Campaign • 87

Lützen & Bautzen 1813

The turning point

Peter Hofschröer • Illustrated by Christa Hook

Series editor Lee Johnson • Consultant editor David G Chandler

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

CHRONOLOGY

THE OPPOSING COMMANDERS

French Commanders • Allied Commanders

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

The French Army • The Russian Army • The Prussian Army

OPPOSING PLANS

THE BATTLES

Lützen, 2 May 1813 • The Battle of Bautzen

THE BATTLEFIELDS TODAY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTRODUCTION

POLAND & GERMANY – AFTERMATH OF THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

Napoleon in 1813. Leaving his army to face its fate at the end of 1812, Napoleon returned to France to set about rebuilding his shattered forces to attempt to maintain his hold of Central Europe. He displayed considerable energy and organisational skills. (Painting by Amable-Louis-Claude Pagnest)

By the spring of 1813, Europe had been at war more or less continuously for two decades. The original cause of this instability had been the French Revolution, which had started in 1789. A certain French artillery officer of Corsican origins, one Napoleone Buonaparte, as he was then known, used the opportunity presented to gain power in France. He eventually crowned himself Emperor in 1804. Not satisfied with ruling one country, Emperor Napoleon engaged in wars of aggression, conquering and subjugating Italy, Austria and Germany. In Germany, these wars caused the collapse of the First Reich, otherwise known as the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. Much of Europe became his sphere of influence. Dominating Central Europe, Napoleon then came to an agreement with Russia, leaving Britain the only country still defying him in Europe. However, Britain was, thanks to her naval superiority, safe from invasion. This was due in part to Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar in 1805.

Unable to gain control of the seas, Napoleon tried to force Britain into line by adopting the so-called ‘Continental System’. This was an attempt at blockade in reverse. Napoleon decreed that the nations of the Continent of Europe should not trade with Britain, hoping thereby to damage Britain’s economy severely. Instead, Europe’s traders felt themselves put at a disadvantage. The Russians, due to their relatively underdeveloped economy, suffered the most, and they soon breached the Continental System. The invasion of 1812 was in part an attempt to bring Czar Alexander back into line.

Napoleon was essentially a dictator who owed his power to popular consent. The populace of France was happy to give its consent as long as Napoleon brought France fame, victories and above all plunder. To avoid unpopularity at home, Napoleon always tried to place as much as possible of the burden of his military conquests on the shoulders of the other nations of Europe. His armies pillaged wherever they went, constantly sending back riches and trophies of war to Paris. Germany in particular suffered severely from this plundering. Prussia had to pay a massive indemnity to France after the catastrophic defeats of 1806, which greatly impoverished the country. Without the resources of Central Europe to fuel his military machine, Napoleon would have been forced to draw more heavily on those of France. Napoleon needed the resources of Central Europe to sustain his dictatorship. His domination of Germany was of vital importance to the continuation of his dynasty.

As far as the other powers of continental Europe were concerned, the fate of Germany would determine the fate of Europe. The Czar of Russia wanted to extent his sphere of influence ever further westwards. The Emperor of Austria wanted to see the German States re-formed into the old First Reich, under Austrian domination. Meanwhile, Czar Alexander groomed King Frederick William III of Prussia to act as his protégé in Germany. The Austrian Emperor Francis I, while wanting to see Napoleon thrown out of Germany, did not want to see Alexander step into his boots. Initially, Francis, acting on advice from the great statesman Metternich, hesitated. He awaited events before committing himself, only doing so in the autumn of 1813. Russia’s Great Patriotic War of 1812 became Germany’s War of Liberation of 1813. This led to Napoleon’s First Abdication of 1814 and the collapse of his Empire.

Alexander I, Czar of Russia. Once Napoleon had been driven out of Russia, the Czar’s forces moved into Central Europe. Alexander saw himself as a liberator. (Lithograph by Katzler)

