Ulrich Beck Edgar Grande

Cosmopolitan Europe

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Illustrations

Cosmopolitan Europe

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Preface

Europe as a model must be rethought. It worked for fifty years but now it has outlived its usefulness. A new era of border-transcending and border-effacing cooperation began, if not at first, then emphatically with the eastern enlargement of the European Union. Yet what exactly has occurred? Where is Europeanization leading us and what has been its driving force to date? The euphoria (and the scepticism) over the new, enlarged Europe cannot disguise the fact that Europe still remains to be understood and conceptualized. This historically unique and distinctive form of intergovernmental and inter-societal community escapes all traditional categories and concepts. Europe exemplifies particularly clearly how historically unreal and blunt our political concepts and the theoretical concepts of the social sciences have become – for both remain trapped in the conceptual straightjacket of methodological nationalism.

What holds the enlarged Europe together? A new perspective on Europe – the cosmopolitan outlook! This book is a response to the new founding moment of the European Union and it presents and develops a concept for it, namely, 'cosmopolitan Europe'. It is an attempt to understand and to provide a new theoretical and practical specification of Europeanization in light of the theory of reflexive modernization.

This reconfiguration of thought and research cannot succeed in a single step. This book is part of a larger project of Ulrich Beck, a trilogy on 'cosmopolitan realism', which it also brings to a close. In the first volume of this trilogy, *Power in the Global Age*, Ulrich Beck explores the legitimacy of political authority under conditions of global

interdependence. The second book, *The Cosmopolitan Vision*, deals with foundational questions and develops the principles of a cosmopolitan enlightenment. This third and final volume, *Cosmopolitan Europe*, which is co-authored with Edgar Grande, throws light on the unknown Europe in which we are living.

task of assembling the bibliography. Our warmest thanks to them both.

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Ulrich Beck

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1
Introduction: The European Malaise and Why the Idea of Cosmopolitan Europe Could Overcome It

1   Rethinking Europe

The world is out of joint. No, this is not a reference to 'globalization' or to the 'terrorist threat', to the 'eastern enlargement of the European Union' or to Europe's 'shrinking population', but referred to an explosion in population, to the scandal that 'servants were becoming kings', that the Reformation was leading to the collapse of a global order and that the first signs indicated that the new form of state was indeed having disciplining effects. Even allowing for the fact that the symptoms of crisis of the current European transformation are different, it is striking how similar the forms of speech in use at the beginning of the twenty-first century are to those used by people responding to the loss of certainty in the early modern period, at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century (Schulze 2004). The more societies are confronted with transformations that threaten their very foundations, the more fearfully people cling to what is familiar and the more likely they are to misunderstand the new realities. Even changes for the better then provoke anxious resistance.

Even the most advanced sciences and scientists were not immune to this infatuation with error intended to protect the foundations of one's thought – far from it. For example, the invention of the printing press was dismissed as a passing fad. Those who viewed the sciences as the source

of renewal stood corrected: the 'friend of truth' had to 'guard with all his strength against all innovation'. For 'omnis novitas periculosa' (Lentulus), all innovation is dangerous! Moreover, according to Bacon, 'whatever has not already been invented and understood, can never be so hereafter' (*Novum organum*). The phenomenon that dramatic changes inspire intellectual and normative stasis has already been remarked by Jacob Burckhardt: 'Major historical changes are always purchased at great cost, often after people imagined they had got them on the cheap' (Burckhardt 1957: 89).[1]

However, the differences in reactions and mentalities among countries were as pronounced then as they are today. In France and England, there were elements of a 'libertine climate of thought'. The changes were accepted but at the same time attempts were made to comprehend them and relate them to older realities. The German reaction was quite different: 'The German discussion was framed by a kind of fundamental moral critique of the existing, "bad", world.' People felt endangered, for example, by 'a Turkish threat of apocalyptic proportions' (Schulze 2004: 10).

Like the printing press at that time, today the European Union is similarly misunderstood, for the simple reason that it is still perceived within the outdated political and scientific framework of the nation, whereas the realities which are producing Europeanization represent *the* classic historical counter-example to the political and social ontology of the nation-state. Because the European Union seems to have been exhaustively researched, the principle that whatever has not yet been discovered and understood cannot be discovered and understood in the future either also seems to hold for research on Europe. This book demonstrates precisely the opposite. Europe stands for the most misunderstood thing in the world, for a powerful

negation – neither state nor society, at least not in the sense in which the United States, for example, is both a state and a society.

