Volker Rittberger
Martina Fischer (eds.)

Strategies for Peace

Contributions of International Organizations, States, and Non-State Actors

Barbara Budrich Publishers

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Part IV CROSS-CUTTING CHALLENGES FOR POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING

Preface

Martina Fischer and Volker Rittberger

While recent research has documented an unmistakable decline in the number of armed conflicts after the Cold War, more than 50 of them are still being waged around the globe.[1] Reactions to this state of affairs range from intensified efforts for conflict prevention, peacekeeping missions and post-conflict peacebuilding to military interventions. International organizations, nation states and civil society actors take an active part in programs aiming at the prevention of violent conflicts and the development of peacebuilding strategies. The number of agencies engaged in international development policy, humanitarian aid, human rights protection and environmental policy has increased substantially over the last two decades as well. A number of high-level international commissions identified the key issues and made suggestions to cope with violent conflicts and to restore and secure peace.[2] Nevertheless, reports of the World Bank have shown that there is a 44 per cent risk of all civil wars relapsing into violent conflict within a five-year period after a peace settlement was negotiated, often due to a lack of sustained international commitment.[3]

The world is still far from having effective institutions and instruments that guarantee stable peace. Researchers, politicians and practitioners agree that the United Nation (UN) system needs to be reformed in a variety of respects.[4] In particular, policy agendas have to be redefined with a view to fostering human security and the responsibility of states to protect their citizens. Furthermore, important issues of analysis and debate refer to how global governance mechanisms can be improved in the future, how the roles of different actors and the impact of their actions both on structures and processes can be assessed, and what criteria can be highlighted for the success and failure of peace processes. Strategies to prevent armed conflicts and to further develop peacebuilding policies can only be effective if they are based on sound scientific analysis and profound knowledge of the causes and dynamics of violent conflicts.

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1   See Human Security Centre (2005, 2006).
2   See Brahimi Panel (2000); Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (2004); UN General Assembly (2004); UN Millenium Project (2005).
3   See Collier, Paul et. al (2003: 83).
4   See the contributions in Die Friedens-Warte. Journal of International Peace and Organization 80 (2005), 3-4.

On the occasion of its fifth anniversary, the German Foundation for Peace Research (*Deutsche Stiftung Friedensforschung*, DSF) invited German and international experts to discuss the challenges for future research and for peacebuilding policies. The International symposium 'Strategies for Peace: Contributions of International Organizations, States, and Non-State Actors' was hosted on 28–29th April 2006 at the University of Osnabrück. This volume presents the revised papers prepared for this symposium.

The DSF was founded by the Federal Government of Germany in October 2000. It was established as an independent institution for the promotion of peace and conflict studies at German universities and research institutes. The Foundation is located in Osnabrück, city of the 'Westphalian Peace' of 1648. The DSF strives to 'foster peaceful co-existence of people and nations on a global level, to contribute to creating the prerequisites and conditions that counteract war, poverty, hunger and oppression, to support the respect of human rights, and to be conducive to shaping international relations on a legal basis. Moreover, the Foundation shall help to ensure that the natural basis of life will be preserved for future generations, and that its development capabilities are taken into particular consideration. Peace research is expected to give new impetus to the worldwide establishment and preservation of peace, justice, prosperity, democracy and human rights.'[5] The Foundation funds and initiates research projects, supports the training of young scholars and practitioners, fosters inter- and trans-disciplinary cooperation as well as international research exchange and networking. Furthermore, the Foundation actively helps to disseminate research results to the broader public and to political practitioners.

The DSF's funding policy covers three key areas, which include research on (1) the dynamics of violent conflict, (2) third party intervention in violent conflicts, and (3) the scope, potential and the limits of institutions and strategies that aim at mitigating violent conflict. The Foundation supports basic and applied research, which it considers a necessary source of information and knowledge for policy-making and organizing peace action. As an independent research organization, the DSF maintains relationships with various actors in this field, for instance with members of parliament and parliamentary factions, governmental departments as well as civil society organizations and political parties, offering advisory services on current international and foreign policy problems. After having begun its funding activities in August 2001, the Foundation has spent more than five million Euros for research projects on topics, such as crisis prevention and prevention of violent conflicts,

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5 Quoted from the German Foundation for Peace Research (2000).

conflict intervention strategies, post-conflict peacebuilding, arms control and disarmament, developments in the realm of international law and international organizations, peace education and historical peace research. In addition, the DSF has invested another five million Euros to establish new institutional capacities, such as post-graduate programs in peace and conflict studies and the Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker-Professorship for Science and Peace Research[6], in close cooperation with German universities and peace research institutes.

The international symposium 'Strategies for Peace: Contributions of International Organizations, States, and Non-State Actors', organized by the DSF, aimed to assess the international state of the art on strategies for conflict prevention and peacebuilding on different operating levels and from the perspectives of a variety of actors. Participants were asked to review the capabilities of international organizations, states, private sector entities and civil society actors to install effective institutions and procedures contributing to stable peace. The conference also provided a forum for dialogue between experts from peace and conflict studies, specialists from foreign policy think tanks, the German government and parliament, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Introductions and key note addresses were given by Volker Rittberger, President of the German Foundation for Peace Research, and Andrew Mack, then Director of the Human Security Centre at the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver. The panels discussed the role of actors and the general framework in which these actors cooperate in securing peace: (1) the role of international and regional organizations, (2) the impact of states on peace processes and the dangers to international peace and security caused by failed or fragile states, (3) the role of non-state actors and (4) cross-cutting challenges, mechanisms and methods to prevent, terminate or settle violent conflict.

