

An abstract geometric artwork featuring a complex arrangement of overlapping rectangles, squares, and circles in various colors including yellow, green, blue, red, and grey. A central arch-like shape is visible, and the overall composition is layered and textured.

Transnationale Geschichte

Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht



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Herausgegeben von

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2. Auflage

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

ISBN 978-3-525-36736-0

Umschlagabbildung: Wassily Kandinsky, Die Brücke, 1931
akg images / Erich Lessing, © VG Bild-Kunst, Bonn 2010

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Satz: Beate Sutterlüty, Bad Homburg
Druck und Bindung: DD AG, Birkach

Gedruckt auf alterungsbeständigem Papier.

Jürgen Kocka
zum 65. Geburtstag

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Vorwort

„Alle Historiker“, so hat der britische Südasienhistoriker C.A. Bayly kürzlich formuliert, „sind heutzutage Welthistoriker, auch wenn vielen von ihnen das noch nicht bewusst ist.“ Diese Formulierung schießt sicher über das Ziel hinaus. An der Tendenz jedoch gibt es wenig Zweifel: Die Internationalisierung der Geschichtswissenschaft und die Ausweitung ihres Gegenstands über die Grenzen des Nationalstaats hinweg stehen auf der Agenda. Die Nachfrage nach weltgeschichtlichen Überblickswerken nimmt zu, aber auch enger begrenzte Untersuchungen orientieren sich zunehmend an transnationalen Fragestellungen und globalen Zusammenhängen.

Die aktuelle Konjunktur transnationaler und welthistorischer Perspektiven ist eng mit fundamentalen wirtschaftlichen, politischen und kulturellen Prozessen der Gegenwart verknüpft. Sie schließt aber auch an wissenschaftliche Ansätze an, die keineswegs neu sind, vor allem an die lange Tradition des historischen Vergleichs, die auf Otto Hintze und Marc Bloch zurückgeht. Der Siegeszug der Modernisierungstheorie hat dem historischen Vergleich zum Durchbruch verholfen und entsprechende Institutionen und Foren geschaffen. Auch in der Bundesrepublik sind vor allem seit den späten 1980er Jahren zahlreiche komparative Untersuchungen entstanden. Ein zweiter Strang der Internationalisierung der Geschichtsschreibung geht auf beziehungsgeschichtliche Ansätze zurück, die zunächst als Gegenentwurf zum systematischen Vergleich diskutiert wurden. Inzwischen haben sich diese Fronten jedoch aufgelöst, und es ist deutlich geworden, dass Vergleiche nicht ohne den Blick auf Transfers auskommen und umgekehrt.

Während diese Ansätze von nationalen Geschichten ausgehen, zielt das Projekt einer Europäischen Geschichte darüber hinaus. Die Europa-Geschichtsschreibung, die seit den 1980er Jahren eine größere Rolle zu spielen begann, hing eng mit politischen Entwicklungen zusammen, reagierte aber auch auf eine steigende Nachfrage des deutschen und europäischen Buchmarktes. Vor diesem Hintergrund sind zahlreiche Synthesen und Gesamtdarstellungen zur europäischen Geschichte entstanden, nach 1990 noch mit erhöhter politischer und öffentlicher Dringlichkeit. Aber auch für empirische Einzeluntersuchungen hat die europäische Perspektive an Bedeutung gewonnen.

Seit den 1990er Jahren, dem Ende des Kalten Krieges und der Durchsetzung des neuen Metanarrativs der Globalisierung, ist die geographische Reichweite historischer und sozialwissenschaftlicher Fragestellungen erneut

gewachsen. Eine Reihe wissenschaftlicher Ansätze hat dazu beigetragen, den Fokus historischer Untersuchungen über die europäische Geschichte hinaus zu erweitern. Dazu gehört ein neues Interesse an den internationalen Beziehungen, die sich längst nicht mehr auf Diplomatiegeschichte reduzieren lassen. Stattdessen sind nichtstaatliche Akteure oder internationale NGOs in den Blick der Forschung geraten. Auch die *Postcolonial Studies*, die seit dem Erscheinen von Edward Saids *Orientalism* vor allem in der englischsprachigen Forschung (das heißt auch in Indien und Australien) eine intensive Diskussion ausgelöst haben, sind in den letzten Jahren in Deutschland rezipiert worden. Seitdem gehört auch die Frage nach den kolonialen Verflechtungen und ihren Rückwirkungen auf die deutsche und europäische Geschichte zu den Forschungsfeldern, die neue Aufschlüsse versprechen.

Hinzu kommt, ebenfalls seit den 1990er Jahren, ein starkes Interesse an globalgeschichtlichen Problemstellungen. Damit ist weniger eine Wiederaufnahme der älteren, häufig stark eurozentrischen Weltgeschichte gemeint, obwohl auch hier Anknüpfungspunkte und Kontinuitäten bestehen. Unter dem Begriff der *global history* werden seit einigen Jahren Ansätze diskutiert, die nach globalen Strukturen, konkreten Interaktionen und der Herausbildung eines globalen Bewusstseins fragen, aber nicht mehr von einer Diffusion westlicher Errungenschaften ausgehen.