In contrast to the great European minds who developed their philosophical and political vision of Europe long before they could have had an inkling of what Europeanization would actually entail, today we are confronting the experience of Europeanization without knowing how to conceptualize and understand it. Europe in movement – Europe *as* movement – escapes our understanding because this permanent process of transformation contradicts the conception within which Europe hitherto seemed to be self-evidently situated, namely, the conceptual horizon of national societies and states. To be sure, social and political history is not the same thing as the history of ideas. Europeanization is also shaped by interests and institutions, and whether this experiment will fail or not does not depend on its false understanding of itself alone. Nevertheless, interpreting a permanent, thoroughgoing transformation like Europeanization for which we lack interpretive categories that are able to represent it as meaningful, and even necessary, multiplies the burden of innovation without revealing its chances of success.

That Europe is trapped in a malaise is by now a truism. However, it is more difficult to explain how this malaise could be overcome. In our view, it would be premature to discard the very idea of Europe as outdated. On the contrary, today Europe is the last politically effective utopia. The maxim 'in dubio pro Europa' remains valid, although Europe for the most part tends to think and behave in national terms. How can the really existing utopia overcome this debilitating malaise?

That the prospects are bleak is taken as a given in public discourses. The assumption is now that the EU can't amount to much, even though not long ago it was the target of impassioned appeals to form a military and political counterweight to America. Internally, the EU has been confronted with intensifying criticism from its citizens, as documented impressively by the failed national referendums on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005. Economically, Europe's performance is still much worse than that of the USA and there is no evidence that the ambitious political objects of the Lisbon Summit in 2000 will ever be met.

Eastern enlargement has added to the current malaise. In its largest extension to date, the European Union expanded eastwards in early 2004, thereby bridging the deep chasm opened up by hot and cold wars during the bloody history of the twentieth century. However, the new Eastern European member states harbour the same scepticism towards the distant bureaucracy in Brussels that nourished their mistrust of Moscow. In the East, Europe belongs to the past. It has been lost and lingers only in memory. It is like a faded family photograph from the interwar years, tinged with nostalgia and longing. In the West, by contrast, Europe signifies a different future, one yet to be discovered and constructed. Thus, the states which have recently been accepted into the European 'family' represent a *terra incognita* for their Western neighbours.

There is currently much talk of the provincialization of Europe. But isn't Europe mainly preoccupied with its favourite topic – namely, itself – while the world is falling to pieces? From the perspective of the postcolonial world, globalization is synonymous with the decline of Europe. For globalization is the materialization of the American world spirit. The erstwhile colonial masters have suddenly been demoted to second-class status and hence no longer set

their own standards of greatness or incompetence. On this point, the postcolonial countries are in agreement with the American 'lords of the world'. Europe no longer even figures in their power calculations. Since Europe cannot assert itself militarily and speaks with many voices in foreign and security policy, it need not be taken seriously and merits only cosmetic regard.

Europe is also mired politically. The uninspired, petty way in which it tried to give itself a constitution is just one example of this. All sides exhaust themselves in complaints, demands and appeals: Something must happen! Something should have happened a long time ago! But nothing is happening – or so it seems. In fact, a lot is happening – for some, even far too much. Though it may sound paradoxical, over the past decade the European process has been driven forward by its 'failures'. 'I've been pronounced dead, so I must be!' is Europe's motto. Europe has grown up amid doom-laden prophecies. If the prophets of doom and their prophesies were correct, then Europe would never have experienced its current major crisis. If it is not to disintegrate, it must answer the question: Who is to set the political agenda for this gigantic entity encompassing twenty-seven states and over 494 million people, and how? However, the fact that the phoenix has hitherto always arisen invigorated from the ashes of the declarations of its demise does not mean that the present malaise can also be overcome merely by being loudly trumpeted.

Yet, could it be that the perpetual diagnosis of 'crisis' and 'decline' also reflects the fact that the nation-state narrative of society and politics which we impose on Europeanization misses reality and leads to systematic misunderstandings? Perhaps it is not a matter of regret that Europe is still at the planning stage in spite of two and a half millennia of history; maybe the point is that this contributes to the reality of Europeanization. Maybe the

main problem is that the political script being played out in the minds of Europeans is at variance with the script which is actually determining European reality. Maybe what is lacking is not a *single* European identity that unites everybody but a narrative of Europeanization that makes sense of the interrelation between new departures and declines. Maybe the real European crisis is just this inability to see the contradictory events as part of a common European undertaking. And maybe this, and not geographical distance, is the reason why the EU institutions seem distant, unreal and irrelevant to the citizens they are supposed to serve.