Background to the Campaign

The army that Napoleon assembled for the 1812 Campaign was at the time the largest ever assembled in history. It marched into Russia in 1812, but only a shattered remnant returned. Napoleon, until then at the peak of his power, rushed back to Paris to deal with a possible uprising against his regime. He left one of his lieutenants, Eugène de Beauharnais, to safeguard his interests in Germany. Meanwhile, Napoleon stabilised his position at home and then began to rebuild his depleted military forces. The Russians too needed time to repair and rebuild their exhausted army before daring to advance into Central Europe. The consequences of the French disaster on the situation in Germany were now becoming apparent. The King of Prussia, Frederick William III, procrastinated, believing the time not yet ripe to make a stand against the oppressor of his kingdom. The first to strike a blow against the ‘Corsican tyrant’ was the Prussian General Yorck. He was the commander of the Prussian Auxiliary Corps, a body of some 20,000 men Prussia had been obliged to contribute to Napoleon’s 1812 expedition. During the French retreat Yorck had managed to detach himself from the rest of the Grande Armée and then commenced negotiations with Diebitsch, the commander of the Russian forces in the area. They agreed to the Convention of Tauroggen on 30 December 1812 which ‘neutralised’ this Prussian contingent. Yorck’s Corps then occupied East Prussia in collaboration with the Czar’s forces. Here, it formed the core of an anti-Napoleonic rebellion. While Prussia officially adopted a course of hesitant neutrality, one of its provinces had de facto declared war against the French. Her king now only needed assurances of Russian support from Czar Alexander before he too threw in his lot with the Russians. Having gained these assurances at a meeting with the Czar in the Prussian province of Silesia in February 1813, Prussia officially declared war on France in March of that year. The stage was now set for the Spring Campaign of 1813.

Many historians regard the winter of 1812 as marking the turning point in Napoleon’s domination of the Continent of Europe. The demise of his Grande Armée of 600,000 men in the dust and snow of Russia meant that he would never again be able to attempt to dominate that country. However, until he suffered a decisive military defeat in Central Europe, Napoleon remained a power to be reckoned with. The rapidity with which he replaced his lost forces during the winter of 1812–13 demonstrated this amply. While the rest of Europe hesitated to challenge the wobbling throne of the Emperor of France, Napoleon set about filling the vacuum that appeared in the aftermath of the Russian disaster. He marched into Germany early in 1813 at the head of a new army, determined to re-establish his hegemony in Central Europe. It appeared only the brave or foolhardy risked standing against him. Napoleon was confronted by a force of Russian and Prussian troops inferior in numbers to his own. They were however determined to bring Napoleon to battle and defeat him. In the spring of 1813 they were to come within a hair’s breadth of achieving this aim. Both major battles were bloody and bitter affairs, and although Napoleon won tactical victories, driving back his adversaries on both occasions, the spring campaign of 1813 marked the strategic turning point in Napoleonic Europe. If Napoleon could not defeat the Russians and Prussians with his superior numbers, then Europe had, at last, the chance of bringing the ‘tyrant’ to bay. This would require the formation of another great coalition of France’s enemies, but Russia and Prussia had cracked Napoleon’s mask of invincibility. From the spring of 1813 the tide began to run ever more strongly against Bonaparte – he had lost his last real chance of preserving his dynasty.

CHRONOLOGY

The War of 1812

24 June 1812 Napoleon invades Russia.

7 September 1812 The Battle of Borodino.

18 October 1812 Napoleon withdraws from Moscow.

28 November 1812 The crossing of the Berezina.

30 December 1812 The Convention of Tauroggen is signed. Yorck’s Prussian Auxiliary Corps defects.

The War of Liberation 1813 – The Spring Campaign

January 1813 The East Prussian Estates rise up against Napoleon.

3 February 1813 The King of Prussia issues an edict calling all men to arms.

27 February 1813 Treaty of Kalisch. The Prussians join the Russians against Napoleon.

4 March 1813 The French withdraw from Berlin.

12 March 1813 The French abandon Hamburg.

17 March 1813 Prussia declares war on France. The Prussian Landwehr is founded.

5 April 1813 Battle of Möckern.

25 April 1813 Napoleon arrives in Erfurt.

28 April 1813 Wittgenstein replaces Kutusov as commander of the Russian Army.

2 May 1813 Battle of Lützen (Grossgörschen).

12 May 1813 The Saxon General von Thielemann, commander of the fortress of Torgau, crosses over to the Allies.

20-21 May 1813 Battle of Bautzen.