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6   The DSF is promoting young researchers by funding three master's degree courses at German universities (Peace Research and International Politics, University of Tübingen; Master of Peace Studies, FernUniversität Hagen; Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Marburg), one post-graduate programme (Master of Peace and Security Studies, University of Hamburg), and one endowed professorship (Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker Centre for Science and Peace Research, University of Hamburg). Furthermore, the DSF is supporting young scholars who compose their Ph.D.-dissertation in the field of peace and conflict studies at three different locations.

1. Global challenges and strategies for peace

The first part of this volume presents contributions that offer general reviews of the state of the international system and of current challenges to global peace and security, together with reflections on the ideas and programs of international peacebuilding.

Volker Rittberger assesses the current world order against the 'Westphalian model' of international politics, which influenced the course of international relations for more than 350 years. He argues that the Westphalian system did not initiate a period of stable peace, but, on the contrary, established a state-centred system defined by an endless cycle of 'hot' war and 'cold' peace, and that today still numerous armed conflicts starting with the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of state and non-state actors, etc., still point to the violent legacy of Westphalia. According to the author, however, this Westphalian legacy of sovereign statehood and an anarchical self-help system form only one side of the coin characterizing international relations today. The other side shows zones of stable peace – in Europe, America, Oceania – where the Westphalian system is transformed into a society of states that are still sovereign but at the same time bound to commonly accepted norms, rules and obligations. The establishment and proliferation of liberal democracies have been given as an explanation for this development. However, the author points out that this finding and its explanation must not be over-generalized, given the experience that democratization can also cause armed conflict. Rittberger concludes that security governance on a global scale is increasingly shaped by a multipartite constellation of actors heralding the emergence of a post-Westphalian order. It transcends the Westphalian order of international relations in two important ways:

- First, through the liberal order of 'democratic peace' which is based on non-violent conflict management and embedded in multilateralism.
- Second, through the growing number and significance of non-state actors who take part in shaping the international political agenda and strive for policies that address the root causes of political violence.

Oliver Richmond discusses the concept of 'Liberal Peace' that is widely accepted as a main principle for intervention in zones of conflict. Yet, the main elements of liberal peace – democratization, the rule of law, human rights, free and globalized markets, and neo-liberal development – are increasingly questioned. Criticism focuses on the incompatibility of certain stages of democratization and economic reform, the ownership of development projects, the

neo-liberal agenda, the possible incompatibility of transitional justice with the stabilization of society and human rights, the problem of crime and corruption in economic and political reform, and the establishment of the rule of law. What has received rather less attention is – according to Richmond – the scope and conceptualization of the liberal peace itself. Understanding the different concepts of peace offers an important contribution towards unravelling the dilemmas of achieving a sustainable peace.

The author outlines theoretical underpinnings of peace that dominate the academic literature. He argues that the liberal peace is subject to four main graduations. These carry important implications for military and non-military humanitarian intervention, peace operations and peacebuilding, for the sustainability of the peace to be constructed, and for the exit strategies of international and other interveners. Finally, according to Richmond, these dominant approaches have implications for peace research: Rather than focusing on the problems caused by conflict, war and underdevelopment, a research agenda should start with the type of peace envisaged in a particular situation.

Andrew Mack's contribution reviews global trends in political violence since the end of World War II, putting a special focus on the period after the end of the Cold War. The author summarizes and explains the findings from studies published by the Human Security Centre (2005, 2006: Fn. 1). This wide ranging research on war and peace in the 21st Century has provided data indicating that the pervasive 'state of the war' characteristic of the Westphalian state system has undergone some transformation since the end of the Cold War. In particular, this 12- to 15-year period has witnessed a general and substantial decline in armed conflicts, including the number of armed conflicts, battle-related deaths, genocides and democides. The database shows that the number of both state and non-state (intra-state) wars has decreased in particular between 2002 and 2005 (from 66 in 2002 to 56 in 2005). Mack argues that the most compelling explanation for this decline is found in the upsurge of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities that started in the early 1990s, spearheaded by the UN, but also supported by many other international agencies, donors, governments and NGOs. The author concludes that all forms of political violence – with the exception of international terrorism in the Middle East and South Asia – have declined in the past 15 years, and the wars that are still being fought are far less deadly on average than those of the Cold War era. But there are serious reasons for concern, given the fact that still more than 50 armed conflicts are being waged around the globe. Sub-Saharan Africa was the only region to experience a decline in armed conflicts between 2002 and 2005 while in four other regions conflicts were increasing in number. According to Mack, in many parts of the poor world, 'root cause'

drivers of armed conflict – weak state capacity, economic decline, political instability and 'horizontal inequality' – remain unchanged or are deteriorating. In addition, he emphasizes that the UN are still critically under-resourced when it comes to preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding, while the organization is also being confronted with growing risks of overstretch in its peace operations.