Diese vielfältige Entgrenzung des historischen Gegenstands, die mit der Intensivierung internationaler Netzwerke von Forschern und Wissenschaftsorganisationen einhergeht, ist eine der dynamischsten Entwicklungen der gegenwärtigen Geschichtsschreibung. Sie könnte die historiographische Landschaft nachhaltig verändern. Nicht nur die Forschung, sondern auch die universitäre Lehre und der Unterricht an den Schulen stehen vor der Ausweitung von Fragestellungen und Perspektiven über den nationalen Rahmen hinaus. Das heißt nicht, dass nationalgeschichtliche Themen keine Rolle mehr spielen werden; für viele Fragen wird der nationale Rahmen von Politik und Gesellschaft maßgebend bleiben. Viele Untersuchungen werden sich jedoch der Herausforderung einer vergleichenden, transnationalen oder globalen Einordnung nicht mehr ohne weiteres entziehen können.

Dieser Band soll eine Zwischenbilanz ziehen. Die Autoren des ersten Teils diskutieren unterschiedliche Ansätze einer Erweiterung der Geschichtsschreibung über den nationalgeschichtlichen Rahmen hinaus. Vom historischen Vergleich über die europäische Geschichte und die *Postcolonial Studies* bis zu globalgeschichtlichen Perspektiven stellen sie die wichtigsten Konzepte einer transnationalen Historiographie vor. Dabei werden die Chancen, aber auch die analytischen Kosten einer Entgrenzung des historischen Gegenstandes gegeneinander abgewogen. Eine Leitfrage, die sich

durch zahlreiche Aufsätze zieht, ist die nach dem Stellenwert der Nation. Sie stellt sich auch dort, wo man sich grundsätzlich auf eine europäische und globale Perspektive einlässt. Auch der Prozess der Globalisierung, so argumentieren einige Beiträge, hat die Nation nicht obsolet werden lassen, erst recht nicht für Historiker. Andere Autoren hingegen interpretieren die Ära des Nationalstaats eher als Etappe innerhalb einer längerfristigen Entwicklung, etwa einer Geschichte imperialer Großreiche oder einer Geschichte der „Territorialisierung“.

Die Aufsätze des zweiten Teils behandeln ausgewählte Felder der Geschichtswissenschaft, ohne dass hier ein Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit erhoben wird. Darunter sind Bereiche wie die jüdische Geschichte, die *Intellectual History*, die Geschichte multinationaler Unternehmen oder die Konsumgeschichte, in denen transnationale Perspektiven eine lange Tradition haben. Daneben stehen Themenfelder wie die historische Nationalismusforschung, die Arbeitergeschichte, die Geschichte der Zivilgesellschaft oder die Geschichte kollektiver Erinnerungen, in denen vergleichende und beziehungsgeschichtliche Fragestellungen in den letzten Jahren erheblich an Bedeutung gewonnen und zu wichtigen neuen Einsichten geführt haben. Aber Berücksichtigung finden auch Ansätze wie die Kulturgeschichte oder die Mikrogeschichte, die sich in mancher Hinsicht gegen die hier behandelten Tendenzen zu sperren scheinen.

Jürgen Kocka hat die skizzierten Entwicklungen in den vergangenen Jahren maßgeblich beeinflusst und die Diskussion über sie immer wieder angestoßen und entscheidend vorangebracht. Er wird weltweit als einer der wichtigsten Vertreter international orientierter Geschichtswissenschaft wahrgenommen. Es fiel daher leicht, herausragende und über die Grenzen ihres Landes hinaus bekannte Vertreter des Faches für diesen Band zu gewinnen. Die meisten von ihnen kennen und schätzen Jürgen Kocka schon seit langem und haben zum Teil intensiv mit ihm zusammengearbeitet. Dies hängt mit seinen zahlreichen übergreifenden und vergleichenden Arbeiten zusammen, aber auch mit seiner herausragenden Bedeutung als Initiator, Organisator und Stichwortgeber historischer Forschung. Dazu gehört auch sein Einsatz für eine moderne, interdisziplinäre und internationale Geschichtswissenschaft, die den systematischen Sozialwissenschaften gegenüber offen und zum Brückenschlag über nationalstaatliche Grenzen hinweg bereit ist. Als Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für die „Geschichte der Industriellen Welt“ an der Freien Universität Berlin, als Permanent Fellow am Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin sowie als Präsident des Wissenschaftszentrums Berlin für Sozialforschung hat er diese Entwicklungen stark gefördert.

Jürgen Kocka hat zur Konjunktur komparativer Geschichtswissenschaft in Deutschland entscheidend beigetragen, sowohl durch eigene Arbeiten

als auch durch die Organisation größerer Forschungszusammenhänge. Er war einer der Initiatoren und wichtigsten Träger des Bielefelder Sonderforschungsbereichs zur Geschichte des neuzeitlichen Bürgertums, in dem die Frage nach dem deutschen „Sonderweg“ durch vergleichende Untersuchungen ausdrücklich in einen europäischen Kontext gestellt wurde. In diesem Zusammenhang hat Jürgen Kocka zahlreiche komparativ und international konzipierte Arbeiten angeregt. Zugleich gingen von ihm wichtige Impulse zur theoretischen und methodischen Auseinandersetzung mit komparativen Ansätzen aus.

