INTRODUCTION
The Cold War never turned hot, so the intriguing question remains: “How would NATO tanks have stacked up against Warsaw Pact tanks?” Other conflicts, fought away from the main theater, may hint at the answer. Operation Desert Storm of February 1991 provided a fascinating example of modern US versus Soviet-built tanks in action. This conflict was not a perfect surrogate for a NATO–Warsaw Pact clash since the latter had better tanks than the Iraqi T-72M1 and Warsaw Pact crews were probably better that the average Iraqi tank crews. Nevertheless, close examination of these tank battles provides an intriguing look at the state of tank technology and tank warfare at the end of the Cold War.
Desert Storm was not the first war which pitted US against Soviet equipment. The first significant clash occurred in Korea in 1950 when the North Korean Army spearheaded their attack on South Korea using Soviet-supplied T-34-85 tanks, and the US-led intervention involved M4A3E8, M26 and M46 tanks. Although the North Korean T-34-85 tanks proved to be highly effective in the initial invasion when faced with poorly trained South Korean infantry, once they were challenged by US Army tanks they suffered massive losses. The reasons were far less to do with the technology of the opposing tank types, which was fairly similar, but instead it was primarily crew quality which made the difference. The US crews were better trained than their North Korean opponents, and this core issue of crew competence would resonate through many later Cold War tank battles.
The 1956 war between Israel and Egypt involved tank combat between US-built Sherman tanks and Czechoslovak-supplied T-34-85 tanks, and once again the results were heavily dependent on crew quality. The 1967 Six-Day War saw the first major clash involving tanks developed after World War II. The Israel tank units largely relied on the British Centurion and US M48A2 Patton tanks while the Egyptian and Syrian forces used Soviet T-54 and T-55 tanks. However, the tank battles were one-sided in favor of Israel even when Israeli units used modified Sherman tanks, and the importance of crew performance was demonstrated especially clearly when Israeli Shermans successfully confrontated the modern Jordanian M47 and M48 tanks. The 1973 Arab–Israeli War saw yet another generation of Cold War tanks put to the test, in this case the US M60A1 and the new Soviet T-62. The results of this conflict were not as lopsided as some of the earlier wars, though ultimately, the Israeli tanks exacted a punishing kill-ratio against their opponents.
The T-72 became the standard license-produced Soviet tank in the 1980s in Poland, Czechoslovakia, India, and Yugoslavia. Iraq was not the only army to use the T-72 in the 1991 war. The Kuwaiti 35th Fatah Brigade operated the Yugoslav-built M-84A version as part of the Joint Coalition Force Group. (US DoD)
These wars could not provide an entirely accurate model for a potential NATO– Warsaw Pact tank confrontation due to differences in terrain, tactics, training and many other factors. But time after time, they suggested that the ultimate factor in deciding the outcome of tank combat was crew performance and not tank technology. The technical balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact tanks through most of the Cold War was close enough that it could not alone determine the outcome of tank fighting. This book will argue that the same was true about Operation Desert Storm. But it will also argue that Desert Storm provided an example where there was not only a clear advantage in crew quality on one side, but that there was a much greater technical disparity than was the case in most of the previous clashes.
The American M1A1 Abrams, German Leopard 2, British Challenger, and Soviet T-72 and T-80 were the ultimate tank designs of the Cold War years, and still have not been replaced by a new generation of tanks. Indeed, there is some question whether they will be replaced in the foreseeable future, since they continue to be viable battlefield contenders so long as they are well maintained and regularly updated. In recent years the focus has instead been on the adoption of a new generation of lightly armored wheeled vehicles that are more economical for peacekeeping operations rather than high-intensity combat.
The M1A1 Abrams tank represented the culmination of a number of technological trends in the 1960s and 1970s, which included the introduction of a new generation of digital electronics. This provided substantially better accuracy at long range, the ability to fire on the move, and significantly improved capabilities to see at night and through smoke and fog. (GDLS)
Several features distinguished the M1A1/T-72 generation from previous generations of tanks. In terms of firepower, these tanks represented the final switch to the use of APFSDS (armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding-sabot) ammunition (simply termed “sabot” in the US Army) for tank fighting. While APFSDS had already been used by previous generations of tanks, HEAT (high explosive anti-tank) ammunition had remained the predominant type in NATO and Warsaw Pact use through the 1970s. APFSDS began to attract serious attention due to its extensive use by Syrian and Egyptian T-62 tanks in the 1973 Arab–Israeli War. The final triumph of APFSDS was due in part to advances in ammunition technology, but also 6 to improvements in fire-control systems that gave APFSDS a level of accuracy resembling that of rivals such as guided tank projectiles. Both the M1A1 Abrams and the T-72 relied on APFSDS as their primary tank-fighting ammunition at the time of Operation Desert Storm.
The greatest disparity between the M1A1 Abrams and the T-72M1 was not in actual gun performance but rather in gun fire-control. The Abrams used a far superior FLIR (forward-looking infrared) thermal-imaging sight while the T-72 relied on the older and less versatile active infrared technology for night vision. The ultimate rule in tank fighting has always been “see first, fire first, hit first.” It was the thermal sights on the M1A1 that provided the crucial combat edge in Operation Desert Storm, since US tanks could spot and engage Iraqi tanks before the US vehicles could be seen. Iraqi tanks suffered another significant disadvantage in 1991 in that they were supplied with inferior ammunition – a generation behind that used by the Russian army of the time.
In terms of armor, the M1A1/T-72 generation marked a distinct turning away from homogenous steel armor towards laminate armor. Laminate armor had been used since the 1960s in the glacis plates (the heavily armored sloping front of a tank’s hull) of Soviet designs such as the T-64, but it had taken some time for armies to be convinced that laminate armor was worth the trouble compared to conventional steel armor. The M1A1 and T-72 provide some important clues to the advantages of the new generations of armor and their value on the modern battlefield. In this respect, the M1A1 held a critical edge over the export T-72M1, which had armor inferior to that of the Russian army’s contemporary T-72B tank.
There was also an important contrast between the T-72 and M1A1 in terms of propulsion. At the time of these tanks’ design there was heated debate about the relative value of conventional diesel engines against the new generation of gas-turbine engines. In the Soviet case both engine types were utilized – the T-72 had a diesel engine, the T-80 a gas-turbine one. The US M1A1 was powered by a gas turbine, but this remained one of the most controversial features of the tank. Operation Desert Storm did not silence this debate, despite the outstanding performance of the Abrams.
The M1 Abrams and T-72 Ural offer a curious contrast in terms of design and development paths. The M1 Abrams program constituted an entirely new effort aimed at producing the best tank possible, albeit within a tight budget. The T-72, on the other hand, was a reinterpretation of the existing T-64A, arising from industrial rivalries within the Soviet Union.
Despite the vehicles’ relative technical merits and flaws, the outcome of the tank battles of Desert Storm hinged as much on tactics, terrain, and crew capabilities as on the machines themselves. The Iraqi army was a mass conscript force that had become oversized as a consequence of recent wars; the army sacrificed quality for quantity in a bid to overcome Iran. The US Army had gone through a decade of reform and was now a lean professional force that had been honed to a sharp edge for potential combat in central Europe. By far the greater disparity between the two armies lay in their quality of troops than in the quality of technology.
CHRONOLOGY
1968
January
- Start of development of T-72.
February
- Start of development of M1 Abrams.
August
- Official state acceptance of T-72.
November
- Start of production of T-72.
- Start of production of T-72 Model 1975 export tank in USSR.
November
- Start of engineering development of M1 Abrams.
May
- Production approval of M1 Abrams.
- Start of production of T-72A tank.
February
- First delivery of series production M1 Abrams.
September 22
- Iraq attacks Iran.
- Start of production of T-72 Model 1975 tank in Poland.
- Start of production of T-72M1 export tank in USSR.
October
- First delivery of series production IPM1 Abrams.
- Start of production of T-72M tank in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
- Start of production of T-72B in USSR.
August
- First delivery of series production M1A1 Abrams.
- Start of production of T-72M1 in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
- Start of production of T-72S export tank in USSR.
August
- 20 Official ceasefire halts Iran–Iraq War.
October
- First delivery of series production M1A1HA Abrams.
August 2
- Start of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
January 17
- Start of coalition air campaign against Iraqi forces in Kuwait.
February 24, 0600 hours
- G-Day – start of coalition ground campaign against Iraq.
February 26, 1500 hours
- 2nd ACR starts Battle of 73 Easting.
February 27, 1200 hours
- 1st Armored Division starts Battle of Medina Ridge.
February 28, 0800 hours
- Ceasefire.
March 2
- Hammurabi Division bumps into 24th Infantry Division, starting Battle of Rumalyah.
The best version of the T-72 in Iraq in 1991 was the T-72M1, like this example captured from the Hammurabi RGFC Armored Division and subsequently put on display at Fort Stewart, Georgia. It has the characteristic features, including upgraded turret armor, smoke dischargers, a thermal sleeve on the gun, and appliqué armor on the hull glacis plate. (Author)
The final tank combat of Operation Desert Storm occurred after the ceasefire on March 2, when the Hammurabi Division bumped into the US 24th Infantry Division while trying to escape, leading to the short but intense “Battle of Rumalyah.” This is an M1A1 of Company C, 4–64 Armor, during the fighting. (US Army)
Capt Mark Gerges, commander of Bravo Company, 2–70 Armor, is seen here inspecting a destroyed BMP-1 at the Medina Ridge battlefield, which his team revisited in March 1991 to further examine the conduct of the battle. Gerges was awarded the Bronze Star and the Bronze Star with Valor device for his service during Operation Desert Storm. (Mark Gerges)
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
M1A1 ABRAMS
In the 1970s, the US Army tank force was based on the M60A1, with some of the older M48A3 Pattons still in service with National Guard units. Both tanks were evolutionary descendants of the M26 Pershing tank of 1945. An attempt to replace the Patton series with the more radical T95 design failed by 1959 as did the subsequent American–German MBT-70 program in the 1960s. Frustrated by cost overruns and poor performance, the US Congress killed the remnants of the MBT-70 program in 1971 and instructed the army to make another fresh start. In the meantime, the M60A1 soldiered on through evolutionary improvements as the M60A3 (TTS), with important innovations including a laser rangefinder, thermal-imaging nightsight, and a new generation of ammunition.
In contrast to previous tank development programs, which had relied on the US Army’s Tank-Automotive Command to undertake most of the design work, the new XM1 program was competitively developed by US industry. In 1972 General Motors and Chrysler received contracts to produce pilots of the XM1. The army did not want a repeat of the situation with the overly complicated MBT-70, and the price per unit was capped at $500,000; by way of comparison, at the time a single M60A1 tank cost $339,000. Due to time constraints, the army decided to stay with the existing 105mm gun instead of the more powerful German 120mm gun being developed for the Leopard 2, with provision for the 120mm weapon to be adopted at a later date.
The 2nd Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, was one of the first units equipped with the new M1 Abrams tank in 1982–83, including these examples from 3–67 Armor. (Author)
One of the main innovations in the M1 Abrams design was the incorporation of laminate armor. The US Army had been studying various types of advanced armors since the 1950s, and in 1972 the British government agreed to share details of its breakthrough Burlington special armor – often referred to as “Chobham” armor, since it was developed by the Fighting Vehicle Research and Development Establishment at Chobham. The primary aim of laminate armor was to defeat shaped-charge HEAT (high-explosive anti-tank) warheads which had become a principal tank-killer through their widespread use in anti-tank missiles as well as projectiles fired by tank guns. With conventional high-explosive warheads the explosive energy is released in all directions. In contrast, a shaped-charge warhead is built around a hollow metal cone and when detonated, the explosive crushes the cone and forms it into a hypervelocity stream of metal particles which can penetrate a significant depth of armor. Experiments had shown that the penetration effect of shaped-charge warheads could be weakened using laminates. As the hypervelocity stream penetrated the layers it tended to break up or be diverted, lessening penetration. In the case of the M1 the protection objective was to shield the front of the tank against both the Soviet 115mm APFSDS projectile and a US 5in (127mm) HEAT warhead comparable to that used in Soviet anti-tank missiles.