2. International and supranational organizations

The second part of the volume covers the contributions of the first conference panel dealing with the achievements and shortcomings of the UN peace missions. The panelists reviewed the mixed record of the UN in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and post-conflict peacebuilding, and they discussed proposals for a reform of the UN in order to make the organization more effective. Key questions were: (1) Are the current reform proposals appropriate to overcome the lack of effectiveness in the past and the occasional political paralysis of the UN? (2) Which role(s) do regional and sub-regional organizations play in crisis prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding?, and (3) How should the interface between the UN and regional organizations be shaped?

   Richard Gowan (Center on International Cooperation, New York University) notes that both the intergovernmental and the executive organs of the UN have become increasingly absorbed by the management of peace operations. He discusses the origins and limitations of the operational-managerial culture and argues that, although 'modern management' is now an established priority in the UN's approach to peace operations, its implementation has been hindered by major political constraints on human and financial resources. Furthermore, the author explores the strategic realities underlying these constraints. The UN's re-emergence in major peace operations has not only placed an immense managerial burden on its Secretariat and Secretary-General, but it also required the commitment of considerable forces from the Global South. This has raised questions about the division of authority over troops seconded to the UN. Finally, UN peace operations become increasingly subject of controversy among its member states. According to Gowan, the struggle over how peace operations should be run often boils down to a clash between the United States (US) (often allied to EU member states) and troop contributors from the South. Therefore, the UN's shift from a political to an operational identity gives rise to a 'new bipolarity' between West and South.

The author argues that the post-9/11 period has seen a bifurcation between the UN's political and operational identities. This is especially due to the US having chosen to follow a unilateral approach on Iraq and other major issues, but to continue to search for multilateral support on other political matters including peacekeeping. The European members of the UN have also taken a dual approach, offering funding and political support to UN peacekeeping, but typically deploying their own units through non-UN structures such as NATO and the EU (under the UN Security Council's mandate). The author suggests that, while there is certainly much room for managerial efficiency at the UN, it must be tied to significant improvements in the relationship between those states that provide manpower for peace operations and those that provide money and logistical support. He gives an overview of some recent suggestions for how to achieve this and warns that, unless more effective mechanisms are found, the future of UN peace operations will be in doubt. Instead of tinkering with the UN bureaucracy and focusing on Charter reform, a new independent UN Peacekeeping Organization (UNPKO) should be established in order to make UN peace operations more coherent, transparent, efficient and accountable.

Ian Manners (University of Malmö) investigates the capacities of the European Union (EU) for developing strategies for sustainable peace. He argues that the European Community, now European Union, has increasingly served as a normative power in the process of developing a comprehensive strategy for peace, aiming at resolving both the structural causes and the violent dynamics of conflict in ways that guarantee rather than enforce peace.

According to Manners, the EU serves as a normative power in three different ways: Firstly, as a hybrid of supranational and international form of governance, the EU exists as a differing 'standard' which transcends Westphalian norms. Member states of the EU share socially constituted economic, social, environmental, conflict, and political standards which make the EU seem different from much of the residual world. Secondly, the author discusses the efforts the EU should make in seeking to contribute to world peace. He suggests that the EU embodies nine normative principles, for instance the principle of sustainable peace and social solidarity, which provides a guide of what should be done in conflict resolution. Thirdly, the author examines the EU's capability of serving as a 'force for good' in international relations, using Dieter Senghaas' 'civilization hexagon' model of conflict analysis to understand the conditions necessary for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the attainment of sustainable peace.

Finally, Manners suggests that the EU should develop a strategy for peace that goes beyond the short term, and that is based on an understanding

of sharing the world with others. These sharing processes, which the author calls 'European Communion', are derived from cosmopolitan and communitarian theories. According to those theories, the EU's external actions are shaped by concerns for humanity as a whole (cosmopolitical level), by concerns of the EU as a whole (supranational level), and by consensus seeking among the governments of the member states (state level). This threefold distinction is illustrated by three overlapping circles, which generate a solidarist, pluralist and unionist intersection.

Tobias Debiel, Christof Hartmann and *Anne Herm* (Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen) investigate the role of regional organizations for stabilizing fragile states in Sub-Saharan Africa. As the Failed States Index[7] shows, African states hold prominent positions. Eight of the ten most fragile states in 2007 were located in Sub-Saharan Africa. The stabilization of fragile states through institution building and the establishment of a security architecture have emerged as two of the central challenges of the 21st Century. Great and middle powers like the United States, France and Great Britain proclaimed the political stability of Africa as a strategic goal, while the EU, the OECD/DAC and the World Bank were developing their own strategies. Moreover, China appeared as a prominent actor with regard to the extraction of raw materials, to development aid, and partly to peacekeeping. The authors discuss the assumption that African regional organizations have an advantage in comparison to actors from outside the region in terms of coping with the challenges of peacekeeping and governance support. However, their potential contribution is obviously a matter of controversial debate. Regional arrangements, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, have become the default option when there are no actors at the global level who are willing or able to intervene.