26 May 1813 Combat at Hainau.

26 May 1813 Barclay de Tolly Replaces Wittgenstein as commander-in-chief of the Russian army.

4 June 1813 Armistice of Pläswitz. End of the Spring Campaign.

OPPOSING COMMANDERS

FRENCH COMMANDERS

Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821), Emperor of France. Napoleon Bonaparte was undoubtedly one of the great military captains of history. He had held Europe in thrall for over a decade, plunging the Continent into its most destructive wars for centuries. Napoleon was essentially a dictator and did little to encourage initiative among his subordinates lest a rival should emerge. His style of command was centralised, and the plan of campaign was a matter Napoleon kept to himself. His staff’s role was not advisory; it was functionary, being there merely to execute its master’s orders. Such a system worked well in the early days of Bonaparte’s campaigning in the Revolutionary Wars. However, this structure was cumbersome when attempting to control armies of the size used in the latter part of the Napoleonic Wars. The lack of initiative on the part of his subordinates could cause difficulties, as when Ney was caught out by the Allied movements on the morning of 2 May 1813. Three weeks later at Bautzen, Ney failed to properly execute the flanking movement ordered by Napoleon. It took Napoleon’s personal intervention to bring matters under control again. The larger armies of the later wars required officers capable of independent command who fully grasped the Emperor’s plans. However, Napoleon always had an eye on Paris and needed to be seen as the sole victor of his battles. He could not allow his subordinates to play too big a role in achieving the victories, lest they steal his glory. This inherent conflict of interests eventually played a role in Napoleon’s downfall.

Frederick William III, King of Prussia. Often regarded as a weak king, Frederick William showed considerable courage when he threw in his lot with Alexander. His gamble paid off, with Napoleon being finally driven from Germany after the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813. (Copy of a painting by François Gérard dated 1814)

Having expended so much horseflesh in Russia, Napoleon was particularly weak in cavalry, which had a noticeable effect on his handling of the campaign. The cavalry were his eyes and ears, and facing a greatly superior number of allied cavalry, Napoleon was essentially deaf and blind for much of the time. Lacking detailed knowledge of Allied positions, movements and intentions, he was at a great disadvantage that was only in part compensated for by his superiority in numbers.

Napoleon did as well as he could in the circumstances. He no longer had the army that had triumphed at Austerlitz and Auerstadt, nor was he facing his enemies of 1805-06. Instead of leading veterans against ponderous and easily demoralised opponents, Napoleon faced a gruelling slogging match against hardy Russians and determined Prussians. Nevertheless, his dynamism and tactical flair remained, as his lightning reaction to events at Lützen showed, while his plan for the Battle of Bautzen on 20/21 May 1813 was ahead of its time. But by 1813, Napoleon had simply run out of luck. He was also running out of time.

Michel Ney (1769-1815), Marshal of France. Ney was one of the more colourful characters of this period. Noted for his bravery, he was much respected by his men. Ney had also shown himself a highly capable corps commander, working his way up the ranks after having joined a regiment of hussars in 1787. Ney was also to play a significant role in the Spring Campaign of 1813. He failed to properly secure the positions of his corps during the night of 1–2 May, allowing the Allies to launch the surprise attack that began the Battle of Lützen. Had the Allies not handled their advance to contact so badly, they may well have won a decisive victory over Napoleon. Ney again had the fate of France in his hands during his flanking march at the battle of Bautzen. At a crucial stage, he delayed his advance, awaiting orders from Napoleon, then failed to use his initiative and break into the rear of the Allies, which would have decided the battle and campaign. Ney is often the scapegoat of Napoleon’s apologists. As we shall see, Napoleon was aware that Ney had not sent patrols out to screen his camp at Grossgörschen. Furthermore, it was understandable for Ney to enquire of Napoleon as to his next move at Bautzen once he had heard the sounds of gunfire. The Emperor had not shared the details of his plan of action for Bautzen with Ney. As such it was difficult for Ney to assess the best course of action.

ALLIED COMMANDERS

Ludwig Adolph Peter, Prince of Sayn and Wittgenstein (1769-1843). As a boy, Wittgenstein joined the Page Corps of the Semenov Regiment with the rank of sergeant. In 1789, he was transferred to the Horse Guard Regiment, being promoted to lieutenant the next year. He received his baptism of fire in the Polish Campaign of 1795. He rose quickly through the ranks, becoming a full colonel in 1798 and major-general a year later. Made colonel-in-chief of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment in 1801, he distinguished himself at Austerlitz in 1805. He fought the Turks in 1806 before fighting the French at Friedland in 1807. He defended St Petersburg in 1812, taking command of the Prusso-Russian army in 1813, commanding it at Lützen and Bautzen. Due to his rather lack-lustre performance, Wittgenstein was replaced by Barclay de Tolly on 26 May 1813.

Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, (1761-1818). Barclay was the one Russian general capable of rising to the challenge of command in Germany in 1813. His military experience had started in 1788 in fighting against the Turks. He fought the Swedes in 1790 and saw action in Poland from 1792 to 1794. In 1806, he commanded the vanguard of Bennigsen’s army, winning a battle at Pultusk and being wounded at Eylau. He distinguished himself in Finland in 1808 and 1809, becoming Minister of War in 1810. In 1812, although he favoured withdrawing in the face of Napoleon’s advance into Russia, public opinion forced him to offer battle at Smolensk, the ‘gateway to Old Russia’. A German-speaker, he was not popular in Russia and was removed from command for his views on the best strategy to adopt against Napoleon’s invasion. The Russian Kutusov, considered a better man to defend the soil of Mother Russia, replaced him, eventually leading the army into Germany in 1813. Wittgenstein took over the command of the army on Kutusov’s death, but did not distinguish himself. On 26 May 1813, Barclay was given command of the Russian forces in Germany. He was known for his caution and pedantry, but the Spring Campaign ended before he was able to influence its events in an appreciable way.

Gebhardt Leberecht von Blücher (1742-1819). Blücher’s military career began at the tender age of fourteen in the Swedish cavalry. This was normal as Sweden held territories on the Baltic coast of Germany at this time and her army drilled according to Frederician regulations with orders given in the German language. The Prussians took him prisoner in 1760 during the Seven Years War, and he joined Belling’s regiment of hussars, later gaining a reputation for wild behaviour off the battlefield and aggression on it. Throughout this period, he was firmly in favour of dealing with French encroachments into Germany by firm military action and his successes in the Revolutionary Wars added to his reputation. At the Battle of Auerstadt in 1806, he mishandled the Prussian cavalry, attacking Davout’s men too early, but made up for this fighting a spirited retreat to Lübeck on the Baltic coast. He added his stature to the reform movement in the Prussian army that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau greatly influenced. A passionate man, his despair at Prussia’s humiliation following the defeats in 1806 caused a nervous breakdown. He gleefully took up his sabre again at the beginning of 1813. By now, the Prussian army had adopted a system of dual command for its larger formations. Blücher commanded a corps in the Spring Campaign with first Scharnhorst and then Gneisenau being his chief-of-staff. The individual genius of Napoleon was countered with the collective genius of the Prussian General Staff. At Bautzen, for example, Gneisenau tempered Blücher’s natural aggression, persuading him to withdraw once Ney’s flanking move became effective.

The Russian General Diebitsch and the Prussian General Yorck first met on the evening of 25 December 1812. Their negotiations took the Prussian contingent out of the Grande Armée and precipitated Prussia’s uprising against Napoleon. (Drawing by Richard Knötel)

THE OPPOSING ARMIES

THE FRENCH ARMY

Napoleon marched into Russia in 1812 with over 600,000 men. Of this force, no less than 500,000 perished, along with around 150,000 horses. Besides that, he lost around 1,000 cannon and 25,000 vehicles. With substantial forces committed to the Peninsular Campaign and with part of his veterans tied down in garrisons in fortresses in Central Europe, Napoleon had to raise an entirely new army around a backbone of about 100,000 men. These men came from several sources.

Hans David Ludwig Yorck, later Graf von Wartenburg. (Print after von Gebauer)

A cadre of 20,000 men consisted of officers, NCOs, dismounted cavalry troopers, etc., who returned from Russia. In addition 2,000 men came from 20 artillery companies that had until then been on garrison duty in Prussia. The depots provided an additional 10,000 men fit for service. Around 7,000 were seconded from 98 ships’ companies and four naval artillery regiments provided a further 12,000 veterans and 4,000 recruits. France’s police forces supplied around 1,000 municipal guards from Paris, 4,000 men from the Departmental Reserve Companies and 3,000 mounted gendarmes, the latter largely former cavalry officers and NCOs. Finally 40,000 veterans were drawn from the forces in Spain.

In addition to this backbone of around 100,000, Napoleon raised new formations. The 1st Contingent of the National Guard provided 78,000 men. These had been called up in 1812 to conduct internal security duties in France and were fully clothed and equipped. In spring 1813, they had the best part of a year’s paramilitary service behind them. From this force, 22 infantry regiments were formed along with three artillery regiments. In addition the Class of 1813 had been called up in September 1812. These 137,000 men had just started training at the beginning of 1813.

Napoleon had, on paper at least, 315,000 men at his immediate disposal from France alone. This was a significant force. In March and April 1813, those men available to the field army were organised as follows: