Blackwell Companions to Philosophy

A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION



Edited by
TIMOTHY O'CONNOR AND
CONSTANTINE SANDIS

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A Companion to the Philosophy of Action

Edited by
Timothy O'Connor and
Constantine Sandis



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This paperback edition is dedicated to the memory of two wonderful contributors: Paul Hoffman and Fred Stoutland

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