In fact, our thesis is that the process of Europeanization – because of its successes! – has reached a critical threshold and that the political energy reserves of the semantics and vision of Europe associated with the nation-state are exhausted. The internal conditions of European politics have changed abruptly with the completion of the European internal market and the eastern enlargement; and, at the same time, the external coordinates of European integration have been fundamentally displaced by globalization and the new global political conflicts. Under these conditions, institutional reforms alone, such as the creation of a European constitution, do not go far enough. Much more is called for, namely, *to rethink Europe.*

If Europe is to live up to its reputation as the world's most successful failing political organization, then it must achieve a new self-understanding comprising three elements: first, a narrative that enables us to situate and understand the contradictory realities of Europeanization as moments of a common European undertaking, second, a new political vision and, third, a new concept of political integration, where both vision and concept should be based on the narrative of Europeanization.

With the idea of *cosmopolitan Europe* developed in this book, our goal is to place such an analytical and political vision for Europe on the agenda. In our view, Europe is not currently weighed down by an excessive burden of tasks nor are its institutions poorly structured. The underlying problem is completely different. Europe is still labouring under a national self-misunderstanding that misrepresents its historical awakening and task and generates political obstacles. This national self-misunderstanding makes Europe and its member countries, behind their cooperative façade, into arch-rivals who threaten each other's existence in the final analysis because of the success of the European project. In a sense, they are conducting a 'war' against each other with the peaceful means of integration: *either* Europe *or* the nation-states – a third possibility is excluded. In this book, we are affirming precisely this third option when we speak of 'cosmopolitan Europe'. However, if this third cosmopolitan option is excluded analytically, and hence does not even appear as a possibility on the horizon, then the progress of Europeanization represents a persistent mortal danger to national identity and national sovereignty. In this view, talk of 'Europe' arouses deep fears that bolt doors shut and erect barricades; for the existence of nation-states must be continually defended and secured against Europe. Thus understood, European integration turns into an infernal zero-sum game in which both Europe and its member states are the ultimate losers.

2 What is meant by cosmopolitan Europe?

The concept of 'cosmopolitan Europe' and the associated idea mark a break with this 'either/or' logic of Europeanization, with the national outlook and methodological nationalism (see Beck 2005: ch. 1; Beck

2006: ch. 1) which consistently duped thought and action with the irreducibility of this alternative, and hence form one of the main reasons why debates about Europe always end up in the same impasse. However, when we speak of *cosmopolitan Europe* we do not mean to imply the dissolution and replacement of the nation but its reinterpretation in light of the ideals and principles for which Europe in essence always stood and stands, that is, in light of a new conception of political cosmopolitanism. The key question (not exclusively, but especially also, for Europe!) is: How can a new kind of society and politics be discovered and justified that does not rely on the old stabilizing factors, building both internally and externally on the historically established forms of nationality, while opening them up and extending them? How can social and political *integration through cosmopolitanization* come about? And how can this horizon of possibility and reality be opened up by dissociating basic social and political structures and concepts – society, state, politics, social inequality, mobility, ethnicity, justice, solidarity, etc. – from the national orthodoxy and redefining them from the cosmopolitan perspective?

The emerging cosmopolitan Europe opens up new possibilities of social organization and political participation, though *not* based on the model of a European demos or of a conventional European political monopoly based on homogeneity and uniformity. As this book demonstrates, de facto Europeanization has already developed in accordance with a different *empirical* logic over the past fifty years. For it was marked from the outset by the fact that the fundamental principle of cosmopolitanism was politically *institutionalized*, though at the same time *deformed* in the most diverse ways. The success story of Europeanization followed the route of limited, even contradictory, deformed cosmopolitanism,

though one which is responsive to conflicts and generates conflicts of its own. This deformed institutionalized cosmopolitanism comprises multiple spheres and subjects; it is the point of intersection of the activities and strategies of a growing number of players involved in the discourse over the definition and shape of 'Europe', whether or not they are formally integrated into the European Union.

In the following chapters, we will offer a series of detailed answers to the question of what is meant by a 'cosmopolitan Europe', or a 'cosmopolitan integration' of Europe. Before we begin, however, we must clarify three prior questions: What is Europe? What is cosmopolitanism? And finally: How does the idea of the cosmopolitan Europe differ from other political visions and analytical concepts of Europe?

2.1   What is Europe?

Taking a closer look at Europe, whether in politics or in the social sciences, is like entering a hall of mirrors. Depending on one's standpoint, it is magnified or shrinks, and the slightest movement of the observer leads to a distortion of its proportions. There are no clear and simple answers to where it begins and ends, to what it is and what it should become. Whether one equates Europe with the European Union and its member states or understands it as a larger geographical and political space, Europe as such does not exist, only *Europeanization* in the sense of an institutionalized process of permanent change. What 'Europe' includes and excludes, the location and direction of its territorial boundaries, its institutional form and what institutional architecture it should have in the future – none of this is clear. Europe is not a fixed condition. Europe is another word for variable geometry, variable national interests, variable involvement, variable internal–external relations, variable statehood and variable identity. This also

holds for the institutional core of Europeanization, the EU. At a first approximation, the EU can only be understood as the counter-image of a static state order. The EU is *an institutionalized 'more and further'*, it is geared to movement, to a process that transcends and interconnects the internal and the external. As we will later show in detail, its development does not follow the logic of state consolidation but of *post-hegemonic expansion*. In short, Europe is not a predefined spatial shell in which 'Europeanization' can unfold, and the goal of this process as yet lacks a conceptual blueprint and is without historical precedent. This innovation 'Europe' is a social construct, one which has until now obeyed a peculiar logic, namely, the *logic of side effects*, the logic of the unintended consequences of political decisions.[2] Therein lies the peculiar modernity of Europe, and it is exactly for this reason that the project of European integration represents an exemplary field of study for the reflexive modernization of modern societies. In what follows, we will elucidate this in five steps.

In a *first* step, we define Europe as an *open* political project, not as a fixed quantity of whatever kind. More precisely, we hold that Europe can define itself only in the form of a political project. In this context, one can certainly draw on the insights of research on nationalism, for the difficulties of conceptualizing 'Europe' are not completely new, historically speaking.[3] They already became apparent in a similar form at the end of the nineteenth century when the problem – sufficiently discussed in the meantime – was one of defining what the 'nation' is. This is shown in an exemplary way by Ernest Renan in his famous lecture at the Sorbonne of March 1882. As is well known, in answering the question 'What is a nation?', Renan concluded that it could be equated neither with a particular race nor with a language, a religion, an interest group or a

naturally defined territory. In other words, the nation cannot be defined in terms of substantive attributes of any kind. And the same holds for Europe! However, this does not mean that these two concepts cannot be defined at all. Ernest Renan, and following him the later research on nationalism (see Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Anderson 1991), concluded that the nation must be defined in *political* terms. More precisely, it must define *itself* politically and bring itself forth as a real community. Generalizing the basic ideas of Benedict Anderson's analysis of nationalism, one could argue that all modern collective identities must be politically 'invented' or 'constructed' (see Anderson 1991), where a constructed identity should not be confused with a *fictitious* one. This holds even more so for transnational, hence nation-transcending, collective identities, such as the European. Europe cannot be discovered [*gefunden*], it must be invented [*erfunden*].

A prime example of this is the adjudication of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which, in accordance with its self-definition, elevated the European founding treaties to the status of a 'Constitutional Charter' in two leading decisions, in 1963 and 1964 (see Weiler 1991, 1999; Joerges 2003). As is generally known, with this it erected one of the two main pillars of the principle of European supranationalism, namely, the immediate jurisdiction of EC law and its priority over national law. Consequently, a European law emerged that claims constitutional *priority* and that was duly acknowledged and accepted as such by the key players in European politics. In this way, a European legal framework and culture developed that is potentially in a position to criticize the national legal systems and to replace them by the European administration of justice. This cosmopolitan overthrow of legal relations was driven forward by the 'legal

conversation' with the national supreme courts (see Alter 2001) and, what is more, was adopted by national governments and parliaments as the basis of their further operations. Two things are especially noteworthy about this. First, this cosmopolitan self-definition of the ECJ gave rise to an authoritative form of constitutionalism in Europe *without* a formal constitution, based on a *practice* of law-making that is not founded on *any* worked-out theory or on *any* knowledge of where this is all leading or of its ultimate goal.[4] We will return to this unintentional aspect of the history of European integration in greater detail in [chapter 2]. However, this example throws light on a further feature of the construction of Europe. It shows that the 'invention of Europe' was a product not of public deliberation and democratic procedures but, in this instance, of judicial prescription.

