphysics and natural philosophy in Suárez and in other Jesuit authors comes as a reply to this basic question: How can the soul be both a form of the body and (due to its incorporeal, subsistent and immortal character) an independent entity at the same time? For this dilemma in Suárez, see Aho (2009, 59). For this question regarding the philosophical discipline to which the inquiry concerning the rational soul belongs, which was a hot issue in the sixteenth century, see Bakker (2012, esp. 11–2).

1. The first cluster applies to Suárez's reading of Aristotle's two basic definitions of soul (including the rational soul) from his *On the Soul*. In the first definition the soul is characterized as '[...] the first actuality of a natural body potentially possessing life; and such will be any body which possesses organs'.³ The second definition conceives the soul as '[...] the origin of the characteristics we have mentioned, and is defined by them, that is by the faculties of nutrition, sensation, thought and movement'⁴ or '[...] that whereby we live and perceive and think in the primary sense'.⁵ While the first formula, which unlike the two formulations of the second is applicable to all kinds of soul, features the soul in terms of formal causality, the two formulations of the second definition describe it through efficient causality. The metaphysical interplay between these two definitions, which in Suárez, as we shall amply see, is substantially determined by a reification and 'dualization' of both hylomorphic principles, constitutes an important part of the metaphysical background of Suárez's philosophy of perception on the side of the percipient.
2. Due to the validity of the scholastic axiom 'actions are of suppositis' (*actiones sunt suppositorum*) and with respect to the fact that for Suárez the soul becomes an agent *sui generis*, it is impossible to omit his theory of the partial subsistence of the rational soul. If perception is a doing, it must somehow come from a subsistent entity, whether it is a hylomorphic composite or a soul. Typically, in the last *CDA* disp. 14 the rational soul in its embodied status is qualified by Suárez as a 'semi-person' (*semipersona*).
3. An important part of the theoretical point of departure of Suárez's view of perception is constituted by his theory of the unicity of a substantial form (the soul) connected with its indivisibility and its hollenmerical character, that is, the claim that the soul exists wholly in every part of the body. In the reasoning for these conclusions, Suárez introduces his theory of the sympathy or harmony of the powers 'rooted' in the same soul, which is operative especially in Suárez's theory of the origin of the species of the internal sense.
4. The last set of the metaphysical agenda is connected with Suárez's theory of the powers, namely with their reified character, their real distinction from the soul and from the material composite and their origin or resulting from the soul. I will argue that the theory of the 'reified' hylomorphic principles is directly correlated with precisely this view of the reified powers.⁶

I will not delve into a detailed elaboration of these metaphysical issues as it would lead me too far from my main concern. First, I will take into account only what Suárez says in *CDA* and the later *TDA*.⁷ Second, I will refer to *DM* and his other

³Aristotle, *On the Soul* II.1, 412 a29–412 b1, 69.

⁴*Ibid.*, II.2, 413 b12–3, 77.

⁵*Ibid.*, II.2, 414 a12–3, 79.

⁶For a detailed elaboration of some of these issues in the context of other early Jesuits' theories as often adumbrating Cartesian philosophy, see Des Chene (1996, 17–251).

⁷For *TDA* and its use in this book, see the notes 1 and 12.

treatises only to the extent to which its formulations help clarify what he says in *CDA*.

2.1 The Soul as the First Actuality of a Natural Body Potentially Possessing Life

In line with Aristotle, Suárez starts with commonsensical observations. Living beings are distinguished from non-living beings through self-movement in a broad sense including augmentation and self-sustenance. If an animal can move and nourish itself, it is alive, if not, it is dead. This is why we call still waters ‘dead waters’ and moving waters ‘living waters’. It is also evident that living beings are not simple. They are composed of parts. Some parts are passive and moved, while others are active and moving. The ancients called the active parts ‘the principle of life’.⁸ A perennial philosophical problem is what this principle of life amounts to. A reader of *CDA*’s introductory passages soon finds out how clear and structured Suárez’s reply to this question is.⁹

He starts by addressing the question of the *genus* of this vital principle, and then he asks about its specific difference.¹⁰ Following the first part of Aristotle’s first definition of the soul (the soul as the first actuality) Suárez declares that the principle of life or the moving part, sc. the soul, can be neither an accident, such as the harmony (*temperamentum*) of the first qualities, nor a body, nor (prime) matter, but the *substantial form of a living body*.¹¹ Although a certain harmony of the first qualities of the cold, the hot, the dry and the wet on the side of the organic parts is necessary and constitutes the material cause for the reception and conservation of the substantial form,¹² the principle of life cannot be characterized through this temperamental account of primary qualities associated, among others, with the names of Galen and Epicur.¹³ Referring (without precisely pinpointing a *locus*) to Augustine’s *De immortalitate animae* Suárez replies to this position by simply claiming that there are the rational soul’s operations, such as those of love and understanding, which obviously exceed the virtues of these qualities and thus are irreducible to them.

⁸*CDA* disp. 1, q. 1, n. 3, t. 1, 58–62.

⁹In defining the soul Suárez follows the first two chapters of Aristotle’s *On the Soul* II.

¹⁰*TDA* book 1, ch. 1, n. 1, 4.

¹¹*CDA* disp. 1, q. 1, n. 5, t. 1, 66. In *TDA* book 1, ch. 1, n. 2, 467 Suárez explicitly refers to *DM* disp. 15, s. 1 where he argues for the existence of substantial forms. I will lay out his argument based on the distinction between accidental and substantial forms below in 2.4 when treating the issue of the unicity of the soul.

¹²*TDA* book 1, ch. 1, n. 10, 470.

¹³*CDA* disp. 1, q. 1, n. 4, t. 1, 64; *TDA* book 1, ch. 1, n. 6, 469. The Galenic temperamental account of the soul was widespread in the medical tradition in the Renaissance. For this conception, see Giglioni (2019). For the importance of Galen’s materialist psychology for early modern Aristotelianism, see Buchenau and Lo Presti (2017, “Introduction,” 3).