This chapter analyses in particular the activities of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), established in 2001, and evaluates achievements of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The authors conclude that the rules of the Westphalian system virtually still dominate the SADC as it places great emphasis on the sovereign equality of states and their right to non-interference. Although there is a parliamentary forum at the SADC level, which mainly concentrates on election monitoring, societal actors are for the most part excluded. ECOWAS has

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7   The Fund for Peace: Failed States Index; available at:
     http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=99&Ite
     mid=140 (27.12.2007).

evolved into a front-runner for security and political integration after the Cold War and has built up its own sub-regional security regime that aims at strengthening constitutional order in the sense of democracy and due process of law – a new understanding of sovereignty. But it has not yet made substantial progress in providing appropriate fora to involve the civil society as well as members of national parliaments in governance problems, institution-building, and political stabilization. The authors conclude that regional cooperation in Africa is still strongly state-centered and mainly shaped by state elites. There have been reforms and changes within regional and sub-regional institutions. At the same time, effective action has often been hindered by a lack of resources and political effort to decisively enforce the proclaimed goals. The newly established structures are still 'fragile' and will not stand up to severe tests. As a consequence, much will depend on the willingness of external actors to support regional reforms and to step in where regional capacities obviously will not be able to stabilize and transform fragile states from a mid-term perspective.

3. States and Civil Society

The third part of the volume comprises contributions from the second and third conference panel, focusing on state actors and non-state actors. Participants in the second panel discussed the role of states and statehood for sustainable peace. Two role models are seen as potential 'pacifying actors': 'liberal hegemons' and 'civilian powers'. Central questions of this panel were: (1) Can hegemony create a sustainable peace order?, (2) Can civilian powers serve as a model of and as protagonists for strengthening the rule of law in international relations?, and (3) Are states part of the problem of endemic violent conflict or part of the solution for sustainable peace?

According to *Michael Mastanduno* (Dartmouth University, Hanover/ N.H.), the Westphalian system has proved resilient and is still persisting some 350 years later. It has expanded beyond the European core and constitutes a global system. Nation-states remain central actors in world politics, although they sit alongside other key players in the modern system including international organizations and an array of non-state actors. The state system persists, but Europe's multipolar order was destroyed by World Wars I and II, and out of that destruction arose a bipolar balance of power lasting 45 years. Bipolarity was characterized by the absence of war among the great powers along with a series of 'smaller' wars fought by allies and proxies of the US

and the Soviet Union in various parts of the world. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, bipolarity gave way to unipolarity.

The author investigates the assumption that hegemonic states may function as pacifying powers, and discusses the question whether unipolarity can contribute to international stability and peace. Mastanduno's analysis of US foreign policy is quite pessimistic about achieving this goal. He points out that the post-Cold War experience of the US gave way to a contradictory set of incentives. These incentives could, on the one hand, result in stabilizing effects, and, on the other hand, they could be disruptive. The US could act either as a power to preserve the *status quo* or as a power to revise the state of the international system. The author argues that the US has shifted from a more to a less stabilizing role over the course of the post-Cold War era. Within 15 years of the 'unipolar moment' the US has moved from being more of a *status quo* power to being more of a revisionist power intent on remaking international order to serve even more clearly American interests and values. The pattern of military intervention since the end of the Cold War reveals that, during the 1990s the US was relatively cautious and intervened militarily only with great reluctance. Since 2001, the US has become less risk averse in military intervention. It intervened to promote regime change in Afghanistan, despite the history of great power failure in that inhospitable environment. In Iraq, the Bush administration initiated a discretionary war against Saddam Hussein and engaged in an extraordinarily difficult nation-building campaign in the face of civil war. With respect to the future, the author suggests that a return to a more *status quo*-oriented policy with emphasis on system stability is the more likely scenario, but there is still a possibility of the US remaining on the more revisionist path.

Ulrich Schneckener (German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin) discusses dilemmas and strategies of international state-building aiming at the prevention of 'fragile statehood'. In his view, the state as an archetype has a dual function in the modern world: First, to guarantee public order and to provide services for its citizens within a defined territory, and second, to constitute together with other states the international system and thereby the global order. Many post-colonial or post-Soviet states fail in both respects. Ineffective, weak, failing or failed states tend to cause problems at the regional, national and global level. Under the leadership of the UN, complex and costly state-building operations have been conducted in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, DR Congo, East Timor and Haiti. In each of these cases, external actors have temporarily taken over a number of public services. This type of quasi-protectorate does not only entail a number of risks for those intervening, but also requires a reliable provision of re-

sources. The author assesses various state-building strategies aiming at liberalization first (with an emphasis on democratization and establishment of market economies), security first (promoting demobilization and security sector reforms), institutionalization first (strengthening legitimate and effective political institutions) and civil society first (fostering bottom-up approaches). The author's sympathy is clearly with the concept of institutionalization.

Schneckener concludes that in many instances international activities do not lead to consolidating statehood, but rather to different structures and modes of transnational governance. The results are often informal or formalized hybrid arrangements that involve both external and local actors as well as state and non-state actors. Most of them are set up on an *ad hoc* basis, while others are unintended side effects of the interactions between insiders and outsiders (e.g., the cooperation between ISAF forces and warlords in Afghanistan). Some of these arrangements may serve as functional equivalents to state functions, delivering for instance security. Others exist only temporarily and play a rather limited role. However, these arrangements will shape the behavior of local elites and the rules of political decision-making. Consequently, they will have an imprint on the kind of statehood that may emerge from the international involvement. The author furthermore discusses unintended consequences and adverse effects that emerge from changes in local power structures as a result of external interference. Para- or quasi-state structures that have replaced state structures or co-exist with them may offer a minimum of stability at the local level, but ultimately prevent the establishment of sustainable state structures. Problems arise from the limited periods of external actors' engagement. Local actors adjust their strategies accordingly. The success and failure of state-building activities therefore depend crucially on external actors' readiness for long-term engagement, on their capacities for strategic planning and coherent action, and on their legitimacy.