This immediately raises the question concerning the European 'We'. Who invents and constructs Europe? Who decides on the legitimacy of changes in the rules of the game? Are transformations in the rules of power founded on the old basis of legitimacy of the nation-state system? Alternatively, are the national sources of the legitimacy of power and authority themselves up for grabs in the European meta-power game? The example of the self-empowerment of the ECJ in interplay with the member governments and the European Commission demonstrates that these questions admit very different and highly controversial answers. It nevertheless remains true that the 'We' in Europe is not the same before and after a surge in Europeanization.

However one interprets this in detail, it entails a change of 'We', a change in identity, subject and legitimacy. The 'We' who legitimize the cosmopolitan legal regime are the *prospective* Europeans who in this way become the subject of their own history. Ultimately, the legitimacy of the self-

fulfilling prophecy is supposed to become (or be made) effective here. Through its adjudication, the ECJ is becoming a *cosmopolitan entrepreneur* who imposes an element of cosmopolitan Europe through the power of law against the national Europe. Here, it not only draws on a circular form of legitimacy but also produces it. The law counts on acceptance by the European subject which it brings into being through its law. Europeanization, thus conceived, is another word for Europe's *self-creation*.

This leads, in a *second* step, to the question of the political principles that are guiding, or should guide, Europe's 'self-creation'. There is no clear and straightforward answer to this question either. In recent years, the discussion concerning Europe has moved between two extremes. The minimal position, as contained in the Copenhagen principles governing the eastern enlargement, for example, demands only commitment to democracy and a market-based economic system from accession countries, plus the ability to put into effect the '*acquis communautaire*', the stock of existing European regulations. The maximal position found expression in the consultations of the European Constitutional Convention. The latter undertook the ambitious task of laying down a comprehensive, and in part highly controversial, catalogue of 'European basic values' in the Constitution, based on the 'Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union' of December 2000 (see European Council 2000). The Charter itself comprises a total of seven chapters and fifty-four articles in which the 'common values' of the European Union are contained. Its preamble not only refers to the 'spiritual and moral heritage' of the Union but at the same time lists a whole series of individual and collective rights, values and principles. The subsequent controversies in the Constitutional Convention showed that people have very different conceptions of what constitutes the 'spiritual and

moral heritage' of Europe. Is it restricted to Western Christian culture, or does it go beyond this? And, if so, does it include the 'Orthodox cultural sphere', as defined by Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1996), or not? The answers to these questions have profound implications, for on them ultimately depends what is included in 'Europe' and which countries can be considered as possible future members of the EU (on this, see chapter 4).

In this book, we will adopt neither of these two positions. We will instead defend a historical argument that makes it possible to see the values and norms of the new Europe as an answer to the history of the regimes of terror of the twentieth century on both the left and the right. We will develop this argument in detail later (see chapter 4). Briefly, we maintain that these terror regimes and their consequences mark a break in the formation of a European collective identity. It is no accident that the institutionalized European cosmopolitanism which fosters respect for difference can be traced back to the Nuremberg Trials in 1945–6. The latter went beyond national sovereignty for the first time and established new ways of comprehending the historical monstrosity of the murder of the Jews in legal categories, namely, in terms of 'crimes against humanity'. This, in turn, gave rise to an original internal European contradiction. The traditions of colonialism, nationalism, expulsion and genocide originated in Europe; but so too did the values and legal categories against which they are measured and condemned as crimes against humanity. Commemoration of the Holocaust, in particular, becomes a beacon warning against the omnipresent modernization of barbarity (Levy and Sznaider 2001). Cosmopolitan Europe in this sense must be understood as a self-critical Europe. It represents its own institutionalized self-criticism. Could this radical self-critical confrontation with its own history be what distinguishes Europe from the United States and

from Islamic societies, for example? Can we derive from this the shared norms which the cosmopolitan project needs to combine recognition of difference with the idea of European integration?