Die vergleichende Perspektive war bei Jürgen Kocka von Anfang an gesamteuropäisch angelegt. Als Gründer und Leiter der Arbeitsstelle für Vergleichende Gesellschaftsgeschichte in Berlin, des Zentrums für Vergleichende Geschichte Europas und des Berliner Kollegs für die Vergleichende Geschichte Europas hat er die Notwendigkeit, zu einer komparativen und integralen Geschichtsschreibung West- und Osteuropas zu gelangen, früh gesehen. In den letzten Jahren hat er darüber hinaus die Frage nach transnationalen Ansätzen und postkolonialen Perspektiven aufgegriffen, etwa durch eine von ihm initiierte Diskussion, die seit 2001 in der Zeitschrift *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* geführt wird. Die Anerkennung, die ihm dafür auch international zuteil wurde, äußerte sich beispielsweise in der Präsidentschaft des Internationalen Historikerverbandes (CISH), die Jürgen Kocka von 2000 bis 2005 innehatte. In dieser Funktion hat er die Einbeziehung nicht-westlicher Historiographien und die globalgeschichtliche Öffnung der Geschichtsschreibung intensiv betrieben. Welche methodischen Ansätze und welche Perspektiven für übergreifende Synthesen sich dabei angesichts der Herausforderung der Globalisierung als besonders fruchtbar herausstellen werden, ist eine Frage, die die Historikerinnen und Historiker in den nächsten Jahren sicher weiter beschäftigen wird.

Jürgen Kocka ist für viele bis heute ein wichtiger Lehrer und Förderer und in seiner intellektuellen Neugier und Offenheit, sachlichen Strenge und Diskussionslust ein Vorbild. Zahlreiche jüngere und ältere Kolleginnen und Kollegen haben über die Jahre hinweg von seiner Arbeit viel profitiert und gelernt. Dieses Buch ist auf ihre Anregung und mit ihrer Unterstützung zustande gekommen. Es ist Jürgen Kocka zum 65. Geburtstag gewidmet.

Gunilla Budde, Sebastian Conrad und Oliver Janz

Natalie Zemon Davis

What is Universal about History?¹

Universal history has been written in many settings. For example, al-Mas‘udi of Baghdad travelled far beyond Dar al-Islam in the tenth century and his books of history and geography covered varied features of the earth’s surface, its peoples, and their past. “History is the record of human social organization, which is identical with world civilization”, wrote Ibn Khaldun in the late fourteenth century (from the Hijra the late eighth century). The volumes of his “Book of Examples” covered the pre-Islamic world and Muslim societies from east to west, with occasional forays into Christian Europe, even while concentrating on the Berbers and Arabs of North Africa. Ibn Khaldun used two modes in his writing. On the one hand, he described relations between peoples through migration, the exchange of ideas and techniques, and conquest. On the other hand, he compared diverse social formations and institutions so as to develop a theory of the historical state and “a science of civilization”. History, he said, was eagerly sought throughout the world, by common people and rulers fascinated to hear of changes in human affairs and the expansion, rise and fall of dynasties. But history was also sought by the learned for its “inner meaning”, “explanation of the causes and origins of existing things, and deep knowledge of how and why of events.”² Ibn Khaldun’s practices in describing relations between peoples and in making comparisons toward the goal of “deep knowledge” help us address important concerns about history writing today, especially writing about East and West, North and South. Universal or global history, it is claimed, has not dealt effectively with deep cultural and social difference. It has been inevitably triumphalist, celebrating the victory of empires: since the eighteenth century the West and its values always come out on top. So strong has been this model that it dominates the argument of those writing to topple western empires. As Dipesh Chakrabarty famously put it, “insofar as the academic discourse of history is concerned, Europe remains the sovereign theoretical subject of all histories, including

1 This paper was delivered at the opening session of the 20th Congress of the International Commission of Historical Sciences, held in Sydney, Australia, July 3, 2005, under the presidency of Professor Jürgen Kocka.

2 Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History*, 3 vols., Princeton 1967, vol. 1, pp. 6–14.

the ones we call Indian, Chinese, Kenyan, and so on. These histories are conceptualized in terms of 'lacks', 'failed transitions', and 'not yet'".³ Similarly, Antonis Liakos has described "the strategies of response to the *canon* of [western] history" used by historians in modern Greece and Turkey to make their country's past fit a western trajectory: either they excluded an unsuitable middle period or they reinterpreted the period to show it had European characteristics. In a third strategy taken up by some historians in postcolonial lands and in China and Japan, differences from the west are celebrated as an "alternative Universality", with its own temporal rhythm. Such a move reaffirms the western canon by centering on its opposite.⁴ Chakrabarty calls for more sweeping changes in historical thinking: first, a muting of the sense of anachronism, which he sees as the "beginning of modern historical consciousness", and its replacement with "heterotemporality", that is, the absolute contemporaneity of different ways of being in the world; second, an elimination of linear thinking and stage theories and their replacement with the notion of multiple possibilities at any moment in the historical process.

I am hopeful for these and allied changes in historical writing, partly because some of them are already under way in different places and even have a tradition behind them. Surely they are needed more than ever to counter the linear and exclusivist eschatologies that are also afloat in our world today. Here I want to concentrate on three issues relevant to good historical practice with a global consciousness.

First, it is essential to describe and interpret relations between peoples along two universal axes: the axis of exchange, involving communication, trade, gifts, and alliance and the axis of power, involving the domination of peoples and resistance to domination. To be sure, there can be coercive aspects to exchange, and conquest is a form of communication; both elements are present in most transactions, but they must still be sorted out. In my own case, the necessity for looking at both axes especially hit me when I began to work on early modern European marriage and family. In this intimate hierarchical world, the interaction between domination and exchange was always evident, whether at the drawing up of the marriage contract, at the wedding ceremony, in the marriage bed, in the birthing chamber, around the family table, in the farmyard or workshop, or at the drawing up of the will. When I came later to study the relations of Europeans and indigenous peoples in

3 Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History. Who Speaks for Indian Pasts?*, in: *Representations* 37 (1992), pp. 1–26; Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton 2000.