The third panel addressed the role of civil society actors in conflict transformation and peacebuilding. The number of non-state actors, in particular NGOs, engaged in international development policy, humanitarian aid, human rights protection and environmental policy has increased substantially over the last two decades. A related development has occurred in the field of conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding. Cooperation with NGOs in these fields has been actively encouraged by the state actors and the international organizations, especially by the UN and the EU, as NGOs have vital knowledge about societies in zones of conflict. However, assessments of the roles and activities of civil society actors have been contradictory and ambivalent. Panelists at the DSF-Symposium were therefore asked to address the following questions: (1) Which role do non-state actors

play in exacerbating or pacifying conflicts? (2) Is the state's legal monopoly of physical violence at risk when activities of non-state actors in conflict management increase? (3) How can NGOs contribute to an effective peace policy?, and (4) How does the concept of civil society relate to state-building processes?

The contribution of *Martina Fischer* (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin) focuses on the role of civil society actors in peacebuilding. This chapter provides a general overview and critical assessment of NGO activities at the international and regional level. Some academics and practitioners have pointed to the strengths of NGOs in peacebuilding, mentioning their political independence, the flexibility of their mandates, their impartiality and high standards of credibility. Others take a far more critical stance on NGOs. The most important issues of criticism are that NGOs are often state-driven or change their activities according to requirements of donor markets and mass media, and that NGOs are not subject to democratic control and thus lack legitimacy. The author shows that NGOs engaged in development, human rights, conflict transformation and peacebuilding could acquire legitimacy and credibility mainly by demonstrating their effectiveness and efficiency, and by being clear about their purposes and mandates. Some NGOs have developed transparent systems of reporting about revenues, funding and internal decision making processes; and larger-scale peace-related NGOs have established platforms and networks with discussions about how to improve their monitoring and evaluation tools so as to better assess the impact of their activities and thereby improve their conflict transformation practices.

In addition to transnational and international NGOs, the potential of local civil society actors is critically assessed. Ambivalent roles of civil society in war-torn societies are discussed with specific reference to the last ten years of experience in the Balkans. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, international organizations made a mistake in assuming that, by promoting the NGO sector in general, a strong and powerful civil society would emerge that could counterbalance the ethnic conflict driven by the state institutions and the nationalist political parties. External strategies of civil society support were not linked to initiatives for institution- and state-building. In particular, the need for citizens' participation in political and social processes was completely disregarded. The author concludes that actors intervening in conflicts should take into consideration the different facets of civil society. While civil society actors can substantially contribute to the establishment of democratic values, to the enhancement of positive social change, and even to reconciliation, civil society should not be mistaken for the 'good fairy' that brings about positive change

to save the polity. Another experience from post-Dayton Bosnia is that civil society can never compensate for all of the shortcomings in state-building and failures of international interventions. An important lesson from Bosnia-Herzegovina is that sustainable peacebuilding needs state-building, economic development, and organic civil society development. Replacing one unsuccessful or failed strategy ('liberalization first') with another ('civil society building') contributes neither to democratization nor to peacebuilding. Finally, the chapter raises the question whether all societies have to run through the European or 'Western' path of state-building and social development. With respect to the Global South, 'hybridity' of political order should be acknowledged as a framework for developing adequate strategies to contain violence and promote peacebuilding. There clearly is a need to search for new concepts of statehood and political community that transcend the conventional concepts of the (post-)Westphalian type of state and to further develop the concept of civil society in a way that is sensitive to Euro-centric biases.

4. Crosscutting challenges for post-conflict peacebuilding

The contributions of the fourth and last panel of the symposium focused on cross-cutting challenges for post-conflict peacebuilding. They are based on the assumption that the reconstruction of war-torn societies requires an understanding of the root causes of conflict and the specific dynamics of violence to avoid a relapse into war. Economic and political structures have to be taken into account as well as inter-group relations and competences of individuals. Post-conflict peacebuilding also means transforming cultures of violence, establishing good governance, providing human security and healing of psycho-social wounds. Integration into cooperative regional and global structures is needed as well as pursuing long-term macro-economic policies of equitable growth and sustainable local community development. Panelists addressed the following questions: (1) What are adequate policies for post-conflict peacebuilding? (2) What are preconditions of long-term reconciliation? (3) How can local ownership of the peacebuilding process be achieved?, and (4) How can actors and organizations in different multilevel political arenas be sufficiently coordinated?

The literature on conflict transformation and peacebuilding assumes a general need for reconciliation in war-torn societies because reconciliation is seen as a necessary requirement for sustainable peace and prevention of further outbreaks of violence. This is emphasized in particular for societies that

have gone through a process of violent ethno-political conflict, as antagonists often live in close proximity and have to design a shared future. Victims have been perpetrators of violence and vice versa. Meanwhile, reconciliation has also gained recognition as a crucial factor for peacebuilding on the part of international donors engaging in post-war regions. There is no consensus among international donors about what the term exactly means – reconciliation is understood as a process and/or an outcome, as a healing process on an individual or interpersonal level, or in society as a whole – but it is conceived as closely related to setting up mechanisms for 'dealing with the past', including transitional justice and truth-telling commissions. Nevertheless, there is still a lack of knowledge about the right choice of mechanisms and procedures, the appropriate period of implementation, and the conditions under which they can be successful.

David Bloomfield (then Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin) discusses the significance of reconciliation as a challenge to post-conflict peacebuilding. According to the author, reconciliation should not primarily be seen as an ideal or a final state of peace and harmony but, more pragmatically, as a process. He stresses the relationship between reconciliation, peacebuilding, and justice and states that in literature and practitioners' debates there is a widespread sense of antagonism between reconciliation and justice which he considers to be counter-productive, and that at least a part of it stems from a short-sighted definition of justice which is employed in such contexts. A problem arises from the term 'forgiveness' rooted in Christian thinking, as it was generated by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. Bloomfield suggests that justice should be redefined in a broader, multi-dimensional way, and the definition of reconciliation should be deepened as a process of relationship-building, as was proposed by recent studies that focus on terms such as 'political reconciliation', 'civic trust' and 'democratic reciprocity'. They refer to a subset of the broader process which focuses on political coexistence: the development not of deep sharing, but of workable political cooperation between individuals and political representatives surrounded by a minimal tolerance and trust in the political process among the wider communities. According to the author, reconciliation as 'building working relations' provides a realistic definition, which relates to the reconstruction of democratic politics. At the same time, he suggests that a wider understanding of justice is needed. The concept of retributive justice that concentrates on the perpetrator has to be complemented by other definitions of justice: Restorative justice, aiming at the subsequent restoring of relationships between victim and offender communities; social justice, including a systemic definition of social right and wrong; and

distinctive justice, the vital element of a fair society which ensures that all the goals of a society are shared in a fair way by all.

Michael Zürn and *Anna Herrhausen* (Hertie School of Governance/Social Science Research Center, Berlin) take up the issue of local ownership and inter-agency coordination in post-conflict peacebuilding, especially in multilateral peace operations. The authors draw on empirical research and documentation about UN peace operations and on practitioners' first-hand assessments. Analyses and findings are also substantiated by referring to selected cases namely Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan. These examples are chosen because UN missions either enjoyed far-reaching political and administrative authority (Kosovo and East Timor), or were installed with the goal of facilitating a regime change (Afghanistan). The authors observe that international practitioners and academics alike have grappled with two questions with regard to multilateral peacebuilding: (1) How can local ownership of the peacebuilding process be achieved?, and (2) How can different actors and strategies of action be sufficiently coordinated? The authors elaborate on these questions, but also seek to demonstrate some links between the issue of local ownership and inter-organizational coordination. They argue that improved international coordination is necessary when local ownership is supposed to be achieved, or conversely, that poor coordination impedes this goal. The contribution critically reviews the notion of 'local ownership' and then takes stock of the UN's success in terms of engendering local ownership in recent peacebuilding missions. The authors offer some reasons for shortcomings in this respect and propose means to remedy them. Furthermore, they make clear why coordination has been difficult in recent missions and recommend how at least some of these issues could be dealt with. Finally, they give an outlook on reforms in the field of peacebuilding currently under way in the UN.

Discussing the scope, range and limits of strategies for peace, the symposium's proceedings revealed that additional research is needed to learn more about how interventions in violence-prone conflicts should be carried out to avoid harmful engagement, especially by external actors. There is no doubt that in many cases interventions were triggered by well meant intentions, but created a long-term dependency on external support accompanied by a waste of resources. Furthermore, autonomous developments may be inhibited and, as a consequence, stable peace cannot be achieved. A major challenge for peace research is to develop criteria to identify effective interventions and, in particular, to assess processes of social change that contribute to peace.

Generally, more research is needed to analyse the impacts of interventions, both of military and civilian actors and agencies. Many analysts and

practitioners would agree with the observation that peace should be built from the bottom-up, the top-down and the middle out. Yet, the methodologies for crossing the scale barrier simultaneously and in a coordinated manner are not sufficiently developed. Therefore, the German Foundation for Peace Research will proceed with its funding activities focussing on strategic issues of peace-building.[8] For this purpose, the Foundation supports international cooperation and networking. It will continue to present new research findings by hosting international conferences in the future.

Last but not least, the DSF would like to thank all those who contributed to the international symposium 'Strategies for Peace'. Special thanks are due to Harald Müller and Herbert Wulf who helped to design the symposium. The Foundation is, of course, indebted to all speakers and commentators who contributed to the symposium and made their contributions available for this volume, and to the University of Osnabrück, which generously supported the DSF by providing their facilities. The Foundation is much obliged to those who worked behind the scences helping to organize the symposium, in particular its headquarters team Dr. Thomas Held, Ms. Sabine Podranski, and Ms. Petra Menke.

Finally, the DSF is grateful to those who helped to finalize this volume, the authors, Ms. Susanne Pihs for editing and proofreading, and Mr. Niklaas Haskamp, Barbara Budrich Publishers.

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I.

From the Westphalian Peace to strategies for peace in a post-Westphalian environment*

Volker Rittberger

1. Introduction

The beginning of the 21st Century has prompted scholars and policy-makers alike to ask whether the new century will be more peaceful than its predecessors. On the one hand, the 'Cold War' as the defining conflict of the second half of the 20th Century has been settled peacefully in 1989/1990. Ever since, the world has experienced an unprecedented increase in the number of democracies, an extensive broadening of economic interdependence and an enormous growth in international organizations (Human Security Center 2005: 148f). On the other hand, the violent character of international relations still manifests itself in the existence of armed conflicts, terrorism or one-sided violence against civilian targets. Given this mixed and highly complex picture of the current world order, what are the options for developing viable strategies for peace?

To illuminate this question, we have to identify both the dominant actors of the current international system and the structural conditions which shape and constrain the strategies of these actors. Furthermore, we have to assess the current world order against the 'Westphalian model' of international politics, which shaped the course of international relations for more than 350 years.

2. The 'Westphalian model'

Against the background of a long historical process, the 'Westphalian model' of international politics has emerged as the outcome of the Westphalian peace settlement concluded in the cities of Münster and Osnabrück in 1648.[1] Because it ushered in the modern state system, the Westphalian peace settlement was a hallmark in the development of modern international relations.[2]

Overcoming the medieval, *hierarchical* order based on the principles of Christian morality, the Westphalian system constituted a decentralized, *anarchical* order based on territorial state sovereignty as its defining principle.[3] The concept of sovereignty is dualistic in nature, encompassing an internal and an external dimension (Clark 1999: 73). The internal dimension entails that territorial states' governments exercise legitimate authority over the use of force within their territory. This supremacy within brings about independence or 'freedom of action' in relation to the other sovereign entities and turns states into the pre-eminent actors on the international stage. In other words, external sovereignty materializes as the by-product of internal sovereignty. Therefore, the negotiators at Westphalia, whether unintentionally or purposely, created an order which was meant, first, to overcome fierce struggle and disorder in the domestic realm and, second, to establish a system of flexible alliances as a viable strategy for maintaining the ever precarious stability in the international realm (Kegley/Armond 2002: 104).

The Westphalian system did not initiate a period of stable peace. On the contrary, Westphalia established a state-centered system defined by an endless cycle of 'hot' war and 'cold' peace. Looking at the subsequent record of European and world history after 1648, the Westphalian system, as it has

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1   Krasner is correct to argue that it would be historically inaccurate to state that the Westphalian treaties generated the 'Westphalian model' of international relations (Krasner 1999: 20). Starting from 1648, it took some 100 years until the norm of sovereignty became prevalent in European politics and another 100 years until it became valid as an ordering principle in world affairs through European colonialism. Nonetheless, the conceptual foundations of the model were laid down in the Treaties of Westphalia.

2   For a thoughtful and critical review of this broadly accepted notion, see Teschke (2003).

3   For a comprehensive analysis of the concept of 'sovereignty', see Krasner (1999). According to Krasner, sovereignty can be distinguished into four different dimensions, namely international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty (see Krasner 1999: 9ff). Westphalian sovereignty is based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from internal authority arrangements (Krasner: 20ff). Since it has been widely recognized, but also frequently violated through contract, convention, coercion and imposition, Krasner concludes that sovereignty is a form of 'organized hypocrisy' (Krasner 1999: 69).

been referred to in the scholarly literature, has known no shortage of wars of every kind. Between 1650 and 1945, the empirical records show that both the number and scope of violent conflicts have risen steadily (Kegley/Raymond 2002: 139).

More than 350 years after the Westphalian peace settlement, numerous conflicts still bear witness to the violent legacy of Westphalia: The recent conflict between Israel and the Lebanese militia Hezbollah triggered by the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers; the mass killings in Sudan now extending to the Chad; the ongoing civil war in Iraq, brought about by an illegal and, making things worse, ill-conceived military intervention; the proliferation of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of state and non-state actors who have pronounced themselves ready to 'wipe off the map' other nations or people wantonly typified as enemies. In other words, the paralyzing grip of the 'Westphalian ghost' still haunts the world (Kegley/ Raymond 2002: 154ff).

3. Post-Westphalian features

The human intellect has always reflected critically and constructively on miti-gating or overcoming the pervasive 'state-of-war', which has been identified as the outcome of the anarchical structure characteristic of the Westphalian system. In the midst of the savagery and slaughter of the Thirty Years' War, Hugo Grotius, an influential Dutch legal scholar, devised a vision for an inter-national 'society' of states under the auspices of international law (Grotius 1625 [2002]).

And indeed, the Westphalian legacy of sovereign statehood and an an-archical self-help system is only one side of the coin characterizing inter-national relations today. The other side shows zones of stable peace – in Eur-ope, the North Atlantic area, the Americas, Oceania – where the Westphalian system is transformed into a 'society' of states or 'security communities', where states are still sovereign, but abide by commonly accepted norms, rules, and obligations.[4] Although these zones are not necessarily contiguously distributed across the globe, they show patterns of institutionalized regional

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4   For the classical discussion of the concept of international society, see Bull (1977). More recently, scholars wedded to the 'English school' linked Bull's concept to discussions on globalization (see Little/Williams 2006). On security communities, see Deutsch et al. (1957) and Adler/Barnett (1998).

or inter-regional cooperation across a wide variety of issue areas.[5] In addition, we observe a rapid growth in both the number of international organizations and the range of issue areas they cover on a world-wide scale for the past two decades (Rittberger/Zangl 2006: 25ff). At the same time, the number and plurality of transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has steadily risen as well (Zürn 2006: 31). These developments generate new spheres of (overlapping) authority structures beyond the nation-state. Gradually transforming the Westphalian system, they herald the emergence of a 'post-Westphalian order' (Schneckener 2005: 192f).

In the state-centered Westphalian system, states are the ultimate and exclusive players setting the 'rules of the game'. In a post-Westphalian environment, non-state actors are increasingly important as both rule-takers or the addressees of regulations, and as rule-makers or 'teachers of norms' (Finnemore 1993). These roles become manifest in the growth of transnational governance institutions (Risse 2004: 3) and, in particular, in the trend towards more 'inclusive institutions', encompassing states, international organizations, and non-state actors as members and co-decision-makers (Rittberger 2006; Rittberger et al. 2008). Thus, post-Westphalia can be conceived as a *heterarchical* system of international, if not global governance, defined by a multipartite structure encompassing states, international organizations as well as private and civil societal non-state actors (Brühl/Rittberger 2001: 1f).[6]

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5   The principle behind these institutional arrangements was summed up in the term 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie 1983). However, patterns of cooperation were not confined to the economic field. The existence of various security regimes and organizations illustrates that institutionalized cooperation has even emerged in issue areas of 'high politics'.

6   It has become common in International Relations theory to discuss the emerging governance system in terms of a global governance system. Yet, the term has often been used in a deliberate manner. Although there is a growing number of transnational and supranational institutional arrangements in world politics, modes of intergovernmental decision-making are still prevalent in many issue areas. Thus, the present governance system encompassing international, supranational, and transnational modes of governance can be characterized as heterarchical (see Rittberger 2004a).

Table 1: The Westphalian and the post-Westphalian Order

	Westphalian Order	**Post-Westphalian Order**
Dominant actor type	State actors (*state-centric structure*)	Democratic state actors, International organizations, Non-state actors (*multipartite structure*)
Ordering principle	Anarchy: Self-help System	Heterarchy: International/Global Governance
Dominant mode of conflict resolution	Coercion and accommodation	Cooperation, Inclusion and Institutionalization

4. Research agenda

It is against this backdrop of an emergent post-Westphalian multipartite structure of international, if not global governance in world politics that we have to set out studying anew 'Strategies for Peace' by looking beyond the confines of the Westphalian state system without belittling, however, the roles and functions of stable, democratic statehood in a post-Westphalian environment.

In a wide-ranging study on 'War and Peace in the 21st Century', the Human Security Report 2005 has provided data indicating that the pervasive 'state-of-war' characteristic of the Westphalian state system seems to have undergone some far-reaching transformation.[7] The Report points out that the last 15 years have witnessed a dramatic decline in armed conflicts, including the number of armed conflicts, battle-related deaths, genocides and democides (Human Security Center 2005: 22ff; Human Security Center 2006: 9ff). This is a remarkable finding which has gone largely unnoticed by political analysts and policy-makers alike, let alone the mass media and the public-at-large.

The Report's answers to the obvious question of what to make of this observed trend are said to be preliminary, though they appear to be clear-cut. The Report attributes this trend to several factors encompassing the end of the Cold War as well as the termination of anti-colonial or post-colonial struggles, the spread of democratic governance, the growth of international institutions and the rising levels of economic development and interdependence. However, the Report relates the significant decline of internal or civil wars in

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7   These findings are confirmed by the latest Human Security Brief (Human Security Center 2006).

particular to an 'explosion' of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, peace-making or peacebuilding activities since the early 1990s (Human Security Center 2005: 147ff). And indeed, it can hardly be denied that, since the end of the Cold War, international activism directed toward stopping ongoing wars or preventing ended wars from starting again has been on the rise. International organizations have been working in zones of violent conflict to reduce the suffering of the population by helping to re-establish public security, monitor human rights, or support efforts to rebuild the political and economic structures that are essential for sustainable peace.

But international organizations are far from being the only actors engaged in peacebuilding activities. Together with states, local and non-governmental organizations, they constitute a multiplicity of agents and bodies engaged in the endeavor to overcome endemic violence and promote peace. As the Report itself is apt to admit, the thesis of UN peacebuilding activity being the main cause of the post-Cold War decline may be persuasive, but mostly circumstantial. 'A lot more research is required', the Report therefore demands, 'to determine which specific activities and mechanisms have been most effective in bringing about recent improvements in global security – and under what conditions' (Human Security Center 2005: 155).

Drawing on the multipartite structure of governance in the post-Westphalian environment, this chapter reflects on the realm of the state, international organizations and non-state actors in an effort to identify, on the one hand, the options for fostering peace in a post-Westphalian order, and, on the other hand, to illuminate both the ambivalence and unintended consequences associated with some of these options once they are chosen. Because the Westphalian approach to international order has been based on sovereign statehood as the defining principle, we will first turn to a discussion of the state arguing that only democratically qualified statehood serves as a viable post-Westphalian strategy for peace. However, the proliferation of liberal democracy is hampered by ambivalent effects. It may, under some circumstances, exacerbate violent conflict via legitimizing the use of force, enforcing social competition in transitional regimes or de-stabilizing regional environments. Second, we turn to a discussion of international organizations and non-state actors whose growing number and importance has already been mentioned as indicative of an emergent post-Westphalian approach to international order. However, while both international organizations and non-state actors are guided by the idea to establish good governance in war-torn societies as a long-term strategic goal, some of the methods these actors use to effect this change may undermine this very goal or even lead to contrary results.