Third, it should be emphasized that the political construction of Europe has an internal and an external side. Large areas of research on Europe mistakenly conceive of European integration exclusively as an *internally* oriented process steered by national interests and supranational institutions. The various theoretical approaches differ primarily over which of these factors they accord the greatest weight. In this way, however, they overlook an essential aspect of Europeanization. An examination of the history of the process of European integration shows that the external side is particularly important in the European case. Europe was and is continually forced *from the outside* to define itself politically and to take stances on global political issues. The crucial point is that this is not left up to Europeans themselves, so that they cannot simply refuse to confront this question. Two examples of this are the Iraq War in early 2003 and Turkey's desire to become a member of the EU. It is no accident that both of these problems have provoked discussions of matters of principle and fundamental distinctions – between 'old' and 'new' Europe and between 'Christian-Western' and 'Islamic-Eastern' culture. This also revealed the kind of dead ends into which attempts to define Europe through pre-political, 'cultural' commonalities can lead. The discussion of where Europe stands on matters of foreign policy has ended up in a paradoxical situation as a result. On the one hand, the demarcation of Europe from Turkey is justified by appealing to the cultural, social, legal and political commonalities of its present member states; on the other hand, certain European heads of government presented

precisely the same commonalities as an argument for standing alongside the United States during the Iraq crisis, and hence for the division of Europe.

Fourth, it should be noted that the political construction of Europe exhibits a peculiarity that distinguishes it from all projects of nation-state building. European integration was a *dynamic, open process* from the outset. To repeat, Europe does not exist, only Europeanization. Moreover, this process of Europeanization proceeds in two directions: *inwards*, through constant extensions of the powers of the EU and the resulting structural adaptations in the member states; and *outwards*, through the constant enlargements of the community and the export of its norms and rules.[5] The 'Europe' of the 1950s was very different from that of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s; and, with the eastern enlargement in 2004, Europe again fundamentally altered its territorial shape. In recent years, both the territorial frontiers of the Community towards the outside and the internal 'political frontiers' between the Community and its member states have been shifting significantly. The Europe of the 1980s and 1990s was also different from the Europe of the 1950s with regard to the scope of its supranational tasks and competences. The decisive point here is that, whereas an end of this process has in the meantime become a topic of discussion, we are still far from clear concerning the 'finality' of Europe. Where does Europe end? What belongs to Europe? There is as yet no answer to these questions.

Fifth, and finally, Europe must not be equated with a specific institutional form, the EU (or, previously, the EC). From the outset, the European integration process exhibited a highly *variable architecture* of treaties and alliances. The European Communities (first the European Coal and Steel Community, later the European Economic Community and EURATOM) were not the first, or even the

only, alliances and treaties formed in Europe following World War II. Alongside them were the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), the European Space Agency (ESA), the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), EUREKA (the Europe-wide network for market-oriented industrial R&D) – the list could be extended a lot further. In this way, a highly complex architecture of forms of cooperation with extremely variable memberships and highly differentiated rights and duties for member states was created that extended far beyond the various European Communities in the narrower sense, and some of them were even intended in part as direct competitors to them, as in the case of the EFTA. Hence, it would be fundamentally mistaken simply to equate Europe with the various European Communities or the European Union. If we transcribe this complex architecture onto a map, it becomes apparent that 'Europe' reaches as far west as Los Angeles and Vancouver and as far east as Vladivostok – and it included Turkey from the beginning, needless to say.

In sum, Europe is a highly complex and highly differentiated, politically animated and flexible political project. It cannot be defined clearly and precisely, and certainly not for all time, in a binding way. Consequently, from a nationally fixated perspective it inevitably appears that Europe does not exist, even that it cannot exist! Hence, Europe is an example of something known in fuzzy logic as the 'Law of Incompatibility': 'As complexity rises, precise statements lose meaning and meaningful statements lose precision' (McNeill and Freiberger 1993: 43). However, it by no means follows that meaningful statements are no longer possible. The concept of

cosmopolitanism offers the key to this puzzle, as this book will show.

2.2   What is cosmopolitanism?

What does the concept of cosmopolitanism mean precisely? How does cosmopolitanism differ from other concepts situated beyond the particular, such as the concepts of universalism, multiculturalism and postnationalism? How is it related to modern society and its transformation? And what does the concept of cosmopolitanism contribute to our understanding of Europeanization? These questions are in urgent need of clarification because the concept of cosmopolitanism is currently in vogue and serves as a synonym for many things: globalization, globality, glocalism, globalism, universalism, multiculturalism, pluralism, imperialism. All of these, so it is claimed, contain a cosmopolitan element; nevertheless, their adherents also leave no doubt that there is a world of difference between these concepts. But which difference?

The concept 'cosmopolitanism' has both a very old meaning and one that points to the future. Indeed, what makes it so interesting for a theory of modern societies is that it is both *pre*-national and *post*-national. As is well known, it can be traced back to the Cynics and Stoics of antiquity who also invented the word. Subsequently, it played a role in European societies whenever they were faced with fundamental upheavals. It acquired central importance in the philosophy of the Enlightenment (in Germany, in Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Wieland, Forster, Herder, Goethe, Schiller, Heine and others) (see Schlereth 1977; Toulmin 1990; Kleingeld 1999; Thielking 2000); it was taken up again in the nationalistically oriented, culturally critical philosophy of the late nineteenth century (e.g., Meinecke 1907); and, finally, the current debates on globalization rediscovered it as a positive counterweight to the

organizing power of the market and of the nation-state (see Pogge 1992; Held 1995; Archibugi and Held 1995; Archibugi, Held and Köhler 1998; Linklater 1998; Cheah and Robbins 1998; Kaldor 1999; Levy and Sznaider 2001; Beck 2005, 2006; Vertovec and Cohen 2002; Archibugi 2003b; Kaldor, Anheier and Glasius 2003).

In light of this long prehistory, it would be presumptuous to expect this concept to have a consistent meaning. Nevertheless, we can identify two premises that form the core of the cosmopolitan project. Cosmopolitanism combines appreciation of difference and alterity with attempts to conceive of new democratic forms of political rule beyond the nation-state (see Brennan 1997). Daniele Archibugi has summarized this normative core of cosmopolitanism in three principles: tolerance, democratic legitimacy and effectiveness (Archibugi 2003a: 11).

With our understanding of cosmopolitanism, we draw expressly on this strand of tradition. However, we want to use the concept in a very specific way – namely, as a *social scientific* concept – and for quite specific social facts and circumstances – namely, a specific way of *dealing socially with cultural difference*. In this way, the concept of cosmopolitanism can be distinguished in an ideal-typical manner from a number of other social ways of dealing with difference, in particular, hierarchical subordination, universalistic and nationalistic sameness and postmodern particularism (for a detailed account of the social scientific concept of cosmopolitanism and its counter-concepts, see Beck 2006, ch. 2). In the present context it is important that the concept of cosmopolitanism, whose specific point resides in overcoming the dualities of the global and the local, the national and the international, is not specified in *spatial* terms; in particular, it is not bound to the 'cosmos' or to the 'globe'. The *principle* of cosmopolitanism, as we define it, can be located and applied everywhere, and

hence also to regional geographical units such as Europe. Indeed, understanding Europe in cosmopolitan terms means defining the European concept of society as a regionally and historically particular case of global interdependence, as we will later show (<u>chapter 4</u>).

In the first place, cosmopolitanism differs fundamentally from all forms of vertical differentiation that seek to bring social difference into a hierarchical relation of *superiority and subordination*. This principle can be applied, on the one hand, within societies insofar as they form highly differentiated caste and class systems. However, it was also used to define relations to other societies. Typical here is that one denies 'the others' the status of sameness and equality and perceives them in a relation of hierarchical subordination or inferiority. At the extreme, the others are regarded as 'barbarians' devoid of rights. Not only premodern societies tried to deal with difference in this way; the modern construction of colonial empires from the sixteenth century onwards also followed this principle. Moreover, as Huntington's (1996) concept of civilization and his thesis of a 'clash of civilizations' show, even the postmodern constellation itself is susceptible to a hierarchy of difference.

The *dissolution of differences* represents the countervailing principle to hierarchical subordination. It presupposes the development and recognition of *universal* norms that facilitate the justification and institutionalization of the equal treatment of others. The universalistic approach replaces the multitude of different norms, classes, ethnic identities and religions with one unified norm. In this context, we can distinguish between at least two variants of universalism: a *substantial universalism* that advocates the equality and equal value of externally different others on the basis of substantive norms; and a *procedural universalism* that is primarily geared to fair rules in dealing