4 Antonis Liakos, *The Canon of History and the Strategies of Response*, unpublished essay, 2004.

seventeenth-century Canada and of Europeans and Africans in Suriname, or now between Muslims and Jews in sixteenth-century North Africa, I was prepared to add the dialectic of exchange – of stories, gifts, sexual intimacy, healing – to the polarity of domination and resistance. By now, Richard White had drawn a picture of a “middle ground” in the Great Lakes, in which diplomacy, trade, and other forms of exchange took place between Native Americans and the English who had settled in their ancestral lands; and Homi Bhaba was configuring cultural relations between colonized and colonizer in terms of “hybridity” rather than clear “difference” and “otherness”, and characterizing the rumor of defiled gun cartridges and the circulation of chapatis on the eve of the Indian rebellion of 1857 as the great spreading fear equivocal, circulating wildly on both sides. It spreads beyond the knowledge of ethnic or cultural binarisms and becomes a new, hybrid space of cultural difference in the negotiation of colonial power-relations.⁵

In 2001, in the pages of the “Indian Social and Economic History Review”, Shantanú Phukan challenges the assumption of “monolingualism” in the Mughal period and “the facile equation between literary traditions and religious communities” and describes seventeenth- and eighteenth-century authors reading and writing in Persian and Hindi both. “Where”, he asks, “do we fix the identity of a Punjabi Hindu making a pilgrimage to the tomb of a Sufi saint, enjoying a sophisticated narrative in eastern Hindi and retelling it in high Persian for the delectation of his Persian-and-Urdu-speaking Muslim colleagues?”

This writer’s milieu of Mughal times is multilingual, but it is not Babel – it has shape and limits. This brings me to my second point in regard to historical practice: the historian’s interpretive stance and breadth of consciousness. Abandoning rigid evolutionary schemes that privilege a western style of modernization does not mean settling for no patterns or rhythms at all. We care about Ibn Khaldun’s second goal, the quest for “meaning”, for “knowledge of the how and why of events”. Thus, the concepts of “alternate historical paths” have emerged, or for those who like the term “multiple modernities”, diverse types of long or middle-span trajectories in political, economic, and cultural life. I heard a good example at the last Congress of the Historical Sciences, where Takeshi Hamashita showed us that in sea-linked Pacific societies of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, state formation did not proceed in the direction of centralized and nation-based

5 Richard White, *The Middle Ground. Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815*, Cambridge 1991; Homi Bhaba, *In a Spirit of Calm Violence*, in: Gyan Prakash (ed.), *After Colonialism. Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*, Princeton 1994, pp. 326–343.

sovereign polities. Rather the suzerain-vassal tie, cemented by tribute gifts, was an alternate and viable path.⁶

Are there costs to the preference for multiple paths and alternate trajectories? It may mean giving up on a grandiose universal law for all of history, but it leaves us with a variegated repertoire of typologies and of short-term and middle-term sequences and clusters of cultural traits – themselves always to be rethought through research and debate. It leaves us with a choice of literary narratives to tell about the past, and with the challenge of assessing historical societies in terms other than the binaries of “backward”/“advanced” or “spiritual”/“material”. It allows us to supersede Jack Goody’s concept of the “domestication of the savage mind”, where alleges polar contrasts between pre-literate and literate mind sets. Recent studies of the Americas have been assigning much value to recording devices and “recordkeeping without letters”, such as memory sticks, wampum belts, and pictorial ideographs. Instead of Algonquians and Iroquoians standing in awed admiration before godlike Jesuits with their writing tablets, we can as well visualize the two groups of seventeenth-century practitioners swapping information about techniques. Some Jesuit fathers were quick to adopt Indian memory sticks as superior to the memory boards they knew in France, while some native mothers were quick to send their daughters to the Ursuline convent to learn to read and write. Different modes of “reading” and recording the world have important consequences, but these can be understood more deeply if complexity is acknowledged in both cases. Likewise the implications of different techniques of communication – scribal, oral, print, electronic, visual – can be more richly seen if they are not prejudged as simple or advanced; indeed, the various forms coexist in societies and the interaction between them is often what stimulates the most interesting cultural behavior.

The multiple-path possibility came early to those of us studying the history of women and gender – not only to those calling for non-western models for India, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia – but for those of us working in Europe itself. Did Protestantism with its call to literacy for men and women and its elevation of marriage encourage more symmetrical gender relations than Catholicism with its female saints and its celibate option? Or did each have its spaces for gender choice, its trade-offs, its constraints? Did the hierarchical Old Regime of the eighteenth century allow more public life and influence to aristocratic and wealthy women than contractual republican citizenship, extended fully only to men? Women of the time

6 Takeshi Hamashita, Paper presented at the session on Perspectives on Global History, 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences, Oslo, August 6–13, 2000.

argued both positions, and soon after there were women advocates of a female women's public role in charity work and writing, while leaving the state to men. Each of these were contemporary possibilities, to be explicated by the historian: the most important consequence they have for gender relations lies in their coexistence, their simultaneous claims, challenging and confirming different patterns of relationship.

In urging the exploration of the past by the axis of exchange as well as the axis of power and its interpretation by multiple sequences rather than a single evolutionary scheme, I have been following a strategy of inclusion, that is, thinking of our tasks in ways that make possible a "global community of historians" in the twenty-first century.⁷ I might have said in a post-colonial world or in a post Cold-War world, but with the new imperialism, new fundamentalisms and passionate nationalisms, new eschatological furies and violent paranoia current today, those "post" phrases are too sanguine. Governments in several parts of the world insist that evidence unpalatable to their partisan program be suppressed from history textbooks; extremist religious/political groups in several parts of the world insist that history books be withdrawn from publication and from libraries because they contain evidence unacceptable to their present leaders.

We historians do not possess a monopoly on ways of telling about the past, but we have a strong responsibility to defend historical evidence, duly researched, and credible interpretation of it. I affirm this responsibility in full awareness that it is often difficult to establish the validity of evidence, that documents are never transparent (one of my books is entitled "Fiction in the Archives!"), that historians shape disparate evidence into a narrative form, and that interpretations can be contested. But the goal of our historian's craft has been and is a *quest* for a truthful account of the past as full as we can make it; we try to further that goal by constantly reviewing each other's evidence, offering enlargements, and debating interpretation. Ibn Khaldun composed the "Muqaddima", the prolegomenon, to his "Book of Examples" so that a rightful understanding of political and social processes would correct the "stumbling and slipping and deviating from the highroad of truth" found in history books whose authority rested only on trustworthy transmission (*isnad*). To correct his own errors, he called upon readers of "scholarly competence and wide knowledge" to look at his book with a

7 Jürgen Kocka/Wolfgang J. Mommsen (eds.), Karl Dietrich Erdmann, Toward a Global Community of Historians. The International Historical Congresses and the International Committee of Historical Sciences, 1898–2000, New York 2005.

critical rather than a complacent eye. “The capital of knowledge that an individual scholar has to offer is small.”⁸

Ibn Khaldun’s readers and critics until the nineteenth century remained within the Arabic reading world. As historians today, our readers and critics can speak many tongues and come from many lands and perspectives. We gather together to report and exchange findings in fields or across fields and, in so doing, discover and debate what counts as historical evidence and plausible interpretation in a world community. We need this enlargement – for ourselves as historians, for our local associations, and for the power of our collective voice in support of historical inquiry and expression. “No one can stand up against the authority of truth”, Ibn Khaldun said hopefully six hundred years ago.⁹ Today – when a spokesman for the leaders of the most powerful military machine in the world claims they make their own reality irrespective of what actually happened – our challenge is greater. But with our expanded networks of collaboration, our potential for wisdom as historians and our ability for telling what women and men made happen in the past it is greater than ever.

8 Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah*, vol. 1, p. 14.

9 Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah*, vol. 1, p. 7.

Michael Mann

Globalization, Macro-Regions and Nation-States

Many scholars and critical theorists today contend that the nation-state is dead, “transcended”, “undermined”, “outflanked” or “eroded” by globalization. The sociologist Ulrich Beck says globalization equals “de-nationalization”. He critiques the “methodological nationalism” that relies on a “container theory” of society, and says we have moved from an “age of nation-states” to an “age of globalization”, in which the national containers have sprung too many leaks to be resealed. Transnational fluidity has replaced the fixed, the national – and implicitly even the macro-regional.¹ Many social scientists have added their own obituaries of the nation-state.² Some declare “the end of geography” based on the “distance-destroying” of information and communication technologies.³ Metaphors abound of “distance annihilation”, “time-space compression”, “variable geometry”, “liquid modernity”, plus varied word-plays on “flows” replacing “place” or even “space”. “All that is solid melts into air”, declared Marx – rhetorically, of course. But these social scientists seem to mean it literally.

There have been critics of such obituaries.⁴ I here carry their arguments further, in four ways. First, globalization and nation-states are not opposed, for nation-states have themselves been globalized. Second, the obituaries’ grasp of time and space is weak and wobbly: when and where was the nation-state so vibrant in the past and when and where exactly did it decline?

1 Ulrich Beck, *What Is Globalization?*, Cambridge 2001.

2 Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, Cambridge 2000; Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization. The Human Consequences*, Cambridge 1998, pp. 55–76; Manuel Castells, *The Information Age. Economy, Society and Culture*, vol. 3, *End of Millennium*, Oxford 1998, pp. 357f.; David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Oxford 1989; William Robinson/Jerry Harris, *Towards a Global Ruling Class? Globalization and the Transnational Ruling Class*, in: *Science and Society* 64 (2000), pp. 11–54; Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation-State. The Rise and Fall of Regional Economies*, New York 1995; George Soros, *On Globalization*, New York 2002; Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, Cambridge 1996; Martin Albrow, *The Global Age*, Stanford 1997, p. 91; Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge 1990; Scott Lash/John Urry, *Economies of Signs and Space*, London 1994, pp. 280f.; Malcolm Waters, *Globalization*, London 1995.

3 Richard O’Brien, *Global Financial Integration. The End of Geography*, London 1992.

4 Paul Hirst/Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question*, Cambridge 1999; Michael Mann, *Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?*, in: *Review of International Political Economy* 4 (1997), pp. 472–496; Robert Holton, *Globalization and the Nation-State*, New York 1998; Linda Weiss, *Bringing Domestic Institutions Back*, in: Linda Weiss (ed.), *States in the Global Economy. Bringing Domestic Institutions Back In*, New York 2003.

Third, nation-states vary enormously in their “infrastructural powers” – their ability to routinely penetrate their territories and civil societies and erect barriers against outside forces, including global pressures.⁵ Some are feeble, others are quasi-imperial, able to set the terms of globalization, in their own national interest. Fourth, we must distinguish between forces that are global and forces that are transnational but only “macro-regional”. The effect of these arguments is to dissolve the conventional antinomy between nation-states and globalization, and to re-assert the importance of places, both national and macro-regional, in processes of globalization.

Time and Space

Most social scientists, being little interested in history, have offered only a single dichotomy – as Beck did – between a past age of nation-states and a present age of globalization. Pieterse is one of the few to offer dates: from the 1840s to the 1960s, he says, “the nation-state was the single dominant organizational option”.⁶ This is nonsense. States were quite weak before World War I. They relied on taxes from goods that visibly moved or from land whose area could be measured, rather than today’s far more sophisticated taxes on incomes or wealth at source. They had few economic policies beyond tariffs, whose main purpose was to yield the cash resources of which states were then starved. Capital and labor were already substantially transnational in the 19th century. Arms manufacturers sold their deadliest products freely to the enemies of their own state. States did acquire temporary planning powers in World Wars I and II, though Keynesian planning only became routinized after 1945, as did an exponential growth in state regulations covering most spheres of social life. Our great-grandfathers could beat their wives and children, smoke wherever they liked, and abuse people of other races and creeds, without fear of state punishment. The European nation was more divided by class, status, gender and region, with very different manners and styles of dress and mutually-unintelligible dialects. Today’s states are much stronger and today’s nations may be more cohesive and mono-cultural than they were a century ago.

The obituaries are also Eurocentric. “An age of nation-states” before 1914 could only have existed in Western Europe (plus a few other places),

5 Michael Mann, *The Autonomous Power of the State. Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results*, in: Michael Mann (ed.), *States, War and Capitalism*, Oxford 1988.

6 Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *Globalization as Hybridization*, in: Mike Featherstone (ed.), *Global Modernities*, New York 1995, p. 102.

since the world as a whole (including Asia) was dominated by empires. Between 1920 and 1941 the British Empire alone ruled a quarter of the earth's land surface. True, the motherlands and fatherlands of the empires were becoming nation-states. But their rise to global domination had begun earlier, and the cataclysmic World Wars that ended them resulted more from inter-imperial rivalry than rivalry between nation-states, more specifically by failure to resolve rivalries between expanding empires (Germany, Japan, Russia and America), declining empires (Habsburg, Ottoman and Qing China) and status quo empires (Great Britain and France). The British government was clear that in both wars it was defending its Empire, while two German governments claimed Germany was being prevented from reaching its rightful imperial place in the world.

An age of nation-states could only have begun after 1945, after the defeat of the German and Japanese empires and a long process of decolonization which established many new nation-states. The Soviet Russian empire only collapsed in 1989–1991, resulting in the appearance of more of them (and more resulted from the collapse of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia). The United States is now dominant in the world, but has not had a direct or indirect empire since its unhappy experience in the Philippines in the early 20th century. So the age of empires ended quite recently. Any age of nation-states would have to be placed in the last few decades, and coming to fruition only in the 1990s. The United Nations (note the title) now consists of 191 members, all of whom claim sovereignty over their territories in the name of the “people” or “nation”.

Are they declining already? Most of the obituaries are written by Europeans since the European Union is the one place where decline might seem real, for its states have agreed to pool some sovereignty. This process has no parallel elsewhere in the world – and even the European momentum came to a screeching halt in 2005. Europe is unique mainly because no other macro-region had previously killed over 50 million of its own citizens. Thus it set up institutions to prevent another war. Is this even a net loss of sovereignty? The European states have collectively gained more power relative to two more powerful states, the Soviet Union and the United States. Now they can better share in steering globalization. We are *now* in an age of nation-states, just as we are now in an age of globalization. The globalization of the nation-state is a key part of globalization, not its victim.

The Varying Powers of Nation-States

But states are not equal. From Somalia to the United States is a massive upward leap in power. More states resemble Somalia than the US. In perhaps a third of UN member states the claim to sovereignty is a little hollow, since they possess little infrastructural power over their territories and borders. Just as in the past their colony capitals, normally port-cities, were better connected to the imperial capital in Europe than to their own hinterland, so today the same capitals are better-connected to the Northern aid agencies and buyers of their few commodity exports than to their hinterlands.⁷ Many are driven by civil wars in which rival factions are trying to establish their own nation-state, which is the global ideal for all.⁸ These are not declining nation-states. They never were nation-states, though they are trying to become them. Their main worry is not of global fluidity sweeping through them. It is the opposite: that globalization avoids them. Capitalism avoids states that are not in reality sovereign. As we shall see, global capitalism and effective nation-states normally go together, in harness. Here, amid the poorest, weakest states, both are absent.

The remaining two-thirds or so of states do participate in the global economy. Yet 80% of their trade in goods and services remains confined within national borders. Inter-national price differentials remain much greater than intra-national ones. Borders and distance continue to ratchet up transaction costs, even for capital flows. Every 1% in distance between two countries lowers bilateral trade by 0.7% – no annihilation of distance.⁹ As a share of world output, cross-border trade has been static, at just above 20% since 1980.¹⁰ Most cross-border trade remains within the neighboring region: only 11% of EU output and 8% of NAFTA output goes to the rest of the world. Of course, another one-third of cross-border trade occurs inside multi-national corporations (MNCs), yet they tend to retain a national identity.¹¹ GATT/ WTO agreements reduce tariffs but not subtler forms of protection, like protracted customs inspections, safety regulations and currency manipulations. 60% of world trade is organized through preferential regional and bilateral agreements between governments. Production and trade

7 Frederick Cooper, *Africa since 1940. The Past of the Present*, Cambridge 2002; Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa. Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton 2000.

8 Michael Mann, *The Darkside of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, Cambridge 2005.

9 Jeffrey Frankel, *Globalization of the Economy*, in: Joseph Nye/John Donahue (eds.), *Governance in a Globalizing World*, Washington, DC 2000, pp. 58–67.

10 WTO, *International Trade Statistics*, 2003.

11 Peter Cowhey/Jonathan Aronson, *Managing the World Economy. The Consequences of Corporate Alliances*, New York 1993.

span the world, but states negotiate the rules of global capitalism more than in the past. Again, states and global capitalism expand together, though in a denser economic world.

Finance appears far more transnational. The value of financial cross-border flows, often organized in “offshore” locations, dwarfs the value of world GDP many times over – an artefact resulting from the same bond or stock being traded many times in the course of a day. States have felt increasing transnational pressures on their exchange rate and (to a lesser extent) interest rate policies, yet many state policies still affect international investment decisions. Risk is assessed as much in terms of the overall health of the national economy as in the private economic assets it contains. In fact, the level of cross-border trade and investment is positively correlated to state activism. Stronger, more interventionist states participate more in the global economy and attract foreign capital.¹² There has been no “race to the bottom” on taxes by states supposedly desperately competing to attract foreign capital. OECD tax data suggest that states and global capitalists have negotiated a middle ground that balances capitalist profit against the preservation of national economic health and social welfare.¹³ Weiss says this reflects “governed interdependence”, where states continue to plan and preserve collective welfare, but in conjunction with profit-oriented business organizations.¹⁴ States and markets – national and transnational – remain entwined. One is not undermining the other.

The hierarchy of states and macro-regions remains omnipresent in the world economy. The US sits on top. The dollar is the world’s reserve currency, the US leads the IMF, World Bank, and other international banking agencies, and its economy is double the size of any other national economy. The US is not being weakened by globalization, it sets many of its parameters. It is also the major player in bilateral trade agreements, attempting to counter the recent emergence of collective action among the states of the South within the WTO by dividing and ruling, making deals with individual needy Southern states that they cannot afford to turn down. These are modern versions of the “unequal treaties” characteristic of 19th century informal imperialism. So are structural adjustment programs. Both sets of arrangements reveal the continued relevance of the state system, but as hierarchy, not equality.

The next tier of countries, Germany, Japan, Britain, France, Italy, Russia etc have lesser but still formidable power. The Europeans are banded

12 Dani Rodrik, Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments? in: *Journal of Political Economy* 107 (1998), pp. 997–1032.

13 John Hobson, Disappearing Taxes or the “Race to the Middle”? Fiscal Policy in the OECD, in: Weiss, States.

14 Weiss, Domestic Institutions.

together in the macro-regional EU, Japan is a more informal leader of the East Asian economies. So the supposedly global economy is rather trilateral and decidedly “Northern”. The Northern countries provide over 80% of world production, trade and finance, and over 95% of its research and development. The rise of China and India is now beginning to reduce this, but by adding two more nation-states. These major nation-states and macro-regions are not declining. Their power has actually spread outward, through an alphabet soup of organizations – G-7, G-8, G-12, WTO, IMF etc. They do not exactly “plan” the global economy, though capitalism was even less planned in the 19th century. Yet in many policy areas, from crime, terrorism and human rights to the environment, finance, and trade, officials exchange information, coordinate policies, enforce laws, and regulate markets. Sometimes this strengthens sovereignty and hardens borders, as with measures against terrorism and global financial fraud. Sometimes the effects are more complex. For example, the cooperation between national judicial authorities and international and regional courts is now tending to globalize jurisprudence. This poses a “democratic deficit”, whereby the national parliament has difficulty controlling the activities of state officials and business groups whose interests are often informally privileged within such channels. States themselves become a little “disaggregated”, removed from the nation.¹⁵ But these are the problems of expansion, not decline.

The obituaries often identify “neo-liberalism” as the cutting edge of globalization’s ability to undermine nation-states. Let us consider its two main alleged powers, one exercised over poor countries, the other over rich ones. When poorer countries have fallen into debt, representatives of the Northern states who dominate international banking organizations enforce debt repayment through “structural adjustment programs”. The creditors’ voting strength in these banks reflect the size of each economy, with the US having most votes. Structural adjustment programs tend to redistribute power and income from labor to capital within the “adjusted” country, and from domestic to foreign capital internationally.¹⁶ Since the rich states, and the more economically effective Southern states, are not in debt, they are not affected. But this is not new, since it resembles the “informal imperialism” and the “dollar diplomacy” common in the 19th and early 20th centuries: weaker sovereign states are constrained by the more powerful, imposing “sound finances” on them. The victims can say “no”, as Argentina has done in both the 19th and 21st centuries, though the consequences are often

15 Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order*, Princeton 2004.

16 Samuel Morley, *The Income Distribution Problem in Latin America and the Caribbean*, Santiago 2001.

dire.¹⁷ Such programs do embody the conventional wisdom of global finance capital, but this is enforced by the major states. Structural adjustment programs are the cutting edge, not only of globalization, but also of power relations between states. Again, the two go together.

Second, neo-liberal globalization supposedly puts fiscal pressure on richer states offering generous welfare states and equality-enhancing redistribution. There is no doubting the pressure, only its source. The main economic pressures have arisen from transformations of capitalism, but not directly from its globalization than from the slowing rate of growth in the world economy in the early 1970s, followed by generally low-growth since. Structural unemployment rose and employment shifted toward the less-productive, more-unequal and less unionized service sector. These pressured state budgets, weakened labor movements and widened labor market inequalities. But the biggest pressures are not economic ones. With the “maturation” of welfare states, programs expanded and entitlements spread to more and more of the population. The size of the total pay-out began to strain budgets, even without recession (the “over-regulation” of the labor market in Germany similarly results from “regulatory maturation”). Then add demographic and gender pressures: population ageing (reinforced by rising hi-tech medical costs), more single-person households requiring welfare support, more low-wage women in the labor force, more inequality between households with two and no earners. People stay in school longer, retire earlier and live longer, so fewer workers must pay for the welfare benefits of more economically inactive persons.¹⁸ The more generous the welfare state, the bigger the fiscal crisis. This does not primarily result from globalization, though its consequence might be to weaken the regulatory powers of the nation-state. But to see whether this is true, we must turn finally to the role of macro-regions.

17 Emily Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World. The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900–1930*, Cambridge 1999; Michael Mann, *Incoherent Empire*, London 2003, Chapter 3.

18 See Paul Pierson, *Coping with Permanent Austerity. Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies*, in: Paul Pierson (ed.), *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, Oxford 2001; Lane Kenworthy, *Egalitarian Capitalism? Jobs, Income and Inequality in Affluent Countries*, New York 2004; Evelyne Huber/John D. Stephens, *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State*, Chicago 2001.

Macro-Regions: Between the National and the Global

Very little that is transnational is global. Most influences which transcend national borders emanate not from the globe but the neighborhood. The “tyranny of distance” constrains the movement of goods, services and people, though much less of messages (which is why global culture is also emphasized in the obituaries for the nation-state). What I will call “macro-regional” networks of interaction occur over places that are bigger than state territories but a lot smaller than the globe. They involve shared value orientations and institutions. When we refer, for example, to “Latin America” or to “the Nordic countries” we imply some similarity of values and practices, even though we recognize that these macro-regions also contain some internal variety and fuzzy boundaries. Some are not geographical but purely cultural – like the “Anglo-Saxon” countries.

Fuzzy as macro-regions may be, it is impossible to discuss globalization or its history without them. The term “global”, as in “global economy”, “global culture” etc., often misleads – as does the term “world system”. There was no global or world system until the 20th century, only macro-regional ones, with loose, attenuated relations between them. In the 18th century, for example there was the sphere of influence of the Chinese Empire, a dispersed South-East Asian diaspora trading network, an expanding European imperialism, plus other smaller macro-regions. The late 19th century saw a marked convergence of commodity prices, a sign of an integrated economy say O’Rourke and Williamson.¹⁹ The title of their book calls this “Globalization”, but their sub-title, “The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy”, admits that their data are drawn only from the macro-region combining Western Europe and the white settler colonies in the Americas. In the 20th century this expanding economy truly became global. Macro-regions remain as important differentiations but within the framework of a global capitalism.

In current research, Dylan Riley and I show the relevance of macro-regions in determining levels of inequality within countries in the decades between 1950 and 2000. We grouped thirty-six countries into six macro-regions, each of which exhibited distinct levels and trajectories of income inequality. Three derive from Esping-Andersen’s²⁰ seminal classification of welfare state regimes.²¹ These are (1) liberal or Anglo-Saxon (2) corporatist or Catholic European, and (3) Social Democratic or Nordic. We add three

19 Kevin O’Rourke/Jeffrey Williamson, *Globalization and History. The Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy*, Cambridge 1999.

20 Gosta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Princeton 1990.

21 Huber/Stephens, *Development*; Duane Swank, *Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Changes in Developed Welfare States*, Cambridge 2002.

more: (4) Latin America, (5) East Asia and (6) South Asia.²² Statistical analysis of variance showed that within-region variation in income was much less than between-region variation, and this became even truer through the period. Thus nation-states do not stand alone in their equality practices, they stand amid macro-regional cultures.

It is often assumed that globalization is generating greater inequality across the world. Our data show that during the 1950s and 1960s most regions had become more equal, but since then there has been no uniform trend. Latin American countries have consistently had the highest levels of inequality, almost twice those of many European countries. Their lead in inequality slightly increased in the 1980s and 1990s, probably because of structural adjustment programs. The Anglo-Saxon countries started as the most equal but then were undercut first by the Nordic countries and then by the Euro-corporatists, both of which had entered the postwar period decidedly unequal. The East Asian countries also became relatively egalitarian, the South Asian ones less so (and these countries exhibited most internal variation). Overall, there has been no tendency to global convergence. Indeed, the differences between macro-regions were wider in the 1990s than in the 1950s.

This parallels other research showing that in the first three macro-regions, distinct welfare state regimes emerged and consolidated over this period. Though recently forced to reform them in response to the pressures described earlier, their reforms have tended to be consonant with their distinctive macro-regional traditions.²³ Each had emerged offering a distinctive compromise between the varying class and other interest group configurations characterizing maturing industrial societies. These compromises tended to diffuse across neighboring and/or culturally similar countries (the Anglos are the only non-neighbors), moulded by macro-forces: early/late development, urban/rural differences, types of political regime, and types of experience in the World Wars. In Asia and Latin America we must add their distinctive experiences of colonialism and land reform. The countries in each region tended to exchange conceptions of “best practice” and “best solutions” to crisis. For example, in the Anglo embrace of neo-liberal re-

22 The countries are: Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela; East Asia: Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan; South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand; Anglo: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States; Nordic: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden; Euro Continentals: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland. These were the only countries possessing reliable income statistics from which we can calculate Gini coefficients of inequality on gross and net household incomes.

23 Duane Swank, *Withering Welfare? Globalisation, Political Economic Institutions, and Contemporary Welfare States*, in: Weiss